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Containing Communities: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on
the Governance of Sexual Offenders

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Introduction

In the last few years across the UK there have been many occurrences of community-based ‘anti-paedophile’ vigilante action. This paper applies a psychoanalytic approach to a case study of the protests of members of Residents Against Paedophiles, mostly single parent mothers, on Paulsgrove estate in Portsmouth in August 2000 (the first large scale outburst of its kind). It sets these in the context of the tensions existing between two aspects of the government’s policy on sexual offenders. My argument is that the Paulsgrove protests demonstrate the existence of a strong link between a vigilante state of mind and the ‘mind of state’ that, according to government policy, places communities at the centre of crime management.

Paulsgrove is an estate built in the 1950s as part of a policy of slum-clearance on the edges of Portsmouth on the South-West coast of England. There is only one road in and out of Paulsgrove and a recent account (Silverman and Wilson, 2002) describe it as a ‘beleaguered enclave’ that has a high degree of social problems.(1) On 23 July, the national tabloid News of the World launched its campaign for ‘Sarah’s Law’ in the wake of the murder of Sarah Payne (front headline: ‘Everyone in Britain has a child sex offender living within one mile of their home’). Its naming of convicted sex offenders and its printing of their police identity photographs was an indication of its wider aims: to provide open access to the location of all paedophiles in the UK. In the evenings of the first week of August 2000, about 100 adults and children calling themselves ‘Residents Against Paedophiles’, marched through the Paulsgrove estate. They torched cars and firebombed flats and houses where there suspected sex
offenders and paedophiles were thought to live, including one Victor Burnett, who
had the previous week been ‘named and shamed’ by the *News of the World*. Five
families, unconnected to sex offenders, fled the estate and a policeman was injured.
At least fifty people were arrested according to newspaper reports (Hill, 2001).
Similar events occurred in other areas of the UK such as the Southway area of
Plymouth, Whitely in Berkshire, Manchester, London and Wales.

Vigilantism is all too often understood by political and academic commentators as a
simple expression of a latent moral authoritarianism in the popular ‘masses’ incurred
through an admixture of endemic mental frailty and suggestibility – hence the key
role attributed to populism’s agent, the tabloid press (see Riddell, 2001; 2002).
Expressions of outrage, aggression and anxiety abound as a response to ‘crime’ but, I
suggest, they should not be regarded as archaic, timeless responses of the prototypical
‘mob’, which is largely how the national press saw it. For example, more than one
newspaper article used the archetype ‘rough music’ in relation to the Paulsgrove
protesters (Ferguson, 2001). This is a reference to Grose’s 1796 *Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue* which describes women beating saucepans and pokers in procession in
order to humiliate or scare a neighbour. Mentions of Salem, witches and the ‘violent
stupidity of the mob’ in reporting were frequent (Ferguson, 2001). But the
contextually specific form of vigilantism that is the subject of this paper can be more
subtly understood as also contingent upon the contemporary politics of active
citizenship in which the ‘victim’ – actual or potential – is called upon to play an
authoritative role.
Anti-paedophile ‘vigilante’ campaigns unconsciously manifest the tensions existing in the Blair government’s dual approach to sexual offenders. There is a tension between the government’s deployment of the administrative techniques of neo-liberal governance and, at the same time, its continuing attachment to the rhetoric of contemporary punitive populism. Popular punitivism is reinforced by other agents in the public sphere such as the popular press. From the point of view of community actors, this distinction may not be as absolute as it is often assumed to be. One central outcome is the collapse of a meaningful distinction between vigilance and vigilantism, a collapse that I propose can only be satisfactorily understood from within a psychoanalytic framework. It is certainly the avowed intention of the government in developing its policies on sexual offenders post-prison to inaugurate a renewal of vigilance in the minds of the populace. In its Latin derivation, vigilance means ‘awake’ or ‘observant’ (Johnson, 1996). However, in recent years, I argue, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between vigilance and vigilantism, for the state of being vigilant implies non-action which can ‘bring us into contact with feelings which are very hard to bear’ (Margot Waddell, 1989:14; see Freud, 1984a: 38.). Vigilantism, in contrast, occurs when the actual pressure of events promotes acting in order to provide a temporary sense of relief (see Bion, 1988). (2)

I gave the first version of this paper at a British Society of Criminology annual conference. Now, contemporary criminologists aren’t known for their sympathy to psychoanalysis and so this paper was an intervention into the ‘community safety’ literature. The basic operating assumption here is that people’s ‘fear of crime’ (which both government and independent criminologists have attempted to measure via
survey methods) is not necessarily a direct measure of their actual risk and is therefore not necessarily subject to a rationalist thought process.

In conducting a psychoanalytic approach, then, we are compelled to take these showy and often sadistic anti-paedophile demonstrations – of hatred, aggression, and moral condemnation – wholly seriously as communicative utterances. In aiming to decipher the largely unconscious meaning of the paedophile for specific communities, there is no obligation to stick to social actors’ perceptions of the problem and, indeed, every reason not to. When it is said that a community ‘fears’ crime or a particular criminal protagonist, one has to interpret these phrases as one would in a clinical situation, as a presenting symptom. Individuals, groups and ‘community’ organisations unconsciously use aspects of the external world to represent aspects of their own internal worlds, and it is this relationship that forms my focus here.

Responsibilisation, community and sexual offenders: the penal policy framework

As a number of criminologists have observed, crime prevention in the community has, since the late 1980s, metamorphosed into the discourse of ‘community safety’. ‘Building communities’ is at least part of the community safety strategy itself, and, in part, this requires communities to be ‘literate’ or ‘intelligent’ about crime by taking part in activities that will reduce crimogenic situations. As Nikolas Rose (1999a; 1999b) has argued, this mobilisation of the community – the creation of initiatives to help people to help themselves – is a central plank of what is termed neo-liberal government, linking both Thatcher and Major administrations with those of Blair.
Political government is to be relieved of ‘its powers and obligations to know, plan, calculate and steer from the centre’ (1999a: 476). In this reconfiguration of statecraft, a national government no longer guarantees security, rather it ‘facilitates’ and ‘enables’, through partnerships with independent agencies and powers – schools, hospitals, community organisations, parents, firms.

