Overcoming moral hazard with social networks in the workplace: An experimental approach

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Abstract

The use of social networks in the workplace has been documented by many authors, although the reasons for their widespread prevalence are less well known. In this paper we present evidence based on a combined field-laboratory experiment that social networks are used by employers to reduce worker moral hazard. The worker chooses an effort level given a fixed wage under different settings of social proximity. Social proximity is captured using actual Facebook friendship information revealed anonymously to subjects once they have been recruited. Since employers themselves do not have access to social connections, they delegate the decision to referrers who can select among workers with different degrees of social proximity to themselves. We show that employers choose referrals over anonymous hiring about 80% of the time. In keeping with our predictions, referrers also choose workers with a greater social proximity to themselves and workers who are closer to referrers indeed pay back more to the referrer. The advantage of the lab setting is that we can isolate moral hazard and directed altruism as the main driving forces for these results.

Keywords: Efficiency wage contracts, Moral hazard, Dictator game, Referrals, Altruism, Reciprocity, Directed altruism, Social proximity, Facebook, Experiment, Social networks, Strength of ties, Spot market.

JEL Classification Numbers: D21, D85, D86, J41, J6, O12, O17.

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1 Introduction

Much recent literature in labor markets (e.g. Granovetter (1995), Bandeira et al. (2009), Beaman and Magruder (2012), Dustman et al. (2011), Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006)) has focused on the use of social networks in the workplace and how it affects various employer decisions such as recruitment and discipline within the firm. Recruitment decisions, in particular, have attracted a lot of interest. Starting with Montgomery (1991), a theoretical and empirical literature has developed trying to understand why referrals are used for recruitment rather than anonymous hiring.\(^1\) Empirically, there is increasing evidence that such social networks matter much more than previously assumed.\(^2\)

Social networks and connections thus appear to be vital for recruitment and the use of strong ties, i.e. close friends and family also seems to be a recurring pattern in these jobs (Dhillon et al. (2013)). Yet the empirical literature on the underlying reasons for the use of social networks is handicapped by the difficulties in separating the different possible reasons for the use of social networks. Disentangling various possible mechanisms for why referrals take place is important because the use of social networks might create more efficient outcomes or more inequitable outcomes than a direct hire depending on the exact mechanism underlying their use – e.g. Kramarz and Thesmar (2013) provide evidence that social networks are detrimental to corporate governance in a large sample of French public firms; Fafchamps and Moradi (2010) show that the use of referrals in the Ghanian army was detrimental to productivity. Do these results hold more generally or are there conditions under which we may expect networks to lead to some positive outcomes as well? To answer these questions, we need to understand the mechanisms underlying the use of referrals.

In this paper, we scrutinize whether social networks are used by employers to reduce employee moral hazard using a laboratory experiment. The advantage of the experiment relative to an empirical field study is that in the experimental setting we can rule out other explanations for the use of employee referrals such as the reduction of search costs, adverse selection and improving the match quality as potential explanations of referrals. We can also rule out other explanations than social proximity as the exact mechanism that helps to reduce worker moral hazard and we can control for referrer incentives directly. Finally, we can quantify the extent to which social networks matter in this setting. There are several novel features in our experiment. First, we use the social relationships between participants as they are in real-life, thereby incorporating a feature that is typical to field experiments.

\(^1\)Kugler (2003), studying high skill industries in the United States, suggests that employers, through peer pressure from referrer to the new recruit, gain from a reduction in monitoring costs. Heath’s (2011) research on garment factories in Bangladesh, finds that referrals serve as a disciplining device by employers. Dhillon et al. (2013) assume that social proximity encourages altruistic behavior between workers and referrers and provide evidence suggestive of a moral hazard explanation as well.

\(^2\)For example, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) report that 70% of blue collar jobs in Dadar, Mumbai were found through referral (with a corresponding figure for white collar jobs of around 44%).
Our experiment can be considered in between a conventional lab experiment and a framed field experiment as it incorporates field context information with a standard subject pool of students (see Harrison and List (2004)). Second, we test not just a part of the mechanism (whether workers put in more effort when they are socially connected to referrers) but also whether employers can anticipate this effect.

Our theoretical framework is described below and follows the model developed in Dhillon et al. (2013). An employer is faced with moral hazard in the workplace. He has the choice to hire anonymously through the spot market or delegate the hiring decision to a referrer when the referrer is socially connected to a set of potential workers. The advantage of the referrer is that the referrer and worker have some (directed) altruism towards each other via their social connection and the closer they are, the higher is the altruism. Altruism implies that the worker has some utility from exerting effort for the referrer which is increasing in the strength of the tie. This is the key ingredient that allows the employer to induce less opportunistic behavior by the worker. The closer the relationship between the two, the lower the chances that the worker will shirk. We use the laboratory experiment to test whether the key predictions of the model hold. First, the employer prefers to delegate the hiring decision to a referrer who is potentially socially connected to the workers. Second, the referrer should appoint a worker at a smaller social distance with a higher probability. Third, workers should be willing to work harder when they are socially closer to referrers. Finally, the mechanism through which the employer is able to prevent opportunistic behavior by employees is directed altruism on the part of referrers and workers who are socially connected to them.

The experiment assigns subjects three roles: employer, referrer, workers. Decision making takes place over two stages. In the first stage, the employer decides whether to hire a worker via the spot market or to outsource the hiring to the referrer. When there is a successful outsourcing, the referrer is delegated the hiring decision. In either case, there is a choice between two workers who differ in the extent of social proximity to the referrer. In case the employer decides to hire via the spot market, in the second stage, one of the two random workers will be assigned to him. Each worker who is chosen (whether by referrer or spot market) is given a fixed budget of 30 units out of which he chooses how much to return to the relevant player (employer or referrer). This feature of the design captures moral hazard: the title “worker” suggests that the agent is expected to return some amount of the money he receives to the employer/referrer but neither the employer nor the referrer controls this decision. The setting is common knowledge to the four agents; in particular, the employer is aware of the workers and referrer being given information on their bilateral social relationships, but he does not receive this information.

