An economic perspective on transnational terrorism

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Abstract

This paper indicates how economic analysis can be applied for enlightened policy making with respect to transnational terrorism. Both theoretical tools (e.g., game theory and utility-maximizing models) and empirical techniques (e.g., time series and spectral analysis) are used to put modern-day terrorism into perspective and to suggest policy responses. From hostage negotiations to the installation of technological barriers (e.g., metal detectors, embassy fortification), economic methods are shown to provide policy insights. Transnational terrorism and efforts to address it are shown to involve transnational externalities and market failures. Strategic interactions abound in the study of transnational terrorism.

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1. Introduction

Economic methods—both theoretical and empirical—have been applied by a small group of economists to understand a host of issues associated with terrorism. These issues concern the policy effectiveness of alternative responses (e.g., toughening punishments, retaliatory raids, installing technological barriers), negotiation responses in hostage incidents, the terrorists’ choice of target, the economic impacts of terrorism, and others.

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Terrorism is the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extranormal violence to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience. An essential aspect of this definition concerns the presence of a political objective (e.g., getting the United States out of the Persian Gulf states) that the terrorist acts or campaigns are designed to achieve. Another crucial ingredient is the use of extranormal violence or brutality to capture news headlines. As the public becomes numb to their acts of violence, terrorists respond with more ghastly actions to recapture media attention. Thus, the escalation experienced on 11 September 2001 (henceforth, 9/11) came as no surprise to those who study terrorism. In a deliberate attempt to create a general atmosphere of fear, terrorists strike at a variety of targets with alternative modes of operations, thus making it difficult for the authorities to anticipate the venue of the next incident. Such actions make attacks appear to be random, so that a targeted society must expend large amounts of resources to protect a wide range of vulnerabilities. This simulated randomness provides terrorists with a cost advantage over the stronger authorities who must defend against the threat that they pose (Hirshleifer, 1991). Because people tend to overrespond to unlikely catastrophic events while ignoring more likely daily dangers, terrorists succeed in achieving society-wide anxiety with a minimal amount of resources.

When a terrorist incident in one country involves victims, targets, institutions, governments, or citizens of another country, terrorism assumes a transnational character. In the World Trade Center tragedy, citizens from over 80 countries lost their lives at the hands of terrorists who crossed into the United States from abroad. Obviously, the four hijackings on 9/11 constitute transnational terrorist attacks. Transnational terrorist incidents are trans-boundary externalities, insofar as actions conducted by terrorists or authorities in one country may impose uncompensated costs or benefits on people or property of another country.

Economic methodology is particularly well-suited to provide insights in studying terrorism. Economic analysis can account for the strategic interactions among opposing interests—e.g., the terrorists and the authorities, or between two targeted countries. Rational-choice models, based on microeconomic principles, can be applied to ascertain how terrorists are apt to respond to policy-induced changes to their constraints. The same methods can be used to analyze how governments react to terrorist-induced changes to their policymaking environment. Moreover, the theory of market failures can underscore how agents’ independent optimization may be at odds with socially efficient outcomes, so that governmental failures may result from well-intentioned policies. In addition, various economic empirical methods can be applied to evaluate theoretical predictions and policy recommendations.

The primary purpose of this paper is to survey some essential insights gained from applying an economic perspective to a political problem—e.g., how antiterrorist actions can create unintended consequences. A second purpose is to present some new analyses of trends and cycles, policy-induced externalities, and building a coalition against terrorists. A third purpose is to identify some future research issues.

2. A look at the data

To provide a perspective of the nature of the transnational terrorist threat, we compile Table 1 based on data from the US Department of State (1988–2002). This table indicates...
the annual number of transnational terrorist events, the associated deaths, the number of wounded, and the number of attacks against US people and/or property. A number of essential facts can be drawn from these numbers. First, transnational terrorism on average results in relatively few deaths, especially when compared with the annual 40,000 people killed on US highways, so that the events on 9/11 are clear outliers. In fact, the deaths on this single day are approximately equal to all transnational terrorist-related deaths recorded during the entire 1988–2000 period. Second, transnational terrorism appears to follow a cyclical pattern with much of the 1990s being a relatively calm era. Something that cannot

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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>57</td>
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</table>

Source: US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (1988–2002) and tables provided to Todd Sandler in 1988 by the US Department of State, Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism.