This thesis, of a double movement of autonomisation and ‘responsibilisation’, rests on a perception of a broader ‘neo-liberal’ shift that affects pensions, welfare and health care, etc. The post-Keynesian state seeks to shift responsibility onto the private sector, the voluntary sector, communities and individuals (Rose, 1999; Donzelot, 1991) to provide solutions to problems previously thought to be the exclusive responsibility of centralised authorities. Thus the strategies of neo-liberal governance act in situ rather than by separation or exclusion of deviant cases; they ‘act by manipulating the environment or the effects of problem behaviours, rather than attempting to correct errant individuals’ (O’Malley). In securing themselves against crime risk, ‘the rational subject of risk takes on the capacity to become skilled and knowledgeable about crime prevention and crime risks’ (O’Malley 1996: 201). The control of crime is thus situated in the continuum of normal social interaction; We are most able to see the displacement of the ‘dependent’ subject of welfare by these neo-liberal techniques of ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1986; O’Malley, 1992) in the new rhetoric of communitarian moralism that has made such inroads into New Labour policy in a variety of fields. Community is a means (and product) of government then, one that involves an intensification of detailed knowledge about the activities of its inhabitants and a promotion of its affiliations, ties and bonds (Rose, 2000: 329).
Contemporary punishment strategies are increasingly diversified and, at the same time, ‘designed in’ to the flows of everyday existence (Rose, 1999b) – witness the deployment of curfews, the removal of assets of those convicted of certain categories of crime, the imprisonment or fining (by headteachers! Making schools directly responsible for criminalising parents rather than deferring to the police!) of parents of children who truant. In this way, the dividing line between the criminal and the previously non-criminal is mutating, as the net catching those ‘responsible’ for anti-social acts, and their regulation and prevention, widens.

It is precisely within this diversified crime control environment that the still-developing policies towards sexual offenders need to be situated. These exemplify the tendency of the administrative strategy of the state to adapt its limitations in respect of crime control and prevention (for example by increasingly not meeting targets for the therapeutic treatment of sex offenders). However, and this is increasingly where the category of the sex offender stands alone, the political arm of the state (Blunkett and co.) operates in denial of this by resorting rhetorically to exclusionary modes of populist punitiveness based on moral authoritarianism. This is allied to an enlarged role for the media in determining individual sentencing and penal policy (see Garland, 1996; Bottoms, 1995). The role of the popular press, as we will see in the case of sex offenders, is given explicit legitimation by the government. ‘Populist punitiveness’ (Garland, 2000) is supplied by a harsh rhetoric of government law and order that is fundamentally ‘expressive’ and symbolic, seeking to show the strength of the state and its firmness in the face of crime. In a sense it absorbs the perceived sentiments of the public for a ‘tough’ approach to crime from the point of view of the ‘victim’. As David Garland rightly says, this represents a climate of moral fundamentalism in
which ‘a zero-sum policy game is assumed wherein the offender’s gain is the victim’s loss’ (2002: 351). When imputed to the community, the moral authoritarian response is predicated characteristically on the elimination of danger and dangerous social actors. It seeks to find, uproot and expel the Other, as if it were contaminated and contaminatory. The populist approach thus speaks the language of zero-tolerance in desiring the complete elimination of crime and thus seeks a ‘pure community’ (Foucault, 1977: 198) that coheres around the expelling of foreign matter.

So here is the tension in public discourse. We have a discourse of populist punitiveness, preoccupied with dangerous individuals who threaten community normality from the outside. We also have a still developing neo-liberal governmental strategy applied to the management of sex offenders that construct high-risk populations, grading them into differentially risky categories (Simon, 1998) and seeks to reintegrate offenders within ‘the community’ but with the proviso that their movements are tracked. This neo-liberal project is a managerial one, in that it seeks to classify and manage groups sorted by dangerousness, rather than seeking to respond to individual deviants with the purpose of rehabilitating and treating them. This shift to ‘risk thinking’ (Rose, 1998) creates a space for different forms of community involvement: a different set of relationships between the individual pathological person, the community, and an increasingly diverse range of professionals. Central to this process is the anticipation of future conduct, in which the assumption is that in any re-integration into local communities, re-offence is a realistic risk and therefore knowledge of the presence of sexual offenders a realistic protection against those risks. (5)
It is notable that the UK Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, following on from the Sex Offenders Act of 1997 (see Kemshall and Maguire, 2002) pursues this risk assessment strategy in seeking to manage more effectively the risks posed by sex offenders once relocated to the community (Ashenden, 2002). It is, fundamentally, an inclusive policy – though its ‘effects’, by which I mean the ways it comes to be appropriated by any particular community, may not be.

So, what happens when communities are called upon to participate specifically in the management of sex offenders and the prevention of sex offences? The stated aim of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act with respect to sex offender orders is to protect the public from future serious harm by a sex offender. (6) Based on an assessment of present behaviour in the community, police may apply to the magistrates to take out an order against any sex offender, either already cautioned or convicted, to proscribe specific behaviours as a preventative measure (see CDA 1998. Introductory Guide, Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, 2).(7) Moreover, there are further developments that exemplify the model of dispersed accountability put forward by Rose (2000) and others (Kemshall and Maguire, 2002). In June 2002, the government announced that members of the public will for the first time be given a direct role in drawing up risk assessment plans and monitoring the thousands of paedophiles and other serious criminals released from prison each year by taking a place on Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels which are to be created in each of 42 police districts in England and Wales (see Kemshall and Maguire, 2002; Bright and Hinsliff, 2002).

These regulative developments are responses to the perceived threat posed by the ‘paedophile’, and the target is the stranger, unknown to his victims.(8) The number of
children under 10 who are known to have been killed by strangers is small – in the UK, up to February 1996 fewer than six children under fourteen had been killed by strangers each year since 1984. Three quarters of the perpetrators of violence against children are parents and other relatives. (CSO, 1994, 1995). These facts have been widely reported. What needs to be investigated further are the reasons for the widespread desire to make these facts secret and/or unthinkable – and, moreover, the effects of so doing. Indeed, sexual offenders’ registers and community notification laws are underpinned by the assumption that intrafamilial offences do not threaten the ‘community’ (by which is meant safety in the public domain) but only the private domain of offenders’ families. But a number of research studies indicate a far more complex picture of victimisation and offending that traverse distinctions between extrafamilial/intrafamilial categories of offender (Hinds and Daly, 2001: 266; Cossins, 1999). Furthermore, as my case study indicates, particular communities that share histories of family abuse may have an active collective fantasy life that invokes and aggressively targets one kind of offender in order to repress the existence of another closer to home.

