JUSTICE IN THE RISK SOCIETY: BARTHES GOES TO HOLLYWOOD

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ABSTRACT

Hollywood cinema is rarely acknowledged as an important counterpublic sphere which works to firstly, stimulate a critical and inclusive dialogue on the nature of risk of/from crime; and secondly, facilitate a deliberative engagement with questions of ‘justice’. And yet, in the post 9/11 period, a series of futuristic films take seriously the implications to ‘justice’ of intensified surveillance in liberal democratic societies faced with different kinds of risk. Fictional filmic representations of futuristic technologies for responding to crime, especially those based on identificatory and predictive capacity, disseminate ambivalent discourses of both horror and hope. Box office successes, such as Minority Report (2002), Paycheck (2003) and A Scanner Darkly (2006) may (simply) be entertaining as ‘action-packed’ science fiction thrillers, but they also create a hyperreality which allows us to glimpse alternative frameworks of risk-management which, ambiguously, reflect both authoritarian and libertarian perspectives on systems of ‘justice’, law enforcement and punishment in a ‘risk society’. Through an analysis of these films, and drawing on Barthes’ notions of jouissance and the enigmatic, this paper will explore the critical, subversive and disruptive possibilities of the simulated worlds of ‘Hollywood justice’ paying particular attention to how they work to destabilise and scrutinise the conceptual scope and empirical instantiation of ‘risk’ as well as challenge its ethico-political meaning in contemporary life.
INTRODUCTION

In the academic and policy literature, the concept of risk organises and informs our perspectives on contemporary life, and is used not only as a mobile signifier of the quality of everyday experience in the present, but also as a means of contemplating and planning for the dynamics of the future. For some, ‘risk discourse’ is indicative of a set of expectations within modernity of a ‘right to life’ (Foucault, 1979), a right to protection from the kinds of risks which threaten the quality of life – disease, hunger, crime, pollution, conflict, death, danger. There is now a large body of theoretical scholarship and scientific research which provides a wide range of sophisticated, complex and generally persuasive analyses of the different hazards we face, and the potentialities of a future blighted by environmental, political, economic and social insecurities (Giddens, 1990, 1991, 1994; Beck, 1992; Bauman, 1995, 1997 Giddens, 1990, 1991; Beck, 1992; Bauman, 1995, 1997; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006). Indeed, Giddens’ (1984) clichéd notion of ‘ontological insecurity’ is frequently used as shorthand to describe the uncertainties of life in late modernity; and while there is much to support this gloomy outlook, the rhetoric of a runaway world and its accompanying narratives of precariousness, risk, threat and fear serves to define our common experience, and works to sustain an affective register of concern and a receptivity to strategies and technologies which can be fashioned and developed in the name of risk management. Such a context provides fertile ground for popularising and giving credence to certain narrowly conceived approaches to the containment and management of risk, most especially in relation to the surveillance and regulation of predatory, dangerous and prolific forms of criminality. As Pratt notes:
It might be possible to consider risk thinking as a cognitive habit that has penetrated all levels of Western thought. It has radiated out from scientific laboratories to enter the broadest level of consciousness and from there its influence has spread to the farthest corner of contemporary juridical procedure and penal administration (1997: 3).

Across Western liberal democratic societies, risk analysis, both as a process of inquiry and an apparatus of quantitative, actuarial reasoning has become the dominant procedure used to predict behaviour and situate individuals according to the level of risk they pose (Feeley and Simon, 1992; O’Malley, 2000; Kelmshall, 2003). Indeed, since the publication of Feeley’s and Simon’s (1992) seminal article on the ‘new penology’, criminological scholarship has certainly been swift to comment on how modes of calculation and control associated with risk-oriented technologies and actuarial practices have infiltrated and become _de rigeur_ within criminal justice and penal administration. For example, in the UK, probation practice has traded its rehabilitative ethos for an administrative approach which is driven by policies of public protection via the regulation and management of offenders calculated and categorised as ‘risky’ (Kelmshall, 2003). Reliance on formalised risk assessment tools, such as OASys (Offender Assessment System) has transformed probation’s traditional practice of pre-sentence reporting into a quasi-scientific exercise where ‘risk scores’ are used to evidence the propensity for future offending and the risks of further harm to the community (Kelmshall, 1998). Similarly, policing has shifted from an individualised, investigative approach to tackling crime towards planned and targeted strategies for combating crime and promoting community safety (Maguire, 2000). Making use of biometric methods, psychometric testing, criminal profiling, surveillance systems, forensic identity databases and forensic identification
technologies, policing has developed an operational orientation which prioritises intelligence-led approaches to the management of risk as posed by crime and disorder (Chan, 2001).

At times made meaningful within wider perspectives on neo-liberalism (McLaughlin and Murji, 2001; O’Malley, 1992, 2000, 2001, 2004a; Stenson, 1998, 2000; Sullivan, 2001), and at other times investigated in relation to specific areas of policy and practice – such as, crime prevention (Hughes, 1998; O’Malley, 1998), policing (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997), incarceration and penal policy (Hudson, 2001; Simon, 2001), restorative justice (Clear and Cadora, 2001), drugs policy (O’Malley, 1999a), forensic science (McCartney, 2006), the governance of ‘dangerousness’ (Pratt, 1997) and sexual violence (Janus, 2000) – there now exists a substantial critical literature documenting not only the power effects of ‘risk discourse’, but also how thorny questions of governance, legitimacy, human rights, punishment, law enforcement, justice and community safety are increasingly settled by reference to the notion of ‘risk’. This kind of critical work provides an important counterpoint to (atheoretical) evaluation studies which focus on the administrative utility and instrumental value of different ‘risk technologies’. Widely condemned as ‘positivist correctionalism and managerialism’ (Pratt, 1997: 4), or reviled as ‘administrative criminology’ (Young, 1986: 4-30), the majority of these contributions have been concerned with developing and perfecting different technologies and apparatuses for identifying, managing, measuring, calculating and predicting risk.¹ At best, they provide negative, rather than critical assessments of the effectiveness, efficiency and/or predictive utility of risk technologies; at worst, they leave in place how ‘risk’ should be thought, analysed, managed and communicated in any given politico-economic context. However, and of

¹ See, for example, Champion (1994); Bonta (1996); Loeber and Farrington (1998); Hoge (2002); Webster, MacDonald and Simpson (2006); Schwalbe, Fraser and Day (2007); Kim, Joo and McCarty (2008)
concern here is how critical scholarship and administrative work alike make a number of unqualified assumptions about the popular (public) appetite and support for risk-oriented modes of governance. In his outline of the resonance of fear of crime to the contemporary politics of risk, Jackson posits:

Public perceptions of crime also influence specific government policies. Anxieties about crime make themselves felt through public demands on the police to manage crime and its concomitant causes and effects. Clamor for more police, increasing calls for the government to tackle antisocial behaviour, the seeming refusal of many people to believe that crime rates are not rising – all these evidence the influence of public perceptions of risk. And governments respond: witness popular punitive law and order sloganeering (and) police strategies of reassurance….. In some instances, public perceptions of risk even encourage the police to focus on reassurance at the expense of actual risk reduction (2006: 253).

