

Charitable Giving, Moral Judgements and the Problem of Social Embeddedness: An Investigation into Everyday Morality, Akrasia and Self-Deception in the UK

Dr Balihar Sanghera
SSPSSR, University of Kent
Canterbury, UK

9 October 2011

Words: 10,071

Abstract

This paper examines how practical moral reasoning consists of both reflexive deliberations and subconscious evaluations, involving dominant moral concerns, emotions, habits and unarticulated beliefs. Social structures and ideologies, such as class hierarchy, racism and capitalism, can distort moral sentiments, judgements and responsibilities to produce akratic and self-deceptive giving and non-giving actions. The paper criticises the rationalistic moral reasoning, because ethical evaluations are reduced to abstractions and rationality, neglecting the significance of emotions, habits and concrete particulars. Drawing upon recent works on subconscious moral reasoning, I will suggest how inadvertent virtues, mis-guided conscience and moral weakness can affect charitable giving. I will also outline three types of philanthropists ('die-hard', 'happy' and 'capricious'), who vary in their moral responsiveness and dominant moral concerns.

Keywords: charitable giving, everyday morality, social class, racism and moral concerns

This paper aims to explain the nature of individuals' moral judgements and worth about charitable giving and volunteering. Individuals can be both highly reflexive and subconscious about moral practices, which can be either morally praiseworthy or lacking worth depending upon the degree of moral concern about giving (Archer 2007; Sayer 2011; Arpaly 2003). In evaluating individuals' giving behaviour, it is important to examine how they respond to moral reasons of the situation. I will suggest how individuals act emotionally and habitually, engaging in practical reasoning and everyday morality (Rorty 1998; Sayer 2005). The paper will contribute towards a transdisciplinary analysis of giving, drawing upon different literatures, such as sociology, moral philosophy and philanthropy, which are often treated separately.

Everyday morality refers to how individuals are embedded in a moral web of responsibilities and obligations, as social relationships consist of normative expectations and needs, so that to abstain from making moral judgements is to be cut off from social relationships (Benhabib 1992). Individuals can be highly reflexive about moral responsibilities towards others, consciously aligning dominant moral concerns with social practices (Archer 2007). While deliberation is clearly important

in shaping moral practices, much also happens without it (Arpaly 2003; Sayer 2011). Moral emotions (such as compassion and generosity) are immediate sympathetic responses to situations, though they may be monitored and evaluated later to assess their appropriateness (Smith 1976). Rorty (1998) and Mele (2001) argue that subconscious motivation, unarticulated moral beliefs and habitual dispositions can lead individuals to act quite rationally against their reasoned judgements (i.e., akratic actions), and to act in ways that are contrary to consistent evidence (i.e., self-deceptive actions). Because of akrasia and self-deception, inadvertent virtues and misguided consciences are a salient part of our fallible everyday moral experience (Arpaly 2003).

The moral worth of charitable acts depends upon individuals being morally responsive to situations and being motivated by a high degree of moral concern (Arpaly 2003; Archer 2007). The significance of charitable practices, events and causes will vary amongst individuals in light of their concerns and commitments. For some, charitable causes are essential to their way of life, and they will endure pain, misery and inconvenience for their causes, being highly motivated and knowledgeable about their moral concern. Arpaly (2003) refers to such individuals as ‘die-hard’ philanthropists. For others, charitable acts are incidental and marginal activities, and they are only likely to give during good times and do not necessarily respond to moral factors, but rather to amoral reasons, such as tax incentives and convenience. They are referred to as ‘happy’ and ‘capricious’ philanthropists.

The literature on social embeddedness usually discusses how social networks and relationships shape social and economic behaviour (Granovetter 1985; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Baker 1984), but fails to examine how they affect moral sentiments, judgements and responsibilities. Social structures and ideologies, such as class inequality and racism, can produce excessive emotions, partial judgements and distorted dispositions, resulting in akratic and self-deceptive judgements and actions (Sayer 2005; Rorty 1998). Social embeddedness consists of two opposing forces: on the one hand, individuals are vulnerable, needy, and interdependent human beings, caring for and cared by others, and are able to share similar emotions through sympathy and imagination (Tronto 1994; Nussbaum 2001a; Smith 1976); and on the other hand, social relationships and socialisation can distort moral judgements and responsibilities, resulting in class and racial ‘othering’ and a neglect of care responsibilities (Sayer 2005; Skeggs 2009). In this paper, I will focus on the latter.