The Notes of Guidance that accompany the Act refer to the ‘danger’ of unmanaged publicity and the announcements in 2001 and 2002 of additions to the Act were accompanied by the statement that, in spite of the campaigns led by the parents of the murdered schoolgirl Sarah Payne, uncontrolled public access to the offenders’ register is not to be allowed. It remains the stated belief of the Home Office that improvement to the register will increase public trust that the system can protect communities from criminals. As Ashenden has argued (2002: 206-7), what we have in this governmental discourse is a discursive opposition between sex offenders being known and
manageable to the authorities (which include those in responsible positions in the community, such as headteachers, doctors, youth leaders, sports club managers, doctors), and being widely publicly known through unmanaged publicity which would lead to vigilante action and sex offenders going ‘underground’. ‘Information management’ – the controlled disclosure of information (that would once have been confidential) – is seen as the way of allaying the fears of the public.

Three weeks after an eight year old girl, Sarah Payne, went missing and six days after her body was found, the *News of the World* published the names, photographs and whereabouts (not exact addresses) of 49 male and female ‘convicted paedophiles’ in its regular Sunday edition and on its website, as part of a ‘name and shame’ campaign (Sunday 23 July 2000). In doing so, the aim was to put pressure on the government to implement ‘Sarah’s Law’, closely modelled on ‘Megan’s Law’ in the US. Private individuals cannot be expected unknowingly to bear the risk of living among sex offenders, argued the News of the World, and therefore their demands were that parents should be given direct access to information concerning the identities and whereabouts of child sex offenders. As has been shown convincingly by Samantha Ashenden, the *News of the World*’s declaration of a meaningful distinction between vigilantism and vigilance was undermined by its own rhetoric:

‘…When one combines the claims that police monitoring of sex offenders is insufficient, that the safety of children is more important than individual rights, that this safety can only be achieved by the public naming of sex offenders, and that such offenders are evil monsters, the political and legal disqualification of child sex offenders that follows carries with it the suggestion that the only way to achieve
safety is by removing such individuals, purifying the community.’ (Ashenden, 2002: 215)

The *News of the World*, then, made its arguments for community notification law on an open access basis the opportunity for punitive populism. (11) It is important to note that the government and the police were ambivalent in their response to the *News of the World*, whose demands were not, after all, totally congruent with government policy (see Kemshall and Maguire, 2002: 242; Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 152-158). Governed by its populist leanings, the government seemed to do everything possible to appear to support the *News of the World*: David Blunkett wrote an article expressing his view that ‘local people should have a say’ in the management of sex offenders, (12) and, subsequent to pressure from the Home Office and the Mental Health Unit (now the Dangerous Offenders Unit), the police decided not to prosecute for illegal procurement of images. (13) Thus the national government’s response was effectively to endorse and to encourage the purging mentality of the newspaper, stopping just short of actually supporting the specific demand for wholesale community notification as represented in Sarah’s Law. The ‘name and shame’ campaign ended because the newspaper claimed the government had agreed to consider its proposals (*News of the World*, 6 August 2000, p.6).

My argument so far, then, is that recent sex offender laws, following on from the community notification statutes in the US, combined with the rhetoric of government and popular press, amount to an accommodation of populist response whilst at the same time an implementation of managerialist neo-liberal policies (Simon, 1998) that involve the vertical delayering of responsibility. Where this is significant with respect
to the life of ‘communities’ is that it creates a fundamental ambivalence about where authority lies. The community is to be the site of governmental strategies of risk management, but is also appealed to as the source of expressions of popular will that create an authentic moral order by expelling badness outside its bounds.

Psychoanalytic commentary: The Paulsgrove Protesters

A Note on method

Although there was considerable press coverage of the week-long Paulsgrove protests in July and August 2000, only a few journalists sought to gain access to the actual residents involved in order to solicit their views (Gillan, 2001; Ferguson, 2001). No other descriptions of the attitudes and mental state of the protesters exist in the public domain except for those published recently in a book by Jon Silverman and David Wilson, *Innocence Betrayed* (2002). The latter conducted interviews with members of the Paulsgrove ‘Residents Against Paedophiles’ group and other residents on the estate (see pp.125-145) and it is important to note, in order to trust the sources I used, that these do not conflict with the reports of serious news journalists. My hypothesis, therefore, was developed within the context of this currently available information, and I use quotations from these sources as if they were unproblematic and trustworthy. I presume that I can ‘read through’ media accounts in order to get some access, however circumscribed, to something of the state of mind of the protesters (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000b: 96-7) and I am therefore refraining from engaging with epistemological issues. I recognise that that this stance requires taking some things for granted, but it would be an entirely different project to study the ways in which the media represented the protesters as if this told us all we need to know about
them as phenomena constructed only through representation - and, moreover, self-defeating to do both simultaneously.

What remains in need of explanation, then, is the question of what actions mean to the particular ‘communities’ and individuals who do get involved; how these may be a consequence of unconscious projections and excitations depending on the prevailing anxieties and defences at the time. As in the clinical context of psychoanalytic treatment itself, an external event is understood not so much as something that has ‘effects’ than as something that is used in relation to predisposing factors – ‘a constellation of possible underlying dynamics’ (Waddell, 2002: 191). Accordingly, there is a dynamic link between what is real and what is fantasised; from the point of view of psychoanalysis, there is no such thing as a purely ‘external’ event.