The idea of a compliant public which is not only receptive to the introduction of authoritarian risk-reduction strategies, but which also welcomes the widespread use of pseudo-scientific instruments and tools of risk-management, runs through much of the academic commentary on ‘risk’. There is a tacit assumption that the public is not merely convinced of the utility of risk technologies, but actively clamours for more of the same – see, for example, Ashenden’s (2002) eloquent and insightful article on ‘policing perversion’, in which she examines the ‘normalising models of risk’ which inform popular acceptance of the perceived threat posed by child sex offenders. What is missing from such accounts is any acknowledgement of the circulation of a ‘risk discourse’ which is resistant to or, at least, which problematises, challenges and/or subverts hegemonic ideas about the systems and apparatuses of risk control and their
anticipated effects. I want to suggest three key and interrelated reasons for this omission. First, the literature tends to hold a rather limited (and limiting), one-dimensional view of the nature of public opinion and the orientation of public deliberation; second, there is very little imagination about the range of media through which ‘risk discourse’ circulates, or what counts as the public sphere; and third, academic scholarship, despite its critical credentials, is rather conservative about what it regards as, and where it locates relations and practices of resistance. These issues are elaborated in the next section and form the groundwork for rethinking the nature of contemporary ‘risk consciousness’, how it is mediated and mobilised in relations of resistance. I introduce the notion of a ‘movement of becoming’, borrowed from Connolly (1999), and see this as a dynamic process of sensibility-formation experienced as a transgressive and destabilising awareness of the conditions of ‘risk-management’ in late modernity. The paper goes on to make the case for understanding Hollywood cinema as an important counterpublic sphere which not only mobilises an inclusive and critical public dialogue on the nature of risk off/from crime, but which also prompts a reflexive questioning of and critical responsiveness to the politics and ethics of crime (risk) control. Drawing on Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality, and Barthes’ notions of jouissance and the enigmatic, I develop an epistemological and methodological framework for reading/viewing science fiction film as sites of resistance to contemporary ‘risk discourse’. In the light of these insights, and making use of three contemporary science fiction films – specifically, *Minority Report* (2002), *Paycheck* (2003) and *A Scanner Darkly* (2006) – the paper goes on to explore the critical, subversive and disruptive possibilities of the simulated worlds of ‘Hollywood justice’, paying special attention to how these visuo-discursive spaces mediate a transgressive and reflexive questioning of the limits and boundaries
of our knowledge and experience of ‘risk-management’ and its associated
technologies.

PUBLIC OPINION, COUNTERPUBLIC SPHERES AND RESISTANCE

Elsewhere, I have raised concern about criminology’s tendency to characterise (or
even caricature) public opinion as reactionary and punitive (Campbell, 2008).
According to Lyons and Scheingold (2000), understanding community engagements
with questions of crime and punishment through the lens of ‘punitive populism’
(Bottoms, 1995) has become something of a cumulative enterprise within academic
criminology. Getting to analytical grips with the (re-)emergence of populism and its
presumed support for the reintroduction of harsh measures premised on retribution,
deterrence and incapacitation, has produced some very innovative accounts of the
resurgence of a more conservative, authoritarian penalty which is open to the
proliferating (and often unregulated) use of risk-centred surveillance and control
systems such as CCTV, biometric identification methods, screening and scanning
devices, drugs and alcohol testing procedures and sex offender registers (Lyon, 2001,
2006; Ryan, 2003; Kemshall and McIvor, 2004; Thomas, 2005; McCartney, 2006;
Pratt, 2007). At the same time, the term ‘punitiveness normally carries connotations
of excess’ (Matthews, 2005: 179) in the penal realm, and when articulated in
conjunction with ‘populism’ the effect is to discredit the value of public deliberations
about risk and its management. Indeed, it is not uncommon for public dialogue to be
summarily dismissed as rhetorical, hyperbolic, unreasonable, irrational, paranoid,
hysterical and atavistic (Gattrell, 1994; Anderson, 1995; Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997;
Little, 1999; Freiberg, 2001). However, there is a growing chorus of voices which
question whether the expression ‘the new punitiveness’, or the notion of ‘punitive
populism’ adequately describes the public mood and tolerance for intrusive, panoptic forms of risk-management (O’Malley, 1999b; Matthews, 2005). Indeed, Hutton (2005) questions the notion of a monolithic public disposition and presents empirical data to demonstrate that punitive attitudes co-exist with less visceral and more ‘rational’, reflective attitudes to the politics of risk - see also Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur and Hough (2003); while Sparks calls for a highly contextualised and situationally-specific appreciation of popular views:

… the reception by people of media stories about crime and punishment is best grasped ethnographically and in situ, in which case many public responses that are commonly deprecated by criminologists and others as ‘irrational’ or ‘hysterical’ tend to become substantially more intelligible (2001: 197).

Sparks’ reference to the mediated nature of public discourse on ‘risk’ also prompts us to question what we come to regard as ‘media’ in this context. It is commonplace, for example, to cite newspaper coverage as the source media of public consciousness about the risks posed by crime, most especially the sensationalist reports of the tabloid press. Even those accounts which explicitly examine ‘media representations’ of risk, disproportionately trawl the newspapers for data (Roshier, 1973; Ashenden, 2002; Meyer, 2007) rather than any other medium – an exception here is Reiner, Livingstone and Allen (2001). It is not that this is ‘wrong’ so much that it ultimately skews and narrows our understanding of ‘media’ and, more importantly, it limits our sense of what counts as the public sphere of ‘risk discourse’. In other words, critical work on ‘risk and the media’ remains at some distance from recent developments in public sphere theory which call into question Habermasian notions of the nature of
public deliberation and mediated dialogue\textsuperscript{2}. We can readily accept Habermas’s description of the public sphere as ‘a network for communicating information and points of view’ (1996: 30); as a ‘discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest’ (Hauser, 1998: 86); or as a ‘theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk’ (Fraser, 1990: 57). However, it is Habermas’s insistence on the nature of public discussion – as a rule-based, ideal speech situation; as informed by communicative rationality; and as achieving consensus based on universal norms and principles – which expose him to the charge of failing to recognise the exclusivity of his particular version of discourse ethics (Pettit, 1982; Thompson and Held, 1982; Benhabib, 1986; Fraser, 1990; Calhoun, 1992; Outhwaite, 1994; Alway, 1999; Crossley and Roberts, 2004). Discursive media and practices which do not conform to the formalism of Habermasian criteria are either rendered irrelevant to deliberative forms of political engagement; or, are excluded and silenced as instances of public dialogue. In other words, forms of language and communication which do not exhibit what Garvey (2000) describes as the ‘purity of speech’ are off limits - this might include, for example, the use of parody, irony, satire, as well as different kinds of expression, such as aesthetic, affective and corporeal gestures. Equally, certain discursive media are discounted as valid spheres of public debate. In highly mediated societies, Fraser encourages us to consider ‘parallel discursive arenas’ (1990: 67) wherein counterdiscourses articulate resistive identities, oppositional perspectives and put forward alternative accounts of and solutions to the problems of the day. Such

