Professor Karen Douglas

This research examined the link between attachment styles and belief in conspiracy theories. It was hypothesized, due to the tendency to exaggerate the intensity of threats, that higher anxiously attached individuals would be more likely to hold conspiracy beliefs, even when accounting for other variables such as right-wing authoritarianism, interpersonal trust, and demographic factors that have been found to predict conspiracy belief in previous research. In Study 1 (N = 246 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers), participants higher in anxious attachment style showed a greater tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. Further, this relationship remained significant when accounting for other known predictors of conspiracy belief. Study 2 (N = 230 Prolific Academic workers) revealed that anxious attachment again predicted the general tendency to believe conspiracy theories, but also belief in specific conspiracy theories and conspiracy theories about groups. These relationships held when controlling for demographic factors. The current studies add to the body of research investigating the individual differences predictors of conspiracy belief, demonstrating that conspiracy belief may, to some degree, have roots in early childhood experiences.

The current research tested if explicit anti-conspiracy arguments could be an effective method of addressing the potentially harmful effects of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. In two studies, participants were presented with anti-conspiracy arguments either before, or after reading arguments in favor of popular conspiracy theories concerning vaccination. In both studies, anti-conspiracy arguments increased intentions to vaccinate a fictional child but only when presented prior to conspiracy theories. This effect was mediated by belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and the perception that vaccines are dangerous. These findings suggest that people can be inoculated against the potentially harmful effects of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, but that once they are established, the conspiracy theories may be difficult to correct.

In the present contribution we examine the link between societal crisis situations and belief in conspiracy theories. Contrary to common assumptions, belief in conspiracy theories has been prevalent throughout human history. We first illustrate historical incidents suggesting that societal crisis situations—defined as impactful and rapid societal change that calls established power structures, norms of conduct, or even the existence of specific people or groups, into question —have stimulated belief in conspiracy theories. We then review the psychological literature to explain why this is the case. Evidence suggests that the aversive feelings that people experience when in crisis—fear, uncertainty, the feeling of being out of control—stimulate a motivation to make sense of the situation, increasing the likelihood of perceiving conspiracies in social situations. We then explain that after being formed, conspiracy theories can become historical narratives that may spread through cultural transmission. We conclude that conspiracy theories originate particularly in crisis situations, and may form the basis for how people subsequently remember and mentally represent a historical event.

A common assumption is that belief in conspiracy theories and supernatural phenomena are grounded in illusory pattern perception. In the present research we systematically tested this assumption. Study 1 revealed that such irrational beliefs are related to perceiving patterns in randomly generated coin toss outcomes. In Study 2, pattern search instructions exerted an indirect effect on irrational beliefs through pattern perception. Study 3 revealed that perceiving patterns in chaotic but not in structured paintings predicted irrational beliefs. In Study 4, we found that agreement with texts supporting paranormal phenomena or conspiracy theories predicted pattern perception. In Study 5, we manipulated belief in a specific conspiracy theory. This manipulation influenced the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs. We conclude that illusory pattern perception is a central cognitive mechanism accounting for conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs.

In the current research, we investigated whether belief in conspiracy theories satisfies people's need for uniqueness. We found that the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories was associated with the feeling of possessing scarce information about the situations explained by the conspiracy theories (Study 1) and higher need for uniqueness (Study 2). A further two studies using two different manipulations of need for uniqueness (Studies 3 and 4), showed that people in a high need for uniqueness condition displayed higher conspiracy belief than people in a low need for uniqueness condition. This conclusion is strengthened by a small-scale meta-analysis. These studies suggest that conspiracy theories may serve people's desire to be unique, highlighting a motivational underpinning of conspiracy belief.

This research demonstrates that conspiracy theories – often represented as subversive alternatives to establishment narratives – may bolster, rather than undermine, support for the social status quo when its legitimacy is under threat. A pilot study (N = 98) found a positive relationship between conspiracy belief and satisfaction with the status quo. In Study 1 (N = 120), threatening (vs. affirming) the status quo in British society caused participants to endorse conspiracy theories. In Study 2 (N = 159), exposure to conspiracy theories increased satisfaction with the British social system after this had been experimentally threatened. In Study 3 (N = 109), this effect was mediated by the tendency for participants exposed (vs. not exposed) to conspiracy theories to attribute societal problems relatively more strongly to small groups of people rather than systemic causes. By blaming tragedies, disasters and social problems on the actions of a malign few, conspiracy theories can divert attention from the inherent limitations of social systems.

What psychological factors drive the popularity of conspiracy theories that explain important events as secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups? What are the psychological consequences of adopting these theories? We review the current research, and find that it answers the first of these questions more thoroughly than the second. Belief in conspiracy theories appears to be driven by motives that can be characterized as epistemic (understanding one's environment), existential (being safe and in control of one's environment) and social (maintaining a positive image of the self and the social group). However, little research has investigated the consequences of conspiracy belief, and to date, this research does not indicate that conspiracy belief fulfills people's motivations. Instead, for many people conspiracy belief may be more appealing than satisfying. Further research is needed to determine for whom, and under what conditions, conspiracy theories may satisfy key psychological motives.

Computer-mediated intergroup contact (CMIC) is a valuable strategy to reduce negative sentiments towards members of different social groups. We examined whether characteristics of communication media that facilitate intergroup encounters shape its effect on out-group attitudes. Specifically, we propose that concealing individuating cues about out-group members during CMIC increases prejudice, as interaction partners are perceived as less socially present. To assess these hypotheses, we conducted two mixed-factorial experiments. Participants engaged in synchronous intergroup contact via text-chat with out-group members (Study 1) and a confederate (Study 2) who either shared or concealed their name and photo. Overall, CMIC reduced negative out-group sentiments. Study 2 showed, however, that out-group members' anonymity decreased perceived social presence, which was associated with less positive evaluations of the CMIC and higher prejudice. In conclusion, CMIC can contribute to conflict resolution interventions, preparing individuals for direct intergroup contact, if its affordances or conversation topics enhance interaction partners' social presence.

In the current study we examined how different experiences of a secondary school selective entry examination influenced children's feelings about themselves, school, and intelligence as they approached transition. Children were recruited from three English schools that use a selective entry examination to stream students into secondary schools based on ability (98 children aged around 10) and were assessed at two time points. At Time 1 children had recently decided whether to take the exam, and at Time 2 children had received their exam results. At each time children completed measures of theory of intelligence, locus of control, self-esteem, and feelings about the school system. At Time 1, children who intended to take the exam showed more positive outcomes than those who did not. However, they were also more likely to hold a fixed view of intelligence, which has been associated with longer-term negative outcomes. Similarly at Time 2 children who had passed the exam showed more positive outcomes than those who had failed or had not taken the exam, but again they were more likely to hold a potentially maladaptive fixed view of intelligence. Those who failed the exam were indistinguishable from those who had not taken the exam. These results suggest that passing the selective exam can lead to positive outcomes for children, except in terms of their view of intelligence. However, failing and not being given the opportunity to sit the exam leads to consistently negative outcomes. The potential implications of these results are discussed.

Smartphones allow people to connect with others from almost anywhere at any time. However, there is growing concern that smartphones may actually sometimes detract, rather than complement, social interactions. The term "phubbing" represents the act of snubbing someone in a social setting by concentrating on one's phone instead of talking to the person directly. The current study was designed to examine some of the psychological antecedents and consequences of phubbing behavior. We examined the contributing roles of Internet addiction, fear of missing out, self-control, and smartphone addiction, and how the frequency of phubbing behavior and of being phubbed may both lead to the perception that phubbing is normative. The results revealed that Internet addiction, fear of missing out, and self-control predicted smartphone addiction, which in turn predicted the extent to which people phub. This path also predicted the extent to which people feel that phubbing is normative, both via (a) the extent to which people are phubbed themselves, and (b) independently. Further, gender moderated the relationship between the extent to which people are phubbed and their perception that phubbing is normative. The present findings suggest that phubbing is an important factor in modern communication that warrants further investigation.

We hypothesized that belief in conspiracy theories would be predicted by the general tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it is unlikely to exist. We further hypothesized that this tendency would explain the relationship between education level and belief in conspiracy theories, where lower levels of education have been found to be associated with higher conspiracy belief. In Study 1 (N=202) participants were more likely to agree with a range of conspiracy theories if they also tended to attribute intentionality and agency to inanimate objects. As predicted, this relationship accounted for the link between education level and belief in conspiracy theories. We replicated this finding in Study 2 (N=330), whilst taking into account beliefs in paranormal phenomena. These results suggest that education may undermine the reasoning processes and assumptions that are reflected in conspiracy belief.

Belief in conspiracy theories about societal events is widespread and has important consequences for political, health and environmental behaviour. Little is known, however, about how conspiracy theorising affects people's everyday working lives. In the present research, we predicted that belief in conspiracy theories about the workplace would be associated with increased turnover intentions. We further hypothesised that belief in these organizational conspiracy theories would predict decreased organizational commitment, and job satisfaction. Finally, we hypothesised that these factors would mediate the relationship between organizational conspiracy theories and turnover intentions. In three studies (one correlational and two experiments, Ns = 209, 119, 202), we found support for these hypotheses. The current studies therefore demonstrate the potentially adverse consequences of conspiracy theorising for the workplace. We argue that managers and employees should be careful not to dismiss conspiracy theorising as harmless rumour or gossip.

We designed, in French and in English, a single-item scale to measure people's general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. The validity and reliability of this scale was assessed in 3 studies (total N = 555). In Study 1 (N = 152), positive correlations between the single-item scale and 3 other conspiracy belief scales on a French student sample suggested good concurrent validity. In Study 2 (N = 292), we replicated these results on a larger and more heterogeneous Internet American sample. Moreover, the scale showed good predictive validity—responses predicted participants' willingness to receive a bi-monthly newsletter about alleged conspiracy theories. Finally, in Study 3 (N = 111), we observed good test-retest reliability and demonstrated both convergent and discriminant validity of the single-item scale. Overall these results suggest that the single-item conspiracy belief scale has good validity and reliability and may be used to measure conspiracy belief in favor of lengthier existing scales. In addition, the validation of the single-item scale led us to develop and start validating French versions of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale, the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, and a 10-item version (instead of the 15-item original version) of the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory.

Uncertainty surrounds the public understanding of climate change and provides fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Typically, such conspiracy theories assert that climate scientists and politicians are distorting or hijacking the science to suit their own purposes. Climate change conspiracy theories resemble other conspiracy theories in some respects, but in others they appear to be quite different. For example, climate change conspiracy theories appear to be motivated by the desire to deny or minimize an unwelcome and threatening conclusion. They also appear to be more contentious than other types of conspiracy theories. Perhaps to an unparalleled extent, people on both sides of the issue champion climate change conspiracy theories. Finally, more than other conspiracy theories, those concerning climate change appear to be more politically loaded, dividing opinion across the left-right continuum. Some empirical evidence suggests that climate change conspiracy theories may be harmful, steering people away from environmentally friendly initiatives. They therefore present a significant challenge for governments and environmental organizations that are attempting to convince people to take action against global warming.

In spite of the social stigma surrounding them, conspiracy theories are a common topic of public debate on the Internet. The content and tone of these discussions provide a useful insight into the structure of conspiracist belief systems and the psychological characteristics of those who believe and disbelieve in conspiracy theories. In this focused review, we relate patterns of behaviour found in online comments to the broader research literature on the psychology of conspiracy theories. Most notably, as conspiracism has its basis in disbelieving a mainstream or received narrative rather than in believing a specific alternative, most conspiracist arguments tend to fall along those same lines. Finally, we examine the implications of this methodology for future research into online discussion, particularly among hard-to-research populations.

Background Teachers can deliver feedback using person ('you are clever') or process terms ('you worked hard'). Person feedback can lead to negative academic outcomes, but there is little experimental research examining the impact of feedback on children's perceptions of the student–teacher relationship. Aim We examined the effects of person, process, and no feedback on children's perceptions of their relationship with a (fictional) teacher following success and failure. Samples Participants were British children (145 aged 9–11 in experiment 1 and 98 aged 7–11 in experiment 2). Method In experiment 1, participants read three scenarios where they succeeded and received one of two types of praise (person or process) or no praise. Participants then read two scenarios where they failed. In experiment 2, participants read that they had failed in three tasks and received one of two types of criticism (person or process) or no criticism. Participants then read two scenarios where they succeeded. They rated how much they liked the teacher and how much they felt that the teacher liked them. Results Children felt more positive about the student–teacher relationship following success than failure. Type of praise did not influence perceptions of the student–teacher relationship following success or failure. However, person criticism led children to view the student–teacher relationship more negatively following failure and maintain this negative view following the first success. Conclusions Success appears to be important for developing positive student–teacher relationships. In response to failure, teachers could avoid person criticism which may negatively influence the student–teacher relationship.

Sexist language excludes, trivializes or diminishes either gender. Despite efforts by many professional bodies to encourage the use of nonsexist alternatives, sexist language use persists across many languages. Further, research has shown that men are less supportive of nonsexist language alternatives than women, and that this effect is mediated by attitudes toward women. We propose that broader ideologies related to the perceived legitimacy of dominance hierarchies and existing social systems also explain this gender gap. British undergraduate participants completed measures of attitudes toward women, gender-specific system justification, and social dominance orientation. They also completed an inventory of attitudes toward sexist language. There was a strong gender difference in attitudes toward sexist language that was significantly mediated by gender-specific system justification and social dominance orientation. The relationship between gender and attitudes toward sexist language therefore appears to be driven by broader ideologies that serve to keep women "in their place".

The current studies investigated the potential impact of anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs, and exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, on vaccination intentions. In Study 1, British parents completed a questionnaire measuring beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and the likelihood that they would have a fictitious child vaccinated. Results revealed a significant negative relationship between anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs and vaccination intentions. This effect was mediated by the perceived dangers of vaccines, and feelings of powerlessness, disillusionment and mistrust in authorities. In Study 2, participants were exposed to information that either supported or refuted anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, or a control condition. Results revealed that participants who had been exposed to material supporting anti-vaccine conspiracy theories showed less intention to vaccinate than those in the anti-conspiracy condition or controls. This effect was mediated by the same variables as in Study 1. These findings point to the potentially detrimental consequences of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, and highlight their potential role in shaping health-related behaviors. This is an open access article and a copy can be obtained from the URL: http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0089177

The current studies explored the social consequences of exposure to conspiracy theories. In Study 1, participants were exposed to a range of conspiracy theories concerning government involvement in significant events such as the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. Results revealed that exposure to information supporting conspiracy theories reduced participants' intentions to engage in politics, relative to participants who were given information refuting conspiracy theories. This effect was mediated by feelings of political powerlessness. In Study 2, participants were exposed to conspiracy theories concerning the issue of climate change. Results revealed that exposure to information supporting the conspiracy theories reduced participants' intentions to reduce their carbon footprint, relative to participants who were given refuting information, or those in a control condition. This effect was mediated by powerlessness with respect to climate change, uncertainty, and disillusionment. Exposure to climate change conspiracy theories also influenced political intentions, an effect mediated by political powerlessness. The current findings suggest that conspiracy theories may have potentially significant social consequences, and highlight the need for further research on the social psychology of conspiracism.

Recent research into the psychology of conspiracy belief has highlighted the importance of belief systems in the acceptance or rejection of conspiracy theories. We examined a large sample of conspiracist (pro-conspiracy-theory) and conventionalist (anti-conspiracy-theory) comments on news websites in order to investigate the relative importance of promoting alternative explanations vs. rejecting conventional explanations for events. In accordance with our hypotheses, we found that conspiracist commenters were more likely to argue against the opposing interpretation and less likely to argue in favor of their own interpretation, while the opposite was true of conventionalist commenters. However, conspiracist comments were more likely to explicitly put forward an account than conventionalist comments were. In addition, conspiracists were more likely to express mistrust and made more positive and fewer negative references to other conspiracy theories. The data also indicate that conspiracists were largely unwilling to apply the "conspiracy theory" label to their own beliefs and objected when others did so, lending support to the long-held suggestion that conspiracy belief carries a social stigma. Finally, conventionalist arguments tended to have a more hostile tone. These tendencies in persuasive communication can be understood as a reflection of an underlying conspiracist worldview in which the details of individual conspiracy theories are less important than a generalized rejection of official explanations. This is an open access article and a copy can be obtained from the URL: http://www.frontiersin.org/Personality_Science_and_Individual_Differences/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00409/abstract

In two experimental studies (conducted in Britain and Italy), participants read about a politician answering to leadership- versus morality-related allegations using either downward counterfactuals ("things could have been worse, if…") or upward counterfactuals ("things could have been better, if…"). Downward messages increased the perception of the politician's leadership, while both downward and upward messages increased morality perception. Political sophistication moderated the effect of message direction, with downward messages increasing perceived morality in low sophisticates and upward messages increasing perceived morality in high sophisticates. In the latter group, the acknowledgement of a responsibility-taking intent mediated morality judgment. Results were consistent across different countries, highlighting previously unexplored effects of communication on the perception of the "Big Two" dimensions.

Background: According to Dweck and colleagues (e.g., Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1986), praise can be delivered using person ("you are clever") or process terms ("you worked hard"). Research suggests that giving people process praise after success can help them deal better with subsequent failures because it attributes outcomes to effort rather than fixed ability. However, research has thus far inadequately addressed how these types of praise compare to receiving no evaluative feedback. Aim: The aim of the present research was to examine the effects of person and process praise compared to a control group where only objective outcome feedback was given. Samples: In Study 1, 145 British school children aged 9-11 years took part. In Study 2, participants were 114 British university students. Method: In both studies, participants read three scenarios and were asked to imagine themselves as the main character. In each scenario, they succeeded in an educational task and received either person, process or no praise. Participants then read two scenarios where they failed at a task. Following each scenario participants evaluated their performance, affect and persistence. Results: After one failure, participants who received person praise reacted most negatively on all dependent measures. However, those in the process condition did not differ significantly from those in the control group. Conclusions: These findings suggest that process feedback may not be inherently positive; instead person feedback seems particularly detrimental.

Conspiracy theories can form a monological belief system: a self-sustaining worldview comprised of a network of mutually supportive beliefs. The present research shows that even endorsement of mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively correlated. In Study 1 (n = 137), the more participants believed that Princess Diana faked her own death, the more they believed that she was murdered. In Study 2 (n = 102), the more participants believed that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when U.S. special forces raided his compound in Pakistan, the more they believed he is still alive. Hierarchical regression models showed that mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively associated because both are associated with the view that the authorities are engaged in a cover-up (Study 2). The monological nature of conspiracy belief appears to be driven not by conspiracy theories directly supporting one another, but by broader beliefs supporting conspiracy theories in general.

Two studies documented the "David and Goliath" rule – the tendency for people to perceive criticism of "David" groups (groups with low power and status) as less normatively permissible than criticism of "Goliath" groups (groups with high power and status). We confirmed the existence of the David and Goliath rule across five national samples (Study 1). However the rule was endorsed more strongly in Western than in Chinese cultures, an effect mediated by cultural differences in power distance. Study 2 identified the psychological underpinnings of this rule in an Australian sample. Lower social dominance orientation (SDO) was associated with greater endorsement of the rule, an effect mediated through the differential attribution of stereotypes. Specifically, those low in SDO were more likely to attribute traits of warmth and incompetence to David versus Goliath groups, a pattern of stereotypes that was related to the protection of David groups from criticism.

Previous research has shown that people respond with greater sensitivity to negative stereotypical comments about a group that are made from someone outside the group in question than from someone who belongs to the group. In this paper, we investigated if the same effect occurs in response to comments made about stigmatized groups. Specifically, we examined how people react to comments made about the mentally ill. The conditions under which people accept or reject stereotypes of the mentally ill may shed light on the conditions necessary for effective anti-discrimination campaigns. In the current study, participants responded to positive or negative stereotypes of the mentally ill voiced by either someone who has, or has not, suffered from a mental illness. Participants were more sensitive, agreed less, and evaluated the speaker less favourably when comments came from the out-group rather than the in-group source. The effects were strongest for negative comments, however contrary to previous research participants also responded less favourably to positive comments from the out-group source. These reactions were mediated by the perceived constructiveness of the speaker's motives. Implications for the effectiveness of anti-discrimination campaigns are discussed.

Pregnant women are subjected to popular and official advice to restrict their behaviour in ways that may not always be warranted by medical evidence. The present paper investigates the role of sexism in the proscriptive stance toward pregnancy. Consistent with expectations, both hostile and benevolent sexism were associated with endorsement of proscriptive rules such as "pregnant women should not take strenuous exercise" (Study 1, n =148). Also as predicted, hostile but not benevolent sexism was associated with punitive attitudes to pregnant women who flout proscriptions (Study 2, n = 124). In tandem with recent findings, the present results show that hostile as well as benevolent sexism is associated with proscriptive attitudes surrounding pregnancy.

The present study investigated the role of sexist ideology in perceptions of health risks during pregnancy and willingness to intervene on pregnant women's behavior. Initially, 160 female psychology undergraduates at a university in the South East of England completed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Two months later, in an apparently unrelated study, they rated the safety of 45 behaviours during pregnancy (e.g., drinking alcohol, exercising, drinking tap water, and oral sex), and indicated their willingness to restrict pregnant women's choices (e.g., by refusing to serve soft cheese or alcohol). As predicted, benevolent (but not hostile) sexism was related to willingness to restrict pregnant women's choices. This effect was partially mediated by the perceived danger attributed to behaviours.

We advance a new account of why people endorse conspiracy theories, arguing that individuals use the social-cognitive tool of projection when making social judgments about others. In two studies, we found that individuals were more likely to endorse conspiracy theories if they thought they would be willing, personally, to participate in the alleged conspiracies. Study 1 established an association between conspiracy beliefs and personal willingness to conspire, that fully mediated a relationship between Machiavellianism and conspiracy beliefs. In Study 2, participants primed with their own morality were less inclined than controls to endorse conspiracy theories – a finding fully mediated by personal willingness to conspire. These results suggest that some people think "they conspired" because they think "I would conspire".

People generally assume that others are more influenced than the self (the third person perception or TPP). To further understand this perception we investigated people's intuitive understanding of how persuasion works. Participants rated themselves or others on traits reflecting risk and immunity from persuasion (e.g., weak- and strong-mindedness) and need for cognition (NFC). They then rated how much they or others would be influenced by some advertisements. Results showed that participants associated perceived low NFC and high levels of weak-mindedness with influence. Perceived self–other differences in these variables mediated the TPP. Also, perceived NFC explained the role of self-enhancement in the TPP. People's intuitive understanding of persuasion therefore resembles the elaboration likelihood model on the role it grants to NFC.

According to the linguistic category model (LCM), behaviour can be described at concrete (e.g. 'Kath hit Kim') and abstract (e.g. 'Kath is aggressive') levels. Variations in these levels convey information about the person being described and the relationship between that person and the describer. In the current research, we examined the power of language abstraction to create impressions of describers themselves. Results show that describers are seen as less likeable when they use abstract (vs. concrete) language to describe the negative actions of others. Conversely, impressions of describers are more favourable when they opt for abstract descriptions of others' positive behaviours. This effect is partially mediated by the attribution of a communicative agenda to describers. By virtue of these attributional implications, language abstraction is an impression formation device that can impact on the reputation of describers.

The authors introduce a special issue of the Journal of Language and Social Psychology on linguistic bias, celebrating two decades of research since G. R. Semin and K. Fiedler (1988) first published the linguistic category model (LCM). The LCM has been highly cited and generative and provides a parsimonious framework for investigations of the role of language in social-psychological phenomena. Indeed, the articles in this issue are notable for addressing a wide range of such phenomena, underscoring both the success of the LCM so far and its further potential.

The authors examined the perceived and actual impact of exposure to conspiracy theories surrounding the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in 1997. One group of undergraduate students rated their agreement and their classmates' perceived agreement with several statements about Diana's death. A second group of students from the same undergraduate population read material containing popular conspiracy theories about Diana's death before rating their own and others' agreement with the same statements and perceived retrospective attitudes (i.e., what they thought their own and others' attitudes were before reading the material). Results revealed that whereas participants in the second group accurately estimated others' attitude changes, they underestimated the extent to which their own attitudes were influenced.

Three experiments that examine communicators' ability to inhibit linguistic bias are reported. Research has shown that communicators use more abstract language ( e. g., "Jamie is affectionate" vs. "Jamie kisses Rose") to describe more expected behavior. Recent research has shown that this bias may be overwhelmed by goals to put a "spin" on actions or to manipulate audiences' impressions of actors. Similarly, the present experiments show that people who wish to communicate without bias may often be able to do so. Inhibition occurred when participants selected descriptions from a list of alternatives and when they freely described both expected and unexpected behaviors. However, inhibition failed when participants were asked to freely describe either expected or unexpected behaviors alone.

The present studies examine why people think the world is more just to themselves than to others generally. Beliefs in justice for the self were uniquely associated with psychological adjustment, consistent with the theoretical motive to believe in justice for the self ( Studies 1 and 2). However, this "justice motive" did not appear to affect the relative strength of justice beliefs. Instead, self-other differences in justice beliefs appeared to reflect objective assessments of the justice received by various demographics. Undergraduates believed the world to be more just to themselves than to others but not their undergraduate peers specifically ( Study 1). Participants of both genders believed the world to be more just to men, and to themselves, than to women ( Study 2). Women did not exempt themselves individually from injustice but believed, similar to men, that undergraduate women receive as much justice as men ( Study 3).

The third-person effect (TPE) is the tendency for individuals to assume that persuasive communications have a stronger effect on other people than on themselves. In turn the social distance effect (SDE) is the tendency for this TPE to increase with the psychological distance between self and comparator. Two experiments showed that the SDE is moderated by whether the message favours the ingroup or the outgroup, holding all other content constant. In Study 1, male and female participants read a message arguing that either women were better drivers than men or vice versa, and then indicated how much they thought themselves, ingroup members, outgroup members and society would be influenced. The results indicate that for the pro-outgroup message the SDE was found. However, for the pro-ingroup message the SDE was reversed with ingroup members perceived as more influenced than all other targets, including the self. Study 2 replicated this finding using minimal groups, which eliminated the effects of prior stereotypes about male and female drivers. Across both studies the self was perceived as relatively invulnerable to influence regardless of message bias.

Recent research has documented the intergroup sensitivity effect (ISE) whereby people respond more favorably to internal versus external criticism of their group. The present studies examine the reactions of bystanders who do not belong to the criticized group and whose reactions are therefore more likely to be informed by social conventions than by defensiveness. Studies I and 2 presented British participants with criticisms of Australians, manipulating their ostensible source. These British bystanders exhibited the ISE, responding more favorably to the speaker and comments when the critic was Australian rather than non-Australian. These responses were driven by the perceived motives of speakers rather than their level of experience with the group (Study 2). Study 3 provides direct evidence that internal criticism is more conventionally acceptable than is external criticism.

According to the linguistic category model (Semin & Fiedler, 1988, 1991), a person's behavior can be described at varying levels of abstraction from concrete (e.g., "Lisa slaps Ann") to abstract (e.g., "Lisa is aggressive"). Research has shown that language abstraction conveys information about the person whose behavior is described (Wigboldus, Semin, & Spears, 2000). However to date, little research has examined the information that language abstraction may convey about describers themselves. In this paper, we report three experiments demonstrating that describers who use relatively abstract language to describe others' behaviors are perceived to have biased attitudes and motives compared with those describers who use more concrete language

This study investigated the self-enhancement strategies used by online White supremacist groups. In accordance with social identity theory, we proposed that White supremacist groups, in perceiving themselves as members of a high-status, impermeable group under threat from out-groups, should advocate more social conflict than social creativity strategies. We also expected levels of advocated violence to be lower than levels of social conflict and social creativity due to legal constraints on content. As expected, an analysis of 43 White supremacist web sites revealed that levels of social creativity and social conflict were significantly greater than were levels of advocated violence. However, contrary to predictions, the web sites exhibited social creativity to a greater extent than they exhibited social conflict. The difference between social creativity and social competition strategies was not moderated by identifiability. Results are discussed with reference to legal impediments to overt hostility in online groups and the purpose of socially creative communication

Recent research shows that the belief that the world is fair to the self (BJW-self) is associated with indices of psychological health, whereas the belief that the world is fair to others (BJW-others) is associated with harsh social attitudes (Begue and Bastounis, 2003). However research has not ruled out the possibility that third factors are responsible for these patterns of correlation. In the present research, 233 psychology undergraduates completed measures of BJW-self, BJW-others, attitudes to the poor, life satisfaction, locus of control, self esteem, and socially desirable responding. Results showed that BJW-self is uniquely related to psychological health, BJW-others is uniquely related to harsh attitudes to the poor, and that these relationships are not attributable to the influence of third causes. Results provide strong support for the distinction between perceived justice for the self and for others, and suggest that perceptions of justice are indeed the "active ingredient" responsible for their ability to predict psychological and social outcomes. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Criticism is an important aspect of communication within and between groups, but reactions to criticism of groups have been little studied. Past research has shown that criticism elicits greater sensitivity when made by an outgroup member, compared to an ingroup member. Two experiments were conducted to examine how this intergroup sensitivity effect (ISE) is affected by the context of the criticism. Experiment I showed that the ISE occurs in a private context, but disappears when it is clear that the criticism is made to a large public audience. Experiment 2 investigated intragroup criticism and manipulated both audience size and audience composition. Results showed that ingroup, criticism elicited greater sensitivity and less favorable evaluations of the speaker when made to an outgroup rather than an ingroup audience. The results highlight strategic considerations and tacit protocols governing the criticism of groups.

The third-person effect (TPE) is the tendency for people to perceive the media as more influential on others than on themselves. This study introduced a new methodological paradigm for measuring the TPE and examined whether the effect stems from an overestimation of the persuasibility of others, an underestimation of the persuasibility of the self, both, or neither. In three studies, we compared ratings of (a) current self attitudes (both baseline and post-persuasion), (b) current others' attitudes (both baseline and post-persuasion), (c) retrospective self attitudes, and (d) retrospective others' attitudes. We also measured traditional third-person perception ratings of perceived influence. Rather than overestimating others' attitude change, we found evidence that people underestimated the extent to which their own attitudes had, or would have, changed.

Language abstraction is an important aspect of the description of behavioral events (G.R. Semin & K. Fiedler, 1988) that is typically viewed as a medium by which describers transmit beliefs without conscious awareness or control. Complementary to this view, the authors propose that language abstraction may also be influenced by explicit communication goals such as aggrandizement or derogation, allowing describers to express beliefs that they do not themselves possess. Five studies are reported that support this proposal, showing that explicit communication goals have strong effects on language abstraction that are independent of effects of describers' beliefs or expectancies. Language abstraction is therefore both a medium for the transmission of existing beliefs and a tool by which communicators can create new beliefs

K.M. Douglas and C. McGarty (in press) demonstrated that being identifiable to an ingroup audience in a computer-mediated communication (CMC) setting leads people to describe anonymous outgroup targets in more abstract, or stereotypical ways. Based on these findings, and on the social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE: S.D. Reicher, R. Spears, & T. Postmes, 1995), we aimed to test a model of the effects of identifiability on communicative behavior, in and beyond CMC. Participants in three studies, one CMC and two pen/paper, were asked to write responses to controversial messages. In all three studies, communicators who were identifiable to an ingroup audience used more stereotypical language to describe anonymous outgroup targets. Although Study 1 suggested that this increase in stereotypical language use may be strategic, Studies 2 and 3 suggested instead that it may result from more subtle, or implicit communicative processes. These results are discussed in relation to the revised SIDE model and a final model is proposed.

This research investigated the intergroup properties of hostile 'flaming' behaviour in computer-mediated communication and how flaming language is affected by Internet identifiability, or identifiability by name and e-mail address/geographical location as is common to Internet communication. According to the Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE; e.g. Reicher, Spears: & Postmes, 1995) there may be strategic reasons for identifiable groups members to act in a more group-normative manner in the presence of an audience, to gain acceptance from the in-group, to avoid punishment from the out-group, or to assert their identity to the out-group. For these reasons, it was predicted that communicators would produce more stereo type-consistent (group-normative) descriptions of out-group members' behaviours when their descriptions were identifiable to an audience. In one archival and three experimental studies, it was found that identifiability to an in-group audience was associated with higher levels of stereotype-consistent language when communicators described anonymous out-group targets. These results extend SIDE and suggest the importance of an in-group audience for the expression of stereotypical views.

(OPEN ACCESS ON ENCYCLOPEDIA WEBPAGE: http://climatescience.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228620-e-328) An overwhelming percentage of climate scientists agree that human activity is causing the global climate to change in ways that will have deleterious consequences both for the environment and for humankind. While scientists have alerted both the public and policy makers to the dangers of continuing or increasing the current rate of carbon emission, policy proposals intended to curb carbon emission and thereby mitigate climate change have been resisted by a notable segment of the public. Some of this resistance comes from those not wanting to incur costs or change energy sources (i.e., the carbon-based energy industry). Others oppose policies intended to address climate change for ideological reasons (i.e., they are opposed to the collectivist nature of the solutions usually proposed). But perhaps the most alarming and visible are those who oppose solutions to climate change because they believe, or at least claim to believe, that anthropogenic climate change is not really happening and that climate scientists are lying and their data is fake. Resistance, in this latter case, sometimes referred to as climate "skepticism" or "denialism," varies from region to region in strength but worldwide has been a prominent part of a political force strong enough to preclude both domestic and global policy makers from making binding efforts to avert the further effects of anthropogenic climate change. For example, a 2013 poll in the United States showed that almost 40% believed that climate change was a hoax. Climate skeptics suggest the well-publicized consensus is either manufactured or illusory and that some nefarious force—be it the United Nations, liberals, communists, or authoritarians—want to use climate change as a cover for exerting massive new controls over the populace. This conspiracy-laden rhetoric—if followed to its logical conclusion—expresses a rejection of scientific methods, scientists, and the role that science plays in society. Skeptic rhetoric, on one hand, may suggest that climate skepticism is psychological and the product of underlying conspiratorial thinking, rather than cognitive and the product of a careful weighing of scientific evidence. On the other hand, it may be that skeptics do not harbor underlying conspiratorial thinking, but rather express their opposition to policy solutions in conspiratorial terms because that is the only available strategy when arguing against an accepted scientific consensus. This tactic of calling into question the integrity of science has been used in other scientific debates (i.e., the link between cigarette smoking and cancer). Opinion surveys, however, support the view that climate change denialism is driven at least partially by underlying conspiratorial thinking. Belief in climate change conspiracy theories also appear to drive behaviors in ways consistent with the behaviors of people who think in conspiratorial terms: Climate change conspiracy theorists are less likely to participate politically or take actions that could alleviate their carbon footprint. Furthermore, some climate skeptics reject studies showing that their skepticism is partially a product of conspiratorial thinking: They believe such studies are themselves part of the conspiracy.

(Summary prepared for this repository). This chapter critically examines the often made claim that endorsement of conspiracy theories is characteristic of a "monological" world view (Goertzel, 1994) - in which claims about the causes of an event are not weighed against specific evidence about the event itself so much as abstract, mutually supportive beliefs about the pattern of previous events. Although beliefs in various conspiracy theories are robustly correlated, so that people who believe in one conspiracy theory are likely to believe in several others, this does not in itself demonstrate that conspiracy beliefs are rooted in, or symptomatic of, a monological worldview. There is little evidence to suggest the mindsets of adherents of conspiracy theories are generally more monological - in fact, some research suggests that 'conspiracy theorists' are more open, rather than more closed, to new ideas. Further, some conspiracy theories contradict, rather than reinforce, other conspiracy theories, suggesting that they do not comprise a closed ecosystem of mutually supportive ideas. The authors outline other accounts of why beliefs in various conspiracy theories tend to cluster together. For example, these beliefs are associated with similar personality variables, beliefs about the self, and beliefs about the world. Also explaining their correlation, they may be best viewed not as separate psychological variables but as facets of an underlying variable. The authors conclude that further research is needed to test some of the interesting predictions that may be derived from the monological worldview position. In the meantime, to portray conspiracy belief as a symptom of a monological world view is not yet warranted empirically, and may be unfairly derogatory.

This research experimentally investigated the social consequences of "phubbing" – the act of snubbing someone in a social setting by concentrating on one's mobile phone. Participants viewed a three-minute animation in which they imagined themselves as part of a dyadic conversation. Their communication partner either phubbed them extensively, partially, or not at all. Results revealed that increased phubbing significantly and negatively affected perceived communication quality and relationship satisfaction. These effects were mediated by reduced feelings of belongingness and both positive and negative affect. This research underlines the importance of phubbing as a modern social phenomenon to be further investigated.