**Case study**

What was immediately striking about the Paulsgrove protest, according to all the available accounts (Gillan, 2000; Ferguson, 2001; Silverman and Wilson, 2002), was a conspicuous presence of working class women. Moreover, there is ample evidence that children accompanied their mothers on the marches, carrying coffins and holding placards with slogans such as: ‘Don’t house them, hang them’ and ‘Kill the paedophiles’ (Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 125). It is also important to take account of the fact that, as emerged in the course of some of the interviews, many of the leading women were single parents, undertaking the burden of care for their children with the help of extended families and networks on the estate (Gillan, 2000; Ferguson, 2001; Silverman and Wilson, 2002). Furthermore, as Silverman and Wilson (2002: 128) found out in the course of their research, many of the women active in
‘Residents Against Paedophiles’ (RAP) identified themselves as victims because of periods in their early life when they had been sexually abused. The self-styled, if unofficial, ‘leader’ of RAP, Katrina Kessell, had been sexually abused as a child by her paternal grandfather, and further sexually abused when she was sent into a care home by her mother: ‘I was convinced I was just getting extra affection and attention. And no, I still haven’t dealt with it, and I don’t think I ever will…’ (Kessell, in Ferguson, 2001, p.4). She had a history of chaotic sexual partnerships, with four children by three different partners (see Ferguson, 2001). In at least one press interview during that summer, she spoke of her abuse: ‘My upbringing has made it very hard to accept paedophiles in society. The problems I’ve had have had a terrible effect on my family. It took a long time before I could cuddle my children’ (in Gillan, 2000, p.5). Kessell herself was reported to the social services after her three-year old son was found wandering naked, having escaped from her garden, near a busy road half a mile from home (Milmo, 2000, p.12). At the time, Kessell was being interviewed by a television station. A (harmless) stranger rescued him. Another member of RAP, Sharon Mills, said in an interview: ‘I’ve got people in my own family who were abused, and I know a woman of sixty on this estate who has only just admitted that she was abused as a child’ (Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 129).

There was considerable confusion in the minds of the protesters about the real ‘causes’ and meaning of the protests. They produced accounts that were contradicted by others, such as witnesses and those holding official positions linked to the Paulsgrove estate. Katrina Kessell claimed in interviews (Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 125) that over a period of eighteen months prior to the eruption of the protests, she and others had made concerted efforts, through petitions to Portsmouth City
Council, to have convicted paedophile Victor Burnett removed from the estate. However, Kessell’s account was contested by the local MP Syd Rapson, a witness to the nightly protests, and her own fellow protestor Sharon Mills, both of whom independently claimed that Kessell only found out about Burnett towards the end of July 2002, when the News of the World published his picture, and further claimed that his name had not been mentioned with the council (Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 127; 133). Rapson verified that the only person who did know about Burnett until the beginning of August was the Director of Social Services, because he was in close contact with the monitoring activities of the police (Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 133). Kessell, however, referred also to a more generalised and informal community-based knowledge of paedophile activity on the estate over the years: she hinted that there were quite a few paedophiles whom residents ‘knew of’ (in Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 127). As Silverman and Wilson (127) themselves comment, this is “‘knew” as in taproom gossip and innuendo rather than incontrovertible fact…’ (see also Vasagar, 2000).

Rapson’s own view (in Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 133 and endorsed by them) about the causes of the protests was that, in part,

‘People were targeting paedophiles to distract attention from the sex abuse that goes on within families here. It was a way of assuaging their own guilt. One woman who joined the mob has a son who had been arrested for sexual assault. But she said: ‘Oh that’s different, he’s not guilty – and he’s not a paedophile’.
Silverman and Wilson’s observations, combined with Rapson’s point, gets us closer to the argument that I want now to pursue (although the latter’s formulation suggests the workings of a conscious conspiracy, a view that my account inevitably complicates). My argument follows from the observation that in the minds of many of the protesters under consideration, the distinction between abuser and victim, perpetrator and innocent bystander was fairly permeable and therefore unconsciously blurred. This can be demonstrated by paying attention to what, as we will see, were the likely multiple identifications made by key protesters given their history as sexually abused women, evidence for which is in part provided by the generally confused and endlessly contested interpretations of the ‘truth’ of the events. In particular, I draw attention to the general equivocation among the protesters concerning what was to be counted as reliable ‘knowledge’. What is of particular interest from a psychoanalytic viewpoint is the deep-seated ambivalence of the protesters towards the idea that truthful information should be a prerequisite for action.

However intense this drama, or rather precisely because of its dramatalurgical colour, all the evidence points towards the fact that it remained oddly misdirected. It was not about exactly what it seemed to be about. The actions of the women (seven nights of violent demonstrations, intense engagement with the media, and attacks on the property of suspected paedophiles) were excessive in relation to their aims and destructive in their results. (The longer term local authority response to their deputations will be discussed at the end of the article.) They were ‘sensational’ in the real meaning of that term: acting on the senses. It seems likely that the protests exhibited an extreme quality of acting out. One protester, Jackie Rampton, was quoted
as saying, ‘I can’t help it but this is how I felt. Walking the streets with all the noise, I got a buzz out of it. I know it sounds really childish.’ (in Gillan, 2000, p.5). ‘Acting out’ is an action in which the subject, in grip of unconscious wishes and phantasies, relives these in the present with a sensation of immediacy, which is heightened by his or her refusal to recognise its source. In clinical treatment, acting out is coupled with ‘remembering’, the two being contrasting ways of bringing the past into the present. What is typical in acting out is the replacement of thought by action, implying that the impulse being acted out has never acquired conversion to verbal representation and mental processing (see Rycroft, 1968).

Lacanian thought in particular emphasises that recollection does not involve merely recalling something to consciousness but also requires communication to an ‘Other’ by means of speech (see Evans, 1996). When the other has become ‘deaf’ the subject cannot convey a message to him/her in words and is forced to express the message in actions. In this regard, what Katrina Kessell said is instructive: ‘How else do you get noticed? How else is anyone going to listen to a common person like me? […] At least we were being listened to, and we got something done’ (in Ferguson, 2001).