\textsuperscript{2} Jürgen Habermas wrote extensively on the concept of the public sphere and his work often serves as the starting point for discussions about the discursive conditions of possibility for engendering a participatory, democratic society premised on equality, justice and freedom. See, for example, Habermas 1984, 1987, 1989(1962), 1992, 1993, 1996. Importantly, Habermas revised his thesis in response to the many critiques which the original formulation inspired – see Downey and Fenton, (2003), for an account of Habermas’s changing perspective.
discursive spaces have been theorised as counterpublic spheres (Asen, 2000; Asen and Brouwer, 2001; Warner, 2002) and this is a concept which allows an understanding of public deliberation (of risk in this context) as mobilised discursively within and through a heterogeneity of cultural media. Consequently, stand-up comedy, Hollywood film, television talk shows, video-gaming and cartoons, for example, are as crucial for deliberative and participatory engagement with the politics of risk as are government publications, documentary broadcasts, citizens juries, town hall meetings, local surveys and audits, and consensus conferences. Such media function as discursive spaces of ‘critical publicity’ (Asen and Brouwer, 2001: 6), a notion which denotes the reflexive interaction of resistance and power as a discursive and cultural accomplishment.

These kinds of insights also allow us to be a little more imaginative about the nature of resistance, and where relations and practices of resistance might be located. Hitherto, the ‘criminology of risk’ recognises resistance if it comes in the form of direct action which has the effect of scuppering or problematising the exercise of governmental power – for example, police ‘foot-dragging’ as resistance to the communicative demands of the ‘risk economy’ (O’Malley, 1999c); the reluctance of the Australian criminal courts to implement the ‘dangerousness statutes’, or invoke special powers of detention for ‘serious offenders’, as resistance to the logic of risk (Freiberg, 200); the Paulsgrove residents’ protest (in Portsmouth, UK, 2000) as resistance to local authority policy on the housing of sex offenders (Ashenden, 2002, Drury, 2002; Ryan, 2005). Or consider Coleman and Sim’s (2005) account of how, in Liverpool, 2003, local authority and policing strategies to monitor (and ultimately remove) homeless persons from the city centre - through curfew, undercover policing,
targeted surveillance and routine fingerprinting – floundered, largely as a result of an orchestrated campaign against the initiative. As Coleman and Sim note:

(There was a) public outcry in letters pages in the local press and the threat of legal action by the Big Issue in the North … under human rights legislation. There have also been ‘sleep-outs’ by community groups to raise awareness of rough sleeping in the city along with challenges to the punitive rhetoric and criminalization of asylum seekers by groups such as ‘People Not Profit’ (2005: 113).

So long as resistance is equated with direct forms of action which have a demonstrable, political impact on how risk is communicated and governed, it will obscure the more subtle ways in which contemporary modes of risk-management come to be questioned, reflected upon and challenged as part of an everyday, ongoing and revisable consciousness of ‘risk’. In other words, relations of resistance inhere in what Connolly talks of as a ‘movement of becoming’ (1999: 57-62), a point at which we might engage with forms of critical publicity and counterdiscourses of ‘risk’ in a way which incites an ‘ethos of critical responsiveness’ (ibid: 62; see also, Campbell, 2009 forthcoming). Such an ethos is experienced as a dynamic process of sensibility-formation which involves a disruptive reflexivity about our own and others’ beliefs about ‘risk’ and how it is currently managed. This kind of subjective and intersubjective resistance may not be visually dramatic (or even materially effective) but it unsettles and contests the terms and conditions of the received wisdom of ‘risk’, exposing its ambiguities and uncertainties, and leaving it vulnerable to change.

Kemshall is right to suggest that ‘(t)he identification, assessment, prevention and management of risk have become big business in crime policy, practice and research’
However, the hegemony of a ‘risk-based’ approach to criminal justice matters does not also mean that such strategies are popularly supported, or actively demanded from below. Yet, the existence of a ‘mass risk consciousness’ (O’Malley, 2004b: 185) is continually asserted as though it were the mainspring of the strategic direction of contemporary crime control. It is certainly common for politicians to present legislative or policy change in terms of being responsive to public concern about risk - and this is especially evident in relation to the management of serious sexual and violent offenders. If we agree with Ryan (2005) that the rise of the public voice(s) within the national and local politics of risk democratizes the policy-making process, then it is clearly important to ensure that such voices are heard in their complexity and diversity, rather than assumed to be all singing from the same hymn sheet.

HYPERREALITIES OF ‘RISK’

Hollywood cinema is rarely acknowledged as an important counterpublic sphere which works firstly, to stimulate a critical and inclusive dialogue on the nature of risk of/from crime; and secondly, to facilitate a deliberative engagement with questions of ‘justice’. It is not as though Hollywood film is under-represented in analyses of the cultural politics of mass media, but how it might be read/viewed as an important site of resistance, contestation and confrontation is less clear. In recent years, particularly

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3 In the UK, this is exemplified by the introduction of Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels (MAPPP) in 2001. This followed sustained media campaigns and high profile public protests over the lack of supervision within the community, of paedophiles released from prison. MAPPPs were given legislative force by sections 67 and 68 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Services Act (2000). In a Ministry of Justice press release (20 October 2008), celebrating the record numbers of offenders now monitored under the MAPPP system, the primary remit of MAPPPs was restated: ‘to use more robust management systems for those offenders who live in our communities through the sharing of information and expertise. The teams, comprising police, prison, probation and other relevant agencies, ensure joint working and communication effectively manages risk to the public’ – found at http://www.justice.gov.uk/newsrelease201008a.htm - accessed 25 January 2009. See also, Kemshall and Maguire (2001).
through the work of poststructuralist and/or feminist theorists, the genre of science fiction film (and also that of horror) has been described as the paradigmatic form of reflexive and destabilising cultural experiences (Clover, 1992; Creed, 1993; McGuigan, 1999: 80-85; Dimitrakaki and Tsiantis, 2002; O’Riordan, 2008). Such a status is designated by its subject matter, most especially the recurring references to a dystopian future, alien life forms, apocalyptic scenarios and temporal dislocations.

But whereas most authors regard science fiction as speculative fantasy, often incorporating imaginative elements which have no existence in our present reality, Baudrillard complains that the distinction between film and reality is no longer apparent - ‘life is cinema’, he proclaims in America (1988:101). From this standpoint, the task of science fiction is not a phantasmagorical one, but is:

… to put decentred situations, models of simulation in place and to contrive to give them the feeling of the real, of the banal, of lived experience, to reinvent the real as fiction, precisely because it has disappeared from our own life. Hallucination of the real, of lived experience, of the quotidian, but reconstituted, sometimes down to disquietingly strange details …. Brought to life with a transparent precision, but without substance, derealized in advance, hyperrealised (Baudrillard, 1994[1981]: 124).