* Data on the number wounded in the World Trade Center attack is not available and, thus, is not part of this figure.
be seen from Table 1 is that a high proportion of total casualties for a given year is typically associated with a couple of “spectacular” events—e.g., the simultaneous bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania account for 291 deaths and almost 5000 injuries in 1998 (US Department of State, 1999). Third, attacks against US interests represent a relatively high proportion of events. This is particularly noteworthy from an externality viewpoint, because relatively few incidents take place on US soil—in 1998 and 2000, there were no such events, while, in 1999, there was just one such event (US Department of State, 1999–2001). By having relatively secure borders, the United States must rely on foreign governments to protect US citizens and property while abroad.

2.1. Data


ITERATE poses a number of shortcomings that researchers must take into account when testing theories. By relying on newspaper accounts, ITERATE is better at chronicling the actions of terrorists than in recording those of the authorities. Because ITERATE is an events data set, researchers must rely on event counts rather than on continuous measures of intensity unless casualty counts are used (Enders and Sandler (2000, 2002)). ITERATE picks up newsworthy transnational terrorist incidents, so that there is some bias, which must be recognized. Despite these difficulties, ITERATE is suited to a wide range of empirical tasks. For example, it can display trends and cycles for newsworthy events for forecasting purposes. The data have even been used to investigate terrorist and government bargaining behavior in hostage-taking events by Atkinson et al. (1987), who apply a time-to-failure model, where the length of an incident is related to choice variables of the adversaries.

Based on ITERATE data, we display two quarterly time series—all transnational incidents and bombings—in Fig. 1 for 1970–2000, where transnational terrorism displays peaks and troughs. Bombings are the favorite mode of operation of terrorists, accounting for about half of all transnational terrorist incidents on average in any given year. Additionally, the bombing time series tracks the all-incident series rather well. The latter half of the 1990s represents a downturn in transnational terrorism due, in large part, to fewer states sponsoring terrorism in the post-Cold War era (Enders and Sandler, 1999).

Terrorist experts have documented a change in the makeup and motivation of the general perpetrators of terrorism since the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 (Hoffman, 1998). From the late 1960s until the latter 1980s, transnational terrorism has been primarily motivated by nationalism, separatism, Marxist ideology, and nihilism (Wilkinson, 1986). In the 1990s, the motivation of terrorism changed with “the
emergence of either obscure, idiosyncratic millennium movements” or religious-based fundamentalist groups (Hoffman, 1997, p. 2). Since the beginning of 1980, the number of religious-based groups has increased as a proportion of the active terrorist groups: 2 of 64 groups in 1980, 11 of 48 groups in 1992, 16 of 49 groups in 1994, and 25 of 58 groups in 1995 (Hoffman, 1997, p. 3). Enders and Sandler (2000) show that a significant rise in casualties from transnational incidents can be traced back to the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran, as speculated by Hoffman (1998). In recent years, an incident is almost 17 percentage points more likely to result in death or injury compared with the earlier eras of leftist terrorism.

2.2. Trends and cycles

Judging by the public’s and media’s reaction to 9/11, one might conclude that international terrorism is on the rise, but Fig. 1 indicates just the opposite trend. This misperception may be due to the increasing likelihood of an incident resulting in casualties, making incidents on average more newsworthy. The standard procedure for ascertaining the form of a deterministic trend is by fitting a polynomial in time \( t \), where additional trend terms (i.e., \( t, t^2, t^3 \)) are added until the associated coefficient is no longer statistically significant. For 1968–2000, we investigate trends for six quarterly time series extracted from ITERATE: hostage taking, bombings (of all types), threats and hoaxes, assassinations, incidents with casualties, and all transnational terrorist incidents. Table 2 indicates new polynomial trend estimates for these six quarterly series (where time = \( t \)), all of which are characterized by a nonlinear trend. The \( t \)-ratios associated with the coefficient estimates are indicated in parentheses beneath the constant and the time trend terms. Five of the six series are represented by a quadratic trend with a negative coefficient for the squared time term. This characterization reflects the fact that series tended to rise in the
late 1960s and to decline in the late 1990s. Only the threats and hoaxes series are represented by a more complicated cubic trend; nevertheless, this series also displays a similar inverted U-shaped pattern.