Sayer (2005; 2011) notes that sociology does not adequately address how ethics constitutes social practices, focusing instead on power relations, instrumental reasoning and social conventions. For instance, giving is paradigmatic of Bourdieu’s theoretical vision of the economy of symbolic goods. It reveals the economic character of all practices, in that while claiming to be ‘disinterested’, it is oriented towards the maximisation of economic and symbolic profits (Curtis 1997; Shapely 2001; Kidd 1996). In moral philosophy, ethics tends to be overly rationalistic, detached from everyday concerns and social structures (Rorty 1998; Arpaly 2003; Mele 2001). For instance, Kantian moral philosophy and Rawls’s theory of justice place conscious deliberation and rational autonomy at the centre of their ethical system (Sherman 1997; Rawls 1971). In combining ethical and sociological aspects of social reality, I wish to avoid the artificial divide between the two disciplines, and to contribute towards a critical account of charitable acts that takes into account of how social structures, habits and emotions shape moral judgement and action, in particular akratic and self-deceptive ones (see also Cohen 2000).

The paper has four sections. The first section will criticise the scholastic mode of understanding moral behaviour, and will propose an alternative theoretical framework based upon moral practical reasoning. I will describe the research design and methods in the second section. In the third section, key findings will be discussed, exploring akratic and self-deceptive charitable judgements and actions and the different types of philanthropists. Finally, I will make some concluding remarks.

Theoretical Approaches to Moral Actions

I will briefly criticise the tendency in moral philosophy and sociology to emphasise a rationalistic mode of apprehending the social world to the exclusion of emotions, habits and subconscious motivation. I will then offer an alternative framework based upon practical reasoning, suggesting the significance of akrasia and self-deception in everyday moral practices, including charitable giving.

Limits of Moral Rationalism

In moral philosophy, a rationalistic approach to moral life argues that moral judgements are a product of rational faculties, and that poor rational cognition undermines morality (Korsgaard 1996). For instance, Kantian moral philosophy prescribes ethics based upon rational judgement and deliberation, describing ethics as an expression of objectivity and universalism. Nussbaum (2001b: 94-98) notes how a scientific form of moral knowledge (*technē*) promotes discursive reasoning, Platonic contemplation, universalism and abstraction, marginalising practical wisdom (*phronesis*), emotions and concrete particulars. Moral sense and sentiments are regarded as a threat to a well-ordered rational ethical system (Nichols 2004; Filonowicz 2008).

In sociology, a similar rationalistic view of human agency imputes individuals with instrumental reasoning and a desire to maximise economic gain, often employing formal models, statistical tables and utility calculations to demonstrate individual and collective rationality (Becker 1981). For example, rational choice theory argues that moral actions are based upon mutual reciprocity, and that altruism is a disguised form of self-interestedness. Bourdieu (1977) notes that scholars tend to ignore individuals' practical and habitual dispositions. In addition, moral concerns, commitments and emotions are not regarded as significant factors in a rationalist's social order.

There are three main criticisms of rationalistic moral reasoning. First, Bourdieu (1990; 2000) accuses social scientists of committing a 'scholastic fallacy' by projecting onto ordinary individuals their contemplative, abstract and discursive dispositions, neglecting the practical and habitual aspects of social practices. Arpaly (2003) also argues that while individuals are reflexive about many activities, deliberation is given far more prominence in moral philosophy and social science than its position in daily life would suggest. Akratic and self-deceptive moral actions, derived from dispositions, habits and emotions, are quite pervasive in society (Rorty 1997; 1998; Mele 2001). Academics tend to overlook the importance of emotions, habits, subconscious motivation and practical dispositions in favour of highly abstract narratives of everyday activities, reducing practices to social coordinates, norms or rational will.

