

## Is the United States Europe's Other?

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The distance between European and U.S. American self-understandings has recently widened and, in all likelihood, will become graver and deeper in the near future. In one sense, this distance was always there, a cultural divide between what we have long called the Old and the New Worlds. It was reinforced in the latter part of the twentieth century, especially by the cold war, which sent European and American societies on fundamentally different trajectories, including, above all, a demilitarization of Europe and a militarization of the U.S., a trend that the end of the cold war only accelerated. The crucial event, though, was the Reagan project of the 1980s. Then the U.S. underwent (and is still undergoing) a revolutionary turn in America's mission, away from a New Deal, more-or-less egalitarian, internationalist consensus, to a public policy of belligerent Social Darwinism and class warfare a path Europe never took. In this same period, Europe retained the basic structure and motives of its welfare states, even expanding the application of its principles, from a national to a continental vision of egalitarian, cosmopolitan democracies in an economic and legal union.

In another sense, however, the current W. Bush administration has transformed this distance between Europe and the U.S. into a political and societal rift that is fundamentally antagonistic, consequential, and perhaps enduring. I attribute the recent *widening* of this distance to two processes: *increasing depth and breadth to Europeanization*, and *increasing provincialism of Americanization*. The political rift is both popular and governmental, including differing strategies of capitalism (regulated versus laissez-faire), penalization (minimal incarceration versus the death penalty and "three strikes, you're out"), military strength (strategically limited versus total dominance), health care (preventive and access-for-all versus palliative and limited access), and legality (embedded internationalism versus national sovereignty). But the most volatile and "new" distance concerns the shift in world power from Europe to the Middle East, which the war against Iraq has brought to a head. This war is not the issue, however, but merely an occasion to express a more basic disagreement over the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In other words, the American-European relation is no longer triangulated by cold war Communism but by a new configuration of forces, by Europeanization, Americanization, and the Middle East.

How does the increasing depth and breadth of Europeanization, and the increasing provincialism of Americanization, relate to the topos "Middle East?" Let me develop this argument in three steps: first, the shift in world power from Europe to the Middle East; second, the post 1989 acceleration of Europeanization; and third, the provincialism of Americanization resulting from solidification of Reagan-era reforms and reactions to globalization.

### Shift in World Power to the Middle East

After Yalta and the end of WWII, the epicenter of world power was clearly within Europe and this despite the exhaustion of Europe's moral authority and the end of much of Europe's colonial dominance of the rest of the world. NATO, along with the Allied occupation of Germany, guaranteed an American presence within Europe. Although America approached Europe from the outside, it became internal to European development, especially internal to Europe's cultural (e.g., film, food, music) and military trajectories. Today, the Middle East has become the new epicenter of world power, and both Europe and the U.S. are external actors to its drama. Both have great strategic interests in the Middle East, including of course oil resources, but neither is positioned, like the U.S. was within Europe during the cold war, or as Europe was within the Middle East during its Colonial "mandate" period, as internal to Middle Eastern development. As a matter of fact, the inverse might be argued: Europe and the U.S. appear to have very little leverage on developments in the Middle East--who listens to us there? (This may change, or at least that is the intent of the W. Bush administration). Instead, the Middle East is now actively internal to both European and U.S. development, to self-definitions and visions of the future.

It is this internality, this interiorization of a foreign body, of Middle East people and things, while being excluded from any decisive influence in the Middle East, that is a source of deep ambivalence and confusion if not irrational action for Americans and Europeans. The Middle East's internal presence in Europe and the U.S. goes well beyond the issue of oil dependence to include, more importantly, the internal presence of significant numbers of Arabs and Jews from Middle East countries. These peoples are active Arabs and Jews in different ways, of course--in a kind of diasporic politics that is more reminiscent of conditions in pre-WWI America than anything in the latter half the twentieth century. Their integration, the ways in which they become or do not become European or American, as well as their close ties to and influence on the contemporary Middle East, gives them a very different location in the New and Old Worlds.