In Table 2, the next-to-the-last column on the right reports the \( F \)-statistics and their “\( \text{prob} \)” values in brackets, representing the statistical significance of the overall regression. These significance levels are all zero to three digits, which are strongly supportive of the fitted nonlinear trend equations. Such fitted trends are not useful for very long-term forecasting, because there is little reason to believe that the number of incidents will continue to decline. Instead, the fit of the nonlinear trend cautions against simple statements about a decidedly upward or downward trend to any form of international terrorism.\(^1\) Such proclamations are common in the media. The trend analysis suggests that there is persistence in each of the incident series—high and low levels of terrorism come in waves or cycles. Shocks to any incident series are not permanent, so that there is a reversion toward a long-run mean.

Cycles in terrorism data have been attributable to a number of factors. Alexander and Pluchinsky (1992) explain fluctuations in terrorism using demonstration and copycat effects. Heightened public sensitivity following a successful terrorist attack induces other terrorists to strike when media reaction is likely to be great. The anthrax attacks following 9/11 correspond to this pattern. Economies of scale in planning terrorist incidents by terrorist groups or networks may also lead to the bunching of attacks. Cycles may also stem from the attack-counterattack process between the terrorists and authorities. Public

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\(^1\) In fact, there is reasonable evidence to support the claim that each of the incident series is stationary. Using an augmented Dickey–Fuller unit-root test, we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit-root in all series, but that of threats and hoaxes, at the .05 level. For this latter series, we can reject the null of a unit-root at the 0.10 level.
opinion following a spate of attacks can prompt governments’ periodic crackdowns that temporarily create a lull in transnational terrorism. These downturns are subsequently followed by countermeasures and recruitment by the terrorists as they prepare for a new offensive. Enders and Sandler (1999) and Enders et al. (1992a) argue that logistically complex events such as skyjackings, large suicide car bombings, and assassinations will have longer cycles than less sophisticated events as the attack-counterattack interaction among adversaries takes longer.

The theory of Fourier series allows a wide class of functions to be expressed in terms of sine and cosine components. To uncover the underlying cycles in a series, a researcher must regress the detrended values of a series on all frequencies in the interval \([1, T/2]\), where \(T\) is the number of observations. The frequency of a series indicates how fast the underlying cycle is completed—a low (high) frequency implies a long (short) cycle. A graph depiction of the proportionate variation explained by each frequency (called the periodogram) has large peaks representing the crucial underlying frequencies. Some series with obvious cycles, like sunspots or average daily temperatures, will display a periodogram with a single focal frequency. Given the stochastic behavior of terrorists and the measures applied to curb terrorism, there is unlikely to be one deterministic frequency that dominates the periodicity for any of the six series. Thus, we use a different approach here than trying to identify one particular frequency. Series with long periods will have most of their variance explained by the low frequencies, whereas series with short periods will have most of their variance explained by high frequencies.

In accordance with spectral analysis, we detrend each series using the fitted polynomial trends in Table 2. The last two columns of Table 2 report the total variance of each series and the proportion of this variance accounted for by the lowest 15% of the frequencies. We anticipate that the logistically complex incident types will have relatively large amounts of this proportion attributable to the low frequencies. The all-events series has a large variance of 1335.56 with just 25.2% corresponding to the relatively low frequencies. In marked contrast, the more complex events of assassinations and those involving casualties have smaller variances with more of this variance (41.1% and 52.7%, respectively) attributed to low frequencies. Threats and hoaxes display the greatest evidence of short cycles with just 24.7% of the variance explained by the longest cycles. The variance results for hostage taking and bombing events imply moderately short cycles. Only in the case of hostage taking are our priors not realized.

3. Game theory and hostage taking

Despite the events of 9/11, hostage taking may still have negotiations, because most such missions involve kidnappings, where the terrorists are not suicidal. Recent skyjackings in Turkey and Cuba during March 2003 demonstrate that not all skyjackings

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2 We report the proportion of the variance explained by the frequencies in the interval \([1, 0.15 \times T/2]\). Since we are somewhat skeptical of the fitted polynomial trends, we also obtained results using only demeaned data. These results are very similar to those discussed below.
include terrorists bent on mass destruction. Nevertheless, suicide skyjackings and the 
reactions of desperate passengers to fight back must be analyzed in the future along with a 
government’s decision to destroy a hijacked plane.