We use two levels of social proximity. The first level of social proximity measures whether

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3It is assumed that he cannot choose his own friends, capturing the smaller network of the employer relative to all the employees in his company.
agents are directly connected or not. The second level of social proximity measures the
strength of social ties via the number of friends agents have in common. For our experiment
we use information available via Facebook. So, for a referrer–worker pair social proximity is
given by a pair \((f,c)\), where \(f\) takes a value of 1 in case the referrer and worker are friends
on Facebook and 0 otherwise and \(c\) indicates the number of friends the referrer and the
worker have in common on Facebook. If social networks are used to reduce moral hazard
in the workplace then we hypothesize that: (1) The possibility that referrers can appoint
close friends makes it tempting for the employers to hire via a referrer rather than via the
spot market; (2) Referrers refer friends more often than non-friends and they refer the closer
friends more often; and (3) Workers return on average more to referrers than to anonymous
employers, they return even more to socially closer referrers compared to any other referrer.
Our results support these predictions unambiguously. In addition, we argue that directed
altruism is the underlying mechanism for the worker returning more to friends and to close
friends relative to others. We provide supportive evidence of the importance of directed
altruism when social networks are salient.

The paper is related to the experimental literature on dictator games and trust games.
The average returns by dictators in the literature are about a third of the pie (Engel (2011))
which is higher than the returns to the spot market that we get. In the decision to return
money to the referrer, there are three parties involved, there is only a one shot interaction
and there are social networks involved. Our experimental design is able to eliminate other
motivations for giving on the part of the worker apart from baseline and directed altruism and
directed reciprocity. Leider et al. (2009) use laboratory experiments to separate out various
reasons for prosocial giving: baseline altruism, directed altruism and the prospect of future
interaction. They find that directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52% relative to
random strangers. In our paper, comparing giving in the spot market to giving to a friend
with some common friends the figure is 54% which is reassuring for the external validity of
the experiment.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a simple framework to analyze
this question, Section 3 discusses the experimental design, Section 4 provides the main results
and Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the results.

2 Conceptual framework

There are 3 types of players: an employer, a referrer and \(n\) workers. There are two stages. At
the beginning of stage 1, the employer chooses how to hire a worker at a fixed and exogenously
given wage \(w\). The worker can be hired directly through the spot market or through referral.
Once the worker is hired, in stage 2 he makes an effort decision \(e \in [0, \bar{e}]\). It costs the worker
\(e\) to exert effort but he is paid \(w\) regardless of effort. Effort is not observed at all by anyone
other than the worker.\footnote{A more plausible scenario would have some observability of effort, and the minimum level of effort may well be positive since workers cannot shirk too much without being caught. However, the results would not change qualitatively if we allowed for a positive level of observable effort.} We will assume however that the wage is fully enforceable, thus we capture a situation where worker moral hazard is the main concern. Hiring through the spot market is completely anonymous\footnote{We ignore the possibility that the worker and the employer are connected. We capture a situation where the employer has too many vacancies to fill them with people he is connected to.} and the worker is chosen from among \( n \) possible workers with a probability \( \frac{1}{n} \). If the worker is hired through the spot market, the employer makes a profit \( \pi(e) \), which is increasing and concave in \( e \). Alternatively, the employer can choose to delegate the hiring decision to someone within the firm (the referrer) who can use his social networks to hire a worker. The parameter \( \rho \) captures the social ties between the referrer and a worker. We will assume that \( \rho \) is uniformly distributed over \([0, \bar{\rho}]\) and that a higher \( \rho \) signifies closer social ties between the referrer and a worker. Worker–referrer pairs are heterogenous with respect to \( \rho \). We assume that the referrer and the workers have social preferences that might be related to social proximity; hence including social proximity is important in this setting and our parameter \( \rho \) captures this. If referral is used, the firm outsources the hiring decision to the referrer, at an asking price \( p \). This price \( p \) represents the stakes that the referee has in accepting the delegation. If the referrer is an employee in the firm and he hires a worker, the employer can hold him responsible for the decision. Ultimately the referrer stands to lose something if his referred worker puts in low effort (e.g. the referrer may lose the chance to refer again). In the model, this is captured by the price. Simultaneously, the referrer makes a bid \( b \) for hiring the worker. If the referrer gains from having a socially connected worker in the workplace, he is willing to put in a positive bid. The bid captures the referrees expected benefit from referral. If the bid is higher than the price then a successful outsourcing takes place at the price \( p \). This simply says that a referrer is willing to accept the hiring delegation if his gain (bid) is higher than the cost (price). If the bid is lower than the price the employer must hire through the spot market with a small cost of delay \( c > 0 \). Subsequent to the outsourcing, the employer forfeits any returns from the worker’s effort in the next stage. We make this assumption, because the gains to the employer from using referral is captured already in the price. The price represents the employers profit from using referral vis-à-vis the spot market. The referrer makes a choice in his available network and hires someone at a social distance of \( \rho \), therefore the referrer gets to choose \( \rho \). The employer does not observe the choice of \( \rho \) by the referrer nor does he know \( \bar{\rho} \), but knows that \( \rho \) is uniformly distributed on an interval with lower bound 0. Similarly the referrer, when making his bid, does not know \( \bar{\rho} \), but knows that \( \rho \) is uniformly distributed on an interval with lower bound 0. This is because at this point, he has no information on which of his connections are available to approach for a job. Assume that \( \bar{\rho} \in \{H, L\} \) and the corresponding probabilities are \( q_H \) and \( 1 - q_H \).
The referrer has non-monetary benefits \( v(\rho) \) from choosing a worker who is connected to him; this captures non-monetary benefits from patronage or directed altruism towards the worker. We assume \( v'(\rho) > 0, v''(\rho) < 0 \) and \( v(0) = 0; \) so, if the worker is unknown to the agent selecting him, there are no patronage benefits. We also assume that patronage benefits only accrue if the choice of worker is not random. We will assume that returns from effort to the referrer, \( g(e) \), are increasing and concave in effort. Thus the utility function of the referrer is denoted \( U_R(\rho) = v(\rho) + g(e) \).

