



CROSS-DISCIPLINARY PHENOMENOLOGY:
A READINESS FOR THE QUESTIONABLE



A One-Day Symposium, 24 June 2016

The Dean John Simpson Room
Canterbury Cathedral Lodge
The Precincts
Canterbury, Kent, CT1 2EH



PROGRAMME

8.45-9.15: REGISTRATION & COFFEE/TEA

9.15-9.30: **Introductions**

Ariane Mildenberg (University of Kent), John Scholar (Oxford Phenomenology Network) and Matthew Carbery (Plymouth University)

9.30-11.15: **Panel 1 – Textual Wandering, Language and Space: a New Beginning?**

Patricia M. Locke (St John's College, Annapolis): 'Is Each Day a New Beginning?'

Hayden Kee (Fordham University): 'Does Phenomenology Have the Resources to Illuminate and Describe the Phenomenon of Language?'

Cassandra Falke (University of Tromsø): 'How Can Phenomenology Clarify the Relationship between Literature and Embodied Life?'

Jonathan Hale (University of Nottingham): 'Phenomenology and Architecture: Can Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Language Explain Today's New Materialism?'

Respondent: Ariane Mildenberg

11.15-11.30: COFFEE/TEA

11.30-13.15: **Panel 2 – Mind, Body and Practice: Are We Really Phenomenological?**

Monique Lanoix (Saint Paul University, Ottawa): 'Can Merleau-Ponty's Understanding of Passivity Rehabilitate the Demented (Non)Subject?'

John Gilmore (Canterbury Christ Church University): 'Can Phenomenological Research Truly Enhance Broad Nursing Practice?'

Tina Williams (University of Bristol): 'Can Phenomenology Really Supplement Biomedical Accounts of Dysphnoea?'

Valeria Bizzari (University of Pisa): 'Can Phenomenology Save Subjectivity? The Problem of Self in Psychiatry.'

Respondent: Gail Weiss (The George Washington University)

13.15 – 14.15: LUNCH

14.15-16.00: **Round Table Discussion –**

Poetry, Posthumanism and Care: What is the Contemporary Environment of Phenomenology?'

Harrison Sullivan (University of Kent): 'How Does Phenomenology Speak to Nationalism(s) in Contemporary British Poetry?'

Peter Adkins (University of Kent): 'How Do Contemporary Posthuman Readings of Phenomenology Challenge Longstanding Ideas of a Recognisably "Human" Subject?'

Adam Clay (University of Edinburgh): 'How Do We Phenomenologically and Poetically *Care*?'

Chair: Matthew Carbery

16.00-16.15: COFFEE/TEA

16.15-18.00: **Panel 3 – Norms, Society and Technology: Conflicting Lifeworlds?**

Eleanor Betts (The Open University): 'How Does Phenomenology in Practice Help Us Better to Understand Past Human Societies?'

Gail Weiss (The George Washington University): 'Can We De-Naturalize the Natural Attitude?'

Christopher Müller (Cardiff University): 'How Can Phenomenology Study the Formative Power of (Digital) Technology?'

Respondent: Todd Mei (University of Kent)

18.00-19.00: **CLOSING REMARKS AND WINE RECEPTION**

20.30: **DINNER AT THE GOODS SHED, CANTERBURY (OPTIONAL)**

ORGANISERS

Dr Ariane Mildenberg

Dr Cleo Hanaway-Oakley

Dr Matthew Carbery

BIOS AND ABSTRACTS

Introductions

Ariane Mildenberg is Lecturer in Modernism in the School of English at the University of Kent. She is co-editor of *Phenomenology, Modernism and Beyond* (2010), an interdisciplinary collection of essays exploring a variety of modernist issues gravitating around the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry, Paul Ricoeur and Gaston Bachelard. She has published articles and essays on the interaction of twentieth century philosophy with modernist literature. Her monograph *Modernism and Phenomenology: Literature, Philosophy, Art* is forthcoming from Palgrave Macmillan later this year. Her current research includes an edited volume entitled *Understanding Merleau-Ponty, Understanding Modernism* (Bloomsbury, 2017), and a project on notes in the work of nineteenth and twentieth century writers and philosophers. She also translates Danish poetry.