To date, there have been six economic analyses of hostage-taking events—i.e., 
Atkinson et al. (1987), Lapan and Sandler (1988), Selten (1988), Islam and Shahin 
(1989), Sandler and Scott (1987), and Scott (1991). The first three studies stress game-
theoretic aspects, while the latter three studies do not. We focus our remarks around the 
Lapan and Sandler (1988) study, the most general of these three game-theoretic studies. 
The question posed by their investigation is whether or not a stated policy by which a 
government precommits never to negotiate with hostage takers will have the intended 
consequence of keeping terrorists from ever taking hostages. The conventional wisdom 
states that if terrorists know ahead of time that they have nothing to gain that they will 
ever abduct hostages (Selten, 1988). This belief has become one of the four pillars of US 
policy with respect to addressing transnational terrorism—i.e., “make no concessions to 
terrorists and strike no deals” (US Department of State, 2001, p. iii).

The conventional wisdom for the never-to-capitulate policy hinges on at least four 
implicit assumptions: (i) the government’s deterrence is sufficient to stop all attacks; (ii) 
the government’s pledge is fully credible to all would-be hostage takers; (iii) the 
terrorists’ gains from hostage taking only derive from the fulfillment of their demands; 
and (iv) there is no uncertainty concerning the payoffs. Each of these assumptions may 
not hold in practice. Deterrence will not stop all attacks if the terrorists perceive that there 
is a positive expected payoff from taking hostages. Past concessions limit the credibility 
of the government’s no-concession pledge (Sandler et al., 1983). Moreover, a fanatical 
terrorist group may gain positive benefits from failure in terms of heavenly rewards or 
media exposure. Given that the costs to the government once hostages are secured are 
unknown beforehand, the government’s pledge may be time inconsistent, so that the 
government reneges for the “right” hostages (e.g., the Israeli release of 1,150 Arab 
prisoners in a negotiated swap for three Israeli soldiers in May 1985) if the costs of 
capitulating are less than holding firm. Thus, the pitfalls to this policy are easily laid bare 
by game theory.

Lapan and Sandler (1988) make their analysis more realistic by allowing multiple 
periods and reputation costs. Concessions result in a loss in reputation that is costly in 
terms of more hostage taking in the future. As reputation costs increase, the no-negotiation 
policy is less apt to be time inconsistent. This outcome can be fostered through rules—e.g., 
a constitutional amendment that imposes sufficiently severe punishments to eliminate any 
discretion of government negotiators.

The game can be made still more realistic by including additional sources of 
uncertainty in terms of the terrorists’ payoffs. Hostage-taking incidents involve asymmetric 
information and uncertainty on the part of both terrorists and governments. The beauty 
of game theory is that it permits the evaluation of policies while accounting for uncertainty

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3 The Arab prisoners released included Kozo Okomato, a Japanese Red Army Faction member, who was the 
sole surviving terrorist in the Lod Airport massacre of 1972, which left 27 people dead and 78 injured.

4 On asymmetric information models of terrorism, see Lapan and Sandler (1993) and Overgaard (1994).
and strategic interactions of opposing interests, so that easy fixes may not be so straightforward.

4. Game theory and governmental responses

External costs are present when deterrence at home displaces the attack abroad, while external benefits are relevant when deterrence at home either protects foreigners or reduces the level of attacks globally. Depending on the opposing external effects, and there may be others not listed, there may result too much or too little deterrence (Sandler and Lapan, 1988). The overdeterrence/underdeterrence problem is heightened when a terrorist network (e.g., al-Qaida) operates in upwards of 60 countries and stages their attacks worldwide (US Department of State, 2001). Underdeterrence is particularly acute in countries sympathetic to a group’s grievances when the group focuses their attack on foreigners. As the number of potential targets increase, transference efforts may be especially large. By forming a global network, terrorists limit the effectiveness of countries’ efforts to thwart terrorism as externalities are maximized through countries’ uncoordinated decisions. Terrorists will naturally seek out the weakest link—i.e., the country with the least security—for the venue for their next attack and will dispatch their best team. To address these weaknesses, prime targets, such as the United States, have instituted programs to assist such weakest-link countries in bolstering their counterterrorist capabilities. In fact, this assistance is another of the four pillars of US antiterrorism policy (US Department of State, 2001). Ironically, US efforts to induce other countries to secure their airports and public places make the United States a more attractive target, as 9/11 sadly demonstrated.