The worker’s utility function is, in turn, given by \( U = w - e + \alpha(0)\pi(e) \) when he is in the spot market and by \( U = w - e + \alpha(\rho)U_R(\rho) \) when he is hired by the referrer. \( \alpha \) denotes the strength of social preferences. We assume that \( \alpha \) is increasing and convex in \( \rho \) and \( \alpha(0) > 0; \) the effect of social proximity on the effort decision is therefore positive and the baseline altruism is also positive. If a worker is chosen randomly, moreover, we will assume that his anticipated \( \rho \) equals 0; this captures anonymous hiring.

Solving the game by backward induction: Suppose the worker is hired through the spot market. He chooses \( e \) to maximize \( w - e + \alpha(0)\pi(e) \). The first order conditions are given by \( 1 = \alpha(0)\pi'(e) \). By the concavity of \( \pi(e) \), \( e^* \) denotes the optimal choice of \( e \) by the worker in the spot market. Note that it is independent of \( \rho \).

When referrals are used, then he chooses \( e \) to maximize \( U = w - e + \alpha(\rho)U_R(\rho) \). Substituting for \( U_R \) we get \( U = w - e + \alpha(\rho)(v(\rho) + g(e)) \). The first order conditions are given by \( \alpha(\rho)g'(e) = 1 \). Since \( g(e) \) is concave, there is a unique maximizer to this problem denoted by \( e^*(\rho) \). Notice that \( \frac{\partial e^*}{\partial \rho} = -\frac{\alpha'(0)}{[(\alpha(\rho))']^2}g'(e^*) > 0 \) since \( \alpha' > 0 \) and \( g''(e) < 0 \); so \( e^* \) is increasing in \( \rho \). The referrer anticipates \( e^*(\rho) \) and chooses \( \rho \) to maximize \( U_R(\rho) = g(e^*(\rho)) + v(\rho) \). \( U_R(\rho) \) is increasing in \( \rho \) since both \( g(\cdot) \) and \( v(\cdot) \) are concave while \( e^*(\rho) \) is increasing. If \( v(\rho) \) is sufficiently concave in \( \rho \), then the referrer has a unique maximizer \( \rho^* \) subject to the feasibility constraint \( \rho^* \leq \bar{\rho} \). It is possible that \( U_R \) is not concave but is convex or linear in \( \rho \). In the latter two cases, there will always be a corner solution.

Recall that at the time of making the bid, the referrer does not know \( \bar{\rho} \) but knows it’s distribution, \( \bar{\rho} \in \{H, L\} \). However we know that there is a unique maximizer \( \rho^* \) subject to the feasibility constraint \( \rho^* \leq \bar{\rho} \). When the constraint is not binding \((\rho^* \leq L)\) then regardless of \( \bar{\rho} \) the referrer’s expected utility at the time of the bid is simply \( U_R(\rho^*) = g(e^*(\rho^*)) + v(\rho^*) \).

When the constraint is binding for \( L \) only \((H > \rho^* > L)\) then the expected utility is given by \( E(U_R(\rho^*)) = q_H U_R(\rho^*) + (1 - q_H) U_R(L) \). Finally, when the constraint is binding for both cases \((H < \rho^*)\) then we have \( E(U_R(\rho^*)) = U_R(H) \). Thus it is only when \( H > \rho^* > L \) that we have different effort levels being chosen in equilibrium.

Since he only gets the referral if the bid is no less than the price and his bid does not affect the amount he pays (price), the referrer has a dominant strategy of setting his bid equal to the expected value of the referral. Thus his bid must be equal to \( E(U_R(\rho^*)) \). It follows that
the referrer’s bid is increasing in \( q_H \) whenever \( H - L \) is sufficiently large and \( L \) is small, i.e. \( H > \rho^* > L \). On the other hand, if \( H - L \) is small and \( L \) is large, then the referrer’s bid does not change with \( q_H \).

The employer is willing to outsource for any price that satisfies \( p \geq \pi(e^{**}) \). His optimal price is \( p^* = E(U_R(\rho^*)) \). A lower price would still suffice to guarantee that trade takes place, but does not maximize his returns from the price, while a higher price leads to no trade. Whenever the probability \( q_H \) increases, both employers and referrers anticipate that returns will be higher whenever the difference \( H - L \) is sufficiently large and the size of \( L \) is small, and both the equilibrium bid and the price are higher in this case.

In order to compare \( e^* \) and \( e^{**} \), assume that \( g(e) = \pi(e) \), since there is no reason to expect that effort chosen by the worker in one case is more or less efficacious than the other. Then it is easy to see that \( e^* > e^{**} \). To summarize, our discussion shows that (1) When \( H - L \) is sufficiently large and \( L \) is not too high then the bid and the price increase as \( q_H \) increases or as the likelihood of having a close friend available increases. This prediction implies that the employer, who does not have the choice to hire friends, would prefer to delegate the decision to the referrer who does have the choice of hiring friends as he can extract a price greater than the expected returns from the spot market. (2) \( e^*(\rho) \) is increasing in \( \rho \); and (3) \( e^* > e^{**} \).

These predictions of the solution are the basis for the hypotheses stated earlier in the introduction: (1) Employers prefer to hire via a referrer rather than via the spot market; (2) Referrers refer friends more often than non-friends and they refer the closer friends more often (both because of patronage benefits and because they anticipate higher effort from friends); (3) Workers return on average more to referrers than to anonymous employers, they return even more to socially closer referrers compared to any other referrer. In addition, we argue that directed altruism is the underlying mechanism for the worker returning more to friends and to close friends relative to others.

3 The experiment

We conducted our referral-recruitment experiment in a laboratory using the social relationships between participants as they are in “real-life”, thereby incorporating a feature that is typical to field experiments. The experimental design follows the model closely.

3.1 Design

In our setting, as in the model, there is an employer, a referrer and two workers. Decision making takes place over two stages and the decisions made determine how a fixed surplus of 30 units is divided among the four agents. We interpret the 30 units as the fixed wages discussed in the model.
In the first stage, the employer decides whether to hire a worker via the spot market or to outsource the hiring to the referrer. In case of the latter, he is asked to set the price to be paid to him by the referrer in case of a successful outsourcing. Simultaneously to the employer’s decision making, the referrer has to announce the maximum price he is willing to pay to take over the task to hire a worker. In case the price charged by the employer does not exceed the maximum price the referrer is willing to pay, there is a successful outsourcing and the referrer is given the hiring task for the price charged; otherwise, the employer and referrer disagree on the price, and the employer is sent to the spot market.