Cleo Hanaway-Oakley is founder and chair of Oxford Phenomenology Network, a group of interdisciplinary scholars and practitioners interested in all aspects of phenomenological thought and practice. She was awarded her doctorate from the University of Oxford in 2013 for a thesis on James Joyce, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and early cinema; a revised version of this work, entitled *James Joyce and Film Phenomenology*, is due to be published by Oxford University Press later this year. Other publications include an article on Joyce and the mind-body problem in *Literature & History*, and a chapter on cinematic ways of seeing and being in Joyce's *Ulysses*, in *Roll Away the Reel World: James Joyce and Cinema*, ed. McCourt, (Cork: Cork University Press, 2010). Her current projects include a piece on modernism and blindness and a chapter on Joyce and Merleau-Ponty for inclusion in *Understanding Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Understanding Modernism*, ed. Ariane Mildenberg, (forthcoming - London: Bloomsbury). She currently works at the University of Oxford in the role of Knowledge Exchange Facilitator (Humanities) and also tutors at various Oxford colleges.

Matthew Carbery is a poet and critic working at University of Plymouth. He recently completed his PhD at University of Kent on the Post-Olson long poem and phenomenology, and is now researching the relationship between free jazz and avant-garde poetry. His poems have been published in Blackbox Manifold, Tears in the Fence, Otoliths, Stride, CTRL+ALT+DEL and Dead King Magazine. He is also Editorial Assistant of Periplum Press, and runs EPIZOOTICS! Literary zine. Recently, he has written a chapter on Merleau-Ponty and the Modernist Long Poems of Pound, Eliot, H.D, Loy, Stevens, Stein and Zukofsky for inclusion in *Understanding Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Understanding Modernism*, ed. Ariane Mildenberg, (forthcoming - London: Bloomsbury).

John Scholar is a currently a Research Fellow at Magdalen College, Oxford. His first book, *Henry James and the Art of the Impression*, will be published by OUP. He has written on Henry and William James, Joyce and Heidegger, and Joyce and Bergson. He is a convenor of the Oxford Phenomenology Network, a group of interdisciplinary scholars and practitioners interested in all aspects of phenomenological thought and practice.

Panel 1 – Textual Wandering, Language and Space: a New Beginning?

Patricia M. Locke (St John's College, Annapolis): 'Is Each Day a New Beginning?'

Drawing on Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Marcel Proust, I will consider the phenomenon of waking up in the morning. Does our experience of discontinuity, or a paradoxical continuity woven

through the episodic experiences of return to daytime consciousness, give us a sense of what it means to begin? How do abrupt entries and departures of conscious states affect our sense of being human? The protagonist of *À la recherche du temps perdu* fears sleep for the very reason that he may not wake up—or may wake up as a different person. Given that sleep is necessary for life, how can we reconcile fear and the desire to be coherent selves? My claim is that Proust's narrative, related by an insomniac, offers insight into Merleau-Ponty's understanding of passivity, beginnings, and the sustaining of a personal self over time.

Patricia M. Locke is a Tutor at St. John's College, Annapolis MD, USA, where she teaches across the curriculum. She is interested in phenomenology applied to the arts, sciences, and architecture. She recently edited, together with Rachel McCann, *Merleau-Ponty: Space, Place, Architecture* (Ohio University Press, 2016). Her current work in progress is *The Nighttime World of Marcel Proust*. Patricia Locke is also a painter.

Hayden Kee (Fordham University): 'Does Phenomenology Have the Resources to Illuminate and Describe the Phenomenon of Language?'

