Miltiadis (Miltos) Makris is a Professor of Economics at the University of Kent. After finishing his graduate studies at Athens University of Economics and Business, he was awarded a PhD in Economics by the University of Essex.
He has taught at the Universities of Bristol, Exeter, Leicester and Southampton. He has published in leading peer-reviewed economics journals such as the International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, and the Journal of Public Economics.
Miltos' current research interests include the study of optimal income taxation, dynamic tax competition, understanding understanding the drivers of R&D investment, the study of strategic complementarities in macroeconomics, experimentation, as well as auction theory, contract theory, and dynamic mechanism and information design.
His main research approach has been theoretical modelling, often combined with experiments and/or computational analysis. His research has policy implications for the alleviation of inequality and the design of the income tax code, the scope of barriers to capital tax competition in Europe, the need for the introduction of a stabilisation tax on financial transactions, the design of licence auctions and takeovers, the organisation of markets, the impact of communications in strategic interactions, etc.
For further information, please visit Miltos' personal webpage.
Miltos is a contributor to the blog Greek Economists for Reform and has written articles for various Greek media on the Euro crisis.
- Director of Graduate Studies (PhD)
- Member of School Strategic Management Group
Ioannou, C. and Makris, M. (2019). An Experimental Study of Uncertainty in Coordination Games. International Economic Review [Online] 60:751-799. Available at: http://dx.doi.org//10.1111/iere.12367.
Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Common Knowledge Coordination games. The present study investigates in a controlled setup, using as controls Common Knowledge games, whether idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals (Global games) or uncertainty about the number of actual players (Poisson games) may influence subjects' behavior. We find that uncertainty about the number of actual players has more influence on subjects' behavior than idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals. Furthermore, subjects' behavior under Poisson population?size uncertainty is closer to the respective theoretical prediction than subjects' behavior under idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals.
Balkenborg, D. and Makris, M. (2015). An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values. Journal of Economic Theory [Online] 157:918-958. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.007.
In a class of informed principal problems with common values, we define iteratively a particular allocation which we call the assured allocation. It is comparatively easy to calculate and straightforward to interpret. It always exists, is unique and continuous in the priors. It is undominated, i.e. efficient among the different types of the principal subject to the agent's interim participation constraint. It is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the three-stage game in Myerson  and Maskin and Tirole . It dominates the RSW allocation as defined in Maskin and Tirole  and coincides with it when the latter is undominated. It is the unique neutral optimum as defined in Myerson  when there are only two types. When the assured allocation is separating, then it is a neutral optimum with three or more types. It is an equilibrium of a game of competition in a market with adverse selection.
Giovannoni, F. and Makris, M. (2014). Reputational bidding. International Economic Review [Online] 55:693-710. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12067.
We consider auctions where bidders care about the reputational effects of their bidding and argue that the amount of information disclosed at the end of the auction will influence bidding. We focus on bid disclosure rules that capture all of the realistic cases. We show that bidders distort their bidding in a way that conforms to stylized facts about takeovers/licence auctions. We rank the disclosure rules in terms of their expected revenues and find that, under certain conditions, full disclosure will not be optimal. First-price and second-price auctions with price disclosure are not revenue equivalent and we rank them.