In case the employer decides to hire via the spot market or has failed in his attempt to outsource the hiring task, in the second stage, one of the two random workers will be assigned to him. Without knowing whether they are assigned the job or not, both workers have to indicate how much of the 30 units they return to the employer if they are assigned the job. In this case, the payment to the employer equals the return of the worker who is assigned the job (minus 0.5 in case of a failure to outsource), the worker who is assigned the job receives 30 minus his return, the other worker and the referrer both receive nothing.

In case of a successful outsourcing, in the second stage, the referrer has to choose which of the two workers to hire. Simultaneously, both workers have to indicate how much of the 30 units they return to the referrer if they are assigned the job. As the referrer has no information on the returns of the workers, he cannot condition his choice among them on such information. The only distinguishing information about the worker that the referrer has, is about his social proximity to each of the workers. Moreover, he knows that the workers know their social proximity to him, while deciding how much to return conditional on being hired. Workers do not have information on the social distance between the other worker and the referrer. In this case, the payment to the employer equals the price, the payment to the referrer equals the return by the hired worker minus the price to be paid to the employee, the hired worker receives 30 minus his return, and the other worker receives nothing.

We use two levels of social proximity. The first level of social proximity regards agents being directly connected or not. The second level of social proximity regards the number of friends agents have in common. For our experiment we use the information available via Facebook. So, for a referrer–worker pair social proximity is given by a pair \((f, c)\), where \(f\) takes a value of 1 in case the referrer and worker are friends on Facebook and 0 otherwise and \(c\) indicates the number of friends the referrer and worker have in common on Facebook.\(^8\)

\(^6\)This small change helps us to increase the number of observations without deviating from the spirit of the model as each worker has a probability of being chosen for the job.

\(^7\)The small penalty of 0.5 for the employer in case of a failure to outsource is introduced to make charging a reasonable price when trying to outsource incentive-compatible.

\(^8\)Our social proximity measure is two-dimensional, however modeling \(\rho\) in one dimension saves complication and unnecessary assumptions while it still captures that different social proximity levels are comparable. We do not wish to find an exact mapping between the two, but rather make straightforward comparisons such as being a friend is closer than not being a friend for the same or unknown number of common friends, and when
Notice that this distance is symmetric.

The setting is common knowledge to the four agents. In particular, the employer is aware of the workers and referrer being given information on their bilateral social relationships, but he does not receive this information nor does he ever learn about it later. As in the theory, the employer only has a prior on the level of friendships in the pool. Employers also never learn how much is returned to the referrer by the workers.

3.2 Procedures

For each experimental session in the lab we created two listings in Orsee (Greiner, 2004). For one of the listings three-fourth of the participants signed up; for the other the remaining one-fourth. The participants in the larger group were playing the roles of employer and workers; those in the smaller group that of referrer. The two groups were kept physically separated throughout the entire experimental session, such that referrers never saw whom they could be interacting with or could have been interacting with during the session. So, despite information on real-life social relations being provided throughout the session, we maintained the highest degree of anonymity possible.

Prior to a session, all participants in this session were asked (via email) to accept a link that would allow us (the experimenters) to retrieve information on their social relations on Facebook. The only information we gathered regarded the bilateral connection between any two participants in the session as summarized by their direct relation (first level of social proximity) and the number of common friends (second level of social proximity).

In total we ran six experimental sessions. All sessions took place in December 2012 in the BEElab, the experimental laboratory of Maastricht University. Instructions and comprehension questions were paper-based (see Appendix A); the decision stage was computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Four sessions were run with 24 participants; the other two sessions we had to run with 20 participants due to a low show-up. So, in total 136 students participated.

One-fourth of the participants in a session was assigned the role of employer, one-fourth that of referrer, and the remaining half were given the role of workers. These roles were kept fixed throughout the entire experimental session. The participants interacted in a sequence of 30 rounds, where every round anew they were regrouped with three other participants, such that each group consisted of one employer, one referrer and two workers. So, six groups were formed every round in four sessions and five groups in the other two sessions. In the first 15 rounds only first level social proximity information was given to the referrer–worker pairs; in the second 15 rounds first and second level social proximity information was given. After each round of play, participants received feedback on decisions as long as they were not a friend having more friends in common is strengthening the social ties.
payoff-relevant. This means that employers received information on whether a deal was made (i.e., whether the bid was below the price) and knew the return from the selected worker in case hiring occurred via the spot market, referrers received information on whether a deal was made and in case a deal was made, they learned the price and the return of the worker whom they selected, and workers only learned whether they were selected or not.

Payments accumulated over all rounds and were handed out immediately after the session. For each unit of payoff in the experiment, participants received 0.04 Euros. In addition, they received a show-up fee of 3 Euros, and an initial endowment of 3 Euros in experimental currency units to avoid any bankruptcy (for the referrers).

4 Results

This section consists of four subsections. After having provided descriptive information on the friendship relations among the participants, we deal consecutively with the three types of decisions in the experiment. First we deal with the outsourcing decisions by the employers, where we investigate if employers prefer the spot market or to outsource the hiring decision to a referrer, how often a deal is made and how bids and prices change over time. Thereafter, we consider the hiring decisions referrers make, and how (relative) social proximity to the workers affects these. Finally, we investigate the returns by the workers and how these depend on whether being hired via the spot market or via the referrer and, in case of the latter, on the social distance to the referrer.

4.1 Descriptives

Our aim in the experiment is to examine the effect of friendship on referrer decisions and worker returns while avoiding establishing such relationships superficially in the lab and use real-life relations instead. In order to obtain many friendship relations of different levels while keeping the anonymity, we restricted the subject profile to undergraduate students at the School of Business and Economics.