There is no need to take Baudrillard literally, or to accept his theory of the ‘precession of simulacra’⁴ (Baudrillard, 1994[1981]) in its entirety to appreciate the point he is

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⁴ In Simulacra and Simulation (1994[1981]) Baudrillard sets out his account of the historical succession of image-making techniques. He describes the different phases of image-production - from the art of the Renaissance period, through to the Industrial Revolution and industrial capitalism of the 19th and 20th century, through to late modernity - as a ‘precession of simulacra’ in which images function to i) reflect a profound reality; ii) mask and denaturalise a profound reality; iii) mask the absence of a profound reality; iv) have no relation to any reality whatsoever – the image becomes its own pure simulacrum (1994[1981]: 6)
making here. That is, if all life is a fiction, we can accept the proposition that the difference between how we narrate our everyday experiences of living in a ‘risk society’, and how such experiences are narrated through Hollywood film, is a question of form rather than content. Indeed, the potential of the cinematographic form of a blockbuster science fiction movie lies in its capacity to produce perfect (and spectacular) simulations of extant, everyday ‘realities’ of risk and crime.

All of this is a long way from the ‘mass culture’ theories of the Frankfurt School⁵, as well as the critical representational approaches to power, culture, communication and resistance associated with the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies⁶. Moreover, Baudrillard pushes us beyond the kind of work which regards science fiction as providing a useful social and political commentary on controversial and topical issues (Creed, 1995; Sobchack, 1997; Rickman, 2004). Insightful as these latter studies are in periodising particular sub-genres of science fiction, and contextualising their story lines, characterisations, special effects or cinematic techniques within contemporary events, the approach can appear too schematic and historically reductionist. Moreover, these studies invariably assume an audience which watches from a position of ‘safety’, somehow insulated from the immediacy of the disturbing themes played out in film. For example, in her review of the

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⁵ In this tradition, ‘mass culture’, is dismissed as part of an ideological culture industry which trades in the mass production of synthetic cultural values, and sells these back to a manipulated, passive audience in the form of standardised and formulaic products. Such a view is primarily associated with the work of Theodor Adorno; in a series of essays on mass culture, he writes that: ‘… institutionalization transforms modern mass culture into a medium of undreamed of psychological control. The repetitiveness, the selfsameness, and the ubiquity of modern mass culture tend to make for automatized reactions and to weaken the forces of individual resistance (Adorno, 1991: 160).

⁶ The Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (sometimes referred to as the Birmingham School), was founded in 1964 by Richard Hoggart, and is associated with a broad spectrum of work which draws on Gramscian notions of hegemony, and the importance of culture to practices of resistance. The BCCCS (now defunct), leaves an important legacy of seminal work on youth culture, the manufacture of news, ideology, race, cultural politics and gender – see, for example, Hall and Jefferson (1976); Hall, Hobson, Lowe and Willis (1980); Morley and Chen (1996); Hall (1997).
representations of the ‘monstrous body’ in horror film, Creed (1995) suggests that the cinematic spectacle permits a ‘safe’ encounter with abject and grotesque displays of bodily fragmentation. As such, these tropes ‘may well function to remind the viewing subject of the fragile nature of all limits and boundaries’ (ibid: 157: my emphasis). However, ‘being reminded’ is not the same experience as being unexpectedly jolted, viscerally incited and existentially disturbed by the realization – that is, ‘the action of making real or investing with reality; the process of becoming or being made real; conversion into fact’ (Oxford English Dictionary) – that all limits no longer apply and have already been exceeded. As Baudrillard might put it, the catastrophe has already happened. It is in the fleeting moment of realization, that a ‘critical responsiveness’ to other possibilities for thinking about our present condition, is initiated.  

Baudrillard provides us with a theoretical framework for conceptualising science fiction film as a hyperrealised simulacrum of our everyday life in the ‘risk society’. However, as Merrin (2005: 151) notes, Baudrillard has no dialogue with alternative theories of media, and he fails to reference models of communication and, in particular, theories of the active reception of media products. In short, he cannot account for the continuing popularity of the genre given its propensity to disrupt our

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7 An embodied, visceral viewing experience of realization is no better exemplified than in the final, iconic sequence of *Planet of the Apes* (1968). Having escaped the pursuing gorilla army, this sequence follows George Taylor (Charlton Heston) on horseback, riding at a slow canter along the shore line of a deserted beach. The camera pans to an overhead shot, and we are now looking down on the scene as though from a cliff top. On the left of the screen, a large upright spike appears, and now a second one as we watch Taylor drawing closer through the gap between the two. The scene from the overhead view stops when Taylor pulls up the horse and dismounts. The camera then moves to a close-up of Taylor who, looking upwards at the structure we have been looking through, cries out in anguish and anger: ‘Oh my god. I am back. I’m home. All the time I …. They finally, really did it. You maniacs. You blew it up. Damn you. God. Damn you all to hell’. The camera then pans backwards to reveal what Taylor is looking up at and what, as viewers, we had been positioned behind when looking downwards at the scene. The vision of the Statue of Liberty buried up to its chest on the sandy beach evokes the (sickening) realization that the Planet of the Apes was, indeed, the Planet Earth in a post-apocalyptic future.
sense of ontological security - put another way, why would viewers repeatedly engage with that which troubles and unsettles them? Baudrillard’s failure to explore media receptivity is all the more surprising given his debt to Barthes’ cultural theories as a generic whole – see, for example, Merrin (2005) and Culler (2001) respectively. However, Barthes’ concepts of jouissance and the enigmatic are relevant here. In *The Pleasure of the Text* (1990[1973]), Barthes sets out what Howard describes as an ‘erotics of reading’ (1990[1973]: xviii); it is a thesis which talks of the pleasure and jouissance (bliss) of our textual encounters. The text of pleasure brings comfort and contentment to the reader/viewer by virtue of its stable perspective and conventional narrative form; in Barthes’ words, ‘(it is) the text that comes from culture and does not break with it, (it) is linked to a comfortable practice of reading’ (1990[1973]: 14: *Original emphasis*). In terms of science fiction film, such pleasure might come from ‘feel-good’ sci-fi such as *ET: The Extra terrestrial* (1982), *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* (1977) or *Bicentennial Man* (1999); or ‘happy-ever-after’ sci-fi disaster movies such as *Independence Day* (1996), *Armageddon* (1998) and *The Day After Tomorrow* (2004). However, for the most part, the genre is defined by its apocalyptic and sinister narratives which not only pose questions about humanity’s place in the scheme of things, but which also create a dystopic view of the world which always-already appears grim, threatening, unnerving and dangerous – such as *A Clockwork Orange* (1971), *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1984) or *Twelve Monkeys* (1995). For Telotte, the stuff of science fiction film ‘… typically focuses our attention on borders: the borders of our knowledge, those of

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8 Using the example of *Men in Black* (1997), Leach argues that what used to be alarming in the science fiction genre has now become its main source of humour. In *Men in Black*, she notes that ‘(a)xiety about the roles of technology, gender and the state are *(sic)* replaced by humour about the notion of anxiety itself’ (1998: 1027).
our experience, those that separate us from … “nature” (2001: 197). Such films are more likely, then, to induce *jouissance* amongst their viewers. For Barthes these are ‘texts of bliss’:

… the text that imposes a state of loss, the text that discomforts … unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories, brings to a crisis his (sic) relation with language’ (1990[1973]: 14).