### Europeanization

How do developments internal to Europe and the U.S.--Europeanization and Americanization, respectively--relate to this global shift in the epicenter of power? The collapse of the cold war, or East-West division of Europe, has resulted in a scramble for positions and alliances, all of which increasingly take shape under pressures of Europeanization. In a 1997 Annual Review article, I introduced the term *Europeanization* as an object of inquiry and began to lay out its terms and conditions. I argued that one should avoid swinging between pessimism and euphoria, and instead acknowledge the E.U. as a continental political unit of a novel order. *Europeanization*, in turn, should not be conflated with the E.U., but understood as a spirit, a vision, and a process (Borneman and Fowler 1997: 510). I suggested that five domains--language, money, tourism, sex, and sport--were particularly fruitful to study ethnographically how different national peoples in Europe are becoming more *European*. This new form of subjectivity, the *European*, which, the closer one gets the more fragmented and incoherent it looks, is nonetheless increasingly taking definition against the cultural practices of members of a particular other country, the United States.

To understand how Europeans have come to both resemble each other more and to differ from Americans, we might begin by looking at the institutionalization of their respective lifecourses. In an influential 1985 article, the German sociologist Martin Kohli argues that the lifecourse (*Lebenslauf*) has its own societal structural dimensions, such that, much like *gender*, it becomes institutionalized as a system of rules that orders life over time (1985: 1). During the cold war, indeed, a Europeanization of the national lifecourse in Europe began, driven largely by E.U. law, and accelerated by the production of (and compliance to) E.U. norms. These norms regulate and make translatable intimate cultural practices--from eating and sex to marriage; from notions of equality and equity to rationalization of age-grading and the treatment of minorities; from educational access to the issuance of occupational titles. One of the unusual aspects of this institutionalization of E.U. norms has been that, although they are formulated within Western Europe, prospective E.U. members from the former Soviet bloc increasingly seek to comply with them in anticipation of membership. (Poland and Hungary were, to my knowledge, the first countries to fully adopt this strategy.) The national *Lebenslauf* about which Kohli wrote in 1985 is now in competition with (if not often encompassed by) a European one, a competition that often frames national and local elections, and becomes discursive with regard to issues of immigration, national identity, and the future of welfare provisions.

What does this have to do with the Middle East? Let me approach this through the issue of migration. The E.U. has struggled for at least a decade to establish uniform European immigration, police, and border policies, with a great deal of resistance among member nations. Until 9/11, the massacre at the Twin Towers in New York. Initially, these policies may have seemed oriented to keep *East* Europeans out of the West, but increasingly it is clear that their success depends on the cooperation of East Europeans, with the goal of regulating Muslim entry into and participation in Europe. Anywhere from eight to twelve million Muslims live within the E.U., and if the E.U. expands to the Balkans and southwestern Europe, that number will double. If Turkey is admitted, the face of Europe would change radically. The vast majority of present Muslim residents are the product of postcolonial economic and political migration, many arriving in the 1970s to work for failing industries or in low-skilled jobs. Most live on the margins of Europe, poorly integrated culturally, socially, and politically, and a potential source of unrest and illegality.

Although these Muslims come from many different countries, with correspondingly radical differences in cultural and political orientations, they are treated as a relatively homogeneous group within Europe. In reaction, they increasingly unite around Islam, not as a religion but as a cultural identity. We have only belatedly, if at all, come to acknowledge how the perpetrators of 9/11 were united in the European diaspora, and how this new Europeanized Europe as a place--a place with advanced freedoms and opportunities derived from a specific institutionalized lifecourse--was essential to solidify their beliefs and alliances, and to plan their attack on the United States. This lifecourse is the envy of much of the world, but that is also the problem: New immigrants and foreigners in Europe desire the lifecourse that is absolutely unachievable back in their homelands, and only partly, if at all, achievable in Europe itself. Europe does not have recourse to the American model of multicultural and radically uneven integration, with its weak and diffuse norms, possibilities for continuous displacement and deferral of goals, geographical mobility, and self-imposed ghettoization. Europe is struggling to develop an alternative *Ausländerpolitik*, a vision and a set of policies and practices that might satisfy both its native population and the desires of its new residents. My point is that this large Muslim and Arab population, peoples from ex-colonies or low-skilled laborers, is now internal to European development, a fact of which European governments and societies are increasingly aware, making for new and more aggressive policies directed to their internal placement and to their diasporic links.