Table 1 summarizes the social proximity between participants prior to the role division. Among the 1,484 possible different pairs, 46 direct friendship relations existed. In 680 possible pairs the two respective participants had at least one friend in common. The average number of common friends over all possible pairs is 1.71, and this number is 4.18 when averaging over the pairs with at least one common friend.

Table 2 summarizes the same information for all possible referrer–worker pairs after the roles had been decided. After the role division, there were 388 different possible referrer–worker pairs; among those there are 10 direct friendship relations. 186 possible referrer–worker pairs; among those there are 10 direct friendship relations. 186 possible referrer–worker pairs; among those there are 10 direct friendship relations. 186 possible referrer–worker pairs; among those there are 10 direct friendship relations. 186 possible referrer–worker pairs; among those there are 10 direct friendship relations.

9These unbalanced numbers are due to the use of real-life relations data obtained through Facebook that were not subject to experimental manipulations.
worker pairs had at least one friend in common. The average number of common friends over all possible referrer–worker pairs is 2.14, and this number is 4.47 when restricting attention to the pairs with positive number of common friends.

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<tr>
<td>$f = 1$</td>
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Table 1: Friendship relations among all possible pairs of participants prior to the role division.

Table 2: Friendship relations among all possible referrer–worker pairs.

Referrers only make hiring decisions in rounds where a deal between the employer and the referrer has been established. It is only in these cases that the friendship relation of the referrer with the two workers matters. Out of the 68 participants who were assigned the role of a worker, only 9 of them ever matched, in a successful outsourcing, with a referrer with whom he shares a direct friendship relation. Such a matching, in a successful outsourcing, between a worker and a referrer who is her friend occurred in total 31 times.

4.2 Outsourcing by employers

Employers have two options to choose from, either to hire from the spot market directly or to outsource the hiring to a referrer. If employers expect workers to return more to the referrer, then they may opt for outsourcing to exploit this difference. This comes only at a slight risk due to the small amount employer needs to pay if his offer is declined. We find that, despite the small cost in case of a failure to set a deal, employers prefer to hire via the referrer rather than via the spot market. Over 30 rounds 34 employers made in total 1,020 hiring decisions, and in 831 of them (81%) a deal is offered to a referrer.\(^\text{10}\) This preference to outsource is rather robust over time.\(^\text{11}\)

In case the employer makes the attempt to outsource the hiring by offering a deal to the referrer, whether a deal is reached depends on the referrer’s bid (which is his revealed maximum price that he is willing to pay to take over the responsibility to hire). Out of the 1,020 hiring decisions, 397 (39%) resulted in a deal between the employer and the referrer. Figure 1 shows the percentage of successful outsourcings with respect to all hiring decisions.

\(^{10}\) Percentages by which employers opted for outsourcing averaged by session are 90, 75, 89, 76, 85 and 75.

\(^{11}\) Over the six consecutive bundles of five rounds, all sessions combined, the respective percentages by which employers opted for outsourcing are 73, 87, 77, 82, 85 and 85.
for each session. In order to better picture a possible time-trend, the graph presents moving averages over clusters of 10 rounds.

The figure suggests that heterogeneity across sessions grows over time. Before the first vertical line, the graph is based only on the first fifteen rounds where subjects have no information about the second level of social proximity. After the second vertical line, it is only based on the last fifteen rounds, where referrers and workers receive information also on the second level of social proximity. Between the two lines, the data is based on a mixture of these two informational variations.

Between the first and the second fifteen rounds, where subjects do not know and know about the number of common friends, there is no significant difference between gross percentage of deals ($p = 0.2489$; two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test on session averages). When allowing for a learning effect and considering only the last five rounds under the two different information conditions, we find a significant increase in the number of deals ($p = 0.0345$).

Whether a deal is established depends on the prices and the bids. Figure 2 shows the prices and bids by rounds averaged over sessions.$^{12}$ The average price is based on the instances where employers decide to outsource the hiring; so, given that employers try to outsource in 81% of the time, the average price in each round is based on 28 employer decisions on average. As referrers do not know about the employers’ intention to outsource at the moment of setting their bids, the average bid in each round is based on 34 referrer decisions. We see that both bids and prices are declining over time and follow each other closely.

Referrers are expected to adjust their bids to the returns they receive from the workers. In case the returns are below the bid such an adjustment prevents potential losses; in case

$^{12}$Graphs of the individual sessions do not look much different.
returns are above it such an adjustment increases the opportunity to make a profit. Figure 3 shows the trend of bids and returns to the referrer. The graph suggests that the (relatively) low returns to the referrers drive down the bids referrers make. Still, referrers bid above the returns from the workers in almost all rounds, suggesting that there are positive non-monetary benefits to hiring friends.

Employers, on the other hand, are expected to adjust their prices to the bids from referrers and returns they receive from the spot market. Figure 4 shows the trend of prices and returns from the spot market to the employer. Although employers keep prices far above spot market returns, both quantities show a decreasing trend. Overall, prices seem to be more responsive to bids (recall Figure 2) than to spot market returns. The high prices charged lead us to think that employers do not choose to outsource in order to involve referrers in the sharing of the surplus, but mainly for the sake of self-interest.\footnote{Note here that all employers in our data set have experienced at least one spot market return in the first five rounds and 32 out of the 34 employers even experienced two or more spot market returns throughout the first five rounds.}
4.3 Hiring by referrer

When there is a successful outsourcing, a referrer is randomly matched with two workers, either of whom may be a friend or not. Before deciding whom of the two workers to hire, the referrer receives information on his social proximity to each of them. If this choice is between a friend and a non-friend, we find that referrers choose more often for the friend: 7 referrers were together 29 times in the position to choose between a friend and a non-friend and 22 times they decided to hire the friend (this is significant at \( p = 0.0208 \); two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test on individual percentages; note here that different referrers in the same session never directly interact, hence we believe we can safely regard their decisions as independent).