In an earlier work, *S/Z* ([1975]1970), Barthes outlines a framework for understanding narrative conventions, how these structure reading practices and sustain the dialectical relationship between text and reader – a process which Howard describes as the ‘poetics of reading’ (1990[1973]: vii). Introduced in this work, and of relevance to this discussion, is Barthes’ notion of the *enigmatic*. Barthes posits the presence, in any given narrative, of a hermeneutic code, a sequence of enigmas, paradoxes and puzzles which not only pose and formulate questions, but which also function to retard, equivocate on, evade and denounce answers. From this vantage point, it is easy to recognise how science fiction narratives are characteristically punctuated by multiple enigmas which continually postpone the moment of closure, certainty and narrative resolution. Put another way, the ‘enigmatic’ is that aspect of narrative which induces *jouissance* and prompts a disruptive reflexivity about the ways things are.

In the light of these methodological insights, I want to suggest that our consumption of science fiction films is an experience of *jouissance* involving a series of encounters with the *enigmatic*. Though such films may (simply) be entertaining as action-packed thrillers, they also create a *hyperreality*, a simulated world of risk-management and its technologies which is always-already embedded in our present. The *jouissance* of
viewing jolts us out of our everyday routines of thinking and feeling about ‘risk’, creating not only a heightened sensibility to the limits of our knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon, but also a recognition of the boundaries of our imagination about how it is (and might be) managed. It is a sensibility which may be experienced as a destabilising ‘movement of becoming’, a ‘critical responsiveness’ which initiates a questioning of the conceptual scope and empirical instantiation of ‘risk-management’, as well as challenging its ethico-political meaning in late modernity. In the following analysis, I want to explore these ideas through the lens of three contemporary science fiction films - *Minority Report* (2002), *Paycheck* (2003) and *A Scanner Darkly* (2006).

**THE FUTURE PRESENT**

The adjective most commonly used to describe science fiction as a film (or literary) genre, is that it is ‘futuristic’. While I do not dispute this description, it can obscure more than it illuminates about the temporal horizons of sci-fi narratives. Films invariably open with a reference to the temporal context in which the action is taking place, and this ranges from specific dates – such as ‘2054’ (*Minority Report*, 2002) and ‘1995’ (*A Clockwork Orange*, 1971) – to something more vague and open – such as ‘seven years from now’ (*A Scanner Darkly*, 2006), and ‘in the near future’ (*V for Vendetta*, 2005). In these cinematic futures, we are introduced to a wide range of ‘fanciful’ technologies which have different capabilities in terms of managing, reducing or eliminating risk. In *Paycheck* (2003), for example, we encounter not only a laser-enhanced lens which allows the user to see around the curvature of the earth, and thus, into the future, but also digital and biological procedures for erasing memory. *Minority Report* (2002) features an elaborate system of intelligence-led
policing based on the harnessed powers of human pre-cognition; while *A Scanner Darkly* (2006) opens with a press conference which explains the value to intensive, undercover surveillance of a high-tech scramble-suit which disguises every aspect of the wearer’s appearance. These technologies certainly appeal to our imagination and fantasies of future ‘realities’, or at least, ‘potentialities’ in the field of ‘risk-management’, but they are also grounded in present day technological capabilities. In his review of sci-fi films since the 1960s, Larson (2008) finds that depictions of computer technologies tend to mirror real-world developments and trends. He draws inspiration from Edmund Burke’s (1992[1759]) observation that ‘… the power of the imagination is incapable of producing anything absolutely new; it can only vary the disposition of those ideas which it has received from the senses’ (Burke (1992[1759]: 301 cited in Larson, 2008: 294). But whereas Larson uses this insight as an hypothesis to be tested, Burke’s reference to the *relationship* between imagination and disposition is more instructive here. That is, alongside the more ‘fanciful’ technologies – the most elaborate of which facilitate time travel (*Timecop* (1994), *Total Recall* (1990)) - sci-fi films are resplendent with actually-existing gadgetry and computer-assisted security practices. The use of smartcards, retinal/iris scanning, biometric identification systems, voice authorisation devices, palm print activation locks, miniature camcorder surveillance, holograms/holographics and LCD monitors invite the viewer to experience a veritable ‘gauntlet of cybersecurity’ (Nellis, 2005: 71) which, though instantly recognisable, may appear to be disturbingly strange. In other words, it is not our imagination about risk technologies which is being stimulated, but our disposition to the potential scope and impact of their uses. Consider some of the promotional taglines:
What would you do if you were accused of a murder you had not committed ….. yet? The future can be seen. Murder can be prevented. The guilty punished before the crime is committed. The system is perfect. It's never wrong until it comes after you (Minority Report, 2002).

Big Brother is watching you (Nineteen Eighty Four, 1984).

What does a scanner see? Everything is not going to be OK (A Scanner Darkly, 2006).

Through their taglines, trailers and publicity material, Hollywood sci-fi not only entices viewers with a series of enigmas about the nature of ‘justice’ in the ‘risk society’, but also poses questions about the language, ethics, politics and boundaries of hi-tech security systems and the technologies upon which they rely. Science fiction cinema permits viewers to glance at a strange yet familiar ‘risk landscape’ of future possibilities which are always-already embedded in present realities. Ott (2007) reminds us that the ‘glance’, unlike the ‘gaze’, engages viewers on an emotionally-embodied level rather than on a rational, cognitive basis. As Romanyszyn puts it, the cinematic glance is ‘an emotional vision, a vision that is moved at a bodily level’ (1993: 341). Putting it another way, and paraphrasing Botting’s (1996) comments on Gothic literature, to watch sci-fi films is to experience jouissance as a regressive and destabilising realisation that all is not quite what it seems.
THE LANGUAGE AND RHETORIC OF SCIENTISM

The notion of risk ‘has deep roots in the history of science’ (Horlick-Jones (1998: 84 cited in Kemshall, 2003: 49-50), and is ‘embedded in empiricism, scientific canons of proof, probabilistic thinking, and a realist epistemology’ (Kemshall, 2003: 50). Consequently, the language of risk is infused with pseudo-scientific concepts such that the utility and value of different risk technologies and procedures comes to be seen in abstract, almost technical terms. Whether in the form of a risk assessment tool, a surveillance device or an identificatory technique, the impact and effectiveness of ‘risk technologies’ is often read off from the reliability, systematicity, predictive capacity and/or accuracy of the ‘hardware’. This is the kind of commentary which accompanies our introduction to the ground-breaking technology of Washington, DC’s Pre-Crime Unit featured in Minority Report (2002). The film opens with a series of sequences which show off the predictive capabilities of the ‘pre-cogs’. A series of black and white images of a murder in progress are flashed across the screen, and we witness the gory and horrific event as though it takes place in a dream. This is no dream, but the view of the future as seen through the ‘mind’s eye’ of the ‘pre-cog’, Agatha, one of three psychic ‘humanoids’ who are kept floating in a translucent, nutrient substance in a security-protected chamber. Her ‘pre-cognition’ is translated and made readable through a ball and shute system which delivers the names of the victims and killer, and marks the start of an intelligence-led and highly efficient police investigation which apprehends the murderer before he has had chance to kill. What is significant here, is how far the operational environment of the ‘pre-cogs’ technology is explicitly represented as pristine and sterile with all of the accoutrements and trappings of a hi-tech facility complete with robotics, pulsating lights, electronic probes, steel, glass, remote controls and LCD displays. This is
further buttressed by the presence of a technician who is tasked with the continual monitoring and checking of the ‘pre-cogs’ to ensure not only their maximum efficiency but also that there is no contamination or interference with their functioning in the service of ‘justice’. As Chief Anderton (Tom Cruise) is quick to point out, ‘it’s better if you don’t think of them as human ….. pre-cogs are pattern recognition filters, that’s all’. These signifiers reinforce the scientificity of the ‘pre-cog’ technology and invite viewers to accept its ideological credentials as a neutral, dispassionate and infallible system of risk management which, importantly, is not susceptible to the frailties and contingencies of the human condition.