Historically, language constitutes both a perennial stumbling block and muse for phenomenology. Husserl was never satisfied with his efforts to articulate the relationship between meaning and expression with which the *Logical Investigations* begin. And in his late work, it is in part reflection on language and tradition that forces his phenomenology to push its own limits, as we see in 'Origin of Geometry'. Heidegger expresses puzzlement in *Being and Time* concerning the nature of language, and further pursuing this question motivates in part his *Kehre* and radical transformation (or abandonment) of phenomenology. And it is Merleau-Ponty's confrontation with Saussure and attempt to ontologize the notion of expression that leads to his own departure from the more classically phenomenological approach of *Phenomenology of Perception*. Could the reason for these crises be that viewed phenomenologically, language verges on inaccessibility? For it seems as though the sources of intentionality that underwrite our linguistic facilities are so buried in sedimentation, habituation, and automation that it is questionable whether they can be described and analyzed by a classical phenomenology of consciousness. In light of these challenges, we ask, What kind of phenomenology is required to approach the phenomenon of language? And how is phenomenology challenged to reform and retool itself in the face of – in the midst of – the phenomenon of language?

Hayden Kee is a PhD candidate and Canadian Research Council fellow at Fordham University in New York. His dissertation, 'Pointing the Way to Speech: Towards an Enactive Phenomenological Account of Linguistic Intentionality' explores the relationship between linguistic and non-linguistic intentionalities. During the spring of 2016, he was a visiting Researcher at the Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen.

Cassandra Falke (University of Tromsø): 'How Can Phenomenology Clarify the Relationship between Literature and Embodied Life?'

François Cusset refers to the body as 'lonely' during the process of reading, picturing it as a thing left thoughtlessly behind while the consciousness wanders. He questions the wisdom of the body's abandonment and worries that 'phenomenology,' when linked with literary criticism, has become a 'code word' for a theory of reading that focuses on an abstracted individualistic experience. Cusset rightly implies that reading's ethical and political potential relies on readers' embodied social existence. Phenomenological literary criticism need not lead away from the body, but in fact is

uniquely equipped to account for the connection between literature and life, since phenomenology has long privileged the body as the unifying site of lived experience. In my discussion, I will try to reconnect the phenomenological reader's wandering consciousness with his or her body, looking to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty for foundational concepts, but prioritizing the recent work of French phenomenologist, Jean-Luc Marion.

Cassandra Falke is Professor of English Literature and Culture at the University of Tromsø in northern Norway. Her previous publications include *Intersections in Christianity and Critical Theory* (ed.), *Literature by the Working Class: English Autobiography, 1820-1848*, and articles about English Romanticism, literary theory, and liberal arts education. Her most recent book, *The Phenomenology of Love and Reading*, is forthcoming from Bloomsbury (November 2016).

Jonathan Hale (University of Nottingham): 'Phenomenology and Architecture: Can Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Language Explain Today's New Materialism?'

One reason for the growing interest in phenomenology today may be that it seems to offer a way of understanding what Bruno Latour has called the agency of 'non-human actors'. In Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the creativity of 'speaking speech' he described a mechanism – 'coherent deformation' – by which new language emerges from distortions of the old. Could this way of understanding language as a material and behavioural phenomenon also explain the role of drawing in the creative process of design? What Latour described as the 'slight surprise of action' also applies to the often unexpected qualities that emerge in the process of constructing a building. What architects often refer to as a 'tectonic sensibility' involves an ability to work in sympathy with the inherent propensities of building materials. Is this same sensibility towards the emergent properties of physical matter (under conditions of transformation) also applicable when design is imagined as a composition of *spatial* rather than *material* form?

Jonathan Hale is an architect, Associate Professor & Reader in Architectural Theory at the University of Nottingham, Department of Architecture and Built Environment. Research interests include: architectural theory and criticism; phenomenology and the philosophy of technology; the relationship between architecture and the body; digital media in museums and architectural exhibitions. He has published widely and received grants from the EPSRC, Leverhulme Trust, British Academy, and the Arts Council. He is also Head of Architecture, Culture and Tectonics research group (ACT) and was founding Chair of the international subject network: Architectural Humanities Research Association (AHRA).

Panel 2 – Mind, Body and Practice: Are We Really Phenomenological?