What is evident is how pleasurably reckless these actions were for the protagonists, and how the mutual amplification shared by the media and the anti-paedophile protesters (who enjoyed minor celebrity status and ‘milked’ it) merely heightened their excited, narcissistic preoccupation with their own experience. At the same time, however, Kessell was suspicious of the trustworthiness of those sections of the media that appeared to support her cause (and it could be argued, were inseparable from her cause). Of the News of the World’s campaign, she told one journalist that ‘…they shouldn’t have done it that way. I think it was all too cynical. And I don’t think they
checked everyone properly, which allowed mistakes, and damaged all of us’ (in Ferguson, 2001; see also Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 136). This statement was typical: the facts that anyone else had were to be doubted and she was even suspicious of those who might appear to be ‘on her side’. Moreover, not only were some of the protesters unimpressed by the fact that as a consequence of ‘mistaken identity’ ‘innocent’ people suffered as a result of their aggression, they also exhibited a lack of empathy with them (see Gillan, 2000, p.5). It appears that these protesters were at one and the same time highly ‘principled’ and moralistic but also operating on the edge of illegality. It is relevant to refer at this point to the insight of psychoanalyst Arthur Hyatt Williams, who spent his career treating convicted murderers. Referring to the murderousness intentions of his patients, many of whom had suffered early life-threatening experiences, he argued that where persecutory anxiety (a primitive response to threat, real or imagined) is all pervasive, ‘aggrievement is rampant and responsibility muted’. He goes on, ‘The victim or other people are felt to bear responsibility for the persecution’ (Hyatt Williams, 1998: 31).

How should we proceed to interpret the meaning of this particular acting out? Well, the overt threat as the women perceived and expressed it came from unknown men. In the specific case of Katrina Kessell and some of the other women interviewed (see Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 129) the focus on the image of unknown men was likely to be based on the disavowal of the existence of real men they had known who had abused and asserted power over them. It was more bearable to locate an external object as the bearer of bad internal objects than to face the conflict that occurs when one has an attachment to the person that shames and humiliates. This involved a displacement through the mechanism of projection. Kessell did know she had been
abused by someone close to her and had not consciously forgotten this; in fact she
draws attention to it in the many interviews she gave to the press (see Gillan, 2000;
Ferguson, 2000). But, as is the nature of disavowal, in the split between belief and
knowledge where the former predominates, the real danger is perceived as external
nonetheless. Here, we can draw on the experience of those working clinically with
adults sexually abused as children (see Balbernie, 1994; Summit, 1983). Where the
abuser is an attachment figure, then internal disunity is a survival strategy. Common
to all experiences of abuse is the feeling of being used by another person as a thing
existing purely for their benefit: ‘identity thus receives its ultimate disconfirmation’
(Balbernie, 1994: 25). In situations where the abuser does not have his/her experience
validated by a saner adult, which we can infer was the case from what Kessell and her
colleagues said, many have argued that child victims of sexual abuse face a
‘secondary trauma’ in which their attempts to ‘reconcile their private experiences with
the realities of the outer world are assaulted by the disbelief, blame and rejection they
experience from adults’ (Summit, 1983: 177). **It is clear, then, that those who have
experienced sexual abuse are highly sensitive to claims about beliefs and
accusations of lying, and therefore have a troubled attitude to the very status of
knowledge.**

And here we arrive at my central hypothesis concerning the protesters’ state of mind
and their relationship to the external world. Quite consistently, across all the
interviews and accounts of her that we have, Kessell proved to be evasive and
contradictory about the external origins of the ‘list’ of twenty ‘known’ paedophiles
that was used as the basis and justification for the protest. She told journalist Audrey
Gillan that she did not personally have the alleged list of 20 paedophiles used by the
protesters to find their targets, but that she kept a lot of the details of these alleged offenders ‘in her head’ (in Gillan, 2000, p.5; see also Ferguson, 2001). She went on to say that the list is made up from the number of people who have come to her and said ‘I was abused by so and so’ – but she also claimed that she had seen documentary proof of the offences (Gillan, 2000, p.5). She said, ‘We checked them all out properly, we had people down the library looking back through the newspapers’ (Hill, 2001) and, more importantly, that

‘Nine times out of ten, what is brought to us is official. The stuff is read by me and other people, then we go and check with the neighbours and then we check the electoral roll and confirm the details before we go to the houses. It didn’t come from the internet. People have told me their stories and I have come away in tears a few times’ (Katrina Kessell, in Gillan, 2000, p.5).

However, she would later tell Silverman and Wilson that the list had been drawn up from ‘word of mouth and facts gleaned from the Internet’ (2002: 136). We can surmise then, that the ‘list’ was for Kessell and her fellow protesters an object in phantasy – functioning in a way that echoes the expectations placed on the offender’s register by the government. Like a talisman, it would arm her with good, powerful knowledge that would enhance her capacity to expel the paedophile persecutor. It is significant that her fellow protester, Jackie Rampton, resigned from the protest only when she discovered that the list of paedophiles didn’t ‘exist’ (that is, had a dubious connection to reality). Of this moment of disillusionment, which she presents as something of a revelation, she said to one reporter: ‘There is no list […] . They said to me the list’s all mental. I think then it did hit me what we were doing’ (in Gillan,
2000, p.5). The list was in their heads; it was all *mental*: this is a very precise image of something that has an existence only in an imaginary space, in the mind. (14) It draws attention to the existence of an internal pressure that brought about the extreme grievance they expressed. In Rampton’s statement we see an acknowledgement of her shift away from her earlier position that what is perceived and thus presented in her mind must conform to that which is agreeable, to one in which she accepts the truth of what is perceived even if it is disagreeable. This is what Freud in 1920 referred to as the institution of the reality principle (Freud, 1984a: 36-7. ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’).

Taking up my earlier suggestion, we could refer to many of the women’s actions and their own interpretations of them in terms of paranoia. The paranoid person is significantly aggressive and provocative. In paranoia, extensive rationalisation of aggression goes together with a strong predominance of projective mechanisms, as well as attitudes of alertness towards the external environment and justified indignation (Kernberg, 1998: 87). It is reasonably certain that these women, led by the galvanising presence of Kessell, were disowning the aggressive and destructive anxieties about their own incapacities and bad inner objects from their pasts and projecting them onto the figure of the paedophile. In terms of their attitude towards the present, these incapacities, I shall go on to suggest, lie in the area of not feeling able to provide adequately for one’s children or to protect them.

