16 January 2012

14:00 - 15:00 Gem Stapleton (Brighton): Concept Diagrams for Ontology Modelling: Design, Formalization and Reasoning -- SW101

The process of designing and modelling an ontology can be difficult, particularly if the user finds the syntax with which they are working to be relatively inaccessible. Providing users with graphical syntax with which they can model and visualize their ontology has the potential to be helpful to users. This talk will informally introduce a diagrammatic notation, called concept diagrams, for ontology visualization and modelling. The design of the notation will be linked to cognitive theories of what constitutes an effective diagram. We will then demonstrate the (now standard) approach to formalizing diagrammatic notations, via an abstract syntax and model theoretic semantics, as applied to concept diagrams. The use of concept diagrams will be demonstrated via two case studies. The first is based on privacy and will be used to introduce the notation. The second case study, based on the University of Manchester's People Ontology, has two components: (a) a set of axioms, and (b) a set of theorems that follow from the axioms, together with their proofs. The proofs have been constructed so that they have, in our opinion, an intuitive style. From these proofs, we derive a set of sound inference rules that can be used to formally reason about ontologies. This approach to designing inference rules for a diagrammatic logic differs from previous efforts where the primary focus has been on obtaining a set of sound and complete inference rules, rather than on obtaining intuitive rules.

(Computing Seminars)

17 January 2012

12:00 - 14:00 George Darby (philosophy): Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Metaphysical Methodology -- Grimond LT3

(Philosophy Seminars)

25 January 2012

15:30 - 17:00 Reading group: The Uncertain Reasoner’s Companion by Jeff Paris -- GS1

Chapters 1-3.

31 January 2012

12:00 - 14:00 Julien Murzi (philosophy): Harmony and separability in classical logic -- Grimond LT3

Philosophy Seminars

07 February 2012

11:00 - 12:00 Reading group. “The domain of reasons ” by John Skorupski -- CGAN09b

Contact Simon Kirchin if you would like to attend.

12:00 - 14:00 David Corfield (Philosophy): Michael Friedman’s ‘Dynamics of Reason’ -- Grimond LT3

This talk will give an account of Michael Friedman’s ‘Dynamics of Reason’ (2001), Stanford, which describes a “relativized and historicized version of the Kantian conception of the rationality and objectivity of the modern physical sciences”. I will argue that in one essential respect Friedman does not extend these dynamics far enough.

(Philosophy Department Seminar)
Howard Bowman (computing): When are two brain waves different? Statistical inference in electrophysiological neuroscience, using Monte Carlo resampling -- Computing SW101
Noninvasive EEG neuroscience considers electrical signals (colloquially called brainwaves) recorded at electrodes placed on the scalp. The central technical challenge is identifying signal from noise. Typically, we seek to determine the brain's electrical response to a stimulus (the signal) from amongst electrical change arising from a host of other sources (noise). The standard method to increase the signal to noise ratio is to repeat stimulus presentation and average together the resulting electrical responses.
Nonetheless, determining that a difference in the electrical response to two conditions is empirically significant and not just due to random noise can be statistically hard. We present the standard approach in this context, which we argue often fails to be statistically robust. In particular, treatment of the multiple comparisons problem is often ad hoc and can be unconvincing. We discuss a set of rather straightforward methods to alleviate these difficulties using Monte Carlo resampling, the logic of maximal statistics and a Fisher scoring procedure.

Centre for Reasoning / CCNCS Joint Seminar
non-parametric Bayesian machine learning provides this flexibility. I will survey some of our recent work in this area, including new models for time series, covariances, graphs, deep networks, and other interesting structured data sets.

[Joint seminar with CNCS]

17:00 - 19:00

Simon Schaffer (History and philosophy of science, Cambridge): The media magnates of Victorian physics -- Marlowe Lecture Theatre 1

H G Wells' early training in the sciences was vital for his understanding of how media worked. Late Victorian physicists were masters of public showmanship: they used ingenious optical devices to win audiences and display the exotic and transient phenomena of their new sciences. This lecture explores ways in which cinematography emerged from these scientific projects; and how display was part of the physics laboratory as well as the Victorian theatre.

History Seminars

20 March 2012

11:00 - 12:00

Reading group. "The domain of reasons " by John Skorupski -- CGAN09b

Contact Simon Kirchin if you would like to attend.

21 March 2012

15:30 - 17:00

POSTPONED - Per Laleng (Law): Causation and risk in the law of tort -- GS1

PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS TALK HAS BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL THE AUTUMN TERM

03 April 2012

11:00 - 12:00

Reading group. "The domain of reasons " by John Skorupski -- CGAN09b

Contact Simon Kirchin if you would like to attend.

12:00 - 14:00

Mauricio Suarez (philosophy, UCM Madrid): Metaphors, Similarities and Inferences -- Grimond LT3

I review and update Max Black's 'interactive' view of metaphor. On this view metaphor cannot be reduced to, or analyzed in terms of, similarity. A metaphor does not merely state a similarity; it rather brings into being a similarity that was not there before. The interactive view has cash value in literary theory, where it originates, but its application to science has often been questioned. I defend a version of the interactive view by providing an account of the role that metaphor plays in fostering inferences from representational sources to targets. The account draws on historical scholarship on 19th-century electrodynamics, and on some of Mary Hesse's celebrated work on models.