It is not only the direct friendship relation, but also the number of common friends that plays a role in the hiring decision of the referrer. We find that when a worker has more friends in common with the referrer, he is more likely to be chosen. In the last fifteen rounds, where referrers have information on both levels of social proximity, referrers hire the worker with the higher number of common friends in 72.79 percent of the 136 occasions (This is significant at \( p = 0.0277 \) for the test based on session percentages). Restricting attention to those 119 cases where the referrer is matched with two non-friend workers, this percentage is 73.11 (\( p = 0.0277 \)). If this choice is between a non-friend worker with zero common friends and a non-friend with a positive number of common friends, this percentage is 73.86 in the 88 cases (\( p = 0.0269 \)); when both non-friend workers share at least one common friend, this percentage is 70.97% in the 31 cases (\( p = 0.0796 \)).

We randomly label one of the two workers as worker 1. Table 3 presents the results of a regression with the probability that worker 1 is selected as dependent variable and the main explanatory variable is how many more friends he has in common with the referrer compared to the other worker.\(^{14}\) As information on the number of common friend is only given in the

\(^{14}\)In this regression, we avoid comparing two levels of social proximity if both dimensions are unequal, since
last fifteen rounds, only these rounds are considered in the regression. The table presents the result for three different selections of the data: (1) when both workers are non-friends (i.e. neither of the workers is friends with the referrer), (2) when both workers are non-friends and one of them shares a positive number of common friends while the other one does not have any friend in common, and (3) when both workers are non-friends and both have at least one friend in common with the referrer.

The results in the table indicate that referrers generally prefer to hire the worker who has more friends in common with him, which supports the earlier findings on basis of the nonparametric tests. If both workers have at least one friend in common with the referrer, this result is not significant, unlike in the earlier nonparametric tests. This is likely to be due to the limited number of observations in which a referrer is matched with two workers who are both non-friends and share an unequal positive number of common friends with him.

### 4.4 Returns by workers

Table 4 provides the average returns by workers to referrers and in the spot market for each sessions. We see that the overall average return to a referrer is significantly higher than the average return in spot market \((p = 0.0747;\) Wilcoxon signed-rank on session level). Possible explanations for this difference include reciprocity, egalitarian taste, or social proximity. A detailed description and discussion of these motives is provided in the final section.

In order to be able to disentangle the importance of social proximity, we categorize the possible relationship situations between a worker and a referrer into five different type-classes, based on first and second levels of social proximity. Type \((f = 1, c > 0)\) refers to workers who are matched with a referrer that he has a friendship relation with and with whom he has such a comparison needs further information about how people compare these levels. Therefore we chose to run the regressions for friends and non-friends separately, not in interaction. Due to limited number of friends data, only the regression for non-friends is presented.
Table 4: Average returns by workers in the different informational conditions over different clusters of rounds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To referrer</th>
<th></th>
<th>To spot market</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.02</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>10.43</td>
<td>7.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>5.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.58</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>7.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Average returns by workers in the different informational conditions over different clusters of rounds.

a positive number of friends in common. As there were no worker–referrer pairs who had a friendship relation but no common friends in our experiment, the class of Type \((f = 1, c = 0)\) workers is empty. Type \((f = 0, c > 0)\) refers to workers who are matched with a referrer that he has no friendship relation with, but does have a positive number of friends in common. Finally, Type \((f = 0, c = 0)\) refers to workers who have maximal social distance in the pool of participants captured in our data. These four types are only relevant once a successful outsourcing of the hiring process is reached. Moreover, full type information is revealed to relevant parties only in the last fifteen rounds; in the first fifteen rounds the first two type-classes and the latter two are not distinguishable. The last type is the spot market, which refers to a worker who is not matched with a referrer but hired by the employer via the spot market. Table 5 summarizes the average returns of the different types when all workers have full information about their type (last fifteen rounds), with, in parentheses, the standard deviation and number of observations.\(^{15}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(c &gt; 0)</th>
<th></th>
<th>(c = 0)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(f = 1)</td>
<td>8.24 (7.31, 17)</td>
<td>- (-, 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f = 0)</td>
<td>9.33 (6.73, 184)</td>
<td>6.00 (6.36, 221)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spot market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.34 (5.67, 598)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Average returns by workers in the different informational conditions.

Table 6 present the result of an OLS and Tobit regression of the returns from the workers in the last fifteen rounds on the types just described relative to the omitted spot market type. The regression results indicate that workers do not return significantly more to a non-friend referrer without common friends than they return in the spot market; as such these referrers are considered total strangers and treated as such. Unlike for workers of type \((f = 1, c > 0)\), this lack of significance is not due to a poor number of observations (see

\(^{15}\)To compare these returns to reciprocal behavior in related famous game situations: the average return in trust games is usually about 37% of the investment (which would suggest a return of 11.1 at the spot market) and the average return in dictator games is about 28% of the endowment (which corresponds to a return of 8.49 at spot market).
Table 6: Returns by the various types of workers. Robust standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>Tobit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type (f = 1, c &gt; 0)</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.02)</td>
<td>(4.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (f = 0, c &gt; 0)</td>
<td>4.00***</td>
<td>4.81***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (f = 0, c = 0)</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round</td>
<td>-0.07**</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.93***</td>
<td>6.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>1,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Relation of returns to the number of common friends. Robust standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rounds 1–15</th>
<th>Rounds 16–30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Tobit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (f = 1, •)</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.52)</td>
<td>(3.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (f = 0, •)</td>
<td>1.42**</td>
<td>1.74***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (f = 1, •)  × c</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
<td>-0.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (f = 0, •)  × c</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round</td>
<td>-0.11**</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.85***</td>
<td>6.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>1,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
over the data of the first fifteen rounds, that workers return more to a non-friend referrer than they return in the spot market. Notice here that in these first fifteen rounds no information is given on the number of friends workers have in common with the referrer and, hence, they cannot assess perfectly their social proximity to the referrer.