The women made definite secondary gains from putting themselves in the position of the persecuted, once they had projected all the destructiveness onto the paedophile other. Strengthened by the group, individuals achieved a position of moral rectitude
that left them feeling omnipotent, arrogant and in control. This conferred a degree of power. It therefore involved an attempt to establish one’s own innocence. The secondary gain therefore provided great relief because one could feel morally superior and cleansed of guilt or self-blame. (15) If we are to take the world of phantasy seriously, we should not accept at face value the presenting symptom of the acted out drama (the drama that is designed to attract our attention). For the presented symptom announces a chasmic difference between the women and the paedophile. But this may cloak the existence of an identification with the aggressor. What might the women have shared unconsciously with the paedophile that was so terrible to acknowledge that it must be cast out as belonging to the paedophile alone?

In ‘Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego’, Freud (1921) offered some thoughts on the reasons for the hostility connected with ‘details of differentiation’ – what he elsewhere termed the ‘narcissism of minor differences’. Vamik Volkan takes up Freud’s observations to draw attention to the connection, or recognition of similarity, that forms the basis of the relationship between the projector and the particular object of that projection:

‘Because the enemy, whatever realistic considerations may be involved, is a reservoir of our unwanted self- and object representations with which elements of our projections are condensed, there should be some unconscious perception of a likeness, a reverse correspondence that binds us together while alienating us. However, these externalizations and projections we have given our enemy are repugnant to us, so we disavow them and do not want to acknowledge this connection consciously.’ (1994: 99).
It seems logical therefore that our best reservoir for phenomena that are originally our own would be those things and people who resemble us or are at least familiar to us (Volkan, 1994: 105). This defence mechanism is particularly pertinent as a way of thinking about individuals who have suffered physical and sexual abuse, perhaps through generations. Identifying with or even impersonating the aggressor is a common feature of the psychic makeup of sexually abused individuals, as was pointed out very early on by Freud (Freud, 1968; Ferenczi, 1980). By assuming the attributes of the aggressor or imitating his aggression, the subject may transform herself from the person threatened into the person who makes the threat. It was Ferenczi (1933) who first showed how the aggressor, who has the ‘overpowering force and authority of the adult’, takes up a powerful place in the inner world of the child. The vulnerable child’s assumption, in the face of betrayal by a loved adult, that s/he is being punished for being ‘bad’ leads to the feeling that an obvious way to be ‘good’ is to copy the person who terrifies him/her. Compliance, the only way the child can make sense of what is going on when the abuser is also an attachment figure, is a phenomenon often referred to in the sexual abuse literature (Balbernie, 1994: 21).

Kessell acknowledged her difficulties in managing her feelings towards her children but did not link this consciously to the paedophile who on a conscious level is perceived as a threat simply emanating from the external world. The fact that they involved their (in some cases, very young) children on the marches may be regarded as an example of this, and may be analysed in terms of the concept of introjective identification. Here, the women are unconsciously identifying with the paedophile, internalising the aggressive and sadistic attributes of the paedophile other and
projecting them subsequently onto their children. In injecting them with knowledge of
sexual aggression of men, paradoxically they pass on, or share out, toxic knowledge
to the very people they feel are most in need of protecting – their young, the
‘innocent’. It is an acknowledged pattern in abusive families that children are instilled
with a sense of the external world as being a dangerous place, thus projecting the
danger and viciousness that lies within the home and within adult carers outwards (see
Walker, 1997: 109). In a context where chief child-carers do not feel they have the
capacity or the support to bear their young children’s dependency on them and
difference from them, they resort, in this case, to the dubious strategy of innoculating
them with detailed knowledge of all possible harms that could come to them. This
means the group would be predisposed to anxiety about additional ‘matter’ that
intrudes, that is dirty and becomes associated with them by close proximity (Douglas,
1966). It is a strong possibility that the mainly single parents comprising the protesters
felt unprotected and uncertain as to how they were managing parenthood. There is
evidence from some of the interviews that they felt inadequate to the task (Gillan,
2001) and we have seen how they were destructive in a number of ways towards their
own dependents.

In psychoanalytic terms, the individual who is prey to primitive anxieties seeks relief
by projecting these anxieties into another – the earliest experience of this is of course
the mother-baby dyad (see Bion, 1982). Wilfred Bion argued that if all goes well
enough, the mother helps the baby to find the capacity to think by ‘processing’ or
taking in its unbearable emotions and handing them back in a way that makes them
manageable; otherwise the baby introjects dread and the terror of complete
helplessness (Bion, 1988: 182). Thus the baby, through a process of projective
identification, splits off and projects its intolerable experiences onto the mother, who in turn, and through a capacity for ‘reverie’, is able to identify with the baby’s feelings. She gives significance to the infant’s somatic and sensory experiences, transforming them through thinking into something that can be processed and helping the baby to integrate destructive impulses with creativity. In this way the baby can ‘learn from experience’ as Bion put it: can sustain her/himself in the event of a parental absence. A felt or real incapacity on behalf of the main carer, then, can leave the infant struggling with his or her feelings in unmodified form. In involving their children directly on the marches, the Paulsgrove mothers were reprojecting and magnifying their anxiety. This leads us to the question: who will support the mother and contain her destructive impulses? Who will contain her and provide her with ‘moral support’? This is a social problem, but in asking this I do not mean to appeal to a revival of patriarchal relations. Although Winnicott implies a gendered division of labour he makes it perfectly clear throughout his writings that what is most important is the structural condition for containment. It therefore does not follow from his theory that these positions should be dictated by gender and so any person might potentially be able to provide maternal containment. When Winnicott spoke of the mother and the child being encircled by the father he was referring to the need for this structure, a set of circles of containment for child carers:

‘…the father is needed to give mother moral support, to be the backing for her authority, to be the human being who stands for the law and order which mother plants in the life of the child. […] Indeed every woman has to speak and act with authority; but if she has to be the whole thing, and has to provide
the whole of the strong or strict element in her children’s lives as well as the love, she carries a big burden indeed.’ (1964: 115)

Where there is no literal or symbolic ‘father’, no substitute ‘Other’ for the mother in conditions of single parenthood, a healthy projective identification process is inhibited. There is in this case, therefore, no containment for single mothers’ dreads; on the contrary mothers have no choice but to experience in quite indigestible form the direct impingement of a very powerful ‘Other’. This ‘other’ in this case comprises a number of ‘authorities’ in the public sphere that, as we have seen, offer quite contradictory messages (managing sexual offenders via social integration or purification via expelling) about what to do with the knowledge that there are imminent threats impinging upon the capacity to conduct everyday life. The persistence of denigratory discourses combined with economic marginalisation that already make single mothers themselves a social Other merely exacerbates the sense of mental precariousness; thus these women in this case study may well feel they have nothing to lose and much to gain (unconsciously) in forming an ‘autistic’ group enclosed in its own circle of defensive moral righteousness (see Ignatieff, 1994: 8).