Philosophy Seminars

17 April 2012

00:00 - 00:00

Turing’s Legacy in Mathematics and Computer Science -- Keynes College

A workshop of the British Mathematical Colloquium 2012

http://www.kent.ac.uk/smsas/events/160412.html
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 April 2012</td>
<td>00:00 - 00:00</td>
<td>Turing’s Legacy in Mathematics and Computer Science -- Keynes College</td>
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<td>09 May 2012</td>
<td>15:30 - 17:00</td>
<td>Reading group: The Uncertain Reasoner’s Companion by Jeff Paris -- Cornwallis Seminar Room 12 Chapter 4. See also <a href="http://brian.weatherson.org/vdt.pdf">http://brian.weatherson.org/vdt.pdf</a> <a href="http://www.princeton.edu/~adame/papers/sharp/elga-subjective-probabilities-should-be-sharp.pdf">http://www.princeton.edu/~adame/papers/sharp/elga-subjective-probabilities-should-be-sharp.pdf</a></td>
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<td>10 May 2012</td>
<td>10:30 - 12:00</td>
<td>George Darby, “Physics, Metaphysics and Metametaphysics” -- DLT1 Philosophy Summer Talks 2012</td>
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<td>15 May 2012</td>
<td>10:30 - 12:00</td>
<td>Jon Williamson, ”Causality is objective but not real”. -- DLT1 Philosophy Summer Talks 2012</td>
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<td>24 May 2012</td>
<td>10:30 - 12:00</td>
<td>David Corfield: “The historical nature of scientific rationality” -- DLT1 Philosophy Summer Talks 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 May 2012</td>
<td>10:30 - 12:00</td>
<td>Simon Kirchin, “The Epistemology of disagreement” -- DLT1 Philosophy Summer Talks 2012</td>
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<td>30 May 2012</td>
<td>15:30 - 17:00</td>
<td>Nick Chater (Business, Warwick) - The Mind is Flat: The illusion of depth in minds, markets and morality -- SW101 Computing Many theories of cognition and decision making assume that people's decisions and utterances arise from 'underlying' beliefs and preferences, which can, with sufficient methodological care, be determined. I argue that these 'hidden depths' are illusory; that thought and behaviour are only locally coherent; and that the process of creating such local coherence is an important (and very challenging) cognitive goal. Rather than determine our behaviour with reference to 'inner' beliefs and preferences, I argue instead that we must infer our beliefs and preferences in just the same way we infer those of other people (both real and fictional). Our own 'hidden mental depths' may be no less an illusion than the hidden depths we impute to a fictional character. This viewpoint has implications for theories of decision making, as well as for economics and ethics. Joint event with CCNCS</td>
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</table>
31 May 2012

10:30 - 12:00 Laurence Goldstein: "Clambering out of the soritical bog". -- DLT1
Philosophy Summer Talks 2012

01 June 2012

13:00 - 16:30 AHRC Workshop on Mechanisms and the evidence hierarchy -- Cornwallis seminar room 5
1-1.15 Welcome and Introduction
1.15-2 Mike Kelly (NICE)
2-2.45 Donald Gillies (Science and Technology Studies, UCL): RCT and evidence of mechanisms: the case of streptomycin
2.45-3.15 break
3.15-4 Alan Bates (Pathology, UCL)
4-4.30 round table discussion

Contact Jon Williamson, j.williamson@kent.ac.uk if you would like to attend.

07 June 2012

10:30 - 12:00 Julien Murzi: "Paradox and logical revision". -- DLT1
Philosophy Summer Talks 2012

13 June 2012

15:30 - 17:00 CANCELLED - Reading group: The Uncertain Reasoner’s Companion by Jeff Paris -- Cornwallis Seminar Room 12
THIS SEMINAR HAS BEEN CANCELLED DUE TO A CLASH

19 June 2012

12:30 - 18:00 Workshop on Reasons and Practical Reasoning -- Keynes Seminar room 16

12.30-2.00 Daniel Star (Boston)
Practical Reasons, Evidence, and Authority

Break - refreshments own arrangements

2.30-4.00 Jonathan Way (Southampton)
What’s Wrong With Incoherence?

Break - refreshments own arrangements

4.30-6.00 Michael Smith (Princeton)
Moral Judgements, Judgements about Reasons, and Motivations

For more details contact:
Simon Kirchin
s.t.kirchin@kent.ac.uk
### 27 June 2012

15:30 - 17:00  
**Jeff Paris (Maths, Manchester): What You See is What You Get -- Cornwallis Seminar Room 12**  
As a firm advocate of the maximum entropy principle (in its time and place) I have been shocked by the bad press it has received over the years. I maintain that this is the result of a widespread and lamentable misunderstandings, which I shall attempt to expose in my talk.