However, Minority Report centres on a narrative which foregrounds the jouissance of the imperfection of perfection (the innocence of the guilty, the humanity of the dehumanised, and the mistrust of the trustworthy). Indeed, the title of the film refers to the production of a report which documents those occasions when the ‘pre-cogs’ disagree about the predicted future. Not even Chief Anderton had been made aware of the possibility of a ‘minority report’. In an exchange between Anderton and Dr Iris Hineman (Lois Smith), the scientist responsible for the development of ‘pre-cog’ technology, she tells him:

*Dr Hineman*: These minority reports are destroyed the instant they occur …. Obviously for pre-crime to function there can’t be any suggestion of fallibility. After all, who wants a justice system that instils doubt. It may be reasonable, but it’s still doubt.

*Chief Anderton*: Does Lamar Burgess – (Max Von Sydow) *Anderton’s superior and Director of the Washington Crime Department* - know of the minority report?
Dr Hineman: Yes, but he thought their existence was an ‘insignificant variable’.

Chief Anderton: What about the people put away? If the country knew there was a chance …..

Dr Hineman: The system would collapse.

However, it is the character, Danny Whitwer (Colin Farrell), sent by the US Attorney-General to assess the work of the Pre-Crime Unit, who recognises that technology is never devoid of human involvement. In a very instructive sequence where he is given a tour of the security chamber, he questions the trust placed in the infallibility of the ‘pre-cog’ system, is sceptical of the hegemony of scientism, and is critical of what he regards as the deification of risk technologies:

Science has stolen most of our miracles….. In a way they (the ‘pre-cogs’) give us hope. Hope of the existence of the divine. I find it interesting that some people have begun to deify the pre-cogs….. You call this room the ‘temple’ …. The oracle isn’t where the power is anyway. The power has always been with the priests ….. If there’s a flaw, it’s human, it always is.

This interjection constitutes a conventional plot device for introducing the (false) villain and delineating his relationship to the hero – that is, as a character who creates the narrative complication (Propp, 1968[1928]). It also serves to prompt the realisation that the promise of predictive crime prevention delivered through a reliable, value-neutral and abstract risk technology is merely a powerful rhetoric.
which masks its human-made flaws and inherent fallibilities, as well as the politics of its use. As O’Malley has argued very persuasively, risk is never technically neutral and, ‘(i)n particular, …. (it) is always shaped and given effect by specific social and political rationales and environments’ (2008: 453).

‘RISK’ AS A POLITICO-ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP

Cinema-goers, as any other section of the population, are familiar with contemporary initiatives in crime reduction and public protection, even if they do not appreciate some of the more nuanced aspects of their development. Indeed the politics of risk management are rarely far from the headlines, especially in the UK where announcements of policy innovations, pilot programmes and new approaches to crime control appear to be relentless (Garland, 2001). There is a common-sense acceptability of managing the risk posed by dangerous, anti-social and persistent offenders but, as Kemshall and Maguire suggest, even when such management raises serious ethical questions about human rights, the rule of law or accountability, ‘(t)he process is self-justificatory and difficult to challenge without appearing to “side with” a highly unpopular group of people’ (2001: 258). The narrative economies of science fiction films permit viewers to glimpse and ponder the politico-ethical dilemmas of risk management practices in ways which seem to be absent from everyday discourse.

*A Scanner Darkly* (2006), for example, is set within the context of a ‘war on drugs’. At a time, ‘seven years from now’, 20% of the population are hooked on the highly addictive and debilitating, illegal drug, Substance D, made from a small blue flower. In response to this ‘culture of addiction’, the government develops an invasive, high-
tech surveillance system which relies on a network of informants and undercover agents. In a retrospective conversation about the film, Richard Linklater (Writer/Director) commented that ‘we just had to imagine a world where you could track every call .... It’s a near future which is pretty much on us now... You know, a lot of people are sitting in rooms looking at everything and everybody’ (DVD [2006]: Special Features). Several sequences in the film which represent this surveillance at work, raise questions about the ethics of such practices in terms of civil liberties, social justice and individual rights. As Lyon (2002) has argued, most people assume (wrongly) that the ‘respectable, law-abiding majority’ have a ‘right’ to their privacy, and also that ‘the innocent’ have nothing to fear from a surveillance-based society. To be sure, critical scholarship has been swift to document the politico-ethical implications of the unrestrained and unregulated spread of surveillance technology – see, for example, Fitzpatrick and Taylor, 2001; Lyon, 2001, 2003 – but McCartney contends that ‘normative constraints are not yet proving sufficient to restrain policy which prioritises risk aversion above human rights and justice for all members of society’ (2006: 129). As the story unfolds, viewers of A Scanner Darkly are invited to reflect on the ethicality of risk management, and to balance the need for security and freedom through the lens of the protagonist’s story; as the DVD plot summary puts it, ‘(t)he story: a twisted funny tale of people hooked on Substance D. And of a government that cheerfully destroys its citizens – their rights, their relationships – in order to save them’.

Bob Arctor (Keanu Reeves) is the undercover agent assigned to immerse himself in the drug underworld and infiltrate the drug supply chain. We follow Arctor’s undercover journey as an experience of increasing paranoia and confusion concerning
his identity, as he becomes addicted to Substance D and no longer able to function effectively. However, the viewer is free to ponder whether it is Substance D, or whether it is the nature of an intensive ‘surveillance society’ which induces these destabilising effects. For example, Arctor’s housemates, though heavy drug-users, are convinced (and justifiably so) that the police have bugged their home and are watching their every move. Moreover, Arctor’s roommate, Barris (Robert Downey Jr), suspects that Arctor (and his girlfriend) are part of a terrorist organisation, and he secretly reports them to the police. Through a variety of sub-plots, some of which provide the most memorable comedic interludes, a sense of the pervasiveness of surveillance and the compulsion to spy even on one’s friends and neighbours, is played out throughout the film. As Linklater commented: ‘The meaning of the film is embedded right here. Authority itself is omnipresent’ (DVD [2006]: Special Features).

