

Kent Political Almanac

'Europe in the World' 2020

Special issue 5



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Kent Political Almanac Issue 5

Europe in the World Special Issue

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Foreword

Dear Readers,

May we welcome you to **the 2020 special edition of the Kent Political Almanac**! We are glad to announce that this year's edition marks the fifth publication.

The editorial board is honoured to launch this Special edition (for the 2nd year in duration) under the **GCRF COMPASS project**, and with the support of the School for Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent. We are particularly Elena Korosteleva, Professor of International Politics and Jean Monnet Chair in European Politics, for her guidance on this special project!

This year's special edition is truly international and interdisciplinary - breaking boundaries in the times of coronavirus and despite of the pandemic. Under the common theme 'Europe in the World' students at different levels, with different backgrounds and different perspectives think about Europe's place in the world.

The starting point of our analysis is the reflection on the VUCA world (Gnad & Burrows, 2017), we live in, a world ever more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. As one of our authors puts it a "world full of rapid change, a lack of predictability and hazy and confounding realities". How does Europe, and the EU in particular, respond to today's complex systems and how does it position itself in the world?

This special edition approaches this question by looking at different policy fields. **Verena Hanko** analyses how the EU is constructing its identity as a normative power and provides important insights on how EU actorness works. **Sam Williams, Stefania Calciati, Gabriel Lorca Aicardi** and **Vladislav Beinar** examine how the EU constructs its relations to other actors in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. Finally, new realms and forms of EU security and defence action are examined by **Corin Hogan**.

Each article reflects upon the questions whether Europe and its actors are reflective of the changing dynamics of the VUCA world, and if they are addressing its challenges effectively. While, academic enquiry requires to be suspicious and sometimes even critical about EU actorness in different policy fields, we remain optimistic as regards the European project and aspire to make our own contribution to its continuous success. Our hope is that this special edition finds you well in the global corona crisis and that you enjoy engaging in constructive thought on Europe in the world.

We are grateful to the POLIR staff reviewers for their time and effort in helping us to put it together; to the COMPASS project itself – for giving this opportunity to us; and of course – to the contributors themselves for their insightful and informative contributions!

Yours sincerely,

Student Editors, with special thanks to **Julia Lohse** for her leadership of this edition

VERENA HANKO - Spreading human rights and democracy? The EU as a normative actor in times of change

Biography

Verena Hanko was raised in Vienna, Austria. After her Master degree in French linguistics and literature, she is now studying International and European Studies, an Erasmus+ program of the European Commission. Besides her passion for ballroom dancing, her research interests range from cultures and languages in a united Europe, to philosophy of social justice and the future of humanity with artificial intelligence systems.

Abstract

The European Union strives for a resilient and sustainable governance in a quickly changing world in order to be effective in its external relations. It's relationship with the "other" – the outside world – depend on its (discursive) actions and reflexivity. Several challenges the EU faces in its normative value promotion make it problematic to be a coherent and reliable actor in a globalised world. But how can we understand the EU's role in this world and how is it constructing its identity as a normative power? Having values and interests at the same time is no insurmountable contrast – but the EU needs a shared vision to be credible in the international scene.

Acronyms

CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
EU	European Union
ECHR	European convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms
EDC	European Defence Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UDHR	Universal declaration of human rights
VUCA	volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous

Introduction

'The trouble with our times is that the future is not what it used to be'
– Paul Valéry

Who do we want to be? What is a good life? How can we cope with the fact that everything is becoming more complex in a globally connected world of interdependence? How can we respond to the change processes of the modern world that can neither be controlled nor stopped and that cause uncertainty and/or anxiety among people?

These are essential questions both at the personal level of individuals and the political level of governance strategies. We are living in a, as Gnad and Burrows called it, “VUCA world” – a world ever more “volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous” (Korosteleva and Flockhart 2020, p.154), full of rapid change, a lack of predictability and hazy and confounding realities. So how shall we act and govern and how can we maintain or expand resilience in today’s complex systems in order “to make them more responsive to the inevitability of change” (Ibid.)?

To approach these issues, we have to acknowledge the fact that everything we are doing is based on normative assumptions, certain conceptions of ethics and subjective visions for a better world. Of course, also the EU as an actor in the international field has defined values and ideas about its version of a good life that it wants to promote and spread in its internal and external relations.

However, in many cases it doesn’t seem to be very effective and it is confronted with many challenges regarding this promotion. In fact, facing our VUCA world, many scholars claim that the European Union should “bring about a more sustainable governing modus operandi to exert influence over a rapidly changing environment” (Ibid., p.155).

As Korosteleva and Flockhart (2020, p.154) point out, by understanding the recently popular word “resilience” as an “art of governance and not just as a quality of a system that can absorb and bounce back from shocks and crises”, as “a way of thinking”, as a “local process and as a self-organizing response of communities to adversity”, we can shift the focus from the global to the local level. Without this emphasis on the “local” and the “person”, and the process of self-governance, the “global” can never be fully understood, they claim (2020, p.162). Furthermore, resilience cannot be exported and imposed from outside with by a top-down strategy of external agents, but it has to be encouraged by self-governing processes; local ownership can therefore be perceived as “a performative act of the local communities, bottom-up and inside-out” (2020, p.163).

So indeed, it is important, how we treat the “other” in external relations, because it’s in this way we are constructing our own identity. To what extent do we, as the European Union, want to be (perceived) as a normative, economic and military actor? How do we want to be seen by the external world? In fact, the normative dimension is important because “the debate about civilian power involves fundamental choices about the EU’s international identity” (Manners 2002, p. 239). So should we spread our values to the world, and if so, how and why? How can we understand the EU’s role in the world and identify its nature as a normative actor?

To address this very last research question, this essay begins with an introductory chapter about the theoretical bases of our analysis. In 2.1, the meaning of (effective) actorness is examined while in 2.2, the concept of a normative power as well as its empirical foundation are explained. The subsequent chapter three then discusses the discursive constructions of the EU’s identity as a normative actor, its forms of “othering” and degree of reflexivity on this discourse level. The last chapter four is dedicated to several challenges that the EU faces in its normative value promotion, including incoherence and credibility problems and military interests, to exemplify why it is so problematic to determine the EU’s normative role in the world.

The EU as an actor

How can we identify the EU’s nature as a global actor? As Niemann and Hoffmann (2018, p.28) stated, classical International Relations theory that primarily focused on statehood couldn’t explain the distinctive nature and hybridity of the Union. Consequently, many scholars emphasized on its internal characteristics that shape its external policies in order to understand as what type of actor the EU can be conceptualized (Ibid.)

But what is actorness? Gunnar Sjöstedt defined the term as „the ability to function actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (1977, p.16). Trying to determine precise criteria for the EU’s status as an actor, Jupille and Caporaso emphasized four elements of actorness: Recognition, Authority, Autonomy and Cohesion (Hoffmann and Niemann 2018, p.30). *Recognition* is defined as the acceptance by other actors. However, as Gehring, Oberthür and Mühleck suppose, this recognition of the EU does not depend on formal membership in other institutions but on its *action capability* (2013, p.853). The internal recognition seems stable following the results of the Eurobarometer surveys: in 2019, 7 out of 10 European citizens believe that they benefit from being in the EU (average of the EU28 is 68%, with Italy being last on the list with only 42% approval). The *authority* delegated by the Member States to the EU is the legal competence to act and the control of governance resources (Hoffmann and Niemann 2018, p.30). Given the limited exclusive competences of the EU, scholars often highlight a “capability-expectations gap” (Hills) in this context (Ibid., p.35). *Autonomy* refers to the institutional machinery and the “degree of discretionary goal formation, decision-making and implementation,

independent of other actors” (Ibid., p.30). Lastly, *cohesion* means having an internally consistent position and the ability to “speak with one voice”, being “united in diversity – a major goal and challenge for the EU. In fact, the EU’s heterogeneity can be considered as a strength and weakness at the same time.

What misses in all these approaches is what Korosteleva calls *relationality*. She criticizes the lack of interest in intersubjective processes related to actorness and argues that in order to be more effective as an (maybe even order making-) actor in a multipolar world, the EU needs to be more reflective and relational. In this sense, it is not only important for the EU to reflect on its inner conceptions of values and sense of a good life, but also on its connection and relation with the external world, its *relationality* and *way of governance* (Korosteleva 2018, p.173-175).

In this paper, we will work with the definition of Pierre and understand governance as “both a process and a state whereby public and private actors engage in the intentional regulation of societal relationships and conflicts” (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2006), p.28) In fact, the way in which the EU structures its relations with 3rd parties has changed and developed over time: from a disciplinary conditionality approach and strict hierarchy, to a deliberative governance style, to a more inclusive model of “governance from a distance”, where partnership is envisaged and the multi-lateral track prioritized (Korosteleva 2018, p.169-170). One of the most discussed kind of actor related to the EU is the concept of “normative power”.

The EU as a normative power

The concept of normative power has been described by several scholars like Duchêne, who referred to it as *civilian power* in the 1970s or Galtung who used the term of *ideological power*. (Diez 2005, p.613; Manners 2002, p.239). However, in 2002, Ian Manners was under the first ones to elaborate what normative power means regarding the international role of the EU, trying to overcome the classic distinction between civilian and military power. In fact, he defined the term as the “ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” (2002, p.239). Consequently, a normative power has an important “impact on what is considered appropriate behaviour by other actors” (Diez 2005, p.615). Manners uses the term ‘power’ to avoid the question whether the EU can be considered as an ‘actor’ in international politics or not (Diez 2005, p.615). By preferring the analytical category ‘normative power’, he rather focuses on its influence as a specific kind of actor, that is, of course, socially constructed. Through its *relationship* to the others, the EU has the power to shape their values, a power “in which norms in themselves achieve what otherwise is done by military arsenals or economic incentives” (Ibid., p.616). However, it is important to emphasize that the different forms of power (military, economic, normative) don’t exclude each other (Ibid.).

Manners (2002, p.241) argues that the EU's exception is *inter alia* due to its new and different political form of governance, combining both supranational and intergovernmental elements and transcending Westphalian conventions. As he highlights, the EU is unique in its commitment to individual rights, as pointed out in article 2 of the TEU:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (TEU, Article 2).

In addition, the EU is basing its relations on norms described in the European convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms (ECHR) and the universal declaration of human rights (UDHR) of the UN (Manners 2002, p.241). In fact, this *acquis communautaire* of peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the norms of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance are the precondition of the EU's legitimacy (Ibid.).

In general, there is consensus in all the European institutions and bodies that Europe should be promoted as a force for peace and well-being. In the Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 of the European Council, it puts an emphasis on the necessity to promote its values and human rights:

In a world of increasing **uncertainty, complexity and change**, the EU needs to pursue a strategic course of action and increase its capacity to act autonomously to **safeguard its interests, uphold its values and way of life**, and help shape the global future. [...] Together with global partners sharing our values, the EU will continue to work towards global peace and stability, and to **promote democracy and human rights**.

However, in a world of discourses, it is crucial to analyse how the EU is constructed and presented as a normative power in order to identify its nature.

The discursive identity construction of the EU: Forms of “othering”

This chapter is based on the theory of social constructivism and discourse analysis. As Diez highlights, “[...] ‘normative power’ is not an objective category. Instead, it is a practice of discursive representation” (2005, p.626). In fact, there lies a strong power in the representation of the EU as a normative power as such:

Not only is the success of this representation a precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU; **it also constructs an identity of the EU against an image of others in the ‘outside world’** (Diez 2005, p.614).

In general, poststructuralists assume that identities “require an ‘other’ against which they are constructed; an ‘other’ which they thus construct at the same time” (Ibid.,

p.627). Indeed, in representing an entity, we are creating it in the very moment of representation.

Diez (2005, p.628) differentiates between 4 different forms of “othering”. The other can be framed as an *existential threat*, which legitimates extraordinary securisation measures. It can also be represented as *inferior*; the self is hence constructed as superior. Furthermore, the other can be seen as *violating universal principles*. The standards of the self are of universal validity which the others should accept. Lastly, it can simply be shown as different, without expressing any specific value-judgement, which however doesn’t make it an innocent practice, since it’s still imposing identities on the other. Concerning the EU, Waever has argued that the other against it constructs itself is particularly its own violent past (McDonagh 2015, p.629). Europe should never again suffer from war like it did in the first half of the 20th century.

Regarding the othering by the reproach of “*violating universal principles*”, as Hobson (2009, p.631) remarks, European politicians tend to consider some values as universal that are certainly not and that need a greater *historicisation* of terms. For example, the concepts of liberalism and democracy, as well as liberal democracy, have a much longer tradition of thought than commonly assumed. In fact, two to three centuries ago, democracy was regarded as a “dangerous and unstable form of rule which inevitably led to anarchy or despotism” (Ibid., p.632). However, by taking the indeed universal values of the United Nations, represented by 193 member states of the world, and the principles of the International Court of Justice as an orientation basis and reference for discussion, rather than those of the CJEU, we can avoid those reproaches. In fact, many of the principles of the EU are at the same time universal values and correspond to international law, which makes the accusation of eurocentrism untenable in many cases.

Improving reflexivity

According to Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War marked the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (Hobson 2009, p.633).

Even though many politicians wish this to be true, there is a need for reflexivity of the discourses and narratives we are engaging in as well as a language sensitivity of connotations and history of terms and norms we are projecting. Indeed, many scholars call for a greater degree of self-reflexivity in the discourse about the EU’s identity construction as a normative power and its political effects. Instead of the “zealous propagation of particular ‘European’ norms”, such a self-reflection “would rescue the idea of ‘normative power Europe’ from those who undermine it by writing it in large letters on their banners” (Diez 2005, p.615).

However, by all legitimate academic criticism, we should keep in mind that Europe is one of the few places in the world where hard critique on systems within the own system is not only possible without the fear of oppression but welcomed, respected and even funded. The standards scholars apply to judge the EU's actions seem to be strict and high, much higher than vis-à-vis any other continent or country – which isn't a bad thing if it is consciously reflected and proportional. However, we should be aware of the danger that lies in generalizing our critique in the very same manner as we blame "the EU" of not differentiating in its relations with the outside world and not being language sensitive.

