School of Economics

2015 Discussion papers

School of Economics Discussion Paper 15/06

Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold
public good game

Edward Cartwright and Anna Stepanova
University of Kent

March 2015


We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.

JEL Classification: C72; H41; C92

Keywords: Public good, threshold, impulse balance theory, quantal response, forced contribution, ordinal potential

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Last Updated: 29/04/2015