However, it is the twist in the tale which provokes our ethical curiosity. Our concern for Arctor’s addiction and his decline into paranoia, deflects our attention away from the ‘bigger picture’ which is revealed toward the end of the film. That is, Arctor’s descent into a drug-fuelled insanity had been intended; it was a carefully conceived police operation to enable them to infiltrate New Path, a global corporation which not only held the monopoly of drug rehabilitative work but which also sponsored a wide range of risk-management and policing programmes relating to drug-use reduction. Thus, selected without his knowledge or consent, Arctor was sacrificed so that he could enter New Path unnoticed as a genuine addict – although it was dubious whether his diminished state rendered him capable of unearthing any evidence of the company’s complicity in the production of Substance D. Some film critics have
complained that *A Scanner Darkly* suffers from an ‘inability to draw in the viewer’, is ‘not involving on an emotional level’ and is ‘well-trodden’ (Berardinelli, 2006), while others have suggested that ‘the brilliance of the film is how it suggests, without bombast or fanfare, the ways in which the real world has come to resemble the dark world of comic books’ (Chocano, 2006). It is not my aim here to pronounce on the filmic merits (or otherwise) of *A Scanner Darkly*, but I would agree with both of these film reviews. On the one hand, the narrative twist which reveals the mass deception of an ‘authority of trust’ (whether in the form of a corporation, a government, an institution or a body of experts) is a conventional plot device used to conclude the story and explain its mysteries – *Soylent Green* (1973), for example, ends with the revelation that humanity had (finally) resorted to cannibalism to maintain a food supply; while *Logan’s Run* (1976) concludes with the discovery that mass euthanasia (at the age of 30) had been used as a means of population control. In this sense, Berardinelli is right to complain of the use of the ‘narrative twist’ in *A Scanner Darkly* as being ‘well-trodden’. However, such twists in the tale vary from film to film and therefore rupture quite different myths about the ethics of risk management, the politics of authority and the nature of trust. We can, therefore, also agree with Chocano and recognise that it is in the particular context of a ‘war on drugs’ (rather than any other sort of risk-producing context), that *A Scanner Darkly* identifies a number of key and specific ethical and political dilemmas. First, it forces viewers to question the ethicality of certain kinds of risk governance, most especially to problematise the means-ends justifications for the use of covert techniques and approaches. Second, it prompts us to reconsider how surveillance functions not only to alter relations between citizens, but also to reconfigure the relationship between citizens and state. Third, through the narrative device of the ‘twist’ comes the abrupt
realisation of the possibility of institutional complicity in generating the very risk it is tasked to manage.

**BLURRING THE BOUNDARIES**

Another way of talking about the dispersal and reversal of authority over risk-management, as discussed above, is to suggest that simplistic dichotomies concerning the guilty/innocent, offender/victim, public/private, risk/protection can be misplaced in a science fiction narrative. As Keanu Reeves commented about *A Scanner Darkly*, ‘the lines between criminals and police are blurred’ (DVD [2006]: Special Features). This is not solely the outcome of the ‘whodunnit’ aspects of the film, but of the transgressive practices which appear to be inherent to a ‘risk society’. For example, in *Minority Report*, we enjoy a cinematic shopping experience where shoppers’ movement through a mall initiates personalised greetings and purchasing hints, all activated through the omnipresent technology of iris scanning. Chief Anderton, now being pursued by his own officers, and having had his eyes surgically replaced by a backstreet ophthalmist, has entered a retail complex to purchase clothes for the abducted ‘pre-cog’, Agatha. As he runs through the mall, we hear an accompanying commentary: ‘Hello Mr Yakamoto. Welcome back to the Gap. How did the assorted tank tops work out for you?’ - to which Anderton mutters, ‘Mr Yakamoto?’.

While this sequence provides a little light relief to a very tense drama, it nonetheless makes two key points. The first is that the technologies of biometric identification can be circumvented. While there is clearly a degree of unalterability of the body parts or tissues which form the basis for unique identification – such as fingerprints, DNA, iris scanning - there remains the possibility of their transferability to another party. Secondly, the sequence makes the important point that databases are fluid, shareable
entities and cannot be fixed in space and time according to a logic of ownership and accountability (Castells, 2000, 2001). In this example, the database which supports iris scanning for risk management/security purposes on the underground metro system, is transferable and communicated to other contexts to meet other ends – in this instance, re-usable as a biometrically-activated personal shopping service. In the UK, several recent scandals concerning the whereabouts of certain public sector databases - variously lost in the post, mislaid on trains or stolen along with the laptops on which they were stored⁹ - have raised fears about the security and potential misuse of personal data. However, in science fiction film, these fears may be realised with considerable vengeance.

While the example of the personalised shopping service is relatively benign, other instances concerning the collection, storage, retrieval and/or access to different kinds of data blur the boundaries of public/private concerns and responsibilities. For example, in A Scanner Darkly personalised and biometric data is shareable and

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⁹ On 20 November 2007, news broke that two computer discs holding the personal details of all families in the UK with a child under 16 had been ‘lost in the post’. The two password-protected CDs containing the child benefit information had been sent unrecorded and unregistered by a junior HMRC (Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs) official through the courier, TNT, to the National Audit Office on 18 October 2007, but never arrived and have not been found in the intervening period. The Child Benefit data on the disks includes the name, address, date of birth, National Insurance number and, where relevant, bank details of 25 million people. The missing CDs were not reported to senior HMRC management until 8 November 2007, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, was not notified until 10 November 2007. In a statement to Parliament, Darling said the delay in notifying the public of the security breach was necessary to allow the banks time to flag up affected bank accounts and monitor them for any ‘unusual activity’. The lost discs were estimated to be worth £1.5 billion to the criminal fraternity. This is not the place to set out the details of every occasion when databases have become vulnerable. However, in recent years, the following headlines have been published in the UK: ‘The zzzzivil servant who fell asleep on the train with laptop secrets in full view’ (Daily Mail, 1 November 2008); ‘Train theft of MoD laptop with fighter secrets alarmed Pentagon’ (The Guardian, 6 February 2001); ‘Police probe theft of MoD laptop’ (BBC News Online, 19 January 2008, found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7197045.stm, accessed 14 February 2009).
interactively used across both statutory and corporate sectors. Given the narrative twist (discussed above), this turns out to be a rather sinister development. Though Peterson is warning of the dangers of database expansion by the state sector, his comments are relevant to this discussion; he comments:

Allowing the government to maintain a database of every individual’s genetic information creates, at the very least, a government that knows more about its citizens ….. there is something ominous and oppressive about an all-knowing state. The inherent danger to our conception of ourselves as a free and autonomous society requires that further expansion of the preventative state, represented by the creation of a universal database, be vigorously opposed (2000: 1237-8).

Such cautions are commonplace within academic circles, but repeated references to cross-sectoral access to personalised intelligence, across different films, reminds viewers of the fragility of ‘protective controls’ and the notion of ‘secure data systems’. For example, in Paycheck, we discover that a disaffected government physicist working on a classified project in the weapons division sold the design to the private corporation, Allcom. He is subsequently killed for his efforts, and the services of Michael Jennings (Ben Affleck), a reverse engineer, are called upon to reconfigure the technology so that it functions even more efficiently – in this case, to see into the future. ‘Risk technology’ in this film is represented as a commodity which can be bought and sold, deconstructed and reconstructed, sabotaged and stolen. While the plot centres on the power struggle over the creation and destruction of an awesome, risk-predictive laser technology, along the way Jennings sidesteps and overcomes a range of high-tech security controls. For example, he uses a dollar bill to jam a security panel; he plants a bug in the computer system to disable it; and he gains entry
to a lab by stealing an entry keycard. Moreover, all of this takes place in full view of a government which is left rather helpless in the face of a powerful corporation and a skilful engineer. In the sequence where Jennings is interrogated by the FBI, the US Attorney-General has reminded the agents that ‘Michael Jennings’s cooperation is a matter of national security’, implying that the future of an entire nation boils down to the technological knowledge and expertise of just one individual. Indeed, Jennings, as a character, blurs our understanding of guilt and innocence, offender and victim, villain and hero, making it difficult to determine whether the possession of ‘risk expertise’ is something which should evoke horror or hope concerning our protection.