Monique Lanoix (Saint Paul University, Ottawa): 'Can Merleau-Ponty's Understanding of Passivity Rehabilitate the Demented (Non)Subject?'

Persons with dementia are socially devalued. Philosophers, such as McMahan, argue that persons who suffer from advanced dementia or are permanently unconscious are longer persons in the moral sense. This paper explores the phenomenological work of Merleau-Ponty on passivity in order to better understand how dementia's challenge to the primacy of consciousness. In his lecture on passivity (Notes de cours au Collège de France 1954-55), in which he engages with the phenomenon of dreaming, Merleau-Ponty explains that the passivity of consciousness can be understood as long as 'to be conscious of' is not taken to be 'to give sense to.' Applying this to those who have dementia can give a better understanding of how such individuals maintain access to an

inner world that eludes those who share their surroundings. If that lifeworld remains inaccessible, it never ceases to be related to the lived experiences in which such individuals were immersed.

Monique Lanoix is Associate Professor of Philosophy at St. Paul University in the Center for Research in Public Ethics and Governance where she teaches courses in environmental ethics, feminist ethics and human rights. She works in medical ethics and her research focuses on dementia, nursing homes and access to long-term care. Her publications include 'Care et Vieillessement,' in *Le care: Éthique féministe actuelle*, Sophie Bourgault et Julie Perrault, dir. (Montréal : Éditions du remue-ménage, 2015); 'Caring for Money: Communicative and Strategic Action in Ancillary Care,' *International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics*, Special issue on Aging and Long-Term Care, 2013, 6 (2): 94-117; and 'Labour as Embodied Practice: The Lessons of Care Work,' *Hypatia*, 2013, 28 (1): 85-100.

John Gilmore (Canterbury Christ Church University): 'Can Phenomenological Research Truly Enhance Broad Nursing Practice?'

Phenomenological enquiry is a well established research methodology in nursing, however as both an academic and therapeutic discipline we are forever under pressure to discover and illuminate better, more efficient practices to enhance the care we provide to our patients. Phenomenology is inextricably linked to concepts of 'Person-centredness' and 'holistic care', so provides an excellent framework for enhancing the ability to care on an individual basis, however in terms of developing broad, more strategic developments in care culture is phenomenology really the best method of enquiry? Phenomenology's emphasis is on the individual lived experiences of the subject, yet, is it an appropriate methodology to discover and establish generalisable practice? In this paper I reflect on my own research, which uses IPA to understand how Gay men discuss sexuality with healthcare practitioners. Like many practitioner/researchers I want my research to enhance the practice of those in my field but when we use phenomenology to develop generalisable practice, I question are we really phenomenological?

John Gilmore is a specialist intensive care nurse and PhD researcher based at Canterbury Christ Church University, UK. His doctoral thesis uses interpretative phenomenological analysis to look at how gay men discuss sexuality with their healthcare providers. As well as his clinical and academic practice, John has been deeply engaged in activist and leadership roles both nationally (Ireland) and internationally in the realms of human rights, youth rights and youth work for many years.

Tina Williams (University of Bristol): 'Can Phenomenology Really Supplement Biomedical Accounts of Dyspnoea?'

This paper poses the question of the utility of applying a phenomenological framework to pathological breathlessness experiences in respiratory illnesses and panic disorder. I consider how breathlessness in physical and mental disorders affects and changes lived experience, being *shaped by* and *shaping* human shared existence. It is shown that the detailed philosophical study of the experience of breathing and breathlessness is strangely lacking despite the necessity of the former and the ubiquity of the latter, to human existence. With breathlessness, this need is particularly pressing with regards to the increasing prevalence of smoking and air quality related lung diseases. I suggest a phenomenological account is demanded: within medicine and the medical humanities we find many studies of the physiological processes of respiration and respiratory diseases, and yet first person, *lived* experiences of breathing and breathlessness are, for the most part, unexplored.