Jews within Europe have a much longer and more prominent history. Much smaller in number, less marginal and more integrated into European social structures, Jews are immigrating to Europe in insignificant numbers compared to Muslims. It is not the number of Jews, however, but how they are located, their representation and symbolic significance, that is the issue. The historical antagonisms between Jews and Christians within Europe is most frequently read through the lens of the Holocaust, meaning that, today, Jews are generally understood as THE symbolic victim group, integral to European history and hence deserving

some from of historical redress. Additionally, they form a fairly homogenous status group; most are solidly middle class and generally considered to be less culturally oppositional than are Muslims. When the particular conceptualization of Jews as fundamentally antagonistic to Christian Europeans is uttered publicly, the speaker is quickly censored, and an entire regime of guilt is brought to bear on the speaker, leading to silence if not shame.<sup>1</sup> (The same censoring does not occur when Islam is posited as radically alter.) Witness the recent stunted careers of Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Jörg Haider in Austria, and Jürgen Möllemann in Germany, who in various ways pandered to anti-Semitic stereotypes. Muslims and Jews, then, are very differently positioned within Europe, and the extent to which they are considered a problem is directly linked to the issue of integration or separation, and what kind of ties they cultivate with the Middle East.

This different positioning to the Middle East is creating tensions between Jews and Muslims within Europe that carry over into domestic politics.<sup>2</sup> Western European politicians, in particular, are increasingly sensitive not only to Israeli-identified Jews but also to Palestinian-identified Muslims, the latter who increasingly provide a young workforce to support Europe's ageing population. While most European Jews are firmly European and do not consider themselves part of a diaspora, the Israeli government still considers them all as potential returnees. The Knesset even recently passed a law claiming the right to intervene should a Jew be harmed anywhere in the world. And the Israeli government has been reacting hysterically to the indictment in Belgium of Ariel Sharon for responsibility for the 1982 massacre in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, not only breaking off diplomatic relations and threatening economic sanctions, but also proposing an immediate airlift to remove all Jews from Belgium. Israeli politics of this sort implicates Europe's Jews in Likud's anti-Palestinian politics, and it positions them as in potential opposition to Europe. Meanwhile, both European and American media tend to give much more weight to Jewish voices in Europe that speak with religious authority, hence again interpellating Jews not as secular citizens but as somehow bound up with the Old Testament and a contemporary Israeli politics of revenge.

By contrast, although the European public increasingly recognizes the marginalization of its Muslims, and the series of historical humiliations--up to the present Palestinian degradation--suffered by Arabs in the Middle East, often at the hands of European colonizers, European governments are less inclined to openly acknowledge or act upon these perceptions. Instead, they, like many American commentators, frequently blame Muslims for creating the conditions for their own victimization (i.e., Islamic Acultural backwardness@ is the cause of their political repression and stunted economic development; Palestinian suffering at the hands of Israelis is brought on by their own Asuicide bombers.@) Reacting to these narratives, many Arabs and Muslims are increasingly radicalized while living in the European diaspora. Some are active in the desecration of Jewish symbolsCsynagogues, graveyardsCwithin Europe, and many finance Islamicist political movements and parties in their countries of origin, from North Africa to the Middle and Far East.

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<sup>1</sup> Academics are not immune from these processes either. Timothy Garton Ash (2003: 8) recently pointed to "the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Y [as] source and catalyst of what threatens to become a downward spiral of burgeoning European anti-Americanism." But he is quite aware of the dangers for himself in writing about this conflict in an American publication: it is "Adifficult for a non-Jewish European to write about [this] without contributing to the malaise one is trying to analyze."

<sup>2</sup> France's attempt, in April 2003, to give voice to its five million Muslims by organizing a Muslim council, alongside the councils for Catholics, Jews, and Protestants, is the most recent explicit governmental response to this tension.

Partly in response to 9/11, European governments are engaged in a kind of measured aggressiveness against the Middle East diaspora of Muslims and Arabs. We should not dismiss this turn as mere xenophobia. Especially the governments of France, Germany, England, Switzerland, Sweden, and Belgium are, as one might expect, ambivalent, if not fearful, of the effects of long-distance links especially to Turkey, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, Pakistan, or to one of the Gulf States. This ambivalence is registered in contradictory policies that alternately encourage dual or single citizenship, and in contradictory everyday practices that are alternately xenophobic or insist on social assimilation, or encourage multicultural identifications, or, as in France and Germany, learning a *Leitkultur*. It is stimulated both by what Benedict Anderson a decade ago called Along-distance nationalism@Cloyalties to the distant homeland where one no longer resides, which one no longer knows well, and to which one is not accountable; and it is stimulated by transnational terrorism, in which opportunities provided by European and American science, telecommunications, open financial markets --in short, global capitalism's goodiesCdirectly enable the use of violence to foment widespread anxiety.