Second, rationalistic accounts of moral and social practices draw upon a body-mind dualism that mistakenly argues that emotions are irrational and lack intelligence (Sayer 2011). Moral emotions are in fact cognitive but fallible judgements about

things we have reason to value (Nussbaum 2001a). For instance, individuals can feel sympathy and compassion for the victims of an earthquake disaster, and can donate to a disaster relief committee, having good moral reasons to respond to the situation. They can also monitor their own emotions to see how well they relate to issues of social justice and suffering, berating and correcting themselves for any shortcomings. Furthermore, emotions can motivate us to take action in pursuit of good causes. Without emotions, we may act with indifference towards our own and others' suffering.

Third, while rationalists, such as Kantians, argue that moral worth only arises when individuals act consciously and with intent, everyday life can consist of praiseworthy acts despite individuals being 'irrational' and acting against their own best judgement. Arpaly (2003) recounts how Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn acts morally in refusing to hand over Jim, a runaway slave, to the authorities, even though he believes this to be the correct thing to do. Emotional reasons, subconscious motivation and unarticulated beliefs are as important in evaluating moral worth as rational deliberation and intentional beliefs.

Akrasia, Self-Deception and Moral Concerns

Everyday morality challenges the idea that only actions derived by rational deliberation from moral principles and beliefs can be moral. Ordinary individuals are poor abstract thinkers, but their actions can still be praiseworthy if they possess moral sense, good character and virtues (Arpaly 2003: 78; Filonowicz 2008). For neo-Aristotelians (such as Nussbaum 2001b: 290-317), morality involves practical wisdom, deliberation, emotions and habits. On the one hand, moral action can be highly reflexive, an outcome of a complex decision making process, in that individuals have sympathetic feelings towards their recipients, seek to achieve normative ideals, and frame the situation as one deserving their attention. It is because we are human beings with ultimate concerns and deep commitments, living in a world not of our own making, that reflexivity is necessary. We assess what social factors constrain and enable our life projects, how much endurance is needed to stay the course, and what to do next (Archer 2003; 2010).

On the other hand, it is not always necessary for morally responsive individuals to articulate and justify their actions at a discursive level (Arpaly 2003; Sayer 2011). Many of our actions are based upon emotional reasoning, in that moral emotions possess cognitive and motivational elements that are important for taking action (Nussbaum 2001a). Moral behaviour can also be spontaneous and habitual, as a result of dispositions and character traits (Rorty 1997). Habits are embodied responses to situations that we have learnt through early socialisation, life experience and moral education. Both moral emotions and habits are reason-based actions, and we are often reflexive about them, evaluating whether they were appropriate responses.

Akratic and self-deceptive actions highlight how moral judgements and motivations are complex and varied, involving habits, emotions, dispositions, desires and reason, and illuminate the shortcomings of the standard model of rational action (Rorty 1985). In the case of akrasia, moral actions need not be an outcome of conscious deliberation on moral principles, but can occur as a result of acting against one's own best judgement (Arpaly 2003). Nevertheless akratic actions can be rational and morally praiseworthy, if individuals are unable to articulate other significant beliefs at the moment of decision-making because of excessive fear, shame, compassion and anger. Rorty (1997; 1998) argues that akrasia can be performed with relative ease because

the preferred action is more habitual than the best judged one, and the emotional intensity, visual salience and social approbation of the akratic action are much greater.

Self-deception entails individuals believing what they want to believe, resistant to overwhelming evidence to the contrary (Arpaly 2003). While self-deception seems to be irrational, Rorty (1997) argues that it need not be harmful and can preserve social cooperation and cohesion, as without it, our life projects, work, studies, political causes and social politeness would collapse. Self-deception entails developing and advancing particular conceptions of ourselves, our practices and relationships. Largely as a result of perceptual, cognitive, affective and behavioural habits, individuals can unwittingly manipulate incoming information, mis-interpret situations, and persist to hold vague ideas that sustain self-deceptive beliefs (Mele 1999).