If the terrorist networking advantage is to be countered, then targeted nations must learn to coordinate their own efforts at counterterrorism. This poses a special problem because nations resist sacrificing their autonomy over security matters to a supranational collective. With this in mind, terrorist experts have often called for piecemeal policy where intelligence is shared but not deterrence decisions (e.g., Kupperman, 1987, p. 577). Such piecemeal responses may be inadvisable when the strategic incentives are taken into account. Suppose that a terrorist network targets three countries, each of which are engaged in overdeterrence to transfer the attack abroad. Further suppose that intelligence allows the targeted countries to better judge the marginal effectiveness of diverting attacks by revealing the terrorists’ preference for alternative targets. As these nations acquire this information, they become better adept at diverting attacks, thereby augmenting the negative transference externality. The net impact of this information sharing may be to heighten the “transference race” without providing more security against a group bent on attacking, so that the added deterrence costs simply make the three countries worse off. This results in a second-best outcome where the change in one policy parameter (i.e., increased information sharing), which would, under full cooperation, improve efficiency, may worsen inefficiency when a second policy (i.e., coordination of deterrence) is not chosen optimally. A similar second-best scenario may characterize other partial responses—e.g., greater actions to apprehend terrorists without coordinating efforts to
increase punishments. Thus, the application of game theory again raises policy concerns previously ignored in the terrorism literature.

5. Building a coalition against terrorists after 9/11

Actions to coordinate retaliation against either a terrorist organization or a state-sponsor of terrorism has typically been characterized as a Prisoners’ Dilemma (e.g., Lee, 1988) with all countries playing their dominant strategy to sit back and do nothing. The forging of an alliance to wage war on terrorism in Afghanistan after 9/11 appears to abide by a different underlying game form than the Prisoners’ Dilemma for select countries that have participated in the retaliatory response against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. We shall focus on the two most ardent participants—the United States and the United Kingdom. In Fig. 2, we represent an underlying retaliation game in ordinal form, where payoffs are rank ordered from highest (4) to lowest (1). The payoffs for the row player—the US—are listed first, followed by those of the column player—the UK—in each of the four strategic combinations. The ordinal payoffs displayed indicate that the highest payoffs come from these two countries jointly retaliating, followed by the next-largest payoff for free riding when the other country retaliates. The worst payoff corresponds to retaliating on one’s own, followed by the second-worst payoff when neither country retaliates. This game differs from the standard Prisoners’ Dilemma by having the ordinal payoffs of the 3s and 4s switched. That is, the heinous nature of the 9/11 attacks and its human toll on American and British citizens at the World Trade Center increased the ordinal payoff for joint retaliation and decreased this payoff from free riding, as compared with earlier terrorist

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Fig. 2. Ordinal game matrix for retaliation.
incidents, including the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on 21 December 1988. For the assurance game displayed in Fig. 2, there is no dominant strategy that gives higher payoffs no matter what the other country does, but there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibriums, where either both countries retaliate or both do nothing. In this scenario, an alliance can be forged provided that one country leads and begins to retaliate, which was the role that the United States assumed.

6. Rational-choice representations

Beginning with the Landes (1978) study of skyjackings, economists characterize terrorists as rational actors who maximize expected utility or net payoffs subject to constraints. Arguments in these constraints may consist of terrorists’ resource endowments or actions taken by the authorities to thwart terrorism. Using data on US hijackings for 1961–1976, Landes demonstrates that greater prison sentences and enhanced likelihood of apprehension are significant deterrents. He also indicates that the installation of metal detectors on 5 January 1973 led to between 41 and 50 fewer hijackings in the United States during 1973–1976.

In a subsequent analysis, Enders and Sandler (1993) examine a wide range of policy interventions, including metal detectors, fortification of embassies, retaliatory raids, and the Reagan “get-tough-on-terrorists” laws. The theoretical model for the terrorists that underlies their study is analogous to the consumer-choice model. Terrorists maximize utility or expected utility derived from the consumption of basic commodities, produced from terrorist and nonterrorist activities. For example, al-Qaida terrorists may gain utility from a reduced political resolve on the part of the United States to remain in the Persian Gulf as Americans lose their lives in terrorist attacks. This weakening of US resolve is the basic commodity that can be produced with a number of alternative attack modes. Substitution possibilities among terrorist tactics arise when alternative modes of operations produce the same basic commodities (e.g., political instability, media attention) in varying amounts. Substitution is enhanced when attack modes possess closely related outcomes and are logistically similar. This is clearly the case for hijackings and other kinds of hostage events. Complementarity results when combinations of attack modes are required to produce one or more basic commodities. When threats follow real attacks, both actions assume a heightened effectiveness and are then complementary.

