Portrait of Professor Nizar Allouch

Professor Nizar Allouch

Professor of Economics
Director of Research


Nizar Allouch received his PhD from University of Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne. He previously held academic positions at Queen Mary University of London and Warwick University and visiting researcher positions at Cambridge University and MIT.

Nizar is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Public Economic Theory and Economics Bulletin and was a Guest Editor of the Journal of Mathematical Economics. He was also the UK representative and advisory member to the steering committee of the 'Public Goods, Public Projects, Externalities' research networking programme funded by the European Science Foundation (ESF). 

Research interests

Nizar's current research interests are in public economics and the economics of networks. Public economics is one of the main areas of economics and analyses government economic intervention such as the use of taxes, expenditures, and regulations. The economics of networks, which focuses on modelling and understanding varied economic interactions, has recently become one of the most active and dynamic fields in economics. It has the potential for important and lasting policy implications. Nizar also worked on no-arbitrage conditions and short-selling in asset  markets. 

Nizar's RePEc page is https://ideas.repec.org/e/pal104.html



Nizar is willing to supervise PhD students with research interests in:

  • public economics
  • network economics
  • financial markets and systemic risk.

PhD students

  • Dike Chukwudi Henry (University of Kent)
  • Maia King (Queen Mary, University of London)  
  • Maya Jalloul (Queen Mary, University of London)​


Administrative roles

  • Director of Research
  • Member of School Strategic Management Group



  • Allouch, N. and King, M. (2019). Constrained public goods in networks. Journal of Public Economic Theory [Online] 21:895-902. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12383.
    This paper analyses the private provision of public goods where agents interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbours’ provisions. We generalise the public goods in networks model of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) to allow for constrained provision. In so doing, we characterise Nash equilibria with no intermediate contributors.
  • Allouch, N. (2017). The cost of segregation in (social) networks. Games and Economic Behavior [Online] 106:329-342. Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982561730146X?via%3Dihub.
    This paper investigates the welfare effect of income redistribution in the private provision of public goods on networks. We first show that the welfare effect of income redistribution is determined by Bonacich centrality. Then we develop an index based on the network structure of interactions, which, roughly speaking, measures the welfare effect of income redistribution confined to a component of contributors. The proposed index vanishes when applied to large components of contributors that display special segregated interactions, which suggests an “asymptotic neutrality” of redistributive policies.

    JEL classification
    C72; D31; H41
  • Allouch, N. and Wooders, M. (2017). On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games. Economic Theory [Online] 63:191-209. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1010-3.
    We provide a new proof of the nonemptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their “balanced cover games,” which are nonempty, can be approximated by equal-treatment \varepsilon ? -cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we develop a limiting payoff possibilities set and rely on a fixed point theorem.
  • Allouch, N. (2015). On the private provision of public goods on networks. Journal of Economic Theory [Online] 157:527-552. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.007.
    This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbours' provisions. We present a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for general networks and best-reply functions. In addition, we investigate the neutrality result of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) whereby consumers are able to undo the impact of income redistribution as well as public provision financed by lump-sum taxes. To this effect, we show that the neutrality result has a limited scope of application beyond a special network architecture in the neighborhood of the set of contributors.
  • Allouch, N. and Florenzano, M. (2013). Edgeworth rejective core and dividends equilibria of satiated exchange economies. Journal of Mathematical Economics [Online] 49:1-6. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.08.008.
    For an exchange economy, under assumptions which did not bring about the existence of equilibrium with dividends as yet, we prove the non-emptiness of the Edgeworth rejective core. Then, via Konovalov (1998, 2005)'s decentralization result, we solve the equilibrium with dividends existence problem. Adding to the same assumptions a weak non-satiation condition which differs from the weak non-satiation assumption introduced by Allouch and Le Van (2009), we show in the last section the existence of a Walrasian quasiequilibrium. This result, which fits with exchange economies whose consumers' utility functions are not assumed to be upper semicontinuous, complements the one obtained by Martins-da-Rocha and Monteiro (2009).
  • Allouch, N. (2012). A competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy. Economic Theory [Online] 53:269-282. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0689-z.
    The warm-glow model (Andreoni in J Political Econ 97:1447-1458, 1989; Econ J 100:464-477, 1990) of public goods provision has received widespread interest, yet surprisingly most attention has focused on the voluntary contribution equilibrium of the model, and only very little attention has been devoted to the competitive equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce the concept of competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy (henceforth, warm-glow equilibrium) and establish both existence and welfare properties. The warm-glow equilibrium concept may prove to be very useful to the normative and positive theory of public goods provision. First, it is a price-based mechanism achieving efficient outcomes. Second, not only could the warm-glow equilibria outcomes serve as a point of reference to measure free-riding and welfare loss but also, as suggested by Bernheim and Rangel (Behavioral Economics and Its Applications, 2007), in large economies they may be approximated by Walrasian equilibria outcomes.
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