There is no significant difference in returns to friend and non-friend referrers ($p = 0.9421$ in OLS; $p = 0.9197$ in Tobit). Like earlier, this lack of significance may be attributed to the low number of direct friendship relations among worker–referrer pairs. In total there are only nine workers who are ever matched with a referrer who is a friend. If we only consider the average return by these nine workers to referrers who are friends and referrers who are non-friends, we still do not find any significant difference between returns to friends in non-friends by means of a nonparametric test ($p = 0.2123$).\textsuperscript{16}

In the regressions over the last fifteen rounds we see that the return to non-friends is increasing in the number of common friends, while to friends the returns are decreasing in this number. The numbers in the table indicate that up to about fifteen common friends more is returned to a friend and beyond this number more is returned to a non-friend. Though, the negative impact of the number of common friend on returns to friends should be taken with some reservation. During the last fifteen rounds, only seven workers have been matched with a referrer who is a friend (in 17 decision situations). Those seven individuals mostly adopt a fixed return to friends and none of them was ever matched with at least two different referrers that are friends and with whom a different number of common friends is shared. A decent within-subject analysis is therefore not possible.

5 Discussion and conclusion

In this section we discuss the main findings and the motives behind the behavior of the participants. Firstly, we are interested in understanding why workers return anything at all when they are in a position to keep the full surplus to themselves. Possible explanations are reciprocity, egalitarian preferences, baseline altruism, directed altruism, or motivation by future prospects.

A reciprocal individual responds to actions he perceives to be kind in a kind manner and to actions he perceives to be hostile in a hostile manner. When a referrer hires a worker, this may be perceived by the worker as a kind gesture as the referrer actively chooses one worker over the other while risking a loss by placing a bid. The worker may want to return this favor. Instead, in the spot market, the employer does not risk a loss and the worker is not selected by decision; reciprocity should not prevail in this information state.

Egalitarian preferences of workers is another possible explanation. An egalitarian individ-

\textsuperscript{16}Notice that there is no direct interaction between workers nor they learn about each other’s payoffs or relations to the referrers, hence we can safely treat their returns as independent.
ual attempts to produce equality even at a cost to himself (Dawes et al. (2007)). A perfectly egalitarian individual will return 15 in the spot market (the endowment is only shared between the worker and the employer), and return 20 if he is hired by a referrer (the endowment is shared between the worker, the referrer and the employer). Even if we do not observe this perfectly egalitarian behavior, some workers may simply return more to the referrer to be relatively more equal.

Leider et al. (2009) mention three more possible motives. First, baseline altruism, which entails being nice unconditionally (even to strangers). Although the presence of this factor cannot be rejected, it cannot explain the differences in workers’ returns across the different informational conditions. Second, directed altruism, which entails being nicer to socially closer people. According to this notion different types should return differently and returns should be responsive to the number of common friends. Third, motivation by future prospects. Since decisions take place in anonymity, workers are rematched to referrers every round anew, may not be hired in some rounds, or hiring may have taken place via the spot market, there is no scope for building a reputation relationships during the session and this factor appears irrelevant.

Hence, only three of the five factors have potential to be of explanatory value for behavior observed throughout our experiment: reciprocity, egalitarianism and directed altruism.

Average returns to referrers are found to be higher than average returns in the spot market. If this difference were to be attributed to reciprocity or egalitarianism, then we should also see a difference between average returns to non-friend referrers with zero common friends and average returns in the spot market. However, we did not find such a difference (and this is not due to a lack of observations). This supports the earlier claim that social proximity is the main driving force behind observed differences.

However, in the first fifteen rounds (when workers do not know their exact social proximity to the referrer), workers return more to a non-friend referrer than they return in the spot market. This can be explained by reciprocity and egalitarian preferences. It appears that in the absence of exact social proximity information, workers base their decisions on one of these other factors.

Additional support of the role of social proximity is found in the hiring decisions by the referrers as well as the outsourcing decision of employers. Employers prefer to outsource in the vast majority of cases, possibly anticipating higher returns from workers when they are socially more connected to the referrer relative to himself, although this anticipation can also occur due to reciprocity or egalitarianism concerns which have nothing to do with proximity. Referrers tend to hire friends over non-friends, and tend to hire workers with more common friends when neither of them is a direct friend. Moreover, workers return significantly more when they have more friends in common with a non-friend referrer.
In conclusion, social ties generally induce higher returns and hiring decisions on basis of social ties lead to a selection of the more returning worker. The decisions to outsource and to exploit the social ties of referrers to workers by the employers therefore leads to an increase in the joint payoff of the employer and the referrer and justifies the use of job referrals.
References


A Instructions

Welcome

You are about to participate in a session on interactive decision-making. Thank you for agreeing to take part. The session should last 60 to 90 minutes.

You should have already turned off all mobile phones, smart phones, mp3 players and all such devices by now. If not, please do so immediately. These devices must remain switched off throughout the session. Place them in your bag or on the floor besides you. Do not have them in your pocket or on the table in front of you.

The entire session, including all interaction between you and other participants, will take place through the computer. You are not allowed to talk or to communicate with other participants in any other way during the session.

You are asked to abide by these rules throughout the session. Should you fail to do so, we will have to exclude you from this (and future) session(s) and you will not receive any compensation for this session.

We will start with a brief instruction period. Please read these instructions carefully. They are identical for all participants in this session with whom you will interact. If you have any questions about these instructions or at any other time during the experiment, then please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to answer your question.

Compensation for participation in this session

In addition to the 3 Euros participation fee, what you will earn from this session will depend on your decisions, the decisions of others and chance. In the instructions and all decision tasks that follow, payoffs are reported in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). You will receive an initial endowment of 75 ECU which will cover some loss that might occur during the experiment. Just like a profit is automatically added to your total payoff at the end of a round, a loss will be automatically deducted. If at the end of the experiment your total payoff is negative we will ask you to donate this amount to a charity organization of choice. This situation is not likely to occur and under your control. At the end of the experiment, the total amount you have earned will be converted into Euros using the following conversion rate:

1 ECU = 0.04 Euros.

The payment takes place in cash at the end of the experiment. Your decisions in the experiment will remain anonymous.
Instructions

In the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned one of three possible roles: employer, referee or worker. You will keep this role throughout the entire session in which the decision situation explained below is repeated for 30 rounds.

Every round anew, new groups are formed consisting of one employer, one referee and two workers. You will never be informed about identities of the people you are interacting with: neither during nor after the experiment.

Employer

First the employer decides whether s/he wants to hire a random worker from the spot market or to hire one via the referee.