After having discussed the discursive identity construction of the EU, it is now important to examine some challenges for the nature of the EU as a normative actor that seem particularly problematic in the context of EU actorness and governance.

Incoherence and credibility

One of the main critiques in the relevant literature concerns the inconsistency and incoherence of EU behaviour in its external governance. Scholars condemn the assumed hypocrisy and double standards of the union in the application of its policies (Diez 2005, p.614; Börzel and Lebanidze 2017, p.17). This is particularly evident in the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy), where the EU seems to discriminate between different external actors, to selectively sanction non-compliance with democracy standards (Börzel and Lebanidze 2017, p.17) and to act arbitrarily in the application of human rights (Diez 2005, p.624).

In order to achieve more coherence, the EU must "overcome institutional complexities and 'speak with a single voice'" (Börzel and Lebanidze 2017, p.22). Mostly mediatized in migration issues, this seems to be a challenge that is difficult to overcome. One possibility is pointed out in the *White Paper on the future of Europe* of the Commission in 2017, where Juncker outlined 5 possible scenarios for the Union's future. In scenario 3, member states that want to do more in common, form "coalitions of the willing" to work together in certain policies. The advantage of this vision is that single member states can't block urgent decisions in these fields. On the other hand, it involves the risk that some member states feel left behind and that solidarity in a united Europe suffers. Likewise, voices in favour of dissolving the principle of unanimity voting in the European Council in order to remain capable of acting, get stronger. As the former High Representative Mogherini points out in the *Global Security Strategy* of the EU in 2016:

We know what our principles, our interests and our priorities are. This is no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a Strategy. **We need a shared vision, and common action** (European External Action Service (2016), p.3).

Despite this call for coherent strategies and actions, the EU's "ambitions, both internal and external, are constrained by an ongoing tension between the Union itself and its Member States" (Howorth 2014, p.242).

In the light of the above, it is of course important that EU norms and values and not undermined from within the Union, like Hungary and Poland do at the time. In fact, article 7 of the TEU might enter into force in the next years. Suspending (voting) rights of a member states, this article is considered as a last resort when there is a "clear risk of a serious breach of the values on which the Union is founded" (TEU, Article 7). However, the EU understands that living up to its values internally determines its external credibility:

The EU's credibility hinges on our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, **the effectiveness and consistency of our policies**, and adherence to our values (European External Action Service (2016), p.10).

Neoliberal governmentality

Another challenge for the EU as a normative actor and particularly its democracy promotion is the critique of neoliberal approaches within the Union's instruments. One of the most important tools the EU has to implement its normative actorness is the *European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights* (EIDHR), often considered as the "jewel in the crown" of the European Union's democracy promotion (Kurki 2011, p.349). It aims at supporting civil society and claims to "take account of cultural and local sensitivities in target states" and to "actively prioritize the wishes of civil society organizations" (Ibid., p.351). However, scholars criticize hidden political logics and neoliberal conceptual underpinnings in this thematic funding instrument.

Kurki for instance uses Foucault's concept of *neoliberal governmentality* to describe the fact that the underlying mechanisms of the tool "foreground specific kinds of liberal economic rationalities and interventions as essential in fostering "free" and "prosperous" liberal democratic society" (2011, p.350). In fact, by the nature of its call of proposals, the instrument considers individuals as autonomous, self-directing "entrepreneurs" that need to be free and rational in the right way: "[...] competition within the market is the ideal that actively molds the self-understanding, the desires, and the actions of the 'free' individual" (Ibid., p.353). As Kurki (2011, p.354) notes, transferring the self-regulating market logic to all spheres of life also means that powers are devolved from the centralized power of the state to those people, who are competitive and take the risk and responsibility. In this sense, the empowerment of specific forms of civil society can also be understood as drifting away from social democratic traditions of national solidarity or collective learning (Ibid., p.357). In fact, the EU seeks to depoliticize its democracy promotion, however we can state that it is [...] **not unbiased, non-ideological, and non-interfering** in the political and economic systems of states. It entails, **as does all democracy promotion**, political and economical facilitation of **particular visions of good life**, not all of them (Kurki 2011, p.363).

This seems logical, but is it a problem though? In general, the question remains what alternatives the EU has to have an impact in states with no functioning or interested government if not encouraging civil society initiatives. This bottom-up strategy by prioritizing the local is supposed to be the opposite of an imposing or even neo-colonial governance style. As Korosteleva and Flockhart (2020, p.159) highlight, the EU should enable “local communities and real people to actualize their own potential *in ways they specify*, and [...] support them in this process”.

However, concerning the EIDHR, “in ways they specify” seems problematic, given that someone has to set clear criteria and frames for funding – in our case the EU. Moreover, considering that the funds are payed by taxes of European citizens, some form of selection through competition as well as clear structures of oversight over how aid is spent are necessary in this instrument. In fact, selecting projects of specific kinds of civil society that correspond to the values of the EU seems necessary and legitimate.

The EU as a military power?

The last challenge we tackle in trying to understand the EU’s role in the world and its nature as a global actor concerns the EU as a military power and its future. Many scholars argue that the “Kantian idealist avoidance of military means rooted in pacifist values prevailing in Europe” (Diez 2005, p.619) is partly a necessity more than a choice, because Europe simply doesn’t have “the military means and resources to become a military power” (Ibid., p.620).

In fact, after the complete self-destruction of Europe in the Second World War, it had to find a new order and identity. The European integration was therefore an alternative to the systems of IR which was destroyed and had always led to war: it developed *amilitary* values and focused on political cooperation and civilian forms of power. However, this path was also chosen because the big bang approach in form of a European Defence Community (EDC) and consequently the idea of a common army in Europe failed in 1954 due to a negative referendum in the French Assembly (Pastor-Castro 2006).

As a matter of fact, the EU has more and more developed its military means in its foreign policy in the last decades. Particularly important changes were negotiated in the Lisbon Treaty in 2007: the creation of the post of the *High Representative* and the EEAS (European External Action Service).

Naturally, the EU has strategic interests in its external relations, however, as Diez (2005, p.625) points out: “The point is not that normative power is not strategic, but that strategic interests and norms cannot be easily distinguished, and that the assumption of a normative sphere without interests is in itself nonsensical”. Nevertheless, even though military and normative power are compatible in some way,

they are in tension and focusing too much on the military development could undermine or even contradict the EU's founding purpose of a peace project. However, referring to the ongoing military missions, the former High Representative states clearly that hard power isn't a taboo for the EU any more:

However, the idea that Europe is an exclusively "civilian power" does not do justice to an evolving reality. [...] For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand (European External Action Service (2016), p.4).

Conclusion

We have seen in this essay that the EU wants to take responsibility for its role in our VUCA world, their claimed goal, as Mogherini points out: "We will navigate this difficult, more connected, contested and complex world guided by our shared interests, principles and priorities (EEAS, p.7). It wants to hold up to its values and tries to spread its conceptions of 'normal' in the world, guided by a mixture of realistic and idealistic elements that it calls *principled pragmatism* (EEAS, p.8). Like any other actor, the EU constructs its normative and increasingly also military identity through discourses which can be very powerful itself.

The EU's external governance style and methods as a normative actor have been highly criticized during the last decades and face many challenges. Scholars claim for a mind-set where, "power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens' but rather 'making up citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom'" (Korosteleva 2016, p.368) and where "governance is no longer a matter of intervening" (Korosteleva and Flockhart 2020, p.169). In fact, it is not only important what the EU does, but also how it does it in order to understand its role in the world. Concerning its degree of reflexivity, the EU seems to have improved by acknowledging the other side and its contexts. As Mogherini highlights:

We have learnt the lesson: my neighbour's and **my partner's weaknesses are my own weaknesses**. So we will invest in win-win solutions, and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game (European External Action Service (2016), p.4).

However, unfortunately, in many cases these words can't stand up to empirical scrutiny. To conclude, it can be said that in order to better understand the role in the world as a normative actor, greater networking and profound exchanges between the academia world and the politics bubble would be helpful for mutual understanding. This essay argues that the concept of 'normative power Europe' is not a contradiction in terms – having values and interests at the same time is no insurmountable contrast – but Europe needs a shared vision in order to be credible in the international scene.

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SAM WILLIAMS - The challenges for the European Union's relations with its neighbourhood

Biography

Sam Andrea Williams is a final year undergraduate student of Politics and International Relations with a Year in Continental Europe at the University of Kent and Boğaziçi University in Istanbul, Turkey). He also works as newsletter contributor on EU and UK affairs, and foreign press officer for the European affairs-focused Think Tank Trinità dei Monti. Sam previously interned at the European Commission Permanent Representation in London and at APCO Worldwide Brussels, mainly working on matters regarding Brexit, the Energy Union, and the technology sector.

Abstract

The *Big Bang enlargement* brought new challenges for the European Union, which encountered several obstacles throughout the integration process, and especially in relation to neighbouring third countries excluded from the post-1991 expansion of the Union. Obstacles included a shift towards autocratic systems; tensions between democracy promotion and promotion of security; and geographical and ideological barriers to the expansion of EU influence. The EU has sought to approach these problems through initiatives such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or the Eastern Partnership (EaP), yet, they prove to be ineffective overall. By introducing tools belonging to the actorship scholarship, this paper will dig to the core of these interrelated hurdles, to unearth systemic issues at the centre of dysfunctional and counter-productive measures. To tackle these and to become an effective actor, this article calls for an EU-wide enhanced unitary voice, encompassing all Member States, and a centralisation of increased foreign policy competences.

Acronyms

EU	European Union
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EaP	Eastern Partnership
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

The fall of the Soviet Union marked a unique opportunity for the European Union (EU) to increase its normative power and to extend its territory and ideology to its eastern neighbours. Its “*big bang*” enlargement (Hill and Smith 2011, p. 312), through the incorporation of former USSR and Warsaw pact states into the European project, has led to important outcomes for both domestic and foreign policy, bringing new challenges for the EU (Smith 2005). The urge of the EU to include its eastern neighbours gained unanimous consent among the Member States, the only question was when and how (Hill and Smith 2011, p.302). Considered one of the most successful policies of the European Union, the integration of the eastern neighbouring countries has shown how the EU can exert influence through its “*carrot and stick*” strategy. The success of the enlargement policy has shed light on the unsuccessfulness of EU policies in bridging stability through policies directed to its wider neighbourhood, like the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Korosteleva 2016; Börzel & van Hüllen 2014). The ENP has sought to include neighbouring countries in the European project without the prospect of membership. This policy gives way to a bi-dimensional character of relations between the EU and its neighbours, both bilateral and multilateral. However, academic literature highlights how the multilateral link often conflicts with the bilateral link (Weiss, Šlosarčík and Mikhelidze 2013; Pace and Wolff 2017). Consequently, the 2015 review of the ENP has noted how not all countries aim to be included in the EU (European Commission 2015), hence indirectly admitting the initial wrong approach adopted, relying on Euro-centric assumptions and remaining passive while holding high expectations for the region.

For the sake of clarity, when referring to the neighbouring third-countries, this paper will consider (i) countries belonging to the EU enlargement agenda (most notably Turkey), (ii) Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), (iii) countries included in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in the MENA region, and (iv) neighbouring countries not part of the enlargement agenda (Mauritania). Therefore, this paper will not uniquely work on the ENP, although it represents a dominant pillar of the relational policies between the EU and its bordering countries. As such, it will undeniably represent a firm point of reference for the question, and an insightful way of analysing the effectiveness of EU foreign policy in the aforementioned geographical area. The geographical area considered is relevant to the aim of this paper, as it is a shared neighbourhood with Russia, and as such, assessing the level of actorness of the EU in the region will highlight the degree of relevance of the EU as an actor in the international arena, specifically in relation with a world competing power such as Russia.

Drawing from a social-constructivist perspective and an empiricist understanding of actorness, the paper will adopt Manners’ understanding of actorness as a lens to assess the EU’s effectiveness in shaping its neighbourhood to its own advantage

(Manners 2010). In this perspective, it will seek to locate various issues of the EU's foreign policy, to then suggest an alternative line of action, giving great importance to the tools and the characteristics the academic sphere considers as essential for the EU to successfully exert its influence beyond its borders. Accordingly, the first part of the paper will focus on an analysis and critique of issues in three distinct levels in the European Union's foreign policy in its neighbourhood: theoretical, institutional and structural. In line with the theoretical approach of this paper, the second part will seek to locate the areas of improvement of EU policy in its neighbourhood. In other words, the article will answer two clearly defined questions: What are the challenges for the EU's neighbourhood policy? And what EU foreign policy attitudes, objectives and tools are needed for the EU to be a 'regional actor'?

Challenges in the EU's neighbourhood policy

Amongst the wide scholarship on the relationship between the EU and its neighbourhood, the literature suggests four main distinctive yet interrelated issues within the foreign policy of the EU. A problem inherent to EU neighbourhood foreign policy is the apparent vicious cycle concerning a shift towards autocratic, rather than EU-inspired neo-liberal democratic systems. While it is unclear whether this vicious chain reaction is caused by or is an effect of the EU's approach toward non-EU countries by drastically shifting its strategy, it is self-evident that the EU seems to have positioned obstacles along its way. In similar fashion to the social constructivist perspective of this article, obstacles vary their nature according to the different regions. The first obstacle is the re-prioritization of stability and security concerns rather than promotion of democracy and liberal ideals. Relatedly, an additional issue is the "*one size fits all*" approach in the MENA region, disregarding the importance of contextual agents area per area, and not appreciating the diversities inherent in the variety of third countries within the EU neighbourhood. Alongside these theoretical and strategic errors, there are institutional and practical counterproductive issues, most notable of which is the absence of a membership prospect, which proved to be extremely successful in the enlargement process of the EU.

