This module is not currently running in 2024 to 2025.
This module will introduce students to philosophical theories of causality and philosophical theories of probability. The module will provide a broad background to the range of available interpretations of causality and probability. Topics to be covered will vary from year to year, in light of the expertise of the person convening it and student feedback from previous years. Students will gain a good understanding of the complementary and in some cases conflicting perspectives and methodologies on causality and probability. The module will enable students to evaluate contemporary issues in a manner that's informed by a comprehensive set of relevant traditions.
Total Contact Hours: 40
Also available at Level 6 (PL665)
Presentation (15 minutes) – 20%
Mid-term Essay (1,000 words) – 20%
Final Essay (3,000 words) – 60%
Indicative Reading List.
Eagle, A. (2011) Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings, ed. London: Routledge
Gillies, D.A. (2000) Philosophical Theories of Probability. London: Routledge
Illari, P. & Russo, F. (2014) Causality: Philosophical Theory Meets Scientific Practice, Oxford: OUP
Illari, P., Russo, F. & Williamson, J. (2011) Causality in the Sciences, eds. Oxford: OUP
See the library reading list for this module (Canterbury)
On successfully completing the module Level 5 students will be able to:
Understand the major controversies in this area;
Engage critically with some of the central issues in this field, through their study of the relevant arguments;
Demonstrate their understanding of the proposed solutions to the issues in this area, through their study of these arguments;
Demonstrate the ability to engage in a close critical reading of some of major texts in the field.
University of Kent makes every effort to ensure that module information is accurate for the relevant academic session and to provide educational services as described. However, courses, services and other matters may be subject to change. Please read our full disclaimer.