To produce these basic commodities, a terrorist group must choose between non-terrorist and terrorist activities, while being constrained by resources. In the latter choice, terrorists must further choose between different modes of terrorist attacks based on the perceived “prices” associated with alternative operations. Choices are many and include the intended lethality of the act, its country of location, and whom or what to target. The

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5 Britain lost the second greatest number of citizens of any country at the World Trade Center. Despite Pan Am 103 flying out of Heathrow Airport and crashing in the United Kingdom (Lockerbie, Scotland), Britain lost relatively few of its citizens in this incident.
expenditure on any activity consists of the activity’s per-unit price times the activity’s level. Each mode of operation has a per-unit price that includes the value of time, resources, and anticipated risk to accomplish the act. The securing and maintenance of a kidnapping victim in a hidden location is logistically more complex and requires more resources than leaving a small bomb in a trash bin in a railroad station, so that the former has a greater per-unit price. In choosing a venue, the price is anticipated to differ based on security measures taken by the authorities, so that a country with more porous borders will be the staging ground for attacks against targets originating from other more secure countries. The prices confronting the terrorists for each tactic are determined, in large part, by the government’s allocation of resources to thwart various acts of terrorism.

Government policies aimed at a single type of terrorist event adversely change its relative price and results in a substitution into now less expensive modes of attack. Thus, Landes’ (1978) measure of the success of metal detectors, in terms of fewer skyjackings, does not go far enough, because the application of this technology may have induced a large number of other kinds of events.

To account for these substitutions, Enders and Sandler (1993) apply vector autoregression (VAR) analysis to allow for the potential interactions among various terrorist time series in response to government policies. They find that metal detectors decreased skyjackings and threats, but increased other kinds of hostage incidents, not protected by detectors. The trade-off between events was about one for one (also see Enders et al., 1990; Im et al., 1987). Both substitutions and complementarities are uncovered. Fortification of US embassies and missions reduced attacks against such installations, but were tied to a disturbing increase in assassinations of officials and military personnel outside of protected compounds. In addition, Enders and Sandler (1993) establish that the US retaliatory raid against Libya on April 1986 (for its suspected bombing of the La Belle Discothèque in West Berlin on 4 April 1986) was associated with an immediate increase in terrorist attacks against US and UK interests. This increase was shortly followed by a temporary lull as terrorists built up depleted resources. Apparently, the raid caused terrorists to intertemporally substitute attacks planned for the future into the present to protest the retaliation. Within a relatively few quarters, terrorist attacks resumed the same mean number of events.6

There are a number of ways to institute antiterrorist policies that address these likely substitutions and complementarities. First, the government must make the terrorists substitute into less harmful events. Second, the government must go after the terrorists’ resource endowment (i.e., its finances, its leadership, its membership) if an overall decrease in terrorism is to follow. Efforts to infiltrate groups or to freeze terrorist finances have this consequence. Third, the government must simultaneously target a wide range of terrorist attack modes, so that the overall rise in the prices of terrorist attacks becomes analogous to a decrease in resources. Success in raising the price of all modes of terrorist attacks would induce terrorists to shift into legal protests and

6 Analogous results are found in the work of Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (1994) for retaliations by Israel against Palestinian terrorists.
other nonterrorist actions to air grievances. A reliance on technological barriers merely causes a substitution into other attack modes in the short run. In the long term, terrorists will develop ingenious countermeasures (i.e., plastic guns, bottles of flammable liquid) to circumvent the technology. Thus, there is a dynamic strategic interaction present, where authorities must be ever vigilant to be improving the technology by anticipating ways of circumventing such barriers. Unfortunately, authorities have been reactive in practice by only responding after a technological barrier’s weakness has been exploited, leaving the public vulnerable until a new technological fix is found and installed.