Shift towards autocracy

Literature on the topic provides an array of evidence on the malfunctioning of EU foreign policy in its neighbourhood. Pomorska and Noutcheva (2017) closely analyse the problems inherent to the neighbourhood itself, focusing on the spread of an authoritarian *modus vivendi* equally across the region. The polarisation of the neighbourhood is juxtaposed to a polarisation at the member state level within the EU itself. Indeed, Pomorska and Noutcheva point to the nationalist shift in Hungary and Poland (Pomorska and Noutcheva 2017, p. 168), and the inability of the EU to produce any effective policy, limiting its power to *naming and shaming* (*Ibid.*). This leads to a loss of face in the international arena, revealing a lack of domestic cohesiveness. In addition to this theoretical foundation, the democratic backsliding of EU member states

is visible at the institutional level, with Freedom House (2020) noting that besides most states not registering any change of score in their level of freedom, there are more states in regression than there are in advance. Therefore, one of the main responsibilities for the inefficiency of the EU in managing its relations could be attributed to this very hypocrisy of limiting its domestic actions to naming and shaming its own member states, while expecting domestic democratic improvements from non-EU countries, who are not part of the EU.

Stability or democracy?

Another paradox present within EU foreign policy, indicated by Pomorska and Noutcheva (2017), consists in how the EU has remarkably shifted the balance between security and democracy. While its initial goals expressed in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union 2012, Article 2) was aimed at increasing democratisation and exporting its values-based society outside its neighbourhood, the current operational framework denotes how stability/security-oriented the Union is (Pomorska and Noutcheva 2017), lacking a political approach to the management of relations with third countries (Korosteleva 2017). As Korosteleva (2016) and Pace (2009) highlight, there is a clear lack of vision for the region, combined with an exclusion of the general public, leading to a great chasm in the democratisation processes of the region, left by the absence of democratic accountability. This rift, however, is amplified by the fact that, as Youngs (2006) notes, the EU is somewhat effective in exporting part of its values abroad. Yet, it is not enough to constitute a structured pattern able to systematically increase democratisation. Even if it were, it would not be effective, as democratisation may not work as well as it worked in the EU (Youngs 2006, p.903). Tipping the scale towards security, rather than democratisation, proves ineffective in the long term, rather than in the short term, as cooperation needs political reforms to bring legitimization and, more importantly, stability to the region.

One size fits all

However, bringing the political into the discussion does not seem to be the case of the EU in its relations with its bordering countries, and consequently one section of the literature has pointed to a related issue that appears self-evident, by adopting a social-constructivist approach provided by Bretherton and Vogler (1999). Specifically, the EU has a tendency of reproducing itself in its relations with third countries (Bretherton and Vogler 1999). Accordingly, it projects externally solutions that it experiences at the domestic level (Lavenex 2004). Indeed, by viewing the EU as a normative/civilian power within its neighbourhood, it is found that EU Foreign Policy lacks inclusiveness and/or reflexivity. While it acknowledges that not all countries aspire to align to European values and governance principles, it does not seem to address this particular issue, and it adopts a “one-size fits all” strategy when it deals with its neighbours, particularly those in the MENA region (Bicchi 2006). As the most damaging

consequence, the EU creates an environment in which countries of the Mediterranean region compete against each other to develop closer relations with the EU (*Ibid.*). This is counterproductive because it undermines stability, which is the main goal set out by the EU in the ENP.

Another issue adding to this problem is that the EU does not seem to understand the diversity amongst neighbouring MENA countries, where non-state actors are significant in the state apparatus, and key movers and shakers in the stabilisation process in the area. This lack of intuition, along with the lack of vision for the region, limits cooperation to mere security issues such as anti-terrorism or energy security (*Ibid.*). The 2015 review of the ENP sought to tackle this very issue, aiming to strengthen bilateral engagement. The 2017 report on the implementation of the ENP recalled the revised ENP approach, which recognises the different interests and aspirations of individual partners. Accordingly, this aimed “to reflect the level of ambition of each country in its relations with the EU” (European Commission 2017, p.4). However, while cooperation may have changed on a state-to-state basis, it is clear how the EU is still implementing bilateral cooperation on the same themes, i.e. anti-terrorism, security more broadly and stability (European Commission 2017, pp.5-8). Yet, a small nuance must also be acknowledged, following the European Commission’s *Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020* (2020), where the Union implements collaboration on a wider range of fields, *inter alia* circular economy, climate change, trade, society and digital transformation (European Commission 2020). Notwithstanding, these updates regard only eastern partners signatories of the EaP, and they do not seem to have halted the general shift towards autocracy, nor the problematic confusion between multilateral and bilateral relations with the wider neighbourhood.

No membership prospect

Probably the most recurrent issue brought up by academia, another crucial mistake of the EU when managing its relations with its neighbourhood – particularly the ENP – is a structural one. The big bang enlargement has revealed the limits of the EU, which successfully managed to attract many countries during its *expansionist* period. Yet, it inevitably excluded other countries, and cooperation specific to the ENP suffers from a huge disability as the countries involved have no expectation of full membership (Börzel and van Hüllen 2014). Given the broad scope of the region opted in the beginning of the article, it is crucial to differentiate this issue in accordance with the regions. For Balkan states, membership is on the table, for EaP states it is not precluded by EU treaties, yet it is not on the political agenda. Regarding the MENA region, the membership option has been denied, given the membership clause in EU treaties. As Haukkala puts it, the EU has passed from a “carrot and stick” strategy attracting countries to putting a “cart before its neighbours’ horses with no tangible carrot in sight” (Haukkala 2008, p.1617). This substantial obstacle creates more problems than solutions, through the expectation of non-EU countries to adopt the

same rule of law-based system and values as the EU, without providing the countries with tangible material incentives (Huakkala 2008). Additionally, the economic, political and societal cost of adherence to EU conditions is too high for neighbouring countries (Müftüler-Baç 2017). Specifically, Huakkala (2008) highlights how it is the very open-ended nature of EU membership that constitutes the flagship promoting the legitimacy, and not only the appeal, of the EU in its relations with its neighbours. Hence, the dichotomy of membership prospect, and full alignment to EU rules and standards, is the equivalent of a brutal break in the normative character of the EU (*Ibid.*). Therefore, the absence of the membership prospect de-legitimises the EU, it works counterproductively, and it denies contextual recognition to the EU.

Attitudes, objectives and tools needed for the EU to be a regional actor

To overcome these inherent challenges for the European Union's foreign policy within its neighbourhood, this paper will outline a series of ways that can implement its aims in the region. Scholarship focusing on EU actorness provides a wide range of tools and measurements that help to assess the level of influence the EU exerts on third countries. By understanding the EU as a *sui generis* actor (Bretherton and Vogler 2006), the characteristics that the bloc needs to be defined by are unique. Although Bretherton and Vogler (2006) prioritise opportunity, presence and capability, this paper argues that the EU already has a great level of opportunity in the region (*Ibid.*), and it juxtaposes additional tools and political behaviours that would increase the effectiveness of EU foreign policy in the region. Namely, these include cohesiveness, capability, authority, recognition, presence and effectiveness. Cohesiveness, in the sense of "the reduction of regional and social disparities" (Hooghe 1996), is a concept which encapsulates the intuition that the EU will be more effective on the international scene by being united internally (Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014).

This first point leads to define the importance of capability, understood as the availability of policy instruments, and the *ability* to use these (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). These last two points are logically interlinked by authority, understood as "the extent of delegated competences from the member states to the EU, which can take many different shapes and varies greatly by policy area" (Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014, p.964). Equally important is recognition, which, as Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014) put it, is an essential part, as the capability, authority and cohesiveness entity must be recognised as an actor, either *de facto*, or *de jure*. Only then it is possible to locate whether the EU has presence in its neighbourhood. A central factor for Bretherton and Vogler (2006), presence refers to the ability of the EU to exert its influence beyond its borders.

Cohesiveness and capability

This article argues that the EU should take into account the importance of acting more unitarily. In the specific context of the EU managing its neighbourhood, this would

mean putting in place policies that would incentivise member states to establish a highest common factor (Winterton 2009) style of policy-making process. Additionally, greater weight should be given to the cultural, educational, value-based and normative – in the sense of a unitary understanding of what is ‘normal’ (Manners 2002, p.236) – pillars of the EU. This would be crucial to comply with the traditional understanding of cohesiveness, i.e. “the resultant forces which are acting on the members to stay in a group” (Festinger 1950, p.274). Only then would the EU be stronger with effective tools to manage its neighbourhood in line with the argument suggesting a contextual basis on clearer material incentives (Haukkala 2008). This paper interprets the term as “the availability of policy instruments and understandings about the Union’s ability to utilize [its] instruments in response to opportunity and/or to capitalise presence” (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, p.24). It is therefore self-evident how advantageous it would be for the EU to have this characteristic to issue the right policies as an answer to correct opportunities in its relations with its neighbours. Specifically, these would help the EU to overcome the security/democracy dilemma. Indeed, a magnified tank of foreign policy resources could enhance the values of the Union in the region’s bilateral relations, while continuing to work on security issues that should not be however undermined.

Authority and recognition

Yet, that would not be sufficient. For the EU to act unitarily, it is essential to consider the responsibility of Member States, which determine the amount of responsibilities they delegate to Brussels. Indeed, the main structural hurdle inherent to EU foreign policy more broadly, is that larger Member States informally play a much greater role in the creation of EU foreign policy than EU institutions (Lehne 2017). Therefore, a revolutionary step would be that of attributing competencies regarding issues such as national security totally to EU institutions. A centralisation of competences in the sector would allow the EU to have a greater level of authority (Jupille and Caporaso 1998). While the institutionalisation of the EU’s relations with some of its neighbouring countries (i.e. the ENP) contains co-ordination as well as supporting competences and joint competences (da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014), more successful policies would have to provide additional material benefits for bordering countries to shift towards the adoption of EU norms and standards.

Even more importantly, it is how third countries *perceive* EU legitimacy that plays a central role (da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014). The issue that the EU seems to experience in this context is that other countries consider the Union less and less as an actor *de jure* and *de facto*, as the movement towards autocracy testifies (Freedom House 2020). In other words, third countries are not engaging with the EU as satisfyingly enough as the Union aims. By adopting an approach directed at a greater inclusion of its neighbours, the EU could solve the problems caused by the absence of a membership prospect, as acting decisively while following its own interests in the

region, would lead to legitimate recognition of the EU. Accordingly, EU-neighbouring countries would have more incentives to act in line with the aims of the EU.

Presence and effectiveness

Additionally, presence, as the ability of the EU to exert influence beyond its borders (Bretherton and Vogler 2006), is essential for the EU to be a successful actor (Whitman 2013). Going more in-depth in this concept, it is crucial to differentiate *being* normative from *acting* in a normative way (Manners 2008a), which is the difference between endorsing intergovernmental and transnational governance, and behaving in an ethically good way (Whitman 2013). On the one hand, this paper argues that the EU does not have presence within its neighbourhood region, as the inability to manage critical situations, *inter alia* the migrant crisis, the conflicts in Syria and in Libya and the recent shift towards autocracy, prove how the EU is not acting normatively. Yet, the institutional shift towards stability, rather than promotion of values, may also represent a way in which the Union seeks to accept and to adapt to some level to the *status quo* of many neighbouring countries. Therefore, the EU's presence in its region is somewhat limited, and it would need to devote greater attention and effort to embracing intergovernmental and transnational governance across the region. By doing so, the EU would address the one-size-fits-all problem, as the enhancement and the strengthening of bilateral links would lead to a stronger position of the EU in international negotiating tables. Similarly, adopting different epistemological approaches on a bilateral case-by-case basis would make the EU's foreign policy in the region more effective.

Indeed, the aim of the adoption of these specific tools is to increase the effectiveness of EU foreign policy in the neighbourhood. Drawing from the mainstream scholarship admonishing the EU for being characterised by factors including "slow and often only modest internal reforms, an increasing politicisation of formally 'low politics' issues" (Niemann and Bretherton 2013, p.262), this paper argues that the main goal is to increase EU effectiveness in the neighbourhood. Defined as the EU's ability to achieve its objectives by influencing other actors (Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Niemann and Bretherton 2013; Van Schaik 2013), the literature shows how internal cohesiveness is the key to accomplish this aim (da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014; Delreux 2014).

Conclusion: Unity in diversity

This article has shown how specific factors can truly make the EU a normative power in its neighbourhood, especially considering the increase of significance of external factors such as Russia, which the Euro-centric approach of this paper has not given room to consider. This "elephant in the room"-like agent is attracting EU neighbours through an assertive attitude on the regional and global level, that neither the EU nor NATO have been able to address (Pomorska and Noutcheva 2017). Additionally, in line with a constant contextual competition with the EU (Averre 2014), and replying to

Brussels' Eastern Partnership with the Eurasian Union, Russia has successfully attracted many shared-neighbouring countries, as it does not insist on conditionality clauses that this paper has shown are counterproductive. Accordingly, it has fruitfully located the problems in the EU plan for its neighbourhood, and consolidated its influence in the region, e.g. in Ukraine, which wrongly interpreted its increased relations with the EU as a potential future full membership status, and Russia played the situation to its own advantage (Hadfield 2017). To avoid similar mistakes, the EU must prove to be united in diversity.

After having gone in depth in the core issues of EU foreign policy in its neighbourhood, this paper has sought to provide key attitudes, objectives and tools that the Union should apply to increase its effectiveness, and *be* – as well as *behave* as – an actor with its bordering countries. Specifically, the paper has raised the inherent contextual foreign policy problems, concerning (i) the general neighbourhood's autocratic tendencies, (ii) the reprioritisation of security over the spread of values, especially in the ENP, (iii) the strategic "one size fits all" approach disregarding national particularities, and (iv) the theoretical and practical error of inescapable withdrawal of the membership prospect for ENP countries. While academia – as well as EU institutions – has long argued that diversity is not a hindrance to effectiveness in EU foreign policy (da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014; The EU Motto, the European Union), this paper argues that diversity itself is one of the main factors making the EU a *sui generis* actor. Accordingly, the suggested attitudes, objectives and tools that the EU should adopt are cohesiveness, capability, recognition, authority, and presence. These suggested approaches deem a revolutionary enhancement of EU foreign policy in the area, which would include a centralisation of competences related to security, that would enhance the operability of EU institutions. These measures would be essential to secure an increased effectiveness of normative actions of the EU within its neighbourhood.