When the employer chooses to hire a random worker from the spot market, one of the workers is randomly assigned the job. This worker is given an amount of 30 ECU and has to decide how many of this 30 ECU to return to the employer.

If the employer wants to hire via the referee, s/he has to ask a price between 0 and 30 ECU at which s/he is willing to outsource the hiring decision. In case the price-offer is accepted, the referee is given the task to hire a worker and will collect the return, but has to pay the price to the employer. In case the price-offer is rejected, no deal is made and the employer will be assigned a random worker from the spot market and collects the return from this worker. However, in this case, the employer loses 0.5 ECU for the delay.

Referee

The referee (whom does not know which way the employer likes to hire a worker, nor the offered price in case s/he wants to hire via the referee), is asked to indicate the maximum price – the bid – at which s/he is willing to accept the task to hire a worker. Afterwards s/he learns whether a price-offer has been made by the employer. The offer results in a successful deal in case the price asked does not exceed the bid.

In case no successful deal is made, the referee is not assigned the task and does not have to make any further decision this round.

In case a successful deal is made, the referee has to choose to hire one of two possible workers: Worker 1 or Worker 2. Once the deal is realized, the referee observes his/her friendship-connection on Facebook to each of the workers. In the first 15 rounds the information released is whether a worker is a friend on Facebook or not; in the remaining 15 rounds the referee also observes how many friends s/he has in common with the workers on Facebook.\footnote{Remark: Some Facebook-users use security options that do not allow us a perfect counting. As a result, the actual number of common friend may be larger than the number that is presented.}

1
hired worker decides how much of the 30 ECU to return.

The referee chooses to hire one of the workers before s/he sees how much they would return.

**Worker**

In case a worker is randomly hired through the spot market (either because the employer prefers so or because the employer has not been successful in making a deal with the referee), both workers in the group are asked how much of the 30 ECU they want to return in case they are hired.

In case a deal is realized between the employer and the referee, both workers observe their friendship-connection on Facebook to the referee. In the first 15 rounds the information released is whether the referee is a friend on Facebook or not; in the remaining 15 rounds each worker also observes how many friends s/he has in common with the referee on Facebook (see Footnote 1). Both workers are asked how much of the 30 ECU they want to return in case they are hired.

The workers do not know each other’s Facebook-relationship to the referee.

**Additional informational details**

If the employer wants to hire via the referee, the employer only learns if a deal is made or not. That is, s/he learns whether the bid of the referee is below the price or not, but s/he will never learn the precise bid. In case of a successful deal, the employer will not learn which worker is hired by the referee and how much this worker has returned.

In case the worker is not hired via the referee, the return goes to the employer and the referee will not learn about the amount returned.

In case the worker is hired by the referee, the amount that s/he returns goes to the referee, who in turn pays a price to the employer (and the price is not known by this worker).

Notice that a worker decides how much to return before knowing whether s/he is hired or not. At the end of the round the worker learns if s/he is hired for the job.

Also notice that when the referee does the hiring, s/he does not see how much each worker returns before s/he makes a choice between them. Similarly the employer does not see any returns before s/he makes a decision to go to the spot market or to hire via the referee.

**Earnings**

*Employer:*
- If s/he chooses to hire a random worker from the spot market:
  
  Earnings = return
– If s/he offers the task to the referee and the offer is accepted:
  Earnings = price
– If s/he offers the task to the referee and the offer is rejected (and a random worker from
  the spot market is assigned the job):
  Earnings = return - 0.5

Referee:
– If the employer hires a worker from the spot market (either directly or after an unsuccessful
deal):
  Earnings = 0
– If a deal is made with the employer:
  Earnings = return - price

Worker:
– If the worker is hired for the job (either randomly selected from the spot market, or chosen
  by the referee):
  Earnings = 30 - return
– If the worker is not hired:
  Earnings = 0

The earnings (in ECU) are accumulated over (all 30) rounds and transferred to Euros at the
end of the experiment (at the exchange rate given on the first page).

Hypothetical examples for demonstration purposes

Example 1

Suppose the employer wants to hire via the referee and asks a price of 20 (price=20), while
the referee indicates to be willing to pay a price of 15 at maximum (bid=15). Then, no deal
is realized between the employer and the referee, and the employer will be hiring from the
spot market. This means that a randomly selected worker is assigned the job. Suppose this
worker returns 6 of the 30 ECU. Then the earnings of the employer are 5.5 ECU, that of the
referee 0 ECU and that of the worker 24 ECU.

Example 2

Suppose the employer wants to hire via the spot market directly, while the referee indicates
to accept all prices up to 7 (bid=7). The referee learns that no offer is made and that the
employer is hiring from the spot market. Like in the previous example, a randomly selected
worker is assigned the job. Suppose this worker returns 14 of the 30 ECU. Then the earnings
of the employer are 14 ECU, that of the referee 0 ECU and that of the worker 16 ECU.
Example 3

Suppose the employer wants to hire via the referee and asks a price of 12 (price=12), while the referee indicates to accept all prices up to 16 (bid=16). As the bid is not lower than the price, a deal is made between the employer and the referee at a price of 12. As a result, the referee will be hiring a worker and will collect the return. Suppose that Worker 1 and the referee are friends on Facebook, this information will be revealed to both of them now. Suppose that Worker 2 and the referee are not friends on Facebook, this information will be revealed to both of them now. Suppose that Worker 1 indicates to return 20 of the 30 ECU and Worker 2 indicates to return 16 in case being hired. Suppose the referee (who cannot observe the returns of the two workers) hires Worker 2. Then the earnings of the employer are 12 ECU, that of the referee is 4 ECU and that of Worker 2 is 14 ECU; Worker 1 receives 0 ECU.

True or False?

After reading the instructions, before proceeding with the experiment you should be able to tell if the following sentences are true or false. Please write down your answers on this sheet. You will be approached by the experimenter and the answers will be checked.

1. If I am a worker, when I return more I increase my chances of being hired in that round.

2. Every round I will keep the same role, but I will be rematched with others to form a new group.

3. If I am a referee, when there is a deal I need to return the price to the employer.

4. If I am an employer and a deal is made, I will receive the price from the referee for sure.