6.1. Other kinds of substitutions

Substitution effects abound in the study of terrorism and involve not only actions of the terrorists, but also those of the targets. For targets, the economic literature addresses two kinds of substitutions. First, there are studies that examine the tourists’ choice of vacation spot based on the perceived threat of terrorism and other costs. An alteration in travel risks, arising from increased terrorist incidents in a country, raises the price of a holiday there in comparison to other vacation venues, not confronted with terrorism. In a study of Spain, Enders and Sandler (1991) employ VAR analysis to demonstrate that a typical transnational terrorist incident is estimated as scaring away just over 140,000 tourists when all monthly impacts are combined. Companion studies by Enders et al. (1992b) and Drakos and Kutan (2003) establish and quantify terrorism-induced substitutions in tourism for Greece, Austria, Italy, Turkey, Israel, and other terrorism-ridden countries.

Second, target-based substitutions involve foreign direct investment (FDI). Investors decide where to invest based on their perceived economic risks, political risks, and monetary returns. An increase in transnational terrorism directed at FDI (e.g., attacks on Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque region of Spain) is sure to divert such investment. Enders and Sandler (1996) show that an “average” year’s worth of terrorism reduced net FDI in Spain and Greece by 13.5% and 11.9% annually. Transnational terrorism displayed significant economic cost, not counting the billions spent on barriers and deterrence.

7. Toward a benefit-cost analysis of terrorist-thwarting policies

As a future research project, economists should assess the benefits and cost of specific policies to thwart terrorism. Such an exercise has not been adequately done and poses some real challenges. Costs are fairly straightforward since figures are available in, say, the United States as to what is paid to fortify embassies and missions, or to guard airports. Consider the cost associated with airport security. The value of lost time as travelers are screened must be added to the cost of guards and screening equipment.

On the benefit side, calculations are less transparent. One way to estimate a portion of this benefit would be to compute the reduced loss of life attributable to
airport security measures—i.e., fewer people killed in skyjackings. If the net number of such lives saved, after adjusting for substitutions into other life-threatening terrorist actions, can be measured, then the average “value of a statistical life” can be applied to translate these lives into a monetary figure. To this figure, a researcher must also compute and add the reduced losses in property values (i.e., from destroyed planes) attributable to the fewer hijackings. In addition, a portion of the value of net air travel revenues must be considered as a benefit arising from a heightened sense of security stemming from security upgrades. The events of 9/11 clearly underscore that there is a cost to a breach in airport security as the public loses its confidence in air travel. Any of these components are fraught with measurement difficulties, because there may be other intervening factors at work—e.g., air travel was already in a slump prior to 9/11.

Every policy to thwart terrorism would entail its own stream of benefits and costs. Invariably, the benefit calculations are problematic. The US-led retaliation against al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan has well-defined costs in terms of deployed soldiers, ordnance, diplomacy, and side payments to “allies.” However, the true savings or benefits from fewer future acts of terrorism, in terms of lives and property saved, are so much more difficult to calculate. Time-series techniques, engineered by Enders and Sandler (1991, 1996) to measure losses to tourism or to FDI from terrorism, can be utilized following the retaliation to roughly estimate the decline in terrorist incidents and their economic value.

8. Concluding remarks

Although economic methods have enlightened the public on a number of issues concerning transnational terrorism, there are many other issues to analyze. For instance, there is a need for applying more dynamic game methods—i.e., differential game theory—if the waxing and waning of terrorist organizations are to be understood. The terrorists try to increase their organization’s size through enhanced resources, successful operations, and recruitment, while the government tries to limit the group’s size through raids, intelligence, group infiltration, and actions to create failed missions. This dynamic strategic interaction needs to be modeled and empirically tested. In addition, researchers must better assess the role of information and intelligence on behalf of the terrorists and the authorities. Given how little governments really know about the strength of the terrorists that they confront—e.g., the US government had almost no clue about the size of al-Qaida prior to 9/11, asymmetric information characterizes efforts to thwart terrorism. Similarly, the terrorists are ill-informed about the resolve of the government and the amount of resources that it is willing to assign to curbing terrorism. Additionally, there is a need to model terrorist campaigns—i.e., the choice of the sequence and composition of attacks used by terrorists. As researchers better understand
these choices, more effective policy responses can be devised that adjust for the strategic interaction.

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