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STEFANIA CALCIATI - The EU as an effective actor in development policy? The case of Sub-Saharan Africa

Biography

Stefania Calciati is a final year undergraduate student in Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent. During her year abroad in Beijing she had the chance to study the complex relation between China and the European Union, with a particular focus on development efforts. The patterns of cooperation and competition between these two actors in the African continent continue to inspire her research.

Abstract

The delivery of development aid has been a longstanding policy effort of the European Union (EU) since the Treaty of Rome. In the last decades, especially with the Treaty of Lisbon, supranational competencies in this area have been expanded through the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, an increased display of EU actorness often resulted in decreased effectiveness. As such, an analysis of the European Union's development efforts will be performed in order to evaluate its policy coherence and policy effectiveness. In particular, from the evaluation of recent development initiatives towards Sub-Saharan African countries two main issues emerge: a lack of coordination across different areas of the EU external action and substantial differences in Member States' approaches to development.

Acronyms

APC	African, Caribbean and Pacific
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CFP	Common Fisheries Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CPD	Coherence Policy for Development
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Introduction

Provisions for aid deliverance to developing countries have always been included among the prerogatives of European Union's (EU hereafter) since the Treaty of Rome. Indeed, a small foreign aid fund, the European Development Fund, was managed by the European Commission (EC) since 1957, albeit being outside the EU budget (Carbone 2017). However, it was only fairly recently that the EU began to have a significant supranational control of development policy. In particular with the Lisbon Treaty the EC acquired competency over development policy coordination among member states and among different areas of external action (Orbie and Lightfoot 2017). Moreover, the 2006 European Consensus on Development opened a season of increased EU coordination with member states, which expanded EU actorness in development policy. However, contrary to intuitive predictions the display of EU actorness did not always result in increased effectiveness (Carbone 2013; Thomas 2012). Furthermore, the efforts to put in place a coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Lisbon Treaty resulted in coordination problems between the primary development policy goal of poverty reduction and more strategic overall goals of the EU (Hadfield 2007). As such, in the 2010s it appeared as both coherence and effectiveness of EU developing policy were declining. Hence, in order to establish whether the European Union has indeed been successful in setting and achieving its development policy objectives it is necessary to examine the dimensions of policy coherence and policy effectiveness. Thus, this article will be divided into two sections. In the first, this piece of writing will define these dimensions, in order to explain how these concepts can be meaningfully applied to the EU development policy. Secondly, the issues of coherence and effectiveness of EU development policy will be evaluated, taking as a reference the goals and results of the EU policy to Sub-Saharan African countries in the context of EU-APC (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) relations in the early 2000s and after the 2005 Amended Cotonou Partnership Agreements (CPA).

Coherence and effectiveness in recent European development policy

Before defining the dimensions of coherence and effectiveness, which will be employed throughout the text in order to evaluate the capacity of the European Union to set goals for its development policy and to achieve tangible results in their implementation, it is necessary to clarify the theoretical perspective adopted by this article. Indeed, when analysing EU development policy, it is fundamental to remember that there exist a "parallel competence" between the EC-led bilateral component and its multilateral component, represented by the national development policies of member states (Orbie and Lightfoot 2017, p. 202). While in the 2000s and 2010s more power was transferred to the EC through the ambitious Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), member states remain the shapers of the EU development policy. In particular, the cleavage between the Nordic countries (Scandinavia plus the UK) and Southern countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal and France) keeps informing the debate

at all levels of policy, as the first favour a value driven multilateral approach, whereas the second prefer a more strategic bilateral approach (Carbone 2017). For instance, while the Lisbon Treaty extended the obligation for coherence in development policy to intergovernmental efforts, the bureaucratic nature of the PCD failed to solve political problems arising from the different interests of stakeholders both within the EU various external action departments and among members states (Carbone and Keijzer 2016). Indeed, while the 2006 European Consensus for Development represented an important step in reaching a degree of coordination between the member states at the discursive and normative level, there is little evidence that a Europeanisation process is in play when looking at the implementation of development policy (Orbie and Carbone 2016; Orbie and Lightfoot 2017). As such, common European strategies (such as the PCD agenda or the European Consensus) tend to reflect the more ambitious Nordic agenda, as they invoke a deep level of coordination and complementarity among states' policies and stress best practices such as untying aid and recipient ownership. Hence, the difficulty in reaching meaningful coordination in the implementation phase underlines both the EU's ability to set normative frameworks and its difficulty in assuring compliance for them when differences in strategy and interests remain strong among member states.

Secondly, after having underlined the influence of member states in EU development policy, the concepts of coherence and effectiveness will be defined. Coherence will be defined as the "adoption of determinate common policies and pursuit of those policies by European Union member states and institutions" (Thomas 2012, p. 458). It is important to highlight two aspects of coherence: namely, policy determinacy and political cohesion. The former refers to the degree to which a policy defines clear objectives and sets limits for acceptable behaviour of members states and EU bodies (*Ibid.*). The second measures the level of political support commanded by a certain policy. While the highly articulated characterisation of European actorness by Bretherton and Vogler (2008) is equally (or possibly even more) influential, Thomas' definition of coherence has been chosen because of its clarity and because it manages to draw an analytical distinction between coherence and effectiveness, which will assist us in the evaluation of EU development policy goals and implementation in the next section. However, in order to include all relevant dimension of coherence, it is useful to include horizontal coherence in our discussion of the concept (Bretherton and Vogler 2008). Indeed, coherence among different policy areas became a central issue for EU development efforts, as with the Lisbon Treaty the political will and instruments for a common foreign policy were institutionalised through the CFSP. A consequence of the Treaty was to bring security, development and trade closer together, as emphasis was put on the need for complementarity and consistency among different areas of external action (Furness and Gänzle 2017). In the case of development policy, this resulted in tensions between the development goal of poverty reduction, affirmed with the ratification of the MDGs, and the overall strategic goals of the Union's external action (Hadfield 2007) or between the adoption of sustainable development and protectionist trade policies (Bretherton and Vogler 2008). As such, the coherence of EU

development policy towards African countries will be analysed according to the dimensions of policy determinacy, political cohesion and horizontal coherence.

Lastly, regarding the definition of effectiveness, many scholars underline the difficulty in measuring this dimension, as the PCD and its Impact Assessment reports are often considered insufficient in capturing whether tangible results were achieved (Carbone and Keijzer 2016; Carbone 2017). As a result, prominent scholars have focused on the European Union's ability to shape world affairs and global discourses on development in accordance with the objectives it adopts discursively (Thomas 2012; Carbone 2013). Indeed, following Thomas, we can define effectiveness as "the Union's ability to shape world affairs in accordance with the objectives it adopts on particular issues" (Thomas 2012, p. 460). An important issue is that this definition of effectiveness necessarily implies a dynamic interaction between coherence, or EU actorness, and implementation. For instance, as mentioned in the Introduction, it seems that the increased degree of coherence in the early 2000s only increased EU influence as a norm setter for a limited amount of time, as its lack of effectiveness was later noted and criticised by other international actors (Carbone and Keijzer 2016). Moreover, increased EU actorness after the Lisbon Treaty and the European Consensus implied a more rigid approach, as the EC encourages member states to comply with detailed roadmaps or implementation plans. This, in turn, had an overall negative impact on policy effectiveness as recipient states resisted political conditionality and less flexible EC oversight (Delputte and Söderbaum 2012). Thus, the analysis of EU effectiveness in shaping global discourses on development frameworks and best practices will also take into account the dynamic interaction between coherence (or increased EU actorness) and effectiveness.

EU's development policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa

After having defined the dimensions of coherence and effectiveness in development policy, this paper will turn to a more detailed evaluation of the European Union's development efforts. A particular focus will be cast on horizontal coherence, as it represents one of the main issues to have emerged from institutionalisation of the CFSP in the Treaty of Lisbon. Moreover, a geographical spotlight will be cast on the EU relation with Sub-Saharan countries, in the context of the development of EU-APC relations from the early 2000s. Indeed, Sub-Saharan Africa will provide an ideal ground for an evaluation of the EU development policy due to the colonial history of many EU member states, the strategic significance of the continent for overall CFSP goals and the abundance of development aid destined to these countries.

First, while the EU managed to achieve a certain level of policy determinacy through common strategies and normative frameworks, it seems that political cohesion remained quite low, as differences in interests and approaches among member states persisted, pointing to a superficial Europeanisation in development policy. Indeed, the EC managed to reach important compromises with the 27 Member States, especially

in the 2006 European Consensus on Development that expressed an “European view” on the aid effectiveness agenda, which had been discussed in OECD-led global forums since the early 2000s (Delputte and Söderbaum 2012, p. 40; Orbie and Versluys 2008, p. 72). In particular, this document was seen as opening a “new season in EU development policy” (Carbone 2007), as it laid out a concerted strategy to implement the Paris aid effectiveness agenda. Moreover, with the 2007 Code of Conduct for Complementarity and the Division of Labour, the EC outlined a radical change in practices by promoting more coordination among donors, across different countries and sectors (Carbone 2013, p. 347). Nevertheless, while these documents spell out normative frameworks and implementation roadmap, political cohesion showed by EU member states results quite low when achievements on the ground are analysed. For instance, one of the main objectives of the Code of Conduct, that is, rationalising aid spending to end differences between “aid darlings” and “aid orphans” in order to avoid donor fragmentation and underfunding was not fully achieved in Sub-Saharan Africa (*Ibid.*). In fact, EU donors kept investing bilaterally in strategically significant countries, such as in Ethiopia and in the Sahel, while Senegal and Gambia, long course “aid orphans”, continued to experience a lack of funding as the presence of the Commission was not deemed necessary (Carbone 2013, p. 349). In addition, even in countries such as Zambia and Tanzania, in which donor coordination efforts are considered successful, the EC ended up behaving as one of the actors and not as a leader or coordinator, as for instance the World Bank managed to do (Delputte and Söderbaum 2012). Finally, considerable differences persist among EU donors, especially as the Nordic Plus group (composed by Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands and the UK), considered the frontrunner of the aid effectiveness and complementary agenda, manages to maintain a more flexible approach to that of the EC and of Southern donors (*Ibid.*). Hence, the EC managed to reach a consensus for the ambitious framework outlined in the 2006 European Consensus, however this direction was mainly promoted by the cohesive Nordic Plus Group. Thus, the EC fails to coordinate between the Nordic and Southern countries, as they maintain different interests and goals in development policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa.

Secondly, regarding the issue of horizontal coherence, it seems that profound incoherencies persist between development efforts and the goals promoted by EU trade policies, notwithstanding the promotion of PCD. For instance, the adoption by the EU of Sustainable Development as an overarching objective with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 highlighted the issues posed by the protectionist Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy (Bretherton and Vogler 2008; Orbie and Versluys 2008). In particular, the CFP’s “Southern Agreements” allow EU countries to fish in Sub-Saharan developing countries’ waters in exchange for financial compensation. While these arrangements are usually limited to high value fish, such as tuna, for which there is no competition with local fishing communities, “mixed” agreements can encompass a wider variety of species (Bretherton and Vogler 2008, p.400). However, this latter type of agreement, especially frequent on the African West Coast, can directly clash with the interests of local fishing communities, as the EU’s

catches are in part commercialised on the national market, where they can offer a lower price due to the reduced costs of large scale fishing (*Ibid.*). Since the incoherence between the CFP and sustainable development was pointed out, the EC launched the 2002 Fisheries Partnership Agreements reform. However, mayor issues persist, most notably in the case of Senegal, where many fishermen had to find an alternative livelihood, with some switching to people smuggling to Morocco and Spain (*Ibid.*).

Another important issue for the horizontal coherence of EU development policy has been that the overall priority given to strategic CFSP objectives risks undermining the centrality of poverty reduction as the primary development objective. While the PCD agenda was put in place to safeguard the coherence of development policy by outlining possible trade-offs and synergies with other areas of EU external action, some scholars highlighted how the bureaucratic nature of the PCD is not equipped to inform the political and strategic decisions needed when allocating funds and resources to different Directorate-Generals (Carbone Keijzer 2016; Furness and Gänzle 2017). In particular, the lack of coherence between development and foreign policy can result in the diversion of funds from poverty relief programmes to military or stability agendas, with the result of giving prominence to counterterrorism and the halting of migration flows over other goals. A prominent example of this trend is represented by the 2013 Comprehensive Approach to crisis response developed by the Barroso Commission, which united with the regional strategy for the Sahel that followed the 2011 Agenda for Change privileges a mixed development-security nexus response to conflict and humanitarian crises. This approach has been informed at the discursive level by a cyclical understanding of the relation between poverty and insecurity, which gained prominence in the early 2000s, for example in the 2003 European Security Strategy that identifies security as a “first condition for development” (Orbie and Versluys 2008, p.82; Hadfield 2007, p.54). A lack of hierarchy and coordination was also present in budgetary allocations, as the African Peace Facility uses resources from the EDF for peacekeeping and peace building operations, which are being increasingly labelled as ODA (Official Development Assistance) (Orbie and Versluys 2008). In the Sahel counterterrorism approaches, which relied on giving strength to existing governments, were preferred in the context of the fight against Jihadist groups related to AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). According to some analyses, the result was neglecting poverty mitigation and human rights issues (Reitano 2014). Hence, the lack of a political and strategic direction makes it difficult for the PCD mechanism to adjudicate resources among the different sectors of EU external action. In turn, this lack of coordination can have a negative impact on the credibility of EC as a donor, especially when poverty relief is mixed or subordinated to the security agenda.