Tina Williams is the philosophy of medicine (particularly phenomenology of illness) PhD student on the Life of Breath project at the University of Bristol. Her research focuses on the philosophy of breathing and breathlessness in physical illnesses, mental disorders, and everyday life. With a background in philosophy, she is also qualified in cognitive behaviour therapy managing depression and anxiety disorders in both primary care and holistic charitable setting. Her interests include phenomenology, the philosophy of medicine, and the philosophy of psychiatry.

Valeria Bizzari (University of Pisa): 'Can Phenomenology Save Subjectivity? The Problem of Self in Psychiatry.'

In the last few years, the phenomenological method and several notions such as *Leib*, natural attitude, corporeal schema and so on, have started to be addressed to offer explanations of psychiatric diseases like schizophrenia and depression. The aim of this paper is to describe how this could happen and to elicit the discussion about the liceity of the usage of phenomenological tools in psychopathology. In fact, adopting a phenomenological approach to the study of illness seems to allow a full understanding of the complexity of the human being, improving the therapeutical phase too, taking into account the subjectivity of the patient, the person behind the symptoms and the disruptions of the structures of consciousness. Nevertheless, we must remember the strong Husserlian anti-naturalism, which seems inconsistent with this interdisciplinary tendency. Can phenomenology really save the disrupted Self?

Valeria Bizzari is a PhD Candidate at the University of Pisa. Her areas of research are phenomenology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of emotions. She is the coordinator of the research group 'Theories of Emotions', a section of the research project Zetesis (<http://zetesisproject.com>), and she contributes as coordinator and editor to the magazines in political and social philosophy *La Società degli Individui* and *I Quaderni della Ginestra*. She is also a language editor of the online magazine *Phenomenological Reviews* (<http://reviews.ophen.org>). From 2015 she is Junior Researcher of the Laboratory for Research in Phenomenology and Sciences of the Person (PERSONA) at the University Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan. She has been a visiting PhD student of the Center for Subjectivity Research in Copenhagen, where she worked on her dissertation entitled 'Phenomenology and *Leib* in the Contemporary Debate.'

Round Table Discussion -

Poetry, Posthumanism and Care: What is the Contemporary Environment of Phenomenology?

Harrison Sullivan (University of Kent): 'How Does Phenomenology Speak to Nationalism(s) in Contemporary British Poetry?'

Avant-garde English Poetry since 1968 phenomenology features recurs as a system through which different poets attempt to present the subject. This entails an observation of the differences between the phenomenological subject in four different British poets: Allen Fisher, Jeremy Prynne, Maggie O'Sullivan and Andrew Crozier. This appraisal of their use of phenomenology will analyse certain poetic techniques such as direct perception and the manner in which it could be accused of working as an inadequate shortcut to articulating a phenomenological self. These tactics of representation also include Allen Fisher's processual subject or Jeremy Prynne's attempts to efface the subject from his poetry. Post-humanist approaches to the animal other and the human subject, and the ways in which they utilise and build upon phenomenological methods, are also important. The work also pays attention to the manner in which avant-garde poetics are often take up continental philosophical traditions, such as phenomenology, in order to criticise other poetic traditions. This is

exemplified by Andrew Crozier who's description of The Movement poets' poetry as 'empirical lyricism' in effect reconstitutes mainstream and avant-garde poetics as divided along the same national boundaries that are commonly associated with the analytical and continental philosophical divide. What is at stake in these discussions is the future of being or more specifically the manner in which that being should be articulated. It is also concerned with the role which poetry has to play in cultural and philosophical inquiry.

Harrison Sullivan is a first year PhD candidate at the University of Kent. His PhD thesis is researching the relationship between landscape and nation in English poetry after 1968. His research interests include contemporary British poetry; phenomenology; deconstruction; landscape and the Anthropocene.

Peter Adkins (University of Kent): 'How Do Contemporary Posthuman Readings of Phenomenology Challenge Longstanding Ideas of a Recognisably "Human" Subject?'