### 02 July 2012

00:00 - 00:00  
**Science and Metaphysics conference -- University of Kent**  
http://scienceandmetaphysics.weebly.com/programme.html  
Contact George Darby (G.A.Darby@kent.ac.uk) for further information.

### 03 July 2012

00:00 - 00:00  
**Science and Metaphysics conference -- University of Kent**  
Please See Above

### 05 September 2012

00:00 - 00:00  
**Evidence and Causality in the Sciences (ECitS 2012) -- Keynes College Lecture Theatre 6**  
http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/2012/ecits/

### 06 September 2012

All Day  
**Evidence and Causality in the Sciences (ECitS 2012) -- Keynes College Lecture Theatre 6**  
Please See Above

### 07 September 2012

00:00 - 00:00  
**Evidence and Causality in the Sciences (ECitS 2012) -- Keynes College Lecture Theatre 6**  
Please See Above

### 12 September 2012

13:30 - 00:00  
**Inductive logic workshop -- Keynes Seminar room 6 (12th September). Cornwallis Seminar room 12 (13th September)**  
http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/2012/fobetil/  
To attend please contact j.williamson@kent.ac.uk

### 13 September 2012

00:00 - 13:00  
**Inductive logic workshop -- Keynes Seminar room 6 (12th September). Cornwallis Seminar room 12 (13th September)**  
Please See Above
17 September 2012

00:00 - 00:00
http://www.kent.ac.uk/reasoning/club/

18 September 2012

All Day
 Please See Above

19 September 2012

00:00 - 00:00
 Please See Above

03 October 2012

15:30 - 17:00
Per Laleng (Law): Causation and risk in the law of tort -- Cornwallis Seminar room 2
http://www.kent.ac.uk/timetabling/rooms/room.html?roomid=CNWsr2

17 October 2012

15:30 - 17:00
Reading group: Reconsidering Logical Positivism by Michael Friedman -- Cornwallis seminar room 2
http://www.kent.ac.uk/timetabling/rooms/room.html?roomid=CNWsr2

31 October 2012

15:30 - 17:00
Andy Fugard (UCL): Statistical decision making in child and adolescent mental health: illustrations and implications -- Cornwallis seminar room 2
http://www.kent.ac.uk/timetabling/rooms/room.html?roomid=CNWsr2
http://www.andyfugard.info/

14 November 2012

15:30 - 17:00
Reading group: Reconsidering Logical Positivism by Michael Friedman -- Cornwallis seminar room 2
http://www.kent.ac.uk/timetabling/rooms/room.html?roomid=CNWsr2

28 November 2012

15:30 - 17:00
Geoffrey Samuel (Law): Is Legal Reasoning Like medical Reasoning? -- Cornwallis seminar room 2
Comparison in legal studies tends to get translated into comparison between legal systems. However in more recent years the scholarship within this area has become much more adventurous and is investigating methodological and epistemological issues provoked both by the ‘comparison’ and by the ‘law’ aspects of comparative law. Perhaps the time has come where it might be useful for comparison to break out of the confines of comparing just legal systems and move into interdisciplinary comparison. Is legal knowledge different from other social science knowledge? Does law really deserve, as it is in some civilian traditions, to be labelled (and thus compared with) a science? Can types of reasoning in different disciplines be compared? In this present paper, stimulated by the publication some years ago in France of a small book on medical reasoning, legal and medical reasoning are

Jon Williamson
compared. The question that is asked is whether the differences between the two types of reasoning will permit one to have a better understanding of some of the methodological and epistemological issues associated with legal reasoning. It will be argued that although medical and legal reasoners do share things in common, legal reasoning, perhaps unlike medical reasoning, is actually built upon a fragmented methodological and epistemological foundation although this is often hidden behind an ideological agenda.

http://www.kent.ac.uk/timetabling/rooms/room.html?roomid=CNWsr2

04 December 2012

12:00 - 14:00

Rosanna Keefe (University of Sheffield) - Validity, Normativity and Degrees of Belief -- BLT2

Valid arguments are the ones we should use in our reasoning and the assessment of an argument as valid appears to have normative import. Suppose we seek to reject or question the standard definition of validity as necessary preservation of truth: can we illuminate or characterise what it is for an argument to be valid by appealing to the distinctive normative role of valid arguments? And might such considerations help us in choosing between alternative logics, or at least in understanding what should guide such choices? I will ask how to characterise the normative role of validity, in particular when we consider that many of our beliefs are merely partial (in that we have some level of uncertainty in them). I will focus in particular on two principles that Harty Field advocates and ask whether they can help illuminate choices between different logics that people might advocate or employ.

17:00 - 18:30

Prof Danny Goldstick (Toronto) - 'Marxism on Dialectical and Logical Contradiction' -- GS6

05 December 2012

14:00 - 16:00

Prof Danny Goldstick (Toronto) - Could God make a contradiction true? -- COLT3

12 December 2012

15:30 - 17:00

Reading group: Reconsidering Logical Positivism by Michael Friedman -- Cornwallis seminar room 2

http://www.kent.ac.uk/timetabling/rooms/room.html?roomid=CNWsr2