Finally, the dimension of effectiveness will be evaluated. As mentioned in the previous section, this concept refers to the ability of the EU to shape global discourses, in this case in the field of development assistance. As Carbone argues, the EU was influential in promoting the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, both among its member states and in

global forums, such as in the OECD's DAC (Carbone 2013). In particular, EU choices fed into the global policy process in the 2002 Financing for Development Conference and in the Paris Forum, that emphasised issues of coordination, complementarity and ownership in development assistance (Carbone 2013). However, in more recent years and especially with the 2011 Busan Forum it appeared that the EU had abandoned its norm setter role and instead leaned towards norm following in development policy. Indeed, EU influence, at its peak after the 2005 European Consensus for Development suffered from the shortcomings of its implementation process (Carbone and Keijzer 2016). In particular, with the European Consensus, high expectations were set for the EC to have a more active role, both when managing the EDF and as a coordinator among its member states' policies. However, the rigidity of the EC, compared to flexible approach by the Nordic Plus countries actually worsened the EU relations with many countries which distrusted the slow workings of a large bureaucracy (Carbone 2013; Delputte and Söderbaum 2012). This has been true especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the EU has to compete with the quicker development aid coming from non-OECD donors (Scheipers and Sicurelli 2008). In particular, the Chinese approach with its focus on infrastructure investments and the lack of onerous good governance requirements has convinced some Sub-Saharan countries, such as Angola, to rely less on EU development aid with a consequent loss of influence for the European Union (Börzel and Hackenesch 2013).

Conclusion

Thus, an analysis of the European Union's development policy highlighted that the Union has managed to devise coherent normative frameworks and to negotiate ambitious implementation plans with its member states, most notably the 2006 European Consensus for Development. However, while the policy determinacy of this document (and of the 2007 Code of Conduct as well) is quite high, during the implementation phase divisions among the members tend to resurface, with the result of lowering the overall political cohesion. Indeed, notwithstanding the EC enhanced role in the 2000s and 2010s, member states continue to give direction to the Union's development policy, with the Nordic Plus Group usually taking the lead in lobbying for changes and in implementation. As a consequence, while the EU development policy may seem quite coherent at a first glance, when its effectiveness is evaluated on the ground (Sub-Saharan Africa in this case) many incoherencies appear. First of all, the capacity of the Union to coordinate its external action among various areas of policy remains limited, as development's objectives are often in direct contrast with trade policy or overall strategic goals of the CFSP. Furthermore, these shortcomings damaged the EU's effectiveness in shaping the global discourse on development and aid policy, especially from the late 2000s. As a consequence, the EU development policy towards Sub-Saharan countries is now less influential than before, also due to the competition posed by non-OECD donors, especially by China. In conclusion, in this delicate moment for the EC credibility as an international donor coordinator, the negotiations for the new EU-APC Agreement after the expiry of the Amended CPA in

2020 will be of the utmost importance for upholding European influence especially towards African countries.

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GABRIEL LORCA AICARDI - The Ukraine conflict: Why energy policy should be the dominant foreign policy tool in EU-Russia relations – not sanctions

Biography

Gabriel Lorca Aicardi is double-Master's candidate in International Relations at the University of Kent and Higher School of Economics (Moscow), and an Assistant Intern at Confindustria Russia. He graduated in International Relations at the University of Bologna and previously worked at the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce. Gabriel is an active GCRF Compass student affiliate. His research focuses on energy security and EU-Russia energy relations. He received several accolades, including Kent's International Taught Scholarship and a best-employee award in a previous research role.

Abstract

This paper calls for a substantial policy change in EU relations with Russia in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis. It describes the failure of its sanctioning policy in its key dimensions. First, the restrictive measures did not succeed to undermine Russia's macroeconomic stability or to constrain Moscow to modify its behaviour on the ground. Second, they produced unequal economic costs among the EU Member States, which became a factor of strong internal division. Finally, sanctions facilitated a relevant geographic shift of trade and financial links towards China, and particularly in the energy sector, they helped Beijing to position itself as an alternative to EU energy expertise in the long run. On the other hand, the paper evidences the high dependency of Russia's state revenues on oil and gas exports and the high correlation between main macroeconomic indicators and the variation of international oil prices. From this assumption, it explains that the EU should rather promote an assertive energy policy, made by a combination of energy diversification and market regulation, to circumscribe Russia's monopolistic stance and, eventually, to enhance its negotiating position against Moscow.

Introduction

The analysis in this article departs from the point, argued elsewhere (Lorca Aicardi 2019), that the EU could gain a higher leverage over Russia by diversifying its energy supplies rather than with the sole implementation of economic sanctions. In the current work, energy policy is regarded as the preferential tool available to the EU to enhance its negotiating position against Russia. It articulates this policy in two main components – energy diversification (essentially concerning gas) and new regulation/legislation in

the energy sector – and, while not providing conclusive remarks on the effective impact on Russia’s foreign policy, the article still indicates some evidence that the bargaining margin of the EU might improve as a result of some of its measures in energy.

It has been said that the economic sanctions introduced after downing flight MH17 in 2014 were supposed to be the toughest measures advanced by the EU. They included a wide range of restrictions, from bans of dual-use goods to financial and credit limitations. Previous rounds of sanctions were considered to be relatively mild (Kalinichenko 2017; Kuzio 2017; Korhonen, Simola and Solanko 2018). From one perspective, it was reasonable to think about economic sanctions since Russia was the third-largest trade partner of the EU (EUR 285 billion in 2014), and the probability of successful sanctions usually increases when trade linkages between sender and target are larger (Giumelli 2017; Benzell and Lagarda 2017). However, several scholars were highly suspicious about the real impact of sanctions on Russia’s economic collapse in 2014. The crucial and foremostly-observed patterns were the two-third export share and 50%-plus of state budget revenues made by oil and gas, which make the country extremely vulnerable to shifts in global oil prices (Dreger *et al.* 2016, p.296). Some experts evidenced that GDP growth and EU-Russia trade started to decline in 2012, several months before the economic sanctions were imposed (Giumelli 2017; *ibid.*), while others noted that the worseness of items like inflation, GDP and ruble value happened in mid-2014 showed a significant relation with the heavy collapse of oil barrel price of more than USD 60 at the same time (*ibid.*). This work takes this aspect to depict that any plan to constrain Moscow should start with its energy policy. In addition, the fact that in 2015 40% of the EU gas imports and 30% of oil imports were coming from Russia indicates that there is overall a big margin of dependency from Brussels that can be reduced (European Commission 2016, p.2; Bocse 2018, p.146; Vijay 2016, p.100).

At the same time, it is quite clear that the current group of economic sanctions has been largely unsuccessful. As the next section will elaborate, they have essentially failed to undermine Russia’s fundamental economic stability and have so far not persuaded it to change its behaviour towards Ukraine (Troianovski 2018). EU sanctions have produced a politically dangerous uneven impact across the EU (Giumelli 2017). Additionally, they have unleashed a wide-scale geopolitical transition of Russia’s economy and trade, especially in relation to the energy industry. As a consequence, China became the number one purchaser of Russian oil and gas in few years (Downs *et al.* 2018). These analytical key points related to sanctions will be analysed under the economic sanctions scheme suggested by Oxenstierna and Olsson (2015). The third section will elaborate on the core element of the EU energy policy strategy against Russia, mainly in terms of energy diversification and internal energy market legislation. Finally, some further conclusions and recommendations will be offered for future research.

The Failure of Sanctions

In Oxenstierna and Olsson's work, the first important factor to consider about sanctions is their cost. They treat the cost as a metric of success, so "the higher the cost of sanctions, the more likely it is that the target will change its political behaviour in accordance with the sender's demands" (Bapat *et al.* 2013, p.89; Oxenstierna and Olsson 2015, p.24). However, a careful study of the current scenario of the target country Russia would suggest that sanctions have not inflicted a significant cost. For instance, the country has managed to maintain solid macroeconomic stability. Russia's international reserves, after having plummeted from over USD 510 billion in July 2013 to nearly 450 billion a year later, have recovered to USD 450 billion in July 2018. Similarly, unemployment has fallen from 5,5% in July 2013 to a record-Post-Soviet low of 4.8% at the end of Q1 2018, and inflation has been reported to be 2.3% in June 2018, from 6.5% in July 2013 (Troianovski 2018). Subsequently, sanctions have provided little incentives to change Russia's policy in Ukraine in accordance with Brussels's wishes. Moscow continues to financially cover the budget of the separatist republics of Donetsk and Lugansk at levels of 70-90%, and provide military training and equipment to the separatist forces (Kuzio 2017, p.114).

Another crucial aspect of sanctions indicated by Oxenstierna and Olsson is trade dependency. Mutual trade dependency could make sanctions more efficient, but also have the effect of deterring the sender from imposing sanctions. Everything depends on how high the damage incurred by the sender is. A high economic burden "may prevent the sender sustaining or escalating sanctions, which reduces the chance of sanctions succeeding" (Oxenstierna and Olsson 2015, p.24). Again, this is another risk that the EU is experiencing with its sanctions regime. Particularly, for some Member States the impact has been higher than for others. Countries like Malta and Cyprus experienced a trade drop in Russian exports of 91 and 63% in 2013, respectively, whereas the same year Germany lost EUR 14 billion, Italy EUR 4 billion and France and the Netherlands EUR 3 billion in trade (Giumelli 2017, p.1017). Sanctions against Russia have constituted a strong element of division among EU Members, with some having powerful business, financial and energy interests in Russia (Kuzio 2017), and several EU politicians have overtly challenged them because of their adverse implications on their national economies (Giumelli 2017).

Perhaps the most crucial factor refers to the role of third-party countries ('black knights'). Oxenstierna and Olsson (2015, p.25) mention that as this sort of countries may act as alternative export markets and sources of finance, third parties can mitigate the cost of sanctions and, eventually "undermine the legitimacy of sanctions". In this sense, EU sanctions can produce the catastrophic effect of boosting an utter geographical shift of Russia's trade and financial links towards China; and this is quite true in relation to Russia's energy industry. This sector was affected by EU sanctions in two main ways. First, the long- and medium-term financing ban (up to 30 days) was extended not only to main Russian banks but also to companies operating in the energy upstream sector such as Rosneft and Novatek (Downs *et al.* 2018; Korhonen,

Simola and Solanko 2018). Secondly, the technology ban on high-tech equipment could provoke a long-term impact since Russia would no longer count on western technological capabilities for the exploitation of deep-water, Arctic offshore and shale oil projects to offset declining production in traditional fields (*Ibid.*). Still, Russia counteracted by accelerating its pivot towards China. This strategy was firstly reflected in the 'Power of Siberia' project, a 30-year USD-400-billion agreement between Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for the delivery of pipe gas in the amount of 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year (Downs *et al.* 2018). Soon thereafter, a major strike took place in Novatek's Yamal LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) project, where CNPC and the Silk Road Investment Fund purchased nearly 30% of the venture and 'financially' replaced essential western capital for the completion of it (*Ibid.*). Interestingly, this movement was very important for China from a technological point of view. By positioning itself inside Russia's main LNG project, China has got a precious opportunity to create business opportunities for Chinese firms, to gain expertise in manufacturing capabilities for LNG supply chain and ocean engineering and, eventually, to become a global manufacturing superpower in the long term (*Ibid.*).

Towards a Comprehensive EU Energy Policy against Russia

The consistent failures of sanctioning measures implemented against Russia should constitute the first indicator that for the EU a change of strategy is pertinent. This section will elaborate on the importance of the EU energy policy *vis-à-vis* Russia and will provide insights of its two main components: diversification of energy, essentially referred to gas, and framing of Russia's monopoly position in the EU gas market by means of new regulation and legislation. Such a policy may also have promising expectations because of the high mutual interdependency, as previously pointed out. Thus, an energy-independent EU may formulate a more unrestricted and assertive foreign policy towards Russia at different levels and in different areas.

Decreasing the high energy dependency from Russia and circumscribing its grip over the EU domestic energy market have been the main implicit goals behind the Energy Union initiative launched in February 2015. This initiative was defined as "a Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy" and its main pillar was the development of a regional-level energy security conception based on the principle of solidarity among the EU Member States (Institute for Security Studies 2017, p.5; Romanova 2016b, p.780). The key areas of this initiative are: development of renewable sources, diversification of external suppliers through the construction of LNG infrastructure and new pipelines, and new regulation and legislation aimed at ensuring security of gas supply. At this point, the EU has been already operating in each of these areas to enhance energy security, although there have been mixed results. In the following paragraphs, the most relevant aspects of these attempts will be discussed.

The strategy for the promotion of renewable energy resources was enshrined by the 2030 EU energy targets adopted by the European Council in 2014, in accordance with which 27% of the total EU energy mix should be made by renewables by the end of that year. This program was reinforced by a new legislative package proposed by the European Council in 2015 to be implemented in 2016-2017 (Meyer-Ohlendorf *et al.* 2015). This measure produced significant results. The EU-wide share of renewables in final EU energy consumption raised from 16.7% in 2015 to 17.0% in 2016, and by 2018, all EU Member States endorsed a higher EU-wide renewable energy target of 32% by 2030 (RED II) (European Environment Agency 2018, pp.5-13). Another positive outcome was that in 2017 the EU has successfully managed to cut its use of fossil fuels by more than one-tenth, and in 2016 the reduced demand of fossil fuels was of 143 million tonnes of oil equivalent, both figures in relation to the 2005 usage level (*Ibid.*). However, there is still a fundamental problem with renewables, which is its intermittency. Back-up energy sources will still be required, and as coal and nuclear are being progressively phased out, gas will be predominant as the only 'transitional' base-load fuel in this strategy (Cohen 2019). This implies an increased importance of natural gas within this ambitious renewable-energy strategy. Indeed, EU gas imports are predicted to constitute 77% of the gas demand in 2025 and even 83% of the gas demand by 2040 (*Ibid.*; International Energy Agency 2015, in Bocse 2018, p.146).

