School of Economics

 

profile image for Dr Anna Stepanova

Dr Anna Stepanova

Lecturer in Economics

School of Economics, Keynes College, B1.08

 

About

Anna Stepanova is a Lecturer in Economics. She joined the School in August 2006. Her earlier career was in applied mathematics and she graduated from St Petersburg State University (Russia). She was awarded a PhD degree in Economics from the University of Southern Denmark at Odense (Denmark). She previously spent two years working at the School of Economics of the University of Exeter.

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Publications

Anna's publications can also be found on RePEc, Orcid and ResearchGate.

Also view these in the Kent Academic Repository

Article
Cartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2017). Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. International Journal of Game Theory [Online]. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1.
Cartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2015). The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games. Economics Letters [Online] 134:29-33. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.032.
Burr, C., Knauff, M. and Stepanova, A. (2013). On the Prisoner's Dilemma in R&D with Input Spillovers and Incentives for R&D Cooperation. Mathematical Social Sciences [Online] 66:254-261. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.05.004.
Cartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2012). What do Students Learn from a Classroom Experiment: Not much, Unless they Write a Report on it. Journal of Economic Education [Online] 43:48-57. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220485.2012.636710.
Stepanova, A. and Tesoriere, A. (2011). R&D with Spillovers: Monopoly Versus Noncooperative and Cooperative Duopoly. Manchester School [Online] 79:125-144. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02185.x.
Amir, R. and Stepanova, A. (2006). Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly. Games and Economic Behavior [Online] 55:1-20. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.004 .
Monograph
Alberti, F., Cartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2013). Explaining Success Rates at Providing Threshold Public Goods: An Approach Based on Impulse Balance Theory. Social Science Rsearch Network. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2309361.
Confidential report
Cartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2016). Understanding the Moral Component of Conflict: A Re-evaluation of the Relationship between Morality and Strategy. BAE SYSTEMS.
Showing 8 of 9 total publications in KAR. [See all in KAR]
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Research

Research interests

Anna's research in the past few years has been in the field of Industrial Organization.

In a recent paper 'R&D Spillovers, Concentration and Market Performance' she investigates the effect of exogenously changing R&D spillovers and market concentration on the per-firm equilibrium profit and social welfare.

Using the standard setup of a two-stage R&D game of process innovation, she shows that both per-firm equilibrium profit and equilibrium social welfare are inverse U-shaped in the spillover rate. Interpreting spillover as an inverse measure of distance between firms, this result says that an intermediate location achives the objective of maximizing per-firm equilibrium profit, while closer proximity between firms is more desirable for welfare-maximizing purposes.

In another recent paper 'Merger Performance and Returns to Scale in Production' (with Amir R and Jin J) she investigates the profitability and welfare implications of horizontal mergers in industries with initially identical firms. This is done assuming linear inverse demand and quadratic cost functions allowing for either economies or diseconomies of scale. The quadratic structure of the model has the benefit of allowing for closed-form solutions.

While efficiency gains are assumed not to take place, she and her colleagues show that output reallocation allows the merged firm to produce at lower marginal cost after the merger. It is known that in the case of a linear cost function the threshold for profitability is at least 80%, where the threshold for profitability is the lowest percentage of pre-merger market share held by the merging firms that would make the merger profitable. With a quadratic cost function it is shown that the threshold for profitability can be lower than 80%.

With regard to social welfare the results are qualitatively different under the two cost structures. If there is diseconomies of scale, mergers always decrease social welfare. In the case of scale economies, mergers may or may not increase social welfare depending on the intensity of economies of scale.

Anna's RePEc page is http://econpapers.repec.org/RAS/pst331.htm

Working papers

  • 'Explaining Success Rates at Providing Threshold Public Goods: An Approach Based on Impulse Balance Theory' (with
    Alberti F and Cartwright E), 2013. Available at SSRN.
  • 'Merger Performance and Returns to Scale in Production' (with Amir R and Jin J)
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Teaching

Undergraduate

During her career so far, Anna has taught a wide range of courses including: Introductory Game Theory, Microeconomics I (graduate level), Quantitative and Research Techniques (graduate level), Basic Mathematical Economics (undergraduate level), Information and Decisions, Commodities, Futures and Options, Industrial Organization (graduate level), Financial Markets and Decisions (undergraduate level).

 

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Consultation hours

  • tba
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PhD supervision

Current students

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Administrative roles

  • Director of Studies and Chief Examiner for Stage 2

 

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School of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP

Undergraduate enquiries: +44 (0) 1227 827497, Postgraduate enquiries: +44 (0) 1227 827440 or email us

Last Updated: 08/08/2017