In his famous 1967 deconstruction of Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, Jacques Derrida asserts that the illusion of self-presence that derives from the experience of hearing one's own voice is not something 'that happens to a transcendental subject' but rather is what 'produces a subject' (82). In recent years, posthumanist theory has returned to Derrida's reading of phenomenology – particularly his writing on Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas – and drawn out Derrida's prescience in foreshadowing the thematics that have come to colour contemporary debate around post-humanist, nonhuman and transhuman ontology. If, as Cary Wolfe argues, Derrida's notion of auto-affectation in *Speech and Phenomena* pivots upon a notion of supplementation that undermines conventional notions of self-presence and the human as a discrete subject, then the implications for what counts as human or nonhuman need to be rethought (28). Indeed, as Derrida himself noted in a 1989 interview with Jean-Luc Nancy, if for Heidegger, the 'animal will never be either a subject or a *Dasein*' and for Levinas there is not 'an animal face' (268) then it is because the phenomenology that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century is 'marked by ... the presuppositions' of the human subject and anthropocentrism that have accompanied philosophy since Aristotle (268-9). Yet, Derrida's preoccupation with phenomenology, as well as its presence in the work of contemporary theorists such as Wolfe, Claire Colebrook and Timothy Clarke, speaks to the central role that phenomenology must have in any notion of being that comes after the human subject. Indeed, at a time when the sixth great extinction event is routinely predicted in both the press and the academy, a threat to the future of being itself, the project of returning to, refashioning and redeploying the critical apparatus of phenomenology presents itself as more pressing than ever.

Peter Adkins is a PhD student in the School of English at the University of Kent. His thesis, provisionally entitled 'Modernism in the time of the Anthropocene', is a study of the ways in which modernist novels engage with questions of ecology, nonhuman life and planetary change.

Adam Clay (University of Edinburgh): 'How Do We Phenomenologically and Poetically Care?'

What does Heidegger's phenomenology of *care* in *Being and Time* tell us about how 'poetically man dwells' - as the title of one of his later essays puts it? One of the central conclusions of Heidegger's extensive phenomenological exploration of the ways in which we *are* in the world is that we fundamentally *care*: 'Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care' (*BT*, 322). In Heidegger's later work, such as in the collection of essays entitled *Poetry, Language, Thought*, the concept of care has all but disappeared while poetry, broadly conceived, takes a prominent and central place. I will argue in this paper that what Heidegger calls man's poetical 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking' and the poets'

readiness to address the question of 'being' manifest a respectful attentiveness towards being(s) that pertains to the kind of authentic care described more than twenty years earlier in *Being and Time*.

Adam Clay is a doctoral student and a tutor at the University of Edinburgh. Before coming to the UK for his PhD in English literature, he studied and worked as a language teacher in universities in New Zealand and in France, where he spent most of his life. He has postgraduate degrees in Philosophy and in English, and his research, which draws on Heidegger and on Emerson, focuses on poetry and the concept of care.

Panel 3 – Norms, Society and Technology: Conflicting Lifeworlds?

Eleanor Betts (The Open University): 'How Does Phenomenology in Practice Help Us Better to Understand Past Human Societies?'

This paper outlines some of the phenomenological methods and approaches that are being used in archaeological fieldwork to better understand the social interactions, lived spaces and landscapes of past human societies. Whilst these methods originate in Husserlian essentialism and Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world, they are most influenced by Merleau-Ponty and his proposal that we return 'to sensation and examine it closely enough such that it teaches us the living relation of the one who perceives with both his body and his world' (*Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Landes, 2012, 216). The aim of this paper is to open up discussion as to how these and similar methods may be applied to different historical periods and subject disciplines, and how to 'mind the gap' between the present and the past. To what extent can phenomenology help us create a bridge to the past, and how do we account for cultural specificity?

Eleanor Betts' research focuses on the development and application of multisensory approaches to understanding the construction and use of Roman urban and ritual space, and phenomenological approaches to ancient Italic sacred landscapes. She is a founding member of the Sensory Studies in Antiquity network. She is editor of the forthcoming volume *Senses of Empire: Multisensory Approaches to Roman Culture* (Routledge).

Gail Weiss (The George Washington University): 'Can We De-Naturalize the Natural Attitude?'