This circumstance is problematic for the EU diversification strategy away from Russia. On the one hand, the domestic production of gas in Europe (mostly Norway, the Netherlands and the UK) will objectively reduce to around 120 bcm by 2030 (Van Nuffel and Yearwood 2017, p.8). On the other hand, the unconventional gas production will remain largely negligible. In the most positive scenario, total production of biogas will be only 28 bcm/year by 2020, whereas shale gas will remain stuck because of the related and difficult planning and consent processes and eventual public opposition (Dickel *et al.* 2014, pp.15-16). As a consequence, the EU is forced to seek external suppliers to cope with the increasing demand for gas. A main priority for the EU has been the construction of LNG terminals across the EU territory. By 2018, there were 28 LNG gas terminals in the EU with a total regasification capacity of 227 bcm (nearly 40% of the total EU gas demand) (King & Spalding 2018, p.2). However, there are two essential problems with the LNG strategy. First, there are no clear projections regarding how much of the LNG in markets will be directed to the EU, given that in other geographical locations like the far East the LNG demand is rapidly increasing. And secondly, the LNG is unlikely to become a price-competitive alternative to Gazprom's gas. In the most unlikely scenario, LNG can be competitive only if the spot price in the EU market goes below USD 6 (million British Thermal Units) without considering the related cost for shrinkage premiums, liquefaction, transportation and regasification (*Ibid.*).

Another priority for the EU is the construction of bypassing routes away from Russia. A major project in this regard has been the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), a gas pipeline to supply Europe with gas from potential suppliers like Azerbaijan,

Turkmenistan, Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran (Van Nuffel and Yearwood 2017). The idea of connecting the Caspian region and Europe with a gas pipeline dates back to the 1990s. In the 2000s, this desire was represented by the Nabucco project, although it was cancelled because of a disagreement with Turkmenistan and a legal dispute which impedes the construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline under the Caspian Sea (Dickel *et al.*, 2014). Today, the SGC represents a new attempt to get access to the Caspian gas. This corridor is part of a massive plan together with additional ventures such as the Trans Adriatic Pipeline and the North-South energy corridor. These projects should finally create a connecting system for the free circulation of pipe and LNG gas throughout the EU (Institute for Security Studies 2017). When it comes to the SGC, however, a main issue is that Azerbaijan, the only confirmed supplier thus far, would be able to initially supply only 10 bcm/y in 2020, which is a marginal fraction of the annual EU gas consumption (*Ibid.*; Bocse 2018, p.157). Given this scenario, the project would necessarily require an extension to another supplying country to make a meaningful contribution to the EU energy diversification strategy. Turkmenistan, one of the potential alternatives, is not reachable due to the aforementioned legal problems of the Caspian Sea and because most of its gas production is already being demanded by China (Dickel *et al.* 2014). Still, a promising alternative in this regard could materialize with Iran. After all, at the end of 2015, Iran ranked first in natural gas proved reserves (with 18.2% of the world's total) and its relationship with the EU has significantly improved after the deal which was stroke back in 2015 (Bocse 2018, p.160).

Finally, in the field of new regulation and legislation, a game-changing innovation introduced by the EU was the Third Energy Package (TEP) in 2009. This initiative was the culmination of a number of changes promoted in the 1990s to allow for greater competition among suppliers in the EU energy market. The TEP is a main attempt to create a truly unified energy market, which should permit the increase of the bargaining power of EU consumers *vis-à-vis* third suppliers, and its key tool is the unbundling of vertically-integrated energy companies (like Gazprom) into upstream (development and generation), midstream (transportation), and downstream (distribution) entities (Romanova 2016a). An additional attempt to constrain Gazprom further came later in 2012 when the company was formally accused of apparent abuse of dominant position (based on Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). The charges against the Russian monopoly consisted of: dividing the gas markets by hindering the free flow of gas, preventing the diversification of supply, and imposing an unfair linkage of gas prices with oil prices (Stern and Yafimava 2017). More interesting to note, nonetheless, is that before this new regulation Gazprom substantially accommodated its stance. In terms of prices, Gazprom introduced competitive benchmarks and relaxed its oil-indexed gas pricing towards the formation of hub prices. Also, it adopted temporary suspensions of 'take or pay' obligations and reviewed price clauses with Member States (*Ibid.*, p.20; Romanova 2016a, p.870). In addition, it put an end on several practices concerning territorial restrictions for resale (Stern and Yafimava 2017). Not least, the company committed in supporting the

interconnectivity capacity in Bulgaria – by modifying both the supply and transportation contracts in force – and the unbundling requirements in Poland – by amending the 1993 Intergovernmental Agreement with a new certificate in 2014 which finally establishes the Polish company Gaz-System as the only and exclusive transmission system operator (*Ibid.*, pp.6, 17).

Conclusions

This paper elaborated on the current situation of EU economic sanctions against Russia due to its intervention in Ukraine and reveals that the implemented measures have been ineffective in compelling Moscow to change Russia's position. On the contrary, those measures can be perilous for the EU because of the economic damage inflicted on the Member States themselves and the political backlash that can be unleashed as a consequence. In addition, the sanctioning measures are also damaging as they facilitate the positioning of China as the main supplier of financial capital and technology, especially for the energy upstream sector. On the other side, the EU might be better off by developing an assertive energy policy composed of diversification and legislation. In spite of the challenges that this policy faces (and will still face), the paper points out that a Caspian pipeline projection that connects the EU with Iran might possibly be a good outcome for reducing Russia's gas dependency. Similarly, a comprehensive legislation package has successfully managed to ease Gazprom's behaviour in several key areas of the EU gas market.

The energy diversification strategy is based on the assumption that the constraint over Russia would occur as a result of the squeezing effect of the EU energy policy on the profits that Gazprom gets in the EU energy market. However, it is also important to mention that, while diversifying away from Russian energy resources has been a declared interest of both the EU and several of its Member States, it is also true that this is not the only goal pursued with this policy. Other relevant targets of the EU energy policy, such as combatting climate change by means of decarbonisation and greenhouse emission reductions, inevitably require a gradual but consistent increase of gas demand to resolve the problem of intermittency related to renewables. This, of course, can derail the diversification purpose of the policy. A warning sign in this regard is the fact that in 2017 Gazprom has delivered 193.9 bcm to Europe and Turkey – 8% higher than the previous record set in 2016 –, which shows that the actual consumption of Russian gas is soaring (EURACTIV.com with AFP 2018). In addition, Russia has been much more effective in linking itself further with the EU energy market with new gas pipelines (Nordstream 2 and Turkstream), than the EU has been in setting new connectors with third suppliers. In this regard, a main task for the Energy Union, at least in the short run, will surely be to define the priority of this diversification versus other policy goals.

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VLADISLAV BEINAR - The Grand Chinese Chessboard: New Challenges for the EU?

Biography

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Abstract

Relations between the European Union (EU) and China have been advancing since diplomatic ties were first established in 1975. After signing the Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2003, the EU and China entered a new era of cooperation in a range of different policy areas such as foreign policy, climate change, bilateral trade, science and technology, education and investments. In 2013, Xi Jinping announced his ambitious "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) initiative that will connect China with Asia, the Middle East and Europe through a network of energy pipelines, shipping lanes, railways, and highways. Recently, with the crisis in trade relations between the US and China, the Chinese government used the occasion of the annual 17+1 and EU-China summits to restate its interest in Europe. This article examines the development of EU-China relations and which approach the EU is taking to address the challenges arising from this partnership.

Acronyms

FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
OBOR	One Belt One Road Initiative
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
R&D	Research and Development
PRC	People's Republic of China

Introduction

Since the establishment of EU-China diplomatic relations in 1975, the nature of the relationship between the two actors has changed considerably. From one of many developing countries 45 years ago, China has become the second-largest economy and one of the biggest senders of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the world. Today, China is the EU's second-biggest trading partner while the EU is the largest one for

China. A quarter of China's FDI is directed at European businesses and daily bilateral trade amounts to €1.5 billion growing consistently over the past several years (European Commission 2020). It seems like the centre of gravity of the global economy has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific region, and the EU is not as strong and united as it would need to be to address the changing environment of the global economy. From the Yellow Vests protests in France, to Brexit, to Hungary and Poland's backsliding on democracy, to migration and to the rise of right-wing nationalism in Europe which cause internal fraction thereby potentially harming the EU's ability to effectively respond to foreign policy challenges. Amid all this, China seems to successfully deal with internal problems and is actively expanding its influence in the world, including the European continent. Impressive trade and investment activity are gradually leading to the fact that the EU and China are becoming strategic partners. However, the rapid growth of China as an important international actor has made it not only a partner but also a competitor to the EU. The EU acknowledged that especially in the field of economic relations there had been a discrepancy in the benefits that the EU is providing to China compared to the benefits that China is providing the EU.

The development of the EU-China cooperation

Ten years after the establishment of diplomatic ties, China and the European Economic Community signed the 1985 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, which governed their future relations. Starting from the early 1990s, the EU prioritized economic cooperation over political or human rights violations issues in China. The two actors successfully established a range of different dialogues to deepen their bilateral relations: the annual EU-China Summits, the EU-China High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, the Joint Committee on Trade, the Trade and Investment Policy Dialogue, the Economic and Trade Working Group, the Dialogue on Human Rights (with 37 rounds held already) to name only a few (European Commission 2020). The First EU-China Annual Summit took place in London in April 1998, and since then the summits were held every year with the only exception in 2014. After the Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed in 2003, neither the EU nor China considered each other as a security threat. They started to implement different space cooperation projects, and the EU was even considering lifting its ban on arms sales to China (Weitz 2012). But amid growing U.S. opposition to the decision, the EU abandoned the idea. In 2013, the EU and China jointly adopted the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. In the same year, they launched the negotiations for a Bilateral Investment Agreement. The EU initiated an attempt to create investment rights, provide a high level of protection for investors and investments and guarantee non-discrimination (European Commission 2020). China was reluctant to establish such rules referring to their point of view that the country is still in the process of transition to a market-led economy (European Commission 2016). The Chinese delegation argued that this transition might not always be smooth, that an institutional basis still needs to be strengthened, and that it would take more time (Ibid). However, this point of view did not change at a later stage resulting in no

agreement till today. Arguably, the agreement was not and is not in China's best interest, and they are trying to prologue the negotiation process.

The Chinese “Pivot to Europe”

In 2015, the People’s Republic of China was named the number one strategic threat to the United States in cyber-space (Mitchell 2016). China’s cyber behaviour became the number one element of US-China relations, and they continued to deteriorate. Since the inauguration of Donald J. Trump in 2017, tensions in the relations between the two countries have increased dramatically. In the meantime, the EU was avoiding such sensitive topics as cybersecurity or human rights in relations with China, paying attention to multilateral cooperation on trade, climate and development issues instead (European Council 2015). In 2016, the European Commission published the EU strategy on China underlining the necessity of a strong, clear and unified voice in its approach to China, but in general promoted a deeper partnership with a "constructive management of differences" (European Commission 2016, p.2). A year later, Chinese investments in Europe rose by 76% and reached \$81 billion (Baker McKenzie 2018).

The rising tensions with the United States propelled Beijing’s focus on relations with Europe. In 2015, the Chinese government launched a strategic 10-year plan "Made in China 2025". The plan aims at the rapid development of 10 high-tech areas such as IT, semiconductors, emerging biomedicine, aerospace industry and others. With this plan, China aspires to achieve 70% self-efficiency by 2025 (Government of China 2016). To this end, Chinese firms are encouraged to actively invest in foreign companies to gain access to advanced technologies. Given the challenges of the U.S.-China relations, many Chinese companies reoriented their efforts towards Europe, towards Germany in particular. Its high-tech economy has attracted billions of Euros of investments, making Germany China's number one investment destination in the EU. In the long term, it is probable that "Made in China 2025" will accelerate the growth in the Chinese high-tech industry, while lowering the competitiveness of the European industry. The strategy is simple but effective: With FDI in Europe, access to advanced technology is achieved that is then transferred to Chinese companies. This approach was taken with solar cell technology and was highly successful.

During Donald J. Trump’s presidency transatlantic relations have experienced some serious stresses and strains as well, and China did not fail to use this opportunity. While US President Donald Trump decided to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang reaffirmed Beijing's commitment to this agreement. The Chinese prime minister underlined this decision in Berlin, emphasizing that China is the world's largest investor in renewable energy, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel welcomed his statement during their joint press conference (Troianovski 2017). A year later, in July 2018, European Council President Donald Tusk, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang reaffirmed their strong commitment to the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2018).

Additionally, China and the EU reaffirmed their commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and continued criticizing the U.S. for its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (DW 2020). European Council President Donald Tusk mentioned that the two actors also agreed to work together and coordinate on the evolving peace process in Afghanistan (European Council 2019). The Chinese government was drawing attention to the areas of mutual understanding only in the "suitable" areas. In the meantime, "sensitive" issues were avoided by both China and the EU.

The genesis of the EU-China competition: The Belt and Road and "16+1" initiatives

In 2012, the Chinese government started the 16+1 cooperation with sixteen Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), 11 of which are EU member states. The initiative is aimed at promoting business relations between those seventeen countries mainly through Chinese FDI flows. CEECs enthusiastically welcomed the initiative. They unanimously described the 16+1 forum as a "tremendous opportunity" and the "Eastward opening", and relations with China were called a "reliable friendship" (Kynge and Peel 2017). The 16+1 forum is a means to foster cooperation with Europe within the framework of the bigger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI was launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013. Since its launch, a range of outbound trade and investment projects have been completed, significantly expanding China's influence. Both initiatives are unique. The 16+1 forum is the only example of foreign policy interaction between a certain group of the EU countries and an extra-regional power, while the geographic scope of the BRI includes 65 countries that jointly account for one-third of the world populations and around 60% of global GDP (European Parliament 2018). These initiatives are beneficial to CEECs, pouring billions of Euros into their economies, creating opportunities for work and improving infrastructure. However, there are several uncertainties and issues inherent to these projects.