In many ways, these current ambivalences about Islam within Europe parallel the conundrum of the U.S. government and society in deciding whether to integrate or preserve the distinctions of what some today call AFirst Peoples.@ American ambivalence is revealed in the wild historical vacillation between assumptions of elimination, containment and preservation, or integration of the AAmerican Indians.@ I explored the relation of these policies to the development of U.S. anthropology in an article published nearly a decade ago, AAmerican Anthropology as Foreign Policy.@ There is much ethnographic evidence for similar swings and reversals in policy and practice within Europe today. We might pay specific attention to areas of change in the model lifecourse, such as the regulation of civil marriages. This regulation is of the utmost importance to religions such as Islam or Judaism, but it is no longer central to secularized Christian Europe, where marriage is increasingly de-regulated and left to individual contract law. We might also pay attention to rituals of citizenship or civil status that require shedding or adding identifications; or to language, education, and residence policies (that alternately encourage mono- or multi-lingualism); or to the integration or segregation of schools and residential neighborhoods.

Europe's domestic response to the presence of the Middle East within its own political and social body exists in an uneasy tension with its foreign policy response to the territorial Middle East. Of course, neither NATO nor the E.U. have anything resembling a common European foreign policy; there are only national policies driven by national interests. Nonetheless, at the social level there is something resembling a consensus about European foreign policy, revealed in the European public's overwhelming rejection of America's new war against Iraq. This public opposition to America's war is also a response to this shift in the world epicenter to the Middle East, and an awareness that the most effective response to terror is not war against the enemy outside but to find a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The public in Europe is also no longer merely a discursive referent or utopian dream, or an accumulation of national publics with their own corresponding projects. A European public does indeed exist and comes together (outside of and well beyond its current anti-war unity) with respect to a project of political globalizationCsome are calling it cosmopolitanismCthat is shaped both by the awareness of nineteenth-century Colonial and Imperial failures and of twentieth century nationalist (i.e., totalitarian, fascist) failures. It is also shaped by the experience of two world wars, leading to an awareness of the limitations of military solutions to political problems. One might claim that Europeans are merely cowardly, afraid of dying for their causesCand this may be true; but they are also wizened to the political instrumentalization of death cults, which was a staple feature of the national policies leading to two world wars. Today, to be European is to be an internationalist without forsaking the benefits of local democratic control, and to be unwilling to sacrifice society-building for economic or military dominance.

My point here is that Europe is committed to a political-legal form, which crystallized as a pan-European project in response to the collapse of East European state socialist regimes. This form is seemingly alien to present forms of governance in the Middle East, and is also threatened by Europe's interiorization of the Middle East with its accompanying conflicts. Why, then, given all this ambivalence about Islam and the Middle East, has America instead become the Other of Europe?

#### **Americanization**

My argument about the United States will be shorter and merely suggestive of a line of analysis. U.S. provincialism is increasingly becoming the counter-concept, and therefore the Other, for European self-understandings. By U.S. provincialism, I mean a reinforcement of American particularities, or AAmerican exceptionalism,@ a return to the same, national boosterism, devotion not to a rustic but to an aggressively countrified vision. This is the voice of America as global moral project, the constantly invoked Awe@, as in Awe are the world,@ that has come to dominate the image of America abroad.

The Columbia University historian Simon Schama (2003), in a recent amusing and erudite article called AThe Unloved American,@ attributes the distance between Europeans and Americans to Anational egocentricity@ and a Avirtuous isolation(ism)@: AJust as obnoxious is the fraud of Christian piety, a finger-jabbing rectitude incapable of asserting a policy without invoking the Deity as a co-sponsor. This hallelujah Republic was a bedlam of hymns and hosannas, but the only true church was the church of the Dollar Almighty@ (39, 34). These

qualities posed no problem for Europe when the U.S. limited its exercise of power to its own continent, argues Schama, but they become threatening with America's present imperial policy and its global reach.