**Conclusion**

In conducting their protests, Paulsgrove residents made much of a ‘list’ of suspected paedophiles that had been drawn up and was used as the basis for their actions. However, there was no consensus between them as to the sources for this list. Neither has it ever been clear that such a list had a real existence; according to one account there is no firm evidence that anyone other than the protesters ‘saw’ it (Silverstone and Wilson, 2002: 136-7). Other accounts suggest that what some of the protesters
referred to as a ‘mental list’ was used as the basis for a list telephoned to police (Vasagar, 2000). Drawing from the accounts we have of this episode, including interviews conducted with the central protagonists, what is clear is this list had a highly ambiguous status in the minds of the protesters (see Ferguson, 2001; Gillan, 2000; Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 136). The protesters resisted entreaties to have it verified by the council or the police; in fact they refused to make it public. But the protests became unsustainable after it became evident that ‘innocent’ individuals and their property were being attacked, and, more importantly for the purposes of this article, because the legitimacy of the list of sexual offenders became discredited amongst the protesters themselves. For it seemed that the list, seen and used as proof, and used in this way as a mechanism for binding the group together, had had a real existence only in their heads. A ‘reality principle’ set in (Freud, 1984a: 37), but only after considerable destruction had taken place. In offering a psychoanalytic view on these events, the case study indicates the arousal of paranoiac unconscious processes in a context where governance techniques of responsibilisation inject (seemingly good and neutral) ‘information’ into communities as an inoculation against dangerous forces. My argument with respect to the case of the Paulsgrove vigilantists is that the list of paedophiles the protesters compiled played a central role in providing them with, in their eyes, legitimation for their actions. The list was a means of simultaneously creating and then acting upon a form of knowledge that was understood as normally belonging to office holders and therefore normally withheld from the public. It should be said that the idea that ‘information’ contains attractive potentiality was also underlined by key mediators in the public sphere such as the NoW that not only provided information on the whereabouts of particular ‘paedophiles’ but implicitly incited residents to use that information. (3)
The issue this paper has sought to address is the extent to which a particular language of empowerment, responsibility and active citizenship may be mentally burdensome for, and perversely used by, particular individuals in order to form a particular community. Empowerment, along with its sister concepts, such as ‘responsibility, ‘active citizenship’ and ‘initiative’, has the quality of an idealisation that unconsciously sets itself against a bad object that must be denigrated, in this case, ‘dependency’, passivity and lack of initiative to harness knowledge in the steering of oneself. However, it may well be that these policy initiatives based on the production and exchange of information (Pratt, 1995), and which aim to allay ‘fear’ and involve citizens directly in the regulation of risk, have unintended consequences. In an atmosphere where disclosure of information to ‘local communities’ is seen as a moral right and where the government refuses a role as the representative of external reality, the more individuals will cohere into groups which absorb government into their closed system. (16) As Michael Ignatieff has argued, in seeking to put forward the case for toleration from a liberal perspective, intolerant people are uninterested in the individuals who compose despised groups, since what they are really interested in is a more primal opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (1994: 11). He makes the point that threatened or anxious individuals take a leap into collective fantasy in order to ‘avoid the burden of thinking for themselves or even thinking of themselves as individuals’. The perpetrators of intolerant acts are involved in procedures of abstraction in which there is an unconsidered fusion of personal and group identity (1994: 11) – an abstraction which of course they also project onto individual paedophiles who become members of a despised and hounded group. Those susceptible to collective fantasy are often individuals, such as those at Paulsgrove, who may feel that the boundaries of
their private existence are too permeable and will not withstand violent disruption and change coming from their own internal pressures and conflicts, let alone from without. Knowledge presented as ‘empowering’ to a community, even if presented as dry and neutral, can easily become the object of a cathexis by that community. But what are communities supposed to do with knowledge that is presented to them in the spirit of the co-production of community safety? No one discusses the state of mind that is required to deal with this knowledge, or the quality of the emotional resources that will be brought to bear upon it, or the ways in which it might turn out to be impractical. Information does not always function, as it is intended to, as administration without emotion. As we have seen, access to information does not necessarily have the effect of containing adults in such a way that enhances their capacity to act as good enough parents. Instead, through a number of complex identifications, it can become a passport to an impulsive acting out of unacknowledged bad objects.

Responsibilisation desires a politics of presence that seeks to make everything transparent. From the perspective of neo-liberal programmes of governance that seek to responsibilise, information management involving community input is seen as the long term key to managing the safety of communities with respect to sexual offenders post-prison. At the same time, the ‘community’ is pressured – by government and the media – into manifesting idealising norms based on expelling dangerous matter, matter that originates from outside the community. What results is something of an illusion. In the hands of one particular vulnerable and ill-resourced community, lacking both social capital and psychical resources for containment, ‘knowledge’, in this case in the form of a ‘list’, may assume a talismanic quality that becomes the
justice for instantaneous cathartic action, providing those in the know with a sense of omnipotent preparedness. For the Paulsgrove ‘list’ was, as we have seen, invented by a community in the grip of a quasi-psychotic episode. Although it was based almost entirely on unsubstantiated rumour, it incited feelings of curiosity, self-righteousness and perverse forms of identification (see Bion, 1967). The imaginary list mimicked the real, official register, one that is perceived as having the potential to offer a literal index of the location of dangerous, unknown men. But whereas the former could be used to satisfy a desire for action, the knowledge contained in the official register was regarded as frustratingly providing only half-knowledge because access to it was restricted; hence the support by most of the protesters for ‘Sarah’s Law’.(17) The Paulsgrove events thus represent one manifestation of a community mobilising itself in the name of a strategy to govern at a distance. The distinction between vigilance and vigilantism, then, is highly amenable to elision or confusion in the circumstances under consideration in this paper.