When China launched the BRI, it was unclear, and it still is today, what projects they were going to carry out and what amount of money they were going to invest. Moreover, these projects do not amount to a comprehensive development programme with a dedicated budget. Finally, even though Chinese investments seem to be concentrated at the borders of the EU, mainly in Eastern European and Balkan countries, there does not seem to be a clear-cut geographic or economic agenda. In general, China has been engaging with the EU primarily through bilateral discussions with the individual Member States and their institutions rather than through EU institutions (European Parliament 2018). For example, in 2017, the China Development Bank and the Deutsche Bank, the largest German Banking Institution, signed a Memorandum of Understanding. They committed to work together on different infrastructure, renewable energy and commodities projects worth 3 billion US dollars over the next five years (Deutsche Bank 2019). China is trying to disunite the EU, using the *divide et impera* maxime. Since 2014, some of the EU Member States and non-EU

countries have signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with China within the framework of the BRI (Ibid). A deeper analysis of the Chinese investment into 16 European countries reveals a robust interest in Balkan states. More than half of the \$9.4 billion deals were concentrated in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia — countries that are potential candidates to join the EU, which keeps China's hands untied (Peel and Kynge 2018). In 2019, during the Dubrovnik summit, Greece officially joined the 16+1 format, making it the 17+1 format (Hopkins and Hope 2019). This enlargement brought new life into Beijing's project and strengthened China's position in Europe. As a result, the new 17+1 format raised many concerns over Beijing potentially trying to divide the bloc.

Potential threats to the EU

China's Direct Investment Poses three main political challenges in Europe (Meunier 2018). First of all, capital is a source and symbol of power (Ibid). China has become one of the top home countries for FDI in the world, which has no historical precedent, giving economic and political power to China as an actor in international affairs. Secondly, Chinese investments do not "fuel technological progress" in a host country (Ibid, p. 350). When it comes to FDI from China, we can see that technology and know-how flows are not going in a traditional direction. In addition, there is a potential for the acquisition of dual-use technologies that can be used both for civilian and military purposes. Thirdly, there is a threat of assets repatriation. Chinese companies acquire brand name and reputation and then transfer all the production to China (Ibid). This is illustrated by the news of a Chinese automotive company *Geely* acquiring Swedish carmaker Volvo, British companies Lotus Cars Ltd. and London EV Company Ltd. only increase anxiety. After the acquisition China usually transfers production to China, using the acquired technologies and creating working places there.

Further challenges are posed by the political stakes at risk outlined above. Chinese parties take all construction risk while developing BRI projects. At first sight this seems like a goodwill gesture, but the reality is that Chinese development banks tie their investments to Chinese contractors winning the work. As a result, Chinese companies carry out the projects using Chinese labour force and Chinese suppliers. This approach eliminates the positive effect of investments for the host country and does not create new jobs.

Additionally, China provides loans to countries regardless of their ability to pay back. And if a country is not able to pay back, as it often happens, there are alternative deals made that are usually to the disadvantage of the other country as they are in a bad negotiation position. For example, China might ask the respective government for property, land or enterprises in return. In some cases, these assets have a geostrategic value. Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, for example, was leased to China in 2017 for a period of 99 years and is located just 10 nautical miles from the main Indian Ocean sea lane with an average of 10 large container ships and oil tankers passing hourly

(Fuhrman 2017). The port is just a few hundred miles away from India, China's political and military rival. This scenario might happen in Europe as well, giving China a strategic foothold near on in the EU.

Another important reason for concern is the Chinese political system. "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" (Deng 1984) has adopted elements of the market economy, but the private sector is still highly controlled by the government. As a result, there is a certain level of anxiety that the Chinese government is or will be using FDI to interfere in the internal affairs of the states and exert influence on their foreign policy.

A turning point in the EU approach to the BRI and 17+1 forum

In 2019, serious changes took place in the EU policy towards China, and Germany laid the foundation for these changes. China is Germany's largest trading partner and a key market for German industry, which led to this rapid response. In January 2019, the Federation of German Industry published a report titled "How Do We Deal with China's State-Controlled Economy?". China was called a systemic competitor and the harsh tone was reinforced by the accusations that China is expanding its geopolitical influence in the world, using its political weight and exerting economic pressure; that Beijing is shaping third markets according to its interests (BDI 2019). The Federation acknowledged that a proper answer to this challenge can only come "from a strong, reformed Europe speaking with one voice" (ibid, p. 1). The report stressed that to compete successfully with China in the future the EU have to invest more in Research and Development (R&D), infrastructural projects, new technologies and education. It has also outlined that the EU needs to focus on innovation, intelligent regulations, social partnership, infrastructure and free trade. As Angela Merkel once stated: "Germany can do well in the long term only if Europe does well" (Nougayrède 2017). The Federation called for a strong and united Europe, and the call was heard.

On 1 February 2019, the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force. The agreement created the largest open trade zone in the world, connecting the EU with the second-largest Asian economy. Since the EU has rejected signing the same agreement with China, it was a strong signal that China has to play by the rules (European Commission 2019). Next month, against the backdrop of China's growing economic power and political influence, the European Commission formulated a new approach to relations with China. The EU-China strategic outlook was prepared less than a month before the 21st EU-China Summit and the paper seemed to be an attempt by European states to finally unify their policy towards China. There was a noticeable shift in the EU attitude toward China. Beijing was named as "an economic competitor" and "a systemic rival" (European Commission and HR/VP 2019, p. 1)., which reflected the readiness of the EU to deal with China in a unitary manner. The main three objectives mentioned in the outlook were:

1. Based on clearly defined interests and principles, the EU should deepen its engagement with China to promote common interests at a global level.
2. The EU should robustly seek more balanced and reciprocal conditions governing the economic relationship.
3. Finally, to maintain its prosperity, values and social model over the long term, there are areas where the EU itself needs to adapt to changing economic realities and strengthen its domestic policies and industrial base (Ibid).

Moreover, the Commission outlined ten actions and invited the European Council to endorse these actions in relation with China (Ibid). The attention was drawn not only to economic issues but also to such topics as Human Rights, cooperation on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for Iran, the Paris Agreement goals implementation. Even though the tone changed to previous statement, these measures cannot be considered as *a fundamental change* in European policy towards Beijing. Generally, the European Commission still advocated cooperation with China.

China's move was not long in coming. In March 2019, during an official visit by People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping to Rome, Italy joined the Belt and Road Initiative. PRC President Xi Jinping and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte signed a broad and comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (Cristiani 2019). As Cristiani (2019) states, this was Beijing's strategic victory. For the first time, a Group of Seven (G7) members formalized its participation in the project since the launch of BRI in 2013. It was a prompt response to Brussels' attempt to take concentrated action, and an Italian shift away from the pro-European position raised serious concern. Italy was even named a "Trojan Horse" (Ibid) for China in the EU, though Giuseppe Conte declared that the MoU comply with all EU rules and policies (Ibid).

During the 21st EU-China Summit held in April, the two sides conducted difficult negotiations on industrial subsidies and rules-based trade, non-discrimination, fair competition and equal market access in their relations. The EU expressed serious concerns with regards to human rights (European Council 2019). The Summit is considered to be a big success for the EU because China committed to signing the EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement by the end of 2020. It seemed that the EU finally unified its position and acted as a unity. Two days later, during the Dubrovnik Summit Greece joined 16+1. It was considered as both the reward for the support at the United Nations, when Greece blocked the EU statement criticizing China's human rights record (Emmot, Koutantou 2017), and an attempt to strengthen disintegration in the EU. China continued using the *divide et impera* strategy. Six months after the Federation of German Industry's report was published, in July 2019, state-backed Beijing Automotive Group Co bought 5% stake in Daimler, increasing Chinese ownership to 14.7% (Rauwald 2019). Seemingly, the Chinese government is trying to increase its influence on German policy through its industrial giants.

Conclusion

For many years the EU-China relations have been developing successfully. Through numerous agreements and platforms, they have become comprehensive and more complex. But this “honeymoon” did not last for too long. The interdependence between the two actors increased, and new problems emerged. In 2019, the EU realized that the balance of opportunities and challenges presented by China has shifted (European Commission 2019), and 2020 was going to become the defining year in the EU-China relations: EU-China Summit in March, 17+1 summit and, most importantly, the Leipzig summit. Nowadays, the future of EU-China cooperation depends on the fate of the Bilateral Investment Agreement. The original plan was to sign the deal during Xi Jinping’s visit to Leipzig for a special summit that will be hosted by Angela Merkel and will bring together all 27 leaders of the EU’s member states in September 2020. But the Chinese government has been lacking in commitment to reach a consensus on the Investment Agreement for years. With the recent rise of a global crisis in the form of the COVID-19 epidemic, the future of the Agreement is even more uncertain. According to the EEAS special report, “disinformation and misinformation around COVID-19 continue to proliferate around the world, with potentially harmful consequences for public health and effective crisis communication” (European External Action Service 2020). China has been pushing a message that the EU is about to collapse and it “betrays its own values” (Ibid). Chinese coverage highlights that China, unlike the United States, is a responsible and ready to help ally. These actions are aimed at weakening the unity of the EU members and the creation of a favourable image around China for future cooperation. Headlines like “Epidemic situation in Europe remains severe” (Zhang 2020), “China and Europe join hands to fight the epidemic” (Yang 2020) are prevalent in Chinese media outlets as well. Arguably, these measures are not focused on the establishment of relations based on trust, respect and mutual benefit. As it was mentioned before, a united Europe is maybe not in China’s best interest and Beijing is using its own diplomatic approach to approach the EU members. Greece joining the 16+1 forum, Italy officially joining BRI, Deutsche Bank and China Development Bank 3-billion-dollar agreement are vivid and not the only examples. The current epidemic and the temporary suspension of many business activities will inevitably lead to an economic recession in the EU. At the same time, the National Bureau of Statistics of China announced that by the end of March 96.6 per cent of large and medium-sized enterprises have returned to work (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2020). Finally, one might ask if the signing of the investment agreement as well as the more demanding position by the EU towards China is an effective strategy to build future EU-China relations that ultimately benefit the Union.

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CORIN HOGAN - A turning point in European security? The use of remote drone technology (UAV) in European security operations

Biography

Corin Hogan is currently a MA Security and Terrorism student at the University of Kent holding a BA in Politics and International Relations. His research interests include negotiation and mediation strategies, conflict resolution and wider terrorism and security studies with a special interest in the use of drones as a form of counter terrorism foreign policy.

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Abstract

This article examines the factors that have caused European states, especially France and the UK, to question the classical methods of combat and deployment within their security operations. Instead Europe has been launching more 'Remote' operations in recent years. The increasing sophistication and lethality of remote drone (UAV) technology has enabled European states to launch lighter footprint operations and this has radically changed their approach towards overseas deployment. The paper will study historical examples of previous conflicts which Western powers were involved with, and how Europe has learnt from the US' past foreign intervention mistakes, specifically in Vietnam. The article will conclude that the historic large-scale operations of the past have become less economically viable especially since small scale 'remote' operations can fulfil the same role, at a fraction of the cost.

Acronyms

AWS	Automated Weapon Systems
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States (of America)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

Since the end of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, European powers such as France and the UK have adapted the way in which they pursue their security threats, focusing on 'light' deployments, commonly referred to as remote warfare. Recent European interventions under French or British leadership, such as the current operation in Mali as well as training deployments into African nations such as Nigeria and Kenya, have been led predominantly by France and the UK, developing the European security mandate (Olsen 2015). This evolution has moved away from large scale intervention forces often undertaken by the US which were designed to strongarm the adversary into submission, with European states transitioning to lighter-multilateral focused peacekeeping operations. These operations are different to the US led 'nation building' deployments of Afghanistan and Iraq (Biegon and Watts 2017) and are designed to deal with security threats closer to the continent. Remote warfare entails the limited deployment of coalition ground forces, with an increased reliance on training defence forces within the states afflicted by terrorism (ibid). Due to lessons learnt in Iraq, there has also been an increased focus across European powers to follow the British deployment concept of 'hearts and minds', ideally strengthening the interventions legitimacy and local perception (Dixon 2009). The security reform has not only affected the military. Traditionally, non-combative organisations have also seen their parameters change, on both sides of the Atlantic "The CIA still gathers intelligence and does much reporting, but the trend is moving away from 'watch and wait' towards 'capture and kill'" (Aldrich 2018, p.438). Dan Snowden's security leaks have revealed that similar agencies to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), such as the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), have also reputedly begun utilising these styles of operations. GCHQ allegedly directly supports the US' drone campaign over Yemen and Pakistan, providing the information on which the strike is launched (Parliament.UK 2018). This paper will investigate and explain in detail why European States have begun utilising 'remote warfare' to pursue their security goals, through analysing remote operations effectiveness with the help of a cost-benefit analysis that takes financial aspects and how the operations are perceived into account.

The paper is structured to initially define what is meant by remote security and warfare, covering the academic definition and its comparison to past practices. Current cases of European security deployments as well as conflicts that preceded remote security's development will be explored to better explain why the security evolution took place. Then, I will analyse the remote security deployments effectiveness, their cost – financial, political and with respect to the legality of such operations, including a discussion on why these factors have led to the European uptake of the tactic. The paper will conclude that 'remote' security operations, are more effective strategies to ensure European security, when compared to more traditional intervention deployments.

Defining Remote Security and Warfare in a Global Context

The term 'remote warfare' can be understood as "a strategy of countering threats at a distance, without the deployment of large military forces" (Biegon and Watts 2017, p.1). This is similar to the US' and USSR's practices in the Cold War, providing aerial support and strategic advice to allied nation states. The current trend of small, non-state actors is rather like the past paramilitaries of the Vietcong and Mujahideen, with inferior forces denying total victory in a conflict theatre through the utilisation of guerrilla tactics (National Intelligence Council 2017). The difference between the former strategy and what we are seeing today is in the type of enemy that the deployment is combating, with the widescale denouncement of such terrorist organisations.

Remote warfare can be further defined as: "a combination of drone strikes and air strikes from above, knitted together by the development of special forces... and military training teams on the ground" (Biegon and Watts 2017, p.1), with these combined arms directed at combating non-state actors such as terrorists. This assessment was echoed by the US' Defence Secretary in 2007: "the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners" (Gates 2007, p.5), and became a core feature of Obama's reform of the US' Foreign Policy. Consequentially, NATO members, most notably France, quickly adapted and spearheaded many multilateral operations (Recchia 2020). French operations tend to utilise a more 'light footprint' style of warfare, with reduced troop deployment. Many European states are importing and have started using Drones (also referred to as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or UAV's) for both scouting and strike operations (Zegart 2018). Recent European security interventions into Africa, such as France's long term, light footprint deployment within Mali and it's spearheading of the multilateral intervention into Libya has marked a clear paradigm shift in how Europe is combating its security threats (Olsen 2015). The remainder of this paper will explain the strategic evolution of why this shift has occurred.