This paper offers a brief, critical exploration of Husserl's foundational concept, the natural attitude, and seeks to open up a dialogue about its productive explanatory potential for feminist theory, critical race theory, queer theory, and disability studies. One of the most striking features of the natural attitude, as Husserl describes it, is that it is not natural at all; rather, it is a developmental phenomenon that is acquired through, and profoundly influenced by, specific socio-cultural practices. To de-naturalize the natural attitude, then, is to recognize that the natural attitude is not fixed or innate but relative to a particular time period and culture, and therefore always capable of being changed. A major social and political challenge for our time, I suggest, is how to radically transform sexist, racist, and ableist natural attitudes that sanction the oppression of individuals and groups whose behavior and/or bodies violate established norms.

Gail Weiss is Professor of Philosophy at The George Washington University and General Secretary of the International Merleau-Ponty Circle. She is the author of two monographs: *Refiguring the Ordinary* (Indiana U. Press, 2008) and *Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporeality* (Routledge 1999) and she has edited/co-edited four other volumes: *Intertwinings: Interdisciplinary Encounters with Merleau-Ponty* (SUNY 2008), *Feminist Interpretations of Maurice Merleau-Ponty* (Penn State Press 2006),

Thinking the Limits of the Body (SUNY 2003), and *Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersections of Nature and Culture* (Routledge 1999). Other co-edited projects include the Summer 2011 Special Issue of *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy* Vol. 26.3 on 'The Ethics of Embodiment' and the Winter 2012 *Hypatia* Vol. 27.2 Cluster Issue, 'Contesting the Norms of Embodiment.' She is currently completing a monograph on Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir that is under contract with Indiana University Press.

Christopher Müller (Cardiff University): 'How Can Phenomenology Study the Formative Power of (Digital) Technology?'

This paper introduces the thought of Günther Anders that has been scarcely considered in Anglophone research. Anders, a former student of Heidegger and Husserl, mainly developed his object oriented phenomenology in his two volumes of *the Obsolescence of Human Beings*, which are still untranslated into English. I will introduce one of Anders's provocative basic premises for discussion. Anders suggests that technological objects cannot be studied directly because these already shape our intuition, perception and feeling. Put in the words of Anders: 'If one understands the word "phenomenon" as meaning "something that shows itself", as Heidegger does, then the machines [of today] are no longer phenomena'. They look ordinary, "like nothing", 'they seem much less than they are'. From this Anders concludes that the formative power of technology can only be studied negatively, that is, through a phenomenology that investigates their invisibility, or inversely, one that examines what happens to us if we are deprived of the machines we have learnt to intuitively rely on.

Christopher John Müller is an Honorary Research Associate of the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory, Cardiff University, where he also completed his PhD thesis in 2013. He is the author of *Prometheansim: Technology, Digital Culture and Human Obsolescence* (Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming August 2016), a monograph on Günther Anders, which includes a translation of Anders's essay 'On Promethean Shame'. Further relevant publications include: 'Desert Ethics: Technology and the Question of Evil in Günther Anders and Jacques Derrida', *Parallax* (2015), 21 (1): 42-57 and 'Style and Arrogance: The Ethics of Heidegger's Style', *Style in Theory: Between Literature and Philosophy*, ed. Ivan Callus, Gloria Lauri-Lucente, James Corby (Continuum, 2013), pp. 141-162. Information about current research and translation projects can be found on his website: <https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/people/view/260789-muller-christopher>

Respondent:

Todd Mei is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent and specialises in philosophical hermeneutics. Some of his recent publications examine how hermeneutics can contribute to understanding problems in technology and economics. Dr Mei has a monograph on the land and economics (*Land and the Given Economy*) forthcoming with Northwestern University Press (2017) and an article on 'Heidegger and the Machine' with *Continental Philosophy Review* (2015). Past books include a monograph entitled *Heidegger, Work and Being* (Continuum, 2009) and an edited volume entitled *From Ricoeur to Action: The Socio-Political Significance of Ricoeur's Thinking* (2013).