In response to the protesters, Portsmouth City Council has run a ‘keep safe’ programme in local schools, and has launched council-funded child protection awareness sessions (Hill, 2001) as well as a neighbourhood civilian warden scheme (Bennetto, 2000, p.11). Although well intentioned no doubt and perhaps effectual in the short term, this kind of policy response seems only to endorse the massive projections born of collective paranoia and a group assumption that the ‘problem’ is indeed what everyone consciously deems it to be. Psychoanalysis uniquely, I think, offers another picture, one that indicates how the regulative methods now being used may exacerbate rather than allay public anxiety about the management of sexual offenders for particular parts of the population. ‘Responsibilisation’ strategies are
predicated on the assumptions that trust is increased when the differences between officials and laypersons are diminished and that particular communities have the capacity to be responsible.

Its broader implication is to draw attention to the deleterious consequences that follow when government colludes with the disowned, unwanted, and often persecutory feeling states of distressed citizens instead of taking on some responsibility for containing and modifying them.
Notes

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1. Silverman and Wilson usefully compare the working class protests at Paulsgrove with the methods a middle class group in London used to conduct a campaign against paedophiles (2002: 137-145)

2. In the late nineteenth century, Gustav le Bon made one of the first links between the group (for him ‘the crowd’) and the need to act born of a sense of unreflecting moral rectitude:

‘We have shown that crowds do not reason, that they accept or reject ideas as a whole, that they tolerate neither discussion nor contradiction, and that the suggestions brought to bear on them invade the entire field of their understanding and tend at once to transform themselves into acts’ (cited in Freud, 1985: 103)

3. Namely, the News of the World, whose editor Rebekah Wade headlined its name and shame campaign ‘Everyone in Britain has a child sex offender living within one mile of their home’ (Sunday 23 July, p.1).
4. A paper issued to accompany the Guidance notes for the CDA 1998 (Ekblom, 1998: 5), setting out a conceptual role for the development of professional discipline within the context of community safety, states: ‘The professional preventer may directly intervene in the chain of cause and effect leading to the criminal event… But more often, the professional’s role is to act at a distance – to motivate, inform and assist other, more informal, preventers (such as families, teachers or site managers) to implement it.’

5. As a recent analysis by Ron Levi indicates (2000: 485), courts in the US that have upheld the constitutionality of community notification statutes modelled on Megan’s Law have assumed that ‘any harm that community notification may cause to an individual registrant is generally said not to be attributable to…the state’. These actions are regarded as ‘private harms’ since they stem from the actions of private individuals (who have acted on the information released to them) and the state is therefore not held to be responsible for the ‘misuse’ of information released.

6. This should be understood in the context of the lack of political will in meeting what are in any case low targets for therapeutic treatment programmes in prisons (see Kemshall and Maguire, 2002: 241; Vallely, 2002).

7. For detailed analysis of the orders from a governance perspective, see Ashenden, 2002.

8. In the US, sexual predator laws attempt to target those who are likely to pose a threat to community safety, which therefore discursively excludes those whose
victims are their own children or intimates. Sexual predator designates both a type of law and a type of person. Whereas ‘psychopath’ is a psychological term and thus describes mental disease diagnosable and potentially treatable by medical experts, the concept of ‘sexual predator’ that emerged in the 1990s has no medical definition and refers to someone who is believed to suffer from a disorder that is untreatable. As Simon (1998) suggests, sexual predators are ‘monsters conjured from images of evil’.

9. The populist tone of Sarah’s Law, like Megan’s Law in the US, is readily apparent in its timing and nomenclature. Personalising a law in this way is metonymic. One is forced to confront Sarah’s presence: it stands in for her and as such seems to bear the weight of public outrage. Being against the law is to be ‘against Sarah’, an attack on her being. See Simon, 1998: 463.

10. The News of the World also argued for unlimited sentences for the worst cases of what it terms ‘sexual predators’, based on its opinion that child sex offenders cannot be cured and that incapacitation is the only way to prevent re-offending.

11. The reproduction of criminal photographic portraits was probably the most potent weapon the newspaper had and a central contributing element to the elision in the media between vigilance and vigilantism. When police identity photographs appear in a national newspaper the reader is confronted with an image of individual dangerousness; the sexual offender is interpolated as an individual threat to them and their loved ones, one whose dangerousness is an immanent property of his person. However, in the context of the police database, the extent to which each portrait
signifies dangerousness is merely contingent upon a distribution of categories of riskiness across a whole population.


13. A series of confidential emails seen by the BBC’s Home Affairs correspondent Jon Silverman (discussed subsequently in Silverman and Wilson, 2002: 152-158) indicate that the government was so alarmed about the violence that it considered applying for an injunction against The News of the World on the grounds that it had made unauthorised use of information culled from files held by the Scout Association. Evidence had been collated by Acpo and Acops in August 2000 of concrete evidence that the work of the probation service was being impeded by the publications and that sex offenders were going underground and breaking their license conditions – evidence that would be required for a court case to proceed. However, concerned about the political dimensions, in short an expected outcry about attempts to ‘gag the press’, the Home Office decided not to follow this path.

14. Freud says, paraphrasing le Bon, that ‘groups have never thirsted after truth. They demand illusions and cannot do without them. They constantly give what is unreal precedence over what is real; they are almost as strongly influenced by what is untrue as by what is true. They have an evident tendency not to distinguish between the two’ (1985 [1921]: 107).

15. This is largely how the News of the World’s campaign worked – through dictatorial assertion of its own righteousness and a furious hatred of anyone in doubt
as to what constitutes truth. For instance, a headline the day after Roy Whiting was convicted (16 December, 2000, p.11), reads:

Q: Would you want to be told if a predatory paedophile lived next door to you?

A. If you say Yes then you back Sarah’s Law. If you say No then you are a LIAR.


17. It is quite simply wishful thinking that the provision of knowledge, quite specific knowledge of individually named sexual offenders whose whereabouts is known, will be enough to protect a child. But it is this idea that is used to justify responsibilisation strategies in general and community notification laws in particular (see Levi, 2000: 482).

References


Http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/cdact/cstrng5.htm


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