Social structures and ideologies, such as class inequality, capitalism, racism, sexism and consumerism, can shape akrasia and self-deception. Social structures can produce excessive emotions, entrenched habits, partial and interested judgements, distorted character traits, causing individuals to act against one's best judgements and to unwittingly mis-recognise the situation (Rorty 1998; Smith 1976; Sayer 2005). Akratic and self-deceptive actions are not simply individual character disorders or solitary activities, but reflect the deeper and collective aspects of our lived experience that endure over time. Consequently, economic and political reforms of social structures and institutions are required if we wish to tackle some of the damaging and harmful aspects of akratic and self-deceptive actions.

There are four significant ways in which emotions, dispositions and habits can produce akratic and self-deceptive charitable acts and non-giving of different moral worth. First, inadvertent virtue or 'inverse akrasia' refers to doing the right thing against one's best judgement (Arpaly 2003: 9). Individuals may believe that they are taking wrong actions, but are actually doing the right thing because they are emotionally responsive to moral reasons of the situation. For instance, a liberal career-minded woman may not like her parish vicar's brand of conservative teaching, and tells herself to avoid the church as much as possible. At the parish church fete to raise money for mother-toddler and homeless support groups, the vicar asks her to run a food stall. She is adamant that nothing good can come from working with the vicar, but nevertheless is motivated and moved to volunteer, sympathising with the cause.

Second, mis-guided conscience refers to doing the wrong thing in accordance with one's best judgement (Arpaly 2003: 9). Individuals may honestly believe that they are doing good, but are in fact pursuing a morally bad cause or an irrelevant one. In part, they are self-deceptive, drawing upon selective and bias information to justify their beliefs. For example, a white British self-employed businesswoman may refuse to donate money to disaster relief charities overseas, adopting a policy of 'charity begins at home'. She cites recent reports that highlight how governments in developing countries are corrupt and charities have huge administrative costs. Her actions, which are shaped by negative post-colonial perceptual and cognitive habits, lack moral worth, because she fails to adequately respond to the situation of people in need.

Third, akrasia refers to doing the wrong thing against one's best judgement. Individuals may *prima facie* take morally wrong or irrational actions, but actually act coherently in relation to a web of unarticulated beliefs, values and dispositions (Rorty 1997; Arpaly 2003). While rich egalitarians may judge that giving much of their wealth away to be a right thing to do, they typically only donate a very small fraction of their wealth. They may express akratic regret at their inability to act in accordance

to their beliefs, and may offer an excuse for their akratic behaviour, saying that they are no worse than the average non-rich person (Cohen 2000). Rich egalitarians, who have become accustomed to their affluent lifestyle and privileges, find the prospects of losing their power and status too painful.

Fourth, self-deception refers to individuals who believe what they want to believe, resistant to reliable evidence to the effect that they are wrong (Mele 2001). Social structures and vested interests can distort perceptions and values, inhibiting impartial and disinterested judgements (Smith 1976; Sayer 2005). While self-deception is an inevitable part of our daily practices and relationships, it can be dangerous if it develops into a damaging worldview (Rorty 1998). For example, a wealthy stockbroker may donate money to an elite private school, believing that the school will assist talented working class pupils to achieve academically and to facilitate greater social mobility in society. But she really possesses condescending and arrogant class sentiments that cloud her understanding of the unjust nature of the UK schooling system. She may want to believe that she is helping talented working class pupils, but in fact she is subconsciously legitimatising her own privileges and perpetuating class inequality.

While there is no privileged role for conscious attitudes and deliberation in moral actions, being responsive to moral reasons of the situation and having a degree of moral concern are significant in evaluating moral worth. Arpaly (2003: 84) argues:

For an agent to be morally praiseworthy for doing the right thing is for her to have done the right thing for the relevant moral reasons. . . . Moral concern is to be understood as concern for what is in fact morally relevant and not as concern for what the agent takes to be morally relevant.