The ability to sabotage, disable or circumvent different kinds of risk technologies is a pervasive feature of all of the films examined. Minority Report, for example, not only includes the entrepreneurial character of a back street eye surgeon (discussed above), but the reliability of pre-cognition, it appears, can be circumvented from the ‘inside’. When Anderton eventually discovers that it is Lamar Burgess who has used his insider-knowledge of the ‘pre-cogs’ system to commit the ‘perfect’ murder. Anderton confronts Burgess publicly:

You did it, created a world without murder …. And all you had to do was kill someone. I’m talking about Agatha’s mother, Ann Lively, just a junkie … And the problem was, without Agatha, there was no pre-crime. She’s always been the strongest of the three. You knew without Agatha you had nothing, without her you wouldn’t be where you are now…… So, now you had to get rid of Ann Lively, you had to shut her up, which presents a problem. How can you kill her without the pre-cogs seeing it? Simple, use the system you control against her. So you hired someone to kill her knowing full well the pre-cogs would see that murder. You lured Ann
Lively out to the lake with the promise of reuniting her with her daughter … over the dialogue, the film shows the attempted murder of Ann Lively, followed by the arrest of the perpetrator by the Pre-Crime Unit. Burgess now appears at the woodland scene and is seen killing Ann Lively …. And then when you were all alone, you killed her yourself in the same way that the pre-cogs predicted your John Doe would kill her. You made the real murder look like an echo, knowing the tech would do what he was trained to do, disregard it.

While this may be viewed as just another commonplace narrative technique, there is something especially disturbing and unsettling when the ‘trusted insider’ turns out to be the source of the greatest danger and deceit. It is an especially powerful trope which confuses our sense of where risk is located, and who or what we invest with our protection. This kind of storyline, as it appears in a science fiction narrative – rather than, say, within the murder mystery – alerts viewers to the problematic claims of ‘risk knowledges’ which operationalise ‘risk’ in dichotomous ways, and which imagine its management as a zero-sum game between identifiable heroes and villains, and recognisable spaces of safety and danger (O’Malley, 2008).

CONCLUSION
This paper set out to accomplish several inter-related things in an attempt to rethink the nature of public opinion about ‘risk’, its management and the technologies which claim to achieve this. I challenged assumptions about a ‘mass risk consciousness’ which presupposes a largely compliant and passive public who are not only receptive to the introduction of new strategies of risk-management, but who also actively campaign for and demand them. To be sure, there are occasions when this characterisation might be appropriate – for example, popular protests in both the UK,
Europe and the USA in relation to the risk-management of sex offenders, typically call for the use of all and any technologies and instruments which claim to effectively assess, monitor, regulate and police dangerous forms of predatory behaviour. However, there is very little work undertaken which starts from the premise of a popular discourse which may be resistant to, or critical of, or which at least has some reservations about the effectiveness of systems and apparatuses of risk control. It seems to me that as a point of departure, the idea of a critical publicity about ‘risk’ is a necessary component of functioning liberal democratic societies where the introduction and use of different models of risk-management may raise a number of ethical and political questions about their implications to rights, justice, accountability and legitimacy. Even so, deliberative democratic participation relies on more than town hall meetings and e-petitions; that is, we should be prepared to be relatively catholic in what we accept as ‘media of publicity’, and also what we regard as resistive practice. Hitherto, such media have not included popular cultural forms, especially those which may be regarded as carnivalesque, even frivolous, such as comedy sketches, cartoons and blockbuster Hollywood cinema – even though mass marketed entertainment may have a much wider audience than any other form of ‘risk-engagement’ activity. At the same time, relations of resistance need not be demonstrative or have a material impact to be effective. Connolly’s (1999) notion of a ‘movement of becoming’ and an ‘ethos of responsiveness’ perfectly captures this sense of subjective and intersubjective resistance which is experienced as an existentially disturbing moment which unsettles our beliefs about ‘risk’ and its management, and incites a disruptive reflexivity about the received wisdoms of the ‘risk society’.
Given its reputation as a medium of reflexive and destabilising cultural experiences, science fiction film constitutes an important counterpublic sphere through which risk discourse is re-presented and narrated. Baudrillard’s notions of *hyperreality* and *realization*, and Barthes’s concepts of *jouissance* and the *enigmatic* have been used here to inform a viewing/reading of science fiction cinema as a practice of critical publicity which provokes a ‘movement of becoming’. The question of how ‘risk technologies’ are imagined in the aesthetic world of Hollywood sci-fi is important at a time when forms of risk governance and models of risk assessment are under constant revision. However, whereas formal, public discussion may centre on matters of impact, cost-benefits, levels and kinds of harm-minimization, methodologies and technical inventions, film-going promotes a more open dialogue, even a conversation, in which our sensibilities to the ‘risk economy’ and ‘risk-reduction’ are being formed and reformed in the light of different possibilities.

Science fiction film is invariably described as ‘futuristic’, and in the sense that stories are set at some future point in time, this is a reasonable characterisation. However, it obscures the way that filmic futures are always-already embedded in the present. Sci-fi may appear to invoke a universe of fantastical forms, but on closer reading/viewing the genre centres on a range of suppositional narratives which raise questions about the scope and potentialities of actually existing risk technologies. In this paper, I have argued that to view *Minority Report*, *A Scanner Darkly* and *Paycheck* is to experience a critical reflection on the language of science and its associated significations of risk technologies as infallible, reliable and objective, such that it is recognised as a powerful rhetoric which deflects attention away from the flaws, dangers and inherent weaknesses of different models and techniques of risk management – most especially
the implications of the (inevitable) human involvement in abstract systems and apparatuses. Through these films, viewers come to interrogate the politico-ethical relations of the ‘risk society’ in ways which may escape conventional deliberations. Questions of the means-ends justifications for the use of covert techniques; the nature of our relationship to each other in conditions of intensive surveillance; and our relationship to power and governmental authorities all feature as problematic aspects of human societies in which the management of risk has become the organising mode of experience. Moreover, ontological assumptions about what is or who are ‘risky’ are shaken at their core and in film, if not in life, categories and hierarchies of ‘risk-producing’, ‘risk-free’ or ‘risk-prone’ environments and practices collapse, just as the boundaries between public and private and between state and civil society become blurred. These kinds of existential ‘movements of becoming’ do not engender forms of resistance as material practice, but they do foster an ‘ethos of critical responsiveness’ which is not only ready, but is obliged to denaturalise the mythologies of the ‘risk society’.

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