The influence of previous global conflicts on the evolution of European security

One of the prime explanations for the European security shift towards remote warfare can be seen in the global history of the conflicts that NATO has waged before this evolution. During the Cold War, the US believed in the Domino Theory which refers to the idea that, if a few countries fell to Communism in Europe and East-Asia, then neighbouring states would likewise collapse presenting a severe threat to the US' security interests. This perceived threat to the US allowed and justified its initial light deployment in South Vietnam, however after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, US deployment rapidly escalated.

Vietnam was a failure for the US, "the war dragged on for many years beyond the point that American officials thought desirable" (Bakich 2014, p.2). This realisation for the military was also drastically beyond the stage when the US public had given up on the

conflict. By May of 1971, only 28% of Americans polled disagreed that deployment in Vietnam was a mistake (Lunch and Sperlich 1979). The US public could not understand how a war being waged around 8500 miles away was within their own security interests. Moreover, when considering that the US Military suffered around 58,200 fatal casualties (National Archives, n.d.), it became near impossible for the US Government to keep its people onside.

Mistakes made in Vietnam continue to shape and affect present US Foreign Policy, “the spectre of Vietnam has been raised in nearly every war since, including... intervention in Syria... which promised no boots on the ground” (Gerstbauer 2017, p.35). The myriad of troubles that the intervention forces in Iraq experienced also confirmed the lessons taught in Vietnam’s deployment. Despite limited European involvement in the Vietnam War, its unpopularity within the US has influenced NATO’s Intervention Decision Protocol, and as a result – the Foreign Policy of the UK and France, both of which were hesitant to deploy ground forces in Syria. European Powers are now keen to try to avoid the mistakes made by the US in Vietnam, which can aid in an explanation of the remote deployment which (as an example expanded on later in the paper) can currently be witnessed in Mali.

The remote warfare paradox

There is a common fallacy surrounding the European power’s development of remote securitisation operations existing within their effectiveness, as logical rhetoric would dictate that these new operations are being utilised due to their high effectiveness. However, research has found that remote warfare is rarely more effective at combating insurgencies compared to full scale deployments (Biddle et al. 2017). The CIA’s first drone strike in 2002 was launched following flawed intelligence; thinking they were targeting Bin-Laden, as the target was a “tall man” (Shaw 2013, p.538-9). Regrettably, this UAV’s Hellfire missile was launched at innocent civilians collecting scrap metal. Literature also suggests that targeted drone strikes on Al-Qaeda, whilst successful in reducing their numbers within states such as Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, may not have impacted the organisations effectiveness (Cronin 2013, p.46). Simply put “Targeted killings have not thwarted the group’s ability to replace dead leaders with new ones” (ibid), although the strikes have reduced the number of terrorists in the area, it is not combating their ability to recruit more insurgents. This tactic of combating European security threats with remote warfare may be exacerbating the issue “they are not helping to defeat al Qaeda, and they may be creating sworn enemies out of a sea of local insurgents” (ibid, p.44). This suggests that remote warfare is developing more insurgents, thus creating further security threats to European States.

There is, however, also supporting evidence for the use of drone strikes “The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work... U.S drones have killed an estimated 3,300... operatives in Pakistan and Yemen” (Byman 2013, p.1). Despite these statistics, Byman’s (2013) assertions on the positives are still difficult to

accept. He justifies the strikes by stating that they work, and yet later in his paper he also states that in 2011 alone nearly 900 non-combatants were also killed (ibid). Considering that his statistics in support of UAV's estimate that multiple years of operation Pakistan and Yemen have killed 3,300 operatives, but in one year there were approximately 900 incidents of collateral damage, it becomes difficult to justify these strikes as 'successful'. Even without considering UAV's, remote warfare's policy of security cooperation has a troubled track record. For example, Somalia's national army has been continuously trained to be a security ally over a decade of assistance and has been highly ineffectual despite receiving both training and financial backing from a multilateral coalition. The European Union Training Mission has currently invested around €90 million training 5700 soldiers within the state (Williams 2019), the UK and Italy have also provided further independent support to the ongoing mission. Despite this huge multilateral investment into combating Al-Shabaab, in 2017 an assessment on the Somali National Army confirmed that it was in atrocious condition and could not combat threats adequately without United Nations (UN) forces assistance (ibid). The historic example of the early Vietnam War should also be considered, the US trained South Vietnamese military were famously inadequate, refusing to consider US reforms eventually, forcing full-scale US deployment (Hazelton 2018). All this evidence raises a serious question as to why European security pacifies its threats following similar policies, which seemingly cause high civilian casualties and millions of dollars spent on training defence forces for little gain.

The political logic of remote deployments

Fundamentally, it is easier for some states within Europe, such as France and the UK, to continue utilising remote warfare. Remote deployments can be explained using Neoclassical realism conceptualisation, certain foreign policy choices of European states are approved in accordance with their cultural ideas, norms and values. Remote deployments predominantly utilise the afflicted states soldiers to solve European threats, without risking more perceptually valuable European lives (Olsen 2015). Although the outcome is the same – troops are still dying, it minimises 'home' casualties, and the press in Europe simply does not care as much about non-western casualties, this is made evident by the lack of recent reports since the withdrawal of European forces from Afghanistan. There are also very few academic sources which comment on Afghan military and security personnel deaths, one exception being Crawford's (2016) article. The Afghan military and police have lost around 30,000 men (Crawford 2016) during the conflict in Afghanistan. However, the western media, and population considers the western fatalities, totalling around three and a half thousand (ibid) as too steep (YouGov, 2012). Despite the assertions by Biddle et al. (2017) that remote warfare remains less effective than traditional security interventions, European 'remote' deployments result in a drastic decrease in intervention forces casualties. The decreased effectiveness is a small price to pay, as the remote deployment still allows European powers to neutralise their security threats, whilst keeping their general public onside. It is easier to engage with the perceived security risk to the state, if the states

own soldiers are not at risk. Remote deployments tend to be better perceived within the target state as well, one of the main issues with traditional deployments is that they can alienate the civilians within the targeted state (Dixon 2009) and as seen with the 2004 attack in Spain, such foreign policy can make the intervening state a target. Historically, large scale interventions into nation states have led to instability once the intervention's forces pull out, with a key example of this being the Islamic State's takeover of Iraq in 2014 (Wilson Centre 2019). This has resulted in lucrative opportunities created in traditional intervention deployments, insurgents grasp the opportunity from within the instability caused. Security Allies and Remote Warfare allow for the development of the state's own forces, that speak the language and know the lands they operate within, removing the terrorist's tactic of demonising the intervening forces as invaders. By not committing to large-scale deployments, the tactic of remote warfare denies the insurgents a cause with which to rally the people, as the states own security forces will not be perceived as invaders, but as legitimate keepers of peace. Recently, light footprint multilateral operations have allowed France to deal with multiple security threats; in Libya, Mali and Syria, without committing to a costly full-scale intervention (Pannier 2016, p.486). Overall, the use of multilateral operations, and training up security forces reduces the amount of manpower each European power needs to send to each security threat, which reduces the likelihood of European casualties.

However, the use of this tactic has also provoked a severe backlash from the general population within the state where remote warfare is being deployed, as witnessed in Pakistan and Somalia. The Pakistani population's perception is vehemently negative towards the US, due to its large-scale drone campaign within the state, "a 2012 poll found that 74 percent of Pakistanis viewed the United States as their enemy, likely in part because of the ongoing drone campaign" (Byman 2013, p.3). This suggests that even without the deployment of ground troops, drone campaigns can still provide a unifying variable within the afflicted country. Drone strikes, and remote warfare result in an abundance of recruiting opportunities for the very organisations they are designed to stamp out "drone strikes can win the enmity of entire tribes" (ibid); these external strikes are producing martyrs, and new recruits to fight against a faceless foe. Perhaps these tactics, whilst dealing with today's problems, are directly creating tomorrow's adversary. However, this is part of any counter insurgency programme, and it is very difficult to prove that remote warfare, and specifically drone strikes are causing more animosity than any other tactic - wouldn't a ground force produce similar results in the local community? It is difficult to definitively justify if the drones being purchased by numerous European states (Cole 2016) currently can directly combat their security threats any better or worse than traditional counter insurgency operations, however as discussed earlier, remote warfare results in less negative home press. Even if the operations might be making things slightly worse in the long run, it still could be said to be a better, if not only a more economically viable strategy for European powers.

The financial and legal influence

Perhaps the most significant factor that has influenced the European security evolution is the comparatively low cost of conducting remote operations. Overall, across NATO military spending decreased immediately after the Cold War (Roser and Nagdy 2020) as in this new age of 'peace'; at least when considering state v state conflicts, it has become more difficult to justify the maintenance of a large military. External Contractors and mercenaries only need to be paid when the state is involved within conflict. This is unlike a standing military which needs to be employed constantly, trained and maintained within peace, resulting in large amounts of public funds being turned to military upkeep (Krieg 2018). The re-emergence of austerity policies within states such as the UK in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis have also contributed to lower annual military spending globally, as all states worldwide were hit by this recession (Larrabee et al. 2012, Cervera 2012). Traditional military defence budget allocations during the recent financial landscape would not have been affordable (Chafer and Cumming 2010), providing further explanation as to why more European states are contracting away from their national militaries (Krieg 2018). Contractors are more expensive in the short term, but theoretically do not need to be hired on long term basis, and the state does not require to pay them a pension – reducing net military spending when compared to a large standing army (ibid, p.8). Nearly all European powers have decreased their budget concerning standing military forces, leading to lower troop numbers within these states (Munich Security Conference 2017). For the last ten years, state militaries in Europe have not had the economic stability, nor political want to support large scale operations within foreign states, hence why France and the UK now support smaller, light footprint operations. Surprisingly, as the world has recovered from the financial crisis, and as US military spending has subsequently recovered, the UK's standing army has not been replenished (Commons Library 2019). Even post-recession, European powers have continued their use of remote warfare as a cost-effective form of securitisation.

Further explanation to support the turn to remote warfare by NATO exists in the legality of these styles of operations – or lack thereof. Remote warfare currently exists within a legal grey area causing much controversy, and discussion within security academia. Simply put, the use of drones and AWS (Automated Weapon Systems) within remote warfare raise serious legal and ethical issues, especially due to how recent drone strikes are – the rules of war containing them have not been written yet. There has been much debate surrounding *jus in bello* principles around AWS', with some scholars arguing that they are precise weapons decreasing human suffering (Arkin 2010), by directly combating the threat to human lives with an accurate strike. Other scholars assert that the use of drones is more likely to result in escalations, with the targets of the strike being transformed into martyrs, due to the overwhelming power of a drone strike in a completely unproportionate response to a threat (Roff 2015). AWS' have also been criticised for their inability to discern between civilians and combatants (Bode and Huelss 2018), with the former strikes being regarded as 'collateral damage' both

when the missile was fired by an AWS and by a UAV pilot sat hundreds of miles away from the afflicted area. The targeting of civilians within “collateral damage” of a ‘just strike’ could be defined as a war crime depending on the interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. If Article 3 is considered, non-combatants cannot be executed without judgement from a court of law. The technology for this new style of warfare is also rapidly advancing, making it near impossible for the laws to control their usage to be written, this disallows the public to have their say in debating the creation of laws (ibid, p.404). One of the main reasons to explain the European use of these weapons systems lies within its scope; “there is no *specific* regulation in international law regarding the use of AWS... remote-controlled weapons such as drones... their usage also remains largely unregulated” (ibid) the regulations limiting the usage of these weapons simply does not yet exist. Therefore, this style of warfare is used as it allows for a much larger scope of operations and strikes that can be launched, when compared to the more rigorously regulated ground operation forces. The use of remote warfare allows for a more efficient method of combating security threats, as there are a wider range of available viable operations due to the lack of regulation on the technology.

Conclusion

This paper has explained the turn towards remote warfare by European powers; predominantly focusing on this change within France and the UK, through investigating a multitude of factors that have contributed to this shift. As the paper discussed earlier, European NATO members did not begin using this new style of warfare because of its high effectiveness. There is little data supporting the notion that remote warfare has been a more successful tactic in combating European security threats, that has not been sufficiently and convincingly challenged and countered by other academics. However, as mentioned through the analysis of the wars that preceded this new style of warfare, Europe can simply not afford large scale, boots on the ground operations; both from a financial and political perspective. Vietnam was an historically unpopular war, with home support of the conflict hitting record lows, European states are keen to avoid the same mistakes – fighting wars too far away from home to be considered a credible security threat. The 2008 financial crisis arguably also affected how Europe guarantees its security, making large scale deployments, such as Afghanistan and Iraq less economically viable, promoting the usage of contractors due to their lower long-term financial upkeep. The use of security allies and contractors also improves the perception of these operations successes within the target state; helping the intervention forces to convince the targeted nation that the operation is aiding them, and avoiding the stigma that the operation is an invasion, infringing on their sovereignty. The legality of these new remote operations is troubling, as they have not been properly codified within International Law and questions surrounding the ethical debate on drone strikes have not decreased in recent years. European states can get away with more daring operations and have more freedom to pursue their security goals due to the lack of constraints placed upon the technology utilised. Overall, this

essay argues that European powers have not begun using remote warfare because of its successes, but due to its economic viability, lack of legal boundaries, as well as political perception – both internally and externally. Thus, remote warfare allows European powers to pursue their security goals more freely at a lower cost and without being perceived as invaders by the global community. This might arguably explain the recent shift in European security doctrines.

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The initiative came from students of the School of Politics and International Relations, which led to the journal being launched in November 2013.

All articles are peer-reviewed by both students and members of the School's academic staff. We are proud to be an entirely student-led publication, supported from our School of Politics and IR at the University of Kent.



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