Whereas a donation to a disaster relief committee by a shop assistant is morally praiseworthy because she desires to alleviate suffering, a much larger contribution by a rich corporate manager, motivated by tax relief, is morally desirable, but is not praiseworthy. The shop assistant and the corporate manager possess different degrees of moral concern for those suffering in the disaster. Should the corporate manager think that tax relief and self-interest are morally relevant factors, he would be mistaken.

There are at least three main types of philanthropists depending upon their strength of concern and commitment to morality (Arpaly 2003: 87-89; see also Archer 2007; Kant 1949). First, 'die-hard' philanthropists have a deep concern for issues of injustice, suffering and oppression, and are responsive to relevant moral factors. They are strongly motivated to act benevolently, possessing a sense of moral obligation to give, even if they are depressed or have other pressing commitments. They are similar to meta-reflexive individuals in Archer's (2007) study on human reflexivity, in that they are very sensitive to moral values, and that charitable causes are seen as an opportunity to express their sympathy, compassion and justice for distant and unknown others.

Second, 'happy' philanthropists have moral reasons for giving, but are not as motivated as die-hard philanthropists. They will act benevolently only during good times, and will cease to give when serious problems or other commitments arise. Although both die-hard and happy philanthropists express moral reasons to donate, the latter care less and so deserve less praise than the former, whose concern for others' well-being is more serious (Arpaly 2003: 88). Happy philanthropists are akin to communicative reflexive individuals in Archer's (2007) work, in that they subordinate issues of social justice for familial solidarity and friendship, and regard

charity events as an opportunity to socialise and to have fun with significant others; for instance, a person may volunteer with her friends to run in a charity marathon.

Third, 'capricious' philanthropists have a weaker moral concern, and are poorly motivated to act benevolently. Their donations are accidental and a matter of convenience, dependent upon easy access to charity collection boxes and the use of online payments and standing orders (Arpaly 2003: 87). Their actions are largely amoral, motivated by convenience and ease of giving than by moral reasons. Capricious philanthropists are like autonomous reflexive individuals in Archer's (2007) study, in that their dedication to work and performance means that moral deliberations on giving do not absorb them, and donations are incidental in their everyday practices. They are largely ambivalent about charities; giving when it is convenient and useful for them.

Individuals use practical moral reasoning to weigh up conflicting goods and concerns, prioritising and dovetailing a range of goods (such as friendship, work, the family, leisure, education, political causes and religion) according to their dominant concerns and personal circumstances (Archer 2003; 2007). The moral significance of charitable giving will vary amongst them in light of other concerns and commitments. For die-hard philanthropists, charitable causes are integral to their way of life, and their benevolence during sad and difficult times serves to underline their sense of moral obligation and their strength of moral concern, overcoming akratic and self-deceptive actions (Arpaly 2003: 89-90). Happy and capricious philanthropists, on the other hand, are half-hearted in their charitable practices, because their concern for humanity ceases during times of grief and stress, and is offset by other concerns and commitments, such as family and work.

Research Design and Methods

I conducted in-depth interviews with 41 individuals from different occupations, including public sector administrators, university lecturers, social care workers, home-keepers, mature students and retirees. Using Bourdieusian concepts of economic, cultural and symbolic capital, I assigned interviewees into three categories of social class: upper and lower middle class and working class. In many cases, I knew the interviewees prior to the research, so that they were comfortable to talk about their personal history, from their early childhood and schooling to their family and work life. The semi-structured interviews consisted of two parts, lasting on average 2.25 hours. The first part asked the interviewees to recount their life history, describing the twists and turns in their lives, their personal goals and their everyday practices. In the second part, they recalled significant acts of giving and volunteering, describing their feelings and motivations. Every time interviewees mentioned emotions and morality, they were prompted to go on talking and to give illustrations. A picture emerged of how they have had to navigate their way through life, dovetailing and prioritising various moral concerns and commitments in an environment that they could not control. It is in this context that their charitable acts are understood and explained.

In my sample, twenty-one were working class, thirteen lower middle class and seven upper middle class. Although attempts were made to get an equal gender balance, more women were willing to participate in the research than men. Twenty-six women and fifteen men participated in the study. The sample consisted of five 'black' interviewees, and eight retirees. A majority of the interviewees lived most of their lives in the English county of Kent, and several had moved to the county because of

work, family or studies. Six interviewees lived outside the South-East region of England.

All the interviews were tape-recorded, and the interviewees were reassured about confidentiality and anonymity. The interviews were transcribed, and then the transcripts were returned to them to check and edit. Only a few made slight alterations to the text, correcting minor factual details. The subsequent analysis was based on the use of NVivo 8, a computer software programme for analysing qualitative data.

Charitable Donations and Distortions

This section will discuss how individuals can make critical, akratic and self-deceptive judgements on giving, discussing how class and racial feelings can distort moral sentiments, habits and experience. Then I will examine how moral worth can be attributed to individuals on the basis of their degree of moral concern for giving, suggesting three types of philanthropists.

Critical, Akratic and Self-Deceptive Giving and Non-Giving

When individuals are highly reflexive, their actions can accord with their best judgement. Individuals can be deliberative in their charitable practices, collecting and assessing information on charities, judging which ones are likely to satisfy their ideals and values (Archer 2007). Sometimes they will consult their family members and friends to help with their assessments. William, an upper middle class university lecturer, and his partner carefully analyse the effectiveness of different charities in several categories of charitable causes:

We sit down and make a list, things like environmental, animal rights, you know, relief of poverty direct sort of emergency relief and also more long-term poverty-relief type and famine-relief, health concerns, and so on. And we say which of those do we believe in to the point that we want to support that category financially, what are the charities that then work in that sector and, of those, which do we believe are most effective so that our money will actually make the most difference and which have, policies and beliefs that we also subscribe to? . . . I'm reluctant to support, for example, Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth because I don't subscribe to all their beliefs.

In reaching their decision to whom to give, William and his partner assess which categories of charities match their values and beliefs, and then evaluate the effectiveness and merit of particular charities operating in those sectors. Their giving has moral worth because they are responsive to moral reasons and are motivated by moral concerns of social justice and compassion. Morally reflexive deliberations can take different forms, from once a year or so over a couple of months of assessments to more frequent and shorter examinations.

Although there is a tendency to focus on how critical deliberations are in accordance with one's best judgement in shaping charitable acts, giving can also occur against one's best judgement (Arpaly 2003). Individuals can be inadvertently virtuous by doing the right thing despite consciously not wanting to. Ranjit, a lower middle class bank clerk, is an atheist, who is reluctant to donate money to Sikh temples, but nevertheless feels it is the right thing to do on his birthday:

I don't believe in God, I used to, but not now. When you think about it, there is no good reason to believe in Him. . . . It's all show at the temple. 'Look at me! What a good person I am! I'm giving money to the temple!' I hate that

sort of stuff! They will give money at the temple, and then get drunk at the pub or cheat their relatives or even beat up their own wives and children! . . . On my birthday, I will give to the temple. My mum will ask me to give money to a temple in India. Even though, I don't want to and I tell myself I shouldn't, I feel I have to. It's just you know, I don't want to upset her because she believes in God and also it wouldn't look good in front of our community that I didn't give. But I know temples in India are doing good things like, feeding the old and the sick and helping poor people. If it were not for the temples, they would starve. So I do this once a year.

Moral emotions, entrenched habits and social approbation can cause individuals to act against one's best judgements, sometimes producing inversely akratic and worthy actions (Rorty 1998). Although Ranjit does not want to donate, he finds himself making a contribution, because he is moved to give, partly for a morally irrelevant reason, to appease his mother, who thinks that his donation will be rewarded with a divine blessing, and partly for a moral reason, to relieve suffering in poor communities in India. While he thinks there are good reasons for not giving to the temple, on his birthday, he becomes quite emotional, loving and caring for his mother and having compassion for vulnerable and needy groups in India. In addition, his donation has become an important annual ritual, undertaken without too much critical conscious reflection. Having been brought up in an environment where his parents have taught him to give to worthy causes and his relatives and friends often donate to temples and charities in India, he is emotionally and subconsciously responsive to the needs of vulnerable and marginalised groups and desires social approval from the community.

But emotions, habits and recognition can also become distorted, producing akratic judgements and non-giving. While individuals may be sympathetic to charitable causes and may judge that giving is the right thing to do, they may still not donate, as negative emotions, lack of practice and insufficient moral concern inhibit them. They may experience akratic guilt, and may be reminded of their moral weakness by occasional images of poverty and injustices. They care, but not enough to undertake charitable acts. Ranjit explains the emotional and moral turmoil he experiences when he passes a street beggar:

When I see a street beggar, I know I should give them money. You know, they are poor and it's not their fault right. The councils should be providing them with housing and the state should be taking care of them. And some of them come from broken families. But when I see them, I just look down, quickly walk past them. Just like the priest in the Good Samaritan story! It's not right I know. I feel guilty about it. I tell myself, 'Ranjit, give them money!' But I don't. I often think about this, and I tell myself to pick up the phone and donate when I see ActionAid or Save the Children on TV asking for money to help with poverty in third world countries. It's just something inside me stops me reaching for my pocket. Maybe that's why I walk quickly pass the beggar or get up to make some tea when charities appear on TV. I think it's because I grew up having to count every penny. I've always saved and always go for bargains, even though I'm doing okay. When I see them, I'll feel guilty, but then I start to think about other things, work, family, promotion prospects and how to get on in life. But I'm not selfish or anything, it's just a lot of hassle to stop and give when I'm rushing around in the morning or late at night. It's silly to say this but I just don't have time!

Ranjit is very reflexive about his akratic behaviour, berating himself for not giving money to street beggars. But partly because of his frugal upbringing, he has learnt to be very careful with money to the point of being reluctant to donate to worthy charities and causes. Only on his birthday and with strong prompting from his mother, does Ranjit overcome his mental barriers and donate to the temple. Most of the time, he is focused on his career and family, rushing day and night to better his life. As Sayer (2005) notes, class status, social conditioning and upward aspirations can corrupt moral sentiments and judgements, inhibiting moral responsibilities towards vulnerable and needy others, as working class struggle for survival and middle class individualism nurture thrifty dispositions and habits. In addition, when the preferred action is more habitual than the best judged one, akratic behaviour is performed with relative ease, despite the discomfort and guilt (Rorty 1997). Individuals become visually and emotionally distracted by other things (such as getting up to make tea during a charity appeal on television or rushing to catch a train for work) that they stop short of giving, lacking will power, moral concern and social disapproval to perform compassionate and just acts.

Class sentiments can also produce self-deceptive charitable acts in accordance with one's best judgement (Arpaly 2003). Arrogance, pride, superiority and contempt can subconsciously cause individuals to rationalise class privileges and power, interpreting information in ways to justify social institutions, such as private schools, that reproduce social inequalities (Smith 1976; Sayer 2005). Bourdieu (1997) argues that giving can be a form of disguised disinterestedness, a deliberate mis-recognition of the economic. Individuals tend to be very selective in what information they evaluate and to mis-interpret the situation, taking advantage of ambiguities and technicalities and rejecting contradictory evidence. Social ideals and values, such as social mobility, cultural heritage and democratic liberty, can vaguely be employed to sustain self-deceptive beliefs and practices (Mele 1999). Charles, an upper middle class university lecturer, explains why he interprets his son's school fees to elite private schools as a charitable donation:

Charles: I think my biggest contribution to charity over the last 20 year in terms of money has been paying school fees for 20 years. . . . How much have I spent? I don't know, three quarters of a million pounds on school fees? And I think that that's a huge commitment, because I also pay for state schools through my tax. And I, you know, I genuinely think that that provides, that ensures the continued survival of institutions which do immense good, and which would not otherwise exist. So to me that is a serious moral commitment.

Interviewer: So do you see paying schools fees as a charity?

Charles: I'm astonished that you seem to think that is in any way questionable, I mean one is paying money to a charity. Unless you think they should not be charities, which strikes me as being a political prejudