University of Kent

Multi-disciplinary research relating to reasoning, inference and method

 

• Events: Seminars, workshops and conferences; past events

• Teaching: Taught MA in Reasoning, undergraduate study and postgraduate research
• Research: Members of the centre, their research interests and research projects
• The Reasoner: An interdisciplinary gazette on the study of reasoning, inference and method
• The Reasoning Club: A network of related research centres
• Contact: David Corfield (MA in Reasoning), Jon Williamson (other centre activities)

 

NEWS

Dr Jan Lemeire (Electronics and Informatics, Brussels) is visiting the Centre from February to April 2010.

 

EVENTS

 

17 March - Gabor Tahin (classics): Arguments from Probability and Rhetorical Heuristics in Ciceronian Oratory (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

In the paper I am introducing a new form of argumentative analysis in ancient oratory which I will call rhetorical heuristics. The concept of heuristics is described as a collection of complex strategies based on common forms of probabilistic reasoning used by orators in forensic speeches. They could give a complete argumentative account of judicial speeches where the issue at hand is conjectural, that is, when one has to establish his conclusion through the (often manipulative) presentation of incomplete evidence. Firstly, I will describe the process of discovering rhetorical heuristics as a result of the inadequacy of classical rhetoric and also what modern areas of research I made use of in devising the concept. Secondly, I will show how rhetorical heuristics could be applied in understanding the complex argumentative strategies of individual speeches through examples from Ciceronian oratory.

23 March - Tim Lewens (HPS, Cambridge): Essence of Tiger (CNWSem8, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

Darwin showed us that species do not have essences, or so the story goes. Michael Devitt has recently challenged this consensus. Devitt is right to say that many of the arguments given against species essentialism are weak. But Devitt's own arguments in favour of essentialism rely on a mistaken account of the explanatory role of species membership. In this talk I seek to put species anti-essentialism on a stronger footing.

31 March - Martin Ridout (statistics): Fitting complex models - as easy as ABC? (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Likelihood plays a central role in model fitting and inference. But for complex models it may not be possible to evaluate the likelihood function. In the last decade, likelihood-free methods of inference have been developed under the banner of 'Approximate Bayesian Computation' (ABC). Although originally developed for problems in genetics, these simulation-based approaches are now attracting wider interest. This talk will explore some of the key ideas and limitations in a non-technical way, through simple examples, and discuss applications in ecology and systems biology.

28-29 June 2010 - Work in progress in causal and probabilistic reasoning (Reid Hall Campus, Paris, Centre for Reasoning)

9-10 September - ESF workshop on Pluralism in the foundations of statistics (tbc, 9am-6pm, Centre for Reasoning)

 

PAST EVENTS

2007

4 July - Josh Nice & Dirk Janssen: Jerry Fodor's arguments for a language of thought (S110B Computing Laboratory, 4.15pm, CNCS).

5-7 September - Progic2007: The third workshop on combining probability and logic (KLT2, 9.30-5, Centre for Reasoning)

11 September - Colin Johnson: Collective Intelligence: Do Swarms and Crowds Think? (Olde Beverlie, 7pm, Cafe Scientifique)

In this talk we will look at collective behaviour: for example, that of swarms of insects or crowds of people. Often these seem to exhibit a collective intelligent behaviour without there being any central control. We will look at this through computer simulation: starting by looking at how swarms and crowds are simulated in animation and CGI for films, showing how this helps us to answer practical and scientific questions, and considering how these ideas are used in other areas of technology such as telephone call routing and synthesized music.

26 September - Launch of the Centre for Reasoning (Cornwallis seminar room 7, 4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

2 October - Jon Williamson (Philosophy): Objective Bayesian epistemology (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

3 October - Mechanisms and causality reading group (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67:1-25.

9 October - Frank Furedi: What is distinct about the way we fear? (Olde Beverlie, 7pm, Cafe Scientifique)

These days virtually every human experience has become the subject of risk management. Consequently just about everything we do comes with a health warning. What happens when everything is represented as a risk? Do we stop taking or risks or do we just become disoriented or confused? The aim of this presentation is to explain why we have become suspicious of the risk taker and what this means for our lives in the future.

10 October - David Corfield (Philosophy): Projection and projectibility (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

This paper arose from a workshop at the machine learning conference NIPS'06 which considered problems arising when the distribution of the training data and of the test data do not match. In it I argue that much about whether we can project to the test data hinges on the nature of the relevant background knowledge. I discuss this in relation to Nelson Goodman's idea of 'projectability'.

11 October - Fabio Rigat (Warwick): Non-parametric detection of neuronal functional dynamics (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

This talk introduces a novel non-parametric method to detect significant changes of the parameters of time series models. Rather than relying on a parametric specification of the parameters' evolution through time, their dynamics are assessed within a hypothesis testing framework as a change-point problem. The Kullback-Leibler divergence between the posterior distributions of different sets of data under the same model is proposed as a test statistic. Posterior simulation via Markov chain Monte Carlo and particle filters is used to approximate the value of the KL divergence and its critical region under the null hypothesis of no change. The method is applied to detecting changes of the functional connectivity of neuronal networks using in-vivo multiple spike trains recordings obtained via multi-electrode arrays. The changes in the network parameters detected by the Kullback-Leibler statistic explain variations of the baseline neuronal spiking rates and of the functional connections between neurons across different experiments.

11 October - Laurence Goldstein (Philosophy): Paradox (Darwin Seminar 1, 6pm, Philosophy Society)

16 October - Laurence Goldstein (Philosophy): A consistent way with the liar (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

16 October - Simon Haggett (Computing): Evolving a Dynamic Predictive Coding Mechanism for Novelty Detection (Computing S110B, 4pm, Applied and Interdisciplinary Informatics)

Novelty detection is a machine learning technique which identifies new or unknown information in data sets. In this talk, I will present our current work on the construction of a new novelty detector based on a dynamical version of predictive coding. We compare three evolutionary algorithms, a simple genetic algorithm, NEAT and FS-NEAT, for the task of optimising the structure of an illustrative dynamic predictive coding neural network to improve its performance over stimuli from a number of artificially generated visual environments. We find that whilst NEAT performs more reliably than the other two algorithms in this task, both NEAT and FS-NEAT fail to evolve a network with a significantly higher fitness than the best network evolved by the simple genetic algorithm. We also examine the robustness of this network to noise and find that it handles low levels reasonably well, but is outperformed by the illustrative network when the level of noise is increased.

17 October - Mechanisms and causality reading group (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen (2005). Explanation: a mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36:421-441

22 October - Philip Charles (Computing): Evolving Polyhedral Approximations for Boolean Constraints (Computing S110B, 4pm, Theoretical Computer Science)

The abstract domain of polyhedra can be effectively utilised within program verification and abstract interpretation. This work proposes a method enabling an optimal decision process, whereby the convex hull containing the solution space of a system of constraints can be modified by relaxation of constraints to improve tractability and reduce complexity. This method would therefore be useful, for example, in the domain of complex model checking. The work draws together concepts from program analysis, computational geometry and logarithmic approximation.

24 October - Tuan Yu (Business): discussion session: practical reasoning and its applications to management (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

A discussion focussing on the following: Is practical reasoning a special kind of reasoning? Disciplinary perspectives on practical reason: philosophy/ethics, psychology, sociology, economics, politics, law,...Research questions - e.g. use of practical reason (descriptive, normative, prescriptive, evaluative accounts) in management; improvement of practical reasoning; meta-reasoning questionsResearch methods and interpretation - ideas on how to investigate practical reason.
A good introduction to practical reason is found at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/

25 October - Mark Steel (Warwick): Flexible univariate continuous distributions (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

Based on a constructive representation, which distinguishes between a skewing mechanism $P$ and an underlying symmetric distribution $F$, we introduce two flexible classes of distributions. They are generated by nonparametric modelling of either $P$ or $F$. We examine properties of these distributions and consider how they can help us to identify which aspects of the data are badly captured by simple symmetric distributions. Within a Bayesian framework, we investigate useful prior settings and conduct inference through MCMC methods. On the basis of simulated and real data examples, we make recommendations for the use of our models in practice.

29 October - Li Su (Computing): Applying Formal Methods in Human-computer Interaction (Computing S110B, 4pm, Theoretical Computer Science)

Applying formal methods in reducing human error in the use of interactive systems is increasingly important. Previous formal modelling focused on modelling the technology front, in particular on relatively simple devices. However, many seem to be blissfully unaware of formally modelling detailed mental processes of the human users, which are natural parts of the system.

30 October - Colin Johnson (Computing): Computational Search for Counterexamples (Computing S110B, 4pm, Applied and Interdisciplinary Informatics)

In this talk I shall talk about the automated search for counterexamples to mathematical problems, by applying heuristic search techniques such as genetic algorithms and tabu search. I shall give a number of examples from simple geometrical and topological problems.

31 October - Mechanisms and causality reading group (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Stuart Glennan (2002). Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philosophy of Science, 69:S342-S353.

7 November - Geoffrey Samuel (Law): Do lawyers reason as true social scientists (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

7 November - Ken Westphal (Philosophy): Judgement, mutual recognition and rational justification (CGU4, 5pm, LLB Research Seminar)

14 November - Mechanisms and causality reading group (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Stathis Psillos (2004): A Glimpse of the Secret Connexion: Harmonizing Mechanisms with Counterfactuals. Perspectives on Science 12(3):288-319.

14 November - Jon Williamson (Philosophy): Machines that reason (KLT5, 5.15pm, SECL pop lecture)

In this talk I'll try to convey some of the importance of work on artificial intelligence for philosophy and vice versa. I'll distinguish two kinds of AI - psychological and logical - and focus on some interesting connections between the latter and research on reasoning in philosophy. I'll also discuss my own interest in this area: causal and probabilistic reasoning and its automation.

15 November - Byron Morgan (Statistics): Modelling heterogeneity in the survival of wild animals (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

Being able to estimate the survival of wild animals is important, for instance for understanding the effects of climate change and for conservation. Typically, data arise from observations on previously marked animals, and analysis follows by fitting probability models with relevant parameters. The availability of covariates can result in appropriate regressions. The simplest models take no account of the differences between animals. In this talk we start by describing such models, and then consider how they can be made more realistic in two different ways. First we deal with age-variation, and secondly we consider the case when individual time-varying covariates are available,but records may be incomplete. The modelling is illustrated by data on grey herons, Ardea cinera, and Soay sheep, Ovis aries. The work of this talk is joint with Takis Besbeas and Ted Catchpole.

20 November - Federica Russo (Philosophy, Kent & Louvain): Empirical generalisations in social science (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

21 November - Donald Gillies (Science and Technology Studies, UCL): Problem-solving and the problem of induction (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

In his 1972 book: ‘Objective Knowledge’, Popper devotes chapter 1 to the problem of induction. Elsewhere in the book (in chapters 3, 4, 6 & 8), he presents a general schema of problem-solving. The aim of this paper is to bring these two strands of thought together. The initial problem is here the traditional philosophical problem of induction. Popper proposes a tentative solution to this problem. The paper then proceeds with the problem-solving schema by adding error elimination, i.e. criticisms of the tentative solution. These are concerned with computer induction, and with the claim that corroboration is in some sense inductive. This discussion leads in turn to the emergence of a new problem. A suggestion is made about how this new problem might be tackled. The approach involves a Neurath-type holism, but applied to methods rather than theories.

22 November - Sofia Olhede (UCL): Multiscale inference for Lagrangian ocean turbulence (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

22 November - Lorella Lepore (Reading): Motivated perception of others: Situation-relevant goals and stereotyping (KLT4, 4pm, Psychology Seminars)

27 November - Stephen Pethick (Law): How to Solve the Problem(s) of Coherence (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

28 November - Mechanisms and causality reading group (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Peter Machamer (2004): Activities and Causation: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Mechanisms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18(1):27-39.

5 December - Simon Thompson (Computing): How expressive are visual logical notations? (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

The majority of modern logics are symbolic, and use a mathematical style of symbolic notation for their formulas and proofs. This talk will introduce a variety of visual, or diagrammatic, notations for logical concepts and contrast them with traditional logical forms, pointing out the advantages and limitations of the visual approach. The main body of the talk will explore the "spider diagram" notation for naive set theory, and give a characterisation of the limits of expressiveness of this visual notation. The expressiveness proof uses a model theoretic argument to characterise what can and cannot be expressed by means of spider diagrams.

11 December - Mark van Vugt: Evolutionary Psychology; a theory about sex shopping and warfare (Olde Beverlie, 7pm, Cafe Scientifique)

Evolutionary psychology is the scientific study of the brain as the product of evolution through natural selection. It is a novel field with many interesting applications. Here I argue that the human brain is primarily social. This social brain enabled human ancestors to solve many important social problems such as finding a mate, caring for off-spring, sharing food, negotiating status hierarchies, and coordinating groups to fight rival groups. Unfortunately, our Stone Age minds are sometimes ill prepared to cope with the many challenges of modern society. For instance, we are more afraid of spiders and snakes than of cars and electricity, although the latter are far more deadly. In this talk I will discuss various examples of a mismatch between modern and ancestral human environments creating problems related to sex, shopping and warfare. 

12 December - Mechanisms and causality reading group (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Lindley Darden and Carl Craver (2002): Strategies in the Interfield Discovery of the Mechanism of Protein Synthesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33:1-28.

2008

15 January - Jon Williamson: Machines that reason (Olde Beverlie, 7pm, Cafe Scientifique)

16 January - David Lagnado (Psychology, UCL): Causal models in evidential reasoning (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Causal models are critical to the evaluation of evidence in legal contexts, both from a normative and descriptive perspective. A series of experiments investigate how mock jurors combine different items of evidence (e.g., witness testimonies, alibis, confessions, forensic evidence) to judge the probability of guilt of a suspect. The main findings are that people reason in accordance with the qualitative prescripts of Bayesian networks, but are susceptible to certain biases due to the limited-capacity of working memory.

16 January - Li Su: Applying Cognitive Modelling and Physiological Recording in Designing Human-computer Interfaces (S110B, 4.15pm, CCNS)

22 January - Mechanisms and causality reading group (ElecSem1, 10.30-12, Centre for Reasoning)

28 January - Andy King (Computing): Inferring Congruence Equations with SAT (Computing S110B, 4pm, Theoretical Computer Science)

30 January - Damien Fennell (Philosophy, LSE): Evidence, Reasons and Reasoning: Should evidence give us reason to believe? (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Important recent contributions on evidence in philosophy of science, namely Peter Achinstein's and Sherrilyn Roush's theories of evidence, centrally require that evidence in a hypothesis provide us with reason to believe a hypothesis. This paper critically analyzes this fundamental premise, arguing that this approach results in concepts of evidence which apply only in a narrow range of situations, excluding many intuitive and important evidential situations. Moreover, the paper argues that such 'reason to believe' approaches to the analysis of evidence make it difficult to understand how to combine evidence and how to reason with evidence more generally.

30 January - Srivas Chennu: Modelling Temporal Binding and Illusory Conjunctions using the ST2 Model (S110B, 4.15pm, CCNS)

31 January - Maria De Iorio (Imperial): Statistical Models for DNA Sequence Segmentation: Linkage Disequilibrium and Haplotype Blocks (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

7 February - Nikolaos Demiris (MRC Biostatics Unit): Survival Extrapolation (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

7 February - Martin Fischer (Psychology, Dundee): Spatial Representation of Numbers (KLT4, 4pm, Psychology Seminars)

13 February - David Corfield: Introduction to the MA in Reasoning for prospective students (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

13 February - Rosie Cowell: Computational (neural network) model of category learning and rule-extraction in category learning (S110B, 4.15pm, CCNS)

14 February - Paddy (C.P.) Farrington (Open University): Case Series Models and Extensions (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

19 February - Mechanisms and causality reading group (ElecSem1, 10.30-12, Centre for Reasoning)

21 February - Heather Turner (University of Warwick): Nonlinear Discrete-time Hazard Models for Entry into Marriage (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

26 February - Phyllis McKay (Philosophy): Mechanisms and explanation (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

26 February - Mike Stout (Nottingham): Predicting Aspects of Protein Structure using Learning Classifier Systems (Computing S110B, 2pm, Applied and Interdisciplinary Informatics)

27 February - Federica Russo (Philosophy, Kent & Louvain): Causal modelling and system analysis: complementarity or opposition? (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

One objection to causal analysis is that the hypothesis of the closure of the system makes it too narrow in scope, that is it only considers restricted systems and neglects the many other external influences. On the contrary, system analysis deals with complex structures where every thing is interrelated with everything else. The question arises as to whether the two approaches can be compatible and whether causal analysis can be integrated into the broader framework of system analysis. This paper attempts a negative answer on the grounds of fundamental differences in their assumptions.

27 February - Paul Taylor: Functional connectivity underlying the selection of attention and action – combined online TMS-EEG evidence (S110B, 4.15pm, CCNS)

28 February - Darren Wilkinson (Newcastle): Bayesian Inference for Biochemical Network Models (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

4 March - Mechanisms and causality reading group (ElecSem1, 10.30-12, Centre for Reasoning)

5 March - David Corfield: Narrative and the rationality of mathematical practice, discussion of working paper (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning)

The possibility that narrative might play a crucial role in the practice of mathematics has been paid little attention by philosophers. The majority of Anglophone philosophers of mathematics have followed those working in the logical empiricist tradition of the philosophy of science by carving apart rational enquiry into a 'context of discovery' and a 'context of justification'. In so doing, they have aligned the justification component with the analysis of timeless standards of logical correctness, and the discovery component with the historical study of the contingent, the psychological, and the sociological. The failings of this strategy are by now plain. In this debating arena there can be no discussion of the adequacy of current conceptions of notions such as space, dimension, quantity or symmetry. Such matters become questions purely internal to the practice of mathematics, and no interest is shown in the justificatory narratives mathematicians give for their points of view. In this talk, I would like to outline the views of the moral philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre, whose descriptions of tradition-constituted forms of enquiry are highly pertinent to the ways in which mathematics can best be conducted, and allow us to discern the rationality of debates concerning, say, the mathematical understanding of space. An essential component of a thriving research tradition is a narrative account of its history, the internal obstacles it has overcome, and its responses to the objections of rival traditions. To the extent that mathematicians do not contribute to this writing, from the MacIntyrean perspective they are failing to act fully rationally.

5 March - Don Leggett (History): The very principle of thinking and of concluding: William Froude, Jon Henry Newman and the Victorian Cultural Context of Scientific Shipbuilding (Rutherford Postgraduate Suite S4.2, 5pm, History Research Seminars)

6 March - Trevor Bailey (Exeter): Spatial Survival Modelling in Animal Disease Epidemics (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

12 March - Colin Johnson & Konstantinos Sirlantzis: Classification of images of cancer patients (Marlowe LT2, 1pm, CBMI)

12 March - Adrian Bonner: Nutrition and Brain function (S110B, 4.15pm, CCNS)

18 March - Mechanisms and causality reading group (ElecSem1, 10.30-12, Centre for Reasoning)

26 March - Anthony Baines & Martin Ridout: Analysis of the Evolution of Genes (Marlowe LT2, 1-2pm, CBMI)

Mechanisms of evolution and statistical methods for analyzing them.

26 March - Sean Sayers: MacIntyre and modernity (GS7, 2-4pm, Centre for Reasoning MacIntyre Series)

According to Alasdair MacIntyre, the advent of modernity has led to the fragmentation and compartmentalization of social life and values. In this paper I argue that it has also involved the creation of new forms of social relation and new liberal values. MacIntyre's critique does not do justice to the complex and contradictory character of these changes. I make this point through a discussion of the notion of tolerance and of developments in the modern university, including the impact of the RAE. Similar issues are raised by MacIntyre's criticisms of the `enlightenment project' and his attempt to return to an earlier Aristotelian model as the basis for moral and social thought. Rather than rejecting modernity and enlightenment ideas, I argue, we should affirm its core values of liberty, equality and community and seek to realise them in the modern world. A more adequate picture of modernity provides some grounds to question MacIntyre's pessimism about the possibilities of doing so.

26 March - Kiran Kalidindi: Cognitively bounded rational analysis (S110B, 4.15pm, CCNS)

1 April - Mechanisms and causality reading group (ElecSem1, 10.30-12, Centre for Reasoning)

1 April - Hartley Slater: Paraconsistent graphs (CNWSem6, 12-2, Philosophy Seminars)

A visual presentation of the elements in Graham Priest's 'Logic of Paradox' is produced, which, in the manner of Venn and Carroll Diagrams, and also Peirce's Alpha Graphs, enables calculations regarding theses and derivations in Priest's well-known paraconsistent logic to be conducted geometrically.  The graphs are then used to reconsider Priest's claims about the possibility of perceiving contradictions.  Priest has offered figures drawn from the works of Escher, for instance, to support this possibility, but much simpler and more persuasive visual examples can be offered in the light of the graphical presentation of his paraconsistent system.  A reconsideration of Paul Kabay's recent critique of Priest is then offered, along with wider morals about the virtues of paraconsistency.

27 May - Andrew Derrington (Psychology): Human visual motion perception, why do we make so many errors? (S110B, 4.15pm, CCNS)

It is by charting the limits of perceptual performance that we are able to characterise the mechanisms that support different modalities of perception. In the case of motion perception, it has been possible to design experiments in which consistent patterns of errors reveal systematic shifts, distortions or even reversals of motion perception that can be used to infer distinctive principles of operation. A long-standing example of this is the motion after-effect which was first reported in the scientific literature in the early 19th century and which is still being used today to probe the mechanisms of motion perception. This talk will concentrate on two more recent examples:- second-order motion and the reversals in motion perception that occur when coarse and fine features are combined in a briefly presented moving stimulus.
The first indication that the humans respond to second-order motion came from experiments that showed that when observers were required to discriminate the motion of a complex high spatial frequency moving pattern their responses were consistent with second-order but not first-order sensitivity (Badcock & Derrington, 1985). Subsequent experiments showed that second-order features contribute to motion judgements in many situations but measurements of  the limits of second-order motion perception suggest that any purely second-order effects are exerted at a high level - there is no such thing as a dedicated second-order motion mechanism.
Human ability to distinguish the direction of motion of a small, brief visual stimulus that contains only fine, detailed features is systematically impaired if coarser features are added to it. The impairment is most dramatic if the coarser features do not move; under these circumstances the perceived direction of motion reverses completely. These impairments are not explained by current theories of motion perception, which predict that the motion signals from coarse and fine features should not interact because they are extracted by independent mechanisms. We show here in a preliminary model that a low-level process can explain our main findings if we include a subtraction stage between the mechanisms that extract motion signals from fine and coarse scales.

30 May - Simon Thompson (Computing): Lakatos' Proofs and refutations (Computing S110B, 4pm, Computing Book Talks)

Lakatos was one of the 20th century philosophers of science. He, along with Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, changed our understanding of the processes of science. Proofs and Refutations is his look at how mathematics grows, changes and develops.

10 June - Andy Hone (Maths): The Nature of Truth (Olde Beverlie, 7pm, Cafe Scientifique)

WWe are all taught arithmetic at school, and the rules are usually drummed into us, so that statements like 1+1=2 acquire a certain inherent correctness which is hard to question, and it becomes difficult to imagine how one and one could make anything else. However, if one studies higher mathematics, then some facts which were previously obvious can be called into question, and one is forced into trying to justify why they must be "true". In this brief talk, I will describe what motivates me in my research, and give a very personal perspective on what truth means to me as a working mathematician. I will also mention how this might relate to notions of truth in other areas of science.

23 July - Kent-UCL workshop on causality and linking mechanisms (CGU2, 1-6pm, Centre for Reasoning)

3 September - Ben Moszkowski (Software Technology Research Laboratory, de Montfort University): An interval-based approach to axiomatic completeness for omega-regular logics (Computing SW101, 2pm, Computing Seminars)

In the course of almost 40 years, a number of so-called omega-regular logics have been proposed for reasoning about discrete, infinite linear time.Amongst them are several versions of temporal logic of practical import to computer science. We describe a promising new and relatively nonconstructive approach for proving axiomatic completeness for such logics. Our framework is based on Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and avoids some of the technical complexities previously encountered. In particular, it totally dispenses with the requirement of embedding nontrivial proofs about complementing and determinising omega-regular automata which recognise infinite words. Our work also suggests more natural axiom systems in some cases and moreover provides evidence that ITL might even play a fundamental role in the proof theory of omega-regular logics.

8-19 September - Causality study fortnight (CGU4, 9-6, Centre for Reasoning)

1 October - Julia Tanney (philosophy): Ryle's Regress and the Philosophy of Cognitive Science (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Ryle’s anti-rationalist arguments in The Concept of Mind also threaten contemporary rationalist psychologies and functionalist philosophies of mind. Fodor recognised this when attempting to lay the philosophical foundations for classical cognitive science in The Language of Thought. This paper revisits Fodor’s attempts to sidestep Ryle’s regress objections and argues that they fail. It is a mistake, I claim, to assimilate Ryle’s argument with the ‘homunculus’ threat that is seen to have an easy solution for computer design. I conclude that as long as representations are construed as causal determinants of behaviour two different kinds of explanation are confounded with disastrous results: what look to be necessary posits in effect lose their explanatory role. This puts the realism of computational/representational theories in doubt and presents a serious threat to the philosophical underpinnings of cognitive science.

4 October - Argument Day (Various locations, 10.30, 12, 2.30, SECL)

As part of the University of Kent’s Open Day on October 4, 2008, there will be arguments (in the philosophical sense) taking place at various locations on the Canterbury campus. The event is called ‘For the Sake of Argument’. These arguments will be informal. No expertise is required of participants and people are free to join in an argument whenever they wish and to drift away when they have had enough -- and perhaps move on to another discussion at a different location.

6 October - Andy King (computing): Discovering congruence constraints (S110B, 4pm, Theoretical Computer Science)

In 2008 Harald Sondergaard and I published a paper in CAV'08 that showed how SAT solvers could be used to discover invariants (rather than merely check that one is violated).  In this talk, I will explain how the discovery of invariants can be accelerated using (modern) SAT encoding techniques and (ancient) Gaussian elimination.  The talk will be self-contained and not assume any expertise in abstract interpretation or logic programming (you are quite safe).

15 October - Reading group: Giffin Caticha 07 - Updating probabilities with data and moments (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

17 October - David Corfield (philosophy): Narrative and the rationality of mathematical research programmes (Maths Lecture Theatre, 3pm, Maths Seminars)

23 October - Natesh Pillai  (statistics, Warwick): Levy Random Measures: Posterior Consistency and Applications (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Stats Seminars)

Levy random measures, derived from the classical infinitely divisible processes, are known to be a powerful, flexible set of tools to construct (prior) probability distributions on various function spaces. Although they are used widely in practice, the issue of posterior consistency has not been addressed yet. We resolve this problem, and identify a simple set of guide lines so that posterior consistency holds in most commonly used regression problems.

3 November - Rodolfo Gomez : Model-checking Interval Duration Logic on Timed Automata (S110B, 4pm, Theoretical Computer Science)

Model-checkers for timed automata offer restricted requirements languages (i.e., the languages to express correctness properties) in order to achieve efficient reachability algorithms (i.e., the algorithms that explore the model's state space to determine the satisfiability of requirements).

Unfortunately, except for basic safety properties, correctness properties are difficult to express. For instance, sequence and repetition of events/states, persistence of states, and past properties in general, are notoriously hard to specify in real-time model-checkers (even for expert users).

Typically, real-time requirements languages are subsets of the branching-time logic TCTL. In this talk, we argue that much of the expressiveness of (linear-time) interval temporal logics can be easily borrowed to make for more natural notations. In particular, we show that properties written in Interval Duration Logic (IDL), a decidable fragment of
Duration Calculus, can be translated to observers: these are timed automata which are composed with the model at hand to effectively reduce IDL satisfiability checking to reachability analysis.

5 November - Barry Richards: Singular Propositions (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

I consider two basic questions in this paper.
A) What are singular propositions?
1. How are they expressed, i.e. by what means?
2. How are they characterized?
3. What is their semantic / logical import in epistemic contexts, e.g. in belief contexts?
4. How is this captured formally?
B) Can names serve to express singular propositions?
1. Can names be used like indexicals or demonstratives?
2. How is the semantic / logical import of names characterized formally ?
3. How does this capture their semantic / logical import in epistemic contexts ?
I shall venture to answer these questions with a theory that is non-Fregean and non-intensional.
Many have grappled with these questions, or ones closely related. I have documented the
sources of my proposal, though sometimes I have not traced their subsequent history.

5 November - Onora O’Neill: Reasoning about Trust (KLT5, 5.15pm, SECL Seminars)

18 November - Jon Williamson (Philosophy): Mechanistic theories of causality (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

19 November - Ray Land (Higher Education, Strathclyde): Threshold Concepts (UELT Seminar room, 12.15-2pm, Academic Practice Forum)

This session will introduce Land and Meyer's work on Threshold Concepts - this is the "Notion that within specific disciplines there exist significant 'threshold concepts', leading to new and previously inaccessible ways of thinking about something".(Meyer and Land, 2003).
 
Time will be spent describing the characteristics of threshold concepts and identifying them in different disciplines. There will be opportunity for participants to discuss the ideas raised in the context of their work.

This session will be of interest to all academics and other colleagues involved in curriculum design and student learning.

Please reserve a place by email if you wish to attend this event: cpdbookings@kent.ac.uk

19 November - Reading group: Wimsatt - The ontology of complex systems (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

20 November - Ajay Jasra  (Statistics, Imperial): Stochastic Boosting (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Stats Seminars)

In this talk, I discuss a class of stochastic boosting algorithms, which builds upon the work of Holmes & Pintore (2006). In particular, some problems with the importance sampling method are highlighted; it is shown how to perform statistical inference in a computationally efficient manner. Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) methods are used to illustrate that the stochastic boosting methods can provide better predictions, for a higher computational cost, than the corresponding boosting algorithm. A theoretical result is also given, which expresses an upper-bound of the posterior-predictive test error, in terms of that of boosting. The result shows that the averaged predictions used, are relatively stable with respect to boosting, when the latter provides the single best prediction. We also investigate the method on a real case study from machine learning and in a regression context, showing that it can be a useful tool for data exploration.

26 November - Funding bid discussion meeting (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

2 December - Laurence Goldstein (Philosophy): Opacity and vagueness (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

2 December - Rod Smallwood (Computing, Sheffield): Can computation cope with cellular complexity? (Brian Spratt Room, 4pm, Computing Seminars)

Biology is immensely complex - the number of biological functions that could be encoded by the human genome is uncountably large; the number of different proteins is immense; the range of length scales covers at least nine orders of magnitude; and the range of timescales covers perhaps fifteen orders of magnitude. It is widely believed that we will not understand biological function without the assistance of mathematical and computational tools. Is this a reasonable belief, given the complexity? I will discuss how we can approach the problems of cellular behaviour, with examples taken from modelling the behaviour of epithelial tissues.

3 December - Lawrence C. Paulson (Computing, Cambridge) - The relative consistency of the axiom of choice mechanized using Isabelle/ZF (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Gödel's proof of the relative consistency of the axiom of choice has been mechanized using Isabelle/ZF, building on a previous mechanization of the reflection theorem. The heavy reliance on metatheory in the original proof makes the formalization unusually long, and not entirely satisfactory: two parts of the proof do not fit together. It seems impossible to solve these problems without formalizing the metatheory, which would make the proof quite different from Gödel's. The present development follows a standard textbook, Kenneth Kunen's Set theory: an introduction to independence proofs, and could support the formalization of further material from that book. It also serves as an example of what to expect when deep mathematics is formalized.

4 December - Andy Wood (Stats, Nottingham):The Use of Boostrap Methods in Shape Analysis (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Stats Seminars)

9 December - Alan Thomas (Philosophy): Another particularism: reason, status, and defaults (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

11 December - Byron Jones (Pfizer): Examples of Bayesian Adaptive Designs for Clinical Trials (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Stats Seminars)

An important goal of drug development is to determine the correct doses to take into the final confirmatory stage of drug development. In this final stage, large clinical trials are run to provide convincing evidence that the drug works as intended and at a dose that can be prescribed to patients. Increasingly the pharmaceutical industry is making use of adaptive designs at the dose selection stage to increase the chances of selecting the correct doses to take forward. To reduce the number of patients required for these trials and to ensure that all available evidence is taken into account, Bayesian methods are also being increasingly used. Two examples of a Bayesian adaptive design for dose selection will be described. One is for a short-term endpoint and the other for a longer term endpoint.

17 December - Deborah Mayo (Philosophy, Virginia Tech): Four waves in the philosophy of statistics (CNWSem12, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

2009

21 January - Reading group: Hinton 06 - To recognise shapes first learn to generate images + video (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

28 January - Alexandre Borovik (Maths, Manchester) - Philosophy of Mathematics as Seen by a Mathematician (CGU4, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Many mathematicians feel that the philosophy of mathematics as an academic discipline fails to fulfil its basic function: it does not help mathematicians to develop a conceptual framework for their normal, day-to-day, professional discourse. Many of my colleagues believe that mathematicians should perhaps take care of themselves and try to clarify "informal" aspects of their work.

To illustrate this new and growing ideology, I will start with a quote from a Fields Medal winner, Timothy Gowers:

"The following informal concepts of mathematical practice cry out to be explicated: beautiful, natural, deep, trivial, "right", difficult, genuinely, explanatory ..."

Mathematicians are using these words every time when they talk to each other -- but without specifying their meaning. In my talk, I will try to suggest possible interpretations of these terms using, as a case study, the famous Classification of Finite Simple Groups--the longest ever proof in the history of mathematics--and a number of results and satellite theories around it. I will consider the strange phenomenon of "repair mechanisms" for complex and massive theories and delicate intertwining of formal, logical and social aspects of mathematics. The current status of the Classification of Finite Simple Groups is peculiar: every expert agrees that, of course, all existing proofs are formally wrong  and incomplete. For a simple reason of the astronomic size of proofs, they  inevitably contain holes and errors. But it is firmly believed that, as soon as a gap is detected, it would definitely be repaired, and in a relatively routine way. The only problem with this thesis is that it works only while people, who can do repairs, are still alive...

4 February - John Mingers (Business) - Realising research: critical realism as an undepinning philosophy for management research (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

10 February - Nils Kurbis (Philosophy, UCL/Kent): Aristotle on Non-Contradiction (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

10 February - Owen Lyne (Maths): "Chancing it" - luck, lotteries and life (Olde Beverlie, 7pm, Cafe Scientifique)

This talk will consider the role of chance in games and in life. How do we win a classic gameshow? Can we improve our winnings from the lottery? How do we profit from a casino? And how many people attending the talk share the same birthdays?

17 February - Laurence Goldstein (Philosophy): Nonsubstitutivity and the Tanney Puzzle (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

18 February - An introduction to the Centre for Reasoning: (Senate Building, 12.30-2pm, PVC Research Lunchtime Seminars)

18 February - Reading group: Macal North 05 - Tutorial on agent-based modelling and simulation (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

3 March - Marcio Basgalupp (Computing): Evolutionary algorithms for inducing decision trees (S110b, 11am, AII Seminars)

3 March - Helen Beebee (Philosophy, Birmingham): Free will and agent probabilities (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

4 March - Miklos Redei (Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, LSE): Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is the claim that probabilistic correlations always have causal explanations either in terms of a causal connection between the correlated events or in terms of a so-called (Reichenbachian) common cause. The talk presents results that are relevant from the point of view of how one could falsify the Common Cause Principle. The following are shown in particular: (i) any classical probability space is common cause extendible in the sense that the extension contains a common cause of a given correlation; (ii) two correlations cannot, in general, have the same common cause however. Reichenbach's notion of common cause will be generalized to a (Reichenbachian) common cause system and it will be shown that any correlation can be explained by a common cause system of arbitrary finite size. The notion of common cause and common cause system can be defined in non-classical probability theories (where the Boolean algebra is replaced by a non-distributive, orthocomplemented lattice) and some results on common cause extendibility of non-classical probability spaces will be presented. The talk formulates a number of open questions.

17 March - Susan Haack (Philosophy, Miami): The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

18 March - Susan Haack (Philosophy, Miami): Proving Causation (EX9, 1-3pm, Law Seminars)

18 March - Reading group: Squazzoni 08 - The Micro Macro Link In Social Simulation (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

20 March - Peter Linington (Computing): Quine's From a Logical Point of View (S110B, 4-5pm, Computing Book Talks)

24 March - David Corfield (Philosophy): Normative naturalism (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

31 March - Peter Andras (Computing, Newcastle): Network analysis of complex systems (S110b, 2pm, AII Seminars)

Networks are everywhere - in general networks represent systems as sets of interacting nodes. In a static view all interactions and all nodes are considered at once, while in the dynamic approach the  temporal aspect of the existence of nodes and interactions is also considered. Here we apply network analysis in the sense of robustness  evaluation of a range of networks. These networks include protein  interaction networks of cells, food-web inter-species interaction network in an ecological system, human interactions networks in organisations, and the interaction network of components of large scale software systems. We show how static and dynamic network analysis can help in understanding the nature of these networks. The  results show how to search for new antibiotic targets, how to evaluate pesticide usage policies, how to find structural mismatches and how to  track group dynamics in organisations, and how to improve robustness of large scale software systems.

1 April - Barry Richards: Intelligent search - The philosophy of AI (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

Search is one of the most fundamental concepts of artificial Intelligence; and one of the most challenging tasks is to manage search efficiently and appropriately.  One approach is to seek to incorporate "intelligent" techniques into search.  One might then ask:  What does AI tell us about "intelligent search"?  Newell & Simon claim:  "A physical symbol system (a program in a digital computer) exercises its intelligence in problem solving by search ..."  I shall consider three simple AI problems and seek to characterize "intelligent search".  This differs significantly from Newell & Simon's view.  Does either view tell us anything about human intelligence?

7 April - David Barnes (Computing): Towards the development of a large scale biological agent based model (S101b, 2pm, AII Seminars)

8 April - Andrea Greve (Cognitive Neuroscience, WICN): Do familiarity and recollection originate from the same memory trace? - A computational memory model (S110b, 4pm, CNCS Seminars)

26 May - Katrien Schaubroeck (Philosophy, Leuven): Practical Reasons and the Work of the Will (CNWSem6, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars) - CANCELLED

27 May - Reading group: Bedau - Downward Causation and the Autonomy Of Weak Emergence (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

9 June - Riccardo Manzotti (Psychology, Milan): Causation and Existence As Token-Concepts (CNWSem9, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

10 June - Reading group: Cardelli - Abstract machines of systems biology (CGU2, 2-3pm, Centre for Reasoning). See also Luisi 03 - Autopoeisis

10 June - Peter Taylor-Gooby (Social policy): Reasoning about Citizenship: individual rational actor and social perspectives and their implications for political trust [reading] (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

17 June - Suzanna Forwood (Neuroscience, Cambridge): Multiple Cognitive Abilities from a Single Cortical Algorithm (Computing SW101, 4pm, CNCS Seminars)

25-26 June - Multiplicity and unification in statistics and probability (CGU4, Centre for Reasoning)

9-11 September - Mechanisms and causality in the sciences (CGU4, Centre for Reasoning)

Scientific explanation of some phenomenon often proceeds by elucidating the mechanism responsible for the phenomenon. But what is a mechanism, precisely? Does the notion of mechanism vary across the sciences? Causal relationships are also often invoked to explain; how do causal explanations relate to mechanistic explanations? More fundamentally, how do mechanisms relate to causality? The three-day conference Mechanisms and Causality in the Sciences will explore these and related questions.

29 September - George Darby (Philosophy): Quantum mechanics and metaphysical indeterminacy (CNW-Sem8, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

13 October - Jon Williamson (Philosophy): An Objective Bayesian account of confirmation (CNW-Sem8, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

14 October - Laurence Goldstein - From disability to the enhancement of reasoning (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning) slides

Consider an individual learner who is weak in one or more of the 'intelligences' identified by Howard Gardner, or who is impaired in some way that inhibits learning. Designing teaching materials to help such a person learn a particular technique is going to involve asking such fundamental questions as 'Why is that technique worth learning?', 'What is the difference between a superficial and a deep understanding of the technique?' 'How might one best intstill a deep understanding of that technique, given the deficits of the learner?' And the interesting possibility is that a design informed by thinking properly about these questions will result in teaching materials more efficacious  than the traditional ones even for non-deficient learners.  Gardner-inspired equipment for reasoning will be displayed and discussed.

14 October - Drinks and nibbles (CGU2, 5-6pm, Centre for Reasoning)

28 October - Reading group: Thagard - Pathways To Biomedical Discovery (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

29 October - David Corfield (Philosophy): Coalgebra - A New Mathematics? (Computing S110b, 2pm, Computational Intelligence Group)

Some theoretical computer scientists have been enthusiasing about a new type of mathematics - coalgebra - as a mathematical foundation for various kinds of dynamical systems, infinite data structures, and logics. In this talk I shall explain what it is, how it is dual to algebra, and how its identity rests on an implicit breaking of symmetry in mathematics. I shall also describe foreshadowings of coalgebraic thinking from the foundational crisis and earlier.

3 November - Mark Schroeder (Philosophy, University of Southern California) - The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons (CNW-Sem8, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

5 November - Christopher Jennison (Stats, Bath): Interim monitoring of clinical trials: decision theory, dynamic programming and optimal stopping (Maths Lecture Theatre, 2pm, Stats Seminars)

It is standard practice to monitor clinical trials with a view to stopping early if results are sufficiently positive, or negative, at an interim stage.  We shall explain how properties of stopping boundaries can be calculated and how boundaries can be optimised to minimise expected sample size while controlling type I and II error probabilities. Constraints on error probabilities complicate this optimisation problem. However, a solution is possible via unconstrained Bayes problems which can be solved by dynamic programming. Optimality can then be expressed as a sample path property, making this an "optimal stopping" problem in the language of probability theory. We shall give details of numerical computation and optimisation. We shall discuss a variety of applications in clinical trial design and also point out connections with problems arising in financial mathematics.

5 November - Colin Johnson (Computing): Theoretically-Grounded Genetic Programming (Computing S110b, 2pm, Computational Intelligence Group)

 10 November - Charlotte Sleigh (History): Patrons of science: then and now (Olde Beverlie, 7pm, Cafe Scientifique)

Science has always been an expensive business, and scientists have long relied on patrons to fund their research and to bring it kudos. Historians of science have discovered some entertaining and unexpected things about these relationships; on the basis of their findings we can also ask what form the patronage of science takes in the present, and whether it works for good or ill ...

11 November - Federica Alberti: Reasoning in coordination games (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

We argue that focal points might play a significant role in explaining contributions to public good games. The recent focal point literature focuses on a discussion of the usefulness of focal points in solving pure coordination games. Economic public good experiments consistently show outcomes that are inconsistent with the prediction of standard economic theory, and we believe that some focal-point reasoning might be at work. We suggest threshold public good experiments to test whether and how focal-point reasoning explains contribution to a public good. By designing experiments in which the use of focal points might improve contributions to a public good, we hope to find evidence that gives support to our interpretation of public goods. Experimental economics should contribute to the design of strategic situations that support focal-point reasoning. One way of doing this might be exploring the role that suggestions or enforcements have in creating focal points. Another way would be investigating the possibility of voting systems which may block or limit the ability to free ride. Both theoretical and empirical research should focus on the strategic implications of proposing a frame or focal point to solve the contribution problem.

24 November - Mathias Frisch (Philosophy, University of Maryland) - Causes in Physics: Projection or Discovery? (CNW-Sem8, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars) Slides

Causal notions are an integral part of our common sense conception of the world. It is frequently claimed, however, that there is no legitimate place for causal relations in our mature theories of physics. In this paper I will critically examine arguments for and against this claim: What reasons are there either for denying that causal reasoning plays a legitimate role in theorizing in physics or for maintaining that a natural causal metaphysics also finds support in physics? I will discuss examples of appeals to putatively causal principles in physics, ask how a causal critic might interpret these examples and examine what metaphysical conclusions we may be able to draw from these example.

25 November - Reading group: Wagner - Causality In Complex Systems (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

1 December - Robin Taylor (Philosophy) - Gettier and the Problem of Induction (CNW-Sem8, 12-2pm, Philosophy Seminars)

8 December - Simon Colton (Computing, Imperial): Computational Creativity: Towards a Holistic Approach (Brian Spratt Room, 4pm, Computing Seminars)

Computational creativity is the study of simulating behaviours that would be deemed creative if exhibited by humans. Our overall goal is to build software that can take on creative responsibility in art and science projects, whether autonomously or in collaboration with people. In the Computational Creativity group at Imperial (www.doc.ic.ac.uk/ccg), we apply existing and novel AI techniques - and combinations thereof - to applications in pure mathematics, video game design, the visual arts and graphic design. In the talk, I will give details of some recent sub-projects in the development of automated mathematical theory formation systems and in the development of The Painting Fool (www.thepaintingfool.com). I will also provide some overview details of our projects in automating aspects of video game design. The findings from these projects have enabled us to sketch out some general principles such as "climbing the meta-mountain", "the creativity tripod" and "good art makes you think", which could be taken as guidelines for building creative software. I will discuss these principles in an attempt to take a more holistic view of computational creativity than is generally the case.

9 December - Alberto Moraglio: Reasoning about evolving computer programs (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

9 December - Drinks and nibbles (CGU2, 5-6pm, Centre for Reasoning)

2010

20 January - Reading group: Novere et al 09 - The Systems Biology Graphical Notation (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

26 January - Byron Cook (Microsoft Research): Proving that programs eventually do something good (Brian Spratt Room, 4pm, Computing Seminars)

Software failures can be sorted into two groups: those that cause the software to do something wrong (e.g. crashing), and those that result in the software not doing something useful (e.g. hanging). In recent years automatic tools have been developed which use mathematical proof techniques to certify that software cannot crash. Based on Alan Turing's proof of the halting problem's undecidablity, many have considered the dream of automatically proving the absence of hangs to be impossible. While not refuting Turing's original result, recent research now makes this dream a reality. This lecture will describe this recent work and its application to industrial software.

27 January - Second UCL-Kent workshop on causality (KS25, 11-5.20pm, Centre for Reasoning)

11.10 Phyllis Illari: Disambiguating RWT Slides
11.50 Jon Williamson: Weber on RWT Slides
12.30 Lunch
14.00 Brendan Clarke: The Epstein-Barr Virus Slides
14.40 Lorenzo Casini: Complex yet causal Slides
15.20 Coffee
16.00 Federica Russo: Causality across the levels: bio-social mechanisms Slides
16.40 Donald Gillies: Causality, Mechanisms and Intervention Slides Paper

3 February - Geoffrey Samuel (Law): Can legal Reasoning be demystified? (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

4 February - Alastair Young (Stats, Imperial): Objective Bayes and Conditional Probability Matching (MathLT, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

In Bayesian parametric inference, in the absence of subjective prior information about the parameter of interest, it is natural to consider use of an objective prior which leads to posterior probability quantiles which have, at least to some higher order approximation in terms of the sample size, the correct frequentist interpretation. Such priors are termed probability matching priors. In many circumstances, however, the appropriate frequentist inference is a conditional one. The key contexts involve inference in multi-parameter exponential families, where conditioning eliminates the nuisance parameter, and models which admit ancillary statistics, where conditioning on the ancillary is indicated by the conditionality principle of inference. In this talk, we consider conditions on the prior under which posterior quantiles have, to high order, the correct conditional frequentist interpretation. We focus on the exponential family context, where it turns out that a sufficient condition for higher order conditional frequentist accuracy reduces to a condition on the model, not the prior. When the condition is satisfied, as it is in many key situations, any first order probability matching prior (in the unconditional sense) automatically yields higher order conditional probability matching.

17 February - Yossi Borenstein (Computing, Hertfordshire) - An Information Perspective on Evolutionary Computation (CGU2, 3.30-5pm, Centre for Reasoning)

"Information is the tennis ball of communication…" this sentence concluded Keith Devlin's talk trying to answer the question: "Does information Really Exist? ". Whether information exists or not, the discussion about information surely does. Even though the term information has a formal definition (i.e., Kolmogorov complexity, Shannon's information theory), in the EC community (and, as it seems, in many other fields), the term information is used, more often than not, in an informal way (e.g., the problem contains no information and hence it cannot be solved efficiently). This talk focuses mainly on Kolmogorov's notion of information – that is, the information content of a binary string is the length of the shortest program that can produce this string and halt – but more importantly, it concentrates on the applicability of this notion to Optimisation problems and Black-Box algorithms. 

3 March - Robert Sugden (Economics, UEA): Focal points in tacit bargaining games (CGU2, 3.00-4.30pm, Centre for Reasoning) Slides

The paper reports an experiment which investigates Schelling's hypothesis that the outcomes of bargaining problems are influenced by focal points. We investigate tacit bargaining games (i.e. impure coordination games in which there are conflicts of interest between the players) which are framed to suggest bargaining.  We find strong evidence in support of the hypothesis.

4 March - Steffen Lauritzen (Statistics, Oxford): Bayesian networks for complex DNA mixtures (MathLT, 2pm, Statistics Seminars)

A challenging problem in forensic genetics is associated with the interpretation of evidence from complex DNA mixtures, where traces found at a crime scene contain DNA from more than one individual. In additions, the analysis of such traces are made difficult by the presence of so-called artifacts, including so-called stutter, dropout of alleles, as well as silent alleles that are never amplified.  The seminar describes  a Bayesian network for modelling and analysing such cases, using information from peak heights of amplified alleles and exploiting the possibility of combining information from  several traces. This all represents joint work with Robert Cowell and Julia Mortera.

 

ADMINISTRATION

The centre is directed by David Corfield (who is in charge of the MA in Reasoning) and Jon Williamson (who is responsible for the running of the other centre activities).