Inductive logic and confirmation in science

17-18 October 2013, University of Kent, Paris centre, France

Organisers: Juergen Landes, Jon Williamson

 

INTRODUCTION

The workshop is addressed to all researchers (early and not so early career) in all disciplines with an interest in inductive logic and confirmation in science. PhD students are particularly encouraged to participate.

Invited speakers: Branden Fitelson (Rutgers),  Jan-Willem Romeijn (Groningen).

The workshop is free and open to everyone with an interest in inductive logic and confirmation in science. To register simply drop an email to the organizers (j.landes@kent.ac.uk) with your name and affilation.

Provisional programme:

Schedule for Thursday Schdule for Friday
2:00 - 3:00 Branden Fitelson: Steps Toward a New Foundation for Comparative Confidence   9:20 - 10:00 Tom Sterkenburg: Solomonoff Prediction in Philosophical Perspective
3:00 - 3:40 Jonah Schupbach: Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning 10:00 - 10:40 Molly Kao: Old Quantum Theory and Theory Pursuit
3:40 - 4:00 Coffee 10:40 - 11:20 Teddy Groves: Developing Carnapian inductive logic
4:00 - 4:40 Roberto Festa & Gustavo Cevolani: Matthew properties for incremental confirmation and the weak law of likelihood 11:20 - 11:40 Coffee
4:40 - 5:20 Juergen Landes: Scoring Beliefs 11:40 - 12:20 Einar Duenger Bøhn: Confirmation, Induction and Kinds
5:20 - 6:00 David Miller: If You Must Do Confirmation Theory,
Do It This Way
12:20 - 13:20 Jan-Willem Romeijn: Frequentism as formal semantics
Evening Dinner

 

LOCAL INFORMATION

The conference will be held in class room 10, Reid Hall, Paris. Click here for a map. Click here for hotel availability.

 

PUBLICATION AND FUTURE PLANS

A second workshop on inductive logic and confirmation in science will be organised by Jonah Schupbach and held in Salt Lake City, Utah, in the autumn of 2014. It is likely that selected papers from the two workshops will be published in an edited volume or a journal special issue. Please let Juergen Landes know if you would like to submit a paper to this volume.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are very grateful to the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, and the University of Kent Centre for Reasoning for providing financial support.