Schama does what most anthropologists used to do and what many historians continue to do when they take up culture: He makes it constant and ahistorical. This perspective that American culture is unvarying and can change only from without--vitiates the political thrust of Schama's narrative. It would be more politically efficacious if one were to historicize culture, and this process of Americanization, and locate particular agents in the reproduction of American national egocentricity. The provincialism and exceptionalism in its current institutional form dates from the Reagan era, where, in the name of God-and-Country, a muscular rhetoric was employed to reinforce images of American strength and national superiority--frequently set against a European foil of wimps, peaceniks, over-educated, over-cultivated cosmopolitans. It is a particular U.S. Republican vision of the world, naturalized by the huge number of Republican media and think tank propagandists, and now radicalized by those in control of the W. Bush administration.

Since the end of WWII, Americanization has largely defined the conditions of globalization--the spread of ideologies, cultural values and products, the idea of a *Away of life*--for Europeans as well as for much of the rest of the world. But today the European continent is departing from the American trajectory, so that the old term *Westernization*, now used almost solely in a negative sense, no longer characterizes a Euro-American mission. If we ask, following Talcott Parsons, whether this divergence is driven by economic, political, or cultural factors, we must conclude it is driven by all three. If we ask further, whether there is a dominant system that serves both to integrate the Europeans and Americans within their own wholes, respectively, and to drive them apart from each other, then, I want to argue, and this is my major hypothesis, that the European *integrative revolution* (a term Clifford Geertz introduced in his early critique of modernization theory) is dominated by a project of political globalization, whereas the American is driven by economic globalization.

These two projects, of political and economic globalization, are now on collision course, and they meet in the epicenter of the Middle East. One need only watch the evening news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on any European station and compare it to the U.S. news to realize the radical divergence in reporting.<sup>3</sup> And one need only compare the middle-class European lifecourse, and its widespread distribution, to the more uneven, class-based lifecourses found in the United States, to understand why the two publics might find the different reporting styles appealing. Accordingly, the governments in Europe and the U.S. find themselves addressing publics with radically different domestic electoral agendas: a politics of security-production in Europe, a politics of anxiety-production in the U.S.

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<sup>3</sup> William Safire, the former Nixon speechwriter and columnist for the New York Times, is by no means a typical reporter, but he is a leader in producing the "finger-jabbing rectitude" and bad-faith stereotypes about which Schama writes, and which circulate in other media as stereotypes about the European Other. For example, in making a case for blaming "Franco-German dominance" for the failure of W. Bush's diplomacy in bringing about support for the Iraqi war at the United Nations, Safire (2003a) writes, in an article entitled "Bad Herr Dye," that German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder "does not share the free speech values of the West." A week later, Safire (2003b) describes Germany's chancellor as having a "vast intelligence system and diplomatic corps." In other words, Schröder (and Germany) is both wimp (bad Herr dye) and Nazi (vast intelligence system).

Unlike Muslims, Jews are fully internalized within the American cultural-economic scene (not to speak of the number of Israelis with U.S. passports). The way this internalization works is that no U.S. politician dares oppose the foreign policy of Ariel Sharon, a policy that is aggressively anti-Arab, even if his actions run contrary to U.S. national interests. And the U.S. support for Sharon's anti-Arab, anti-Muslim policies has nothing to do with how many Jews in the U.S. or Israel oppose or support the Likud position. Even President W. Bush, who constantly asserts his fearlessness in the face of terror, appears afraid to criticize Sharon. Given this configuration of ideology and power, it is not that difficult to convince Americans today that the territorial division of the world into an Orient and an Occident has given way to a deterritorialized mapping of virtue, the former associated with Islamic evil, the latter with Judeo-Christian good. An alternative American imaginary that might call for a AJudeo-Christian-Muslim nation@ is a notion that many Americans would find, well, un-American. Europe's advanced secularization of Christianity allows for a more consistent and more thinkable model of Jewish and Muslim integration. Yet, while the mapping of assumptions of evil onto Muslims and Arabs are also prevalent within Europe, most European residents find the American project of economic globalization (based on a Social Darwinist model of the social) even more objectionable. American's economic imperialism threatens Europe's goals of a continuance of the welfare state and a globalization of their political-legal form. In this resistance to American economic and military hegemony, Europeans find a nascent ally in many of the peoples of the Middle East. While the U.S. may hope to assert itself over the Middle East through military might and through its alliance with Israel, the Europeans do not have the means or will for this strategy and instead must rely on the cunning seduction of their own modular lifecourse.

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"Beyond Othering"

John Borneman's article essay is, like his other writings, insightful and provocative, and forces one to think carefully about European and U.S. cultural differences and their long-term implications.

One issue it raises is particularly salient, and this is the conflict between the universalizing projects of a nationalist vision that remains fundamentally narcissistic and of a federative transnational vision celebrating negotiation, compromise, and consensus. The latter project of Europeanization (the course of which is not quite as smooth as Borneman seems to suggest) is the legacy of two home-fought world wars, which forced recognition that one power cannot unilaterally impose its will on its neighbors without fomenting mutually destructive resistance. The counter-project of Americanization also devolved from those wars (as well as from a number of other extra-territorial adventures) yet is founded on the idea that U.S. forces, bolstered by a powerful economy at home, can launch attacks on other countries "overseas," forcing them to accord with a home-grown vision of moral and political order. Both of these projects are simultaneously political and economic insofar as they are models for coexistence (one based on consensus, the other on coercion) and also serve to expand and consolidate markets by lowering tariff barriers and overcoming the market-dampening effects of cultural differences. The European strategy is, however, one of acknowledging, accommodating, and rendering difference familiar; the U.S. one either denies and suppresses cultural difference or others it as radical alterity - evil. Borneman is right to see, at the heart of contemporary European - U.S. discord, a fundamental incommensurability which that produces a European consensus on resisting the United States' will to global power.

Borneman, however, suggests that Europe "others" the United States, whereas it appears from here that it is the United States--or those U.S. voices powerful enough to suppress alternative articulationsB that "other" parts of Europe. Recent mainstream U.S. media discourses, repeated and amplified in populist imaginings, attribute collective and apparently essential characteristics to select European nations, representing as good those countries amenable to U.S. plans (the "New Europe," the United Kingdom, and Spain) and reifying as bad "other" places that resist cooptation (the "Old Europe" occupied by "cheese-eating surrender monkeys" and other "EU-nuchs"). Curiously Borneman himself--and this is worrying--appears in his discussion of the "interiorization of a foreign body, of Middle East people and things" to engage in similar processes of collective essentialization. Readers may, assuming that a modicum of shorthand eases the flow of commentary, excuse Borneman's failure to draw attention to the historic lack of fixity and permeability of the "border" between the Middle East and Europe, the

centuries-long presence of communities of Arabic origin within continental Europe (and vice versa), and the historic depth of the migration of Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian individuals and communities into North and South America. One is nonetheless forced to draw back in amazement as one realizes that, in the course of the essay, "Jews from Middle East countries" morph first into "Jews within Europe" and then into "Jews...fully internalized within the U.S. cultural-economic scene." The rhetoric that Borneman uses to express his ideas in effect counters them; it represents Jews, like Arabs, as remain fundamentally unassimilable, forever marked (even when huddled amongst non-Jews) by their putative place of origin and their (ofttimes hidden) cultural alterity. This ahistoric essentialization, which appears to be rife in the "culturalism" of U.S. anthropology, disallows the formation, or adoption, of new identities, and renders unthinkable (and hence unenactable) precisely the federative collusion Borneman seems to admire in Europe. This perhaps explains why Borneman's extended discussion of Middle Eastern people and things within Europe and the United States seems oddly unassimilated into and disjunct from the encompassing argument.

Few Europeans "other" the United States and Americans. Many, however, recognize in the policies of the current U.S. government fundamentalist and antidemocratic forces antagonistic to the federative project we--consciously or unconsciously--are working toward in the wake of the carnage and genocides of the last century. Recognition of that antagonism may be drawing us into a bloc opposed to the agents of U.S. hegemony (a bloc that may well include other communities, in the Middle East and beyond). That bloc, however, is one that in effect 'others' the practice of 'othering' and opens itself to all who recognize consensual cooperation as a more tenable policy than domination. Europeans, especially those millions who opposed the U.S. assault on the United Nations and the International Court of Justice carried out under the guise of dethroning Saddam Hussein, recognized themselves in the massive crowds that turned out in the United States to oppose the war. The antiwar protests of early 2003 produced enduring memories of a contingent, mutable, and diverse but nonetheless reconvenable community spanning the globe; anthropology, in the United States and elsewhere, must work to forge concepts and methods suitable for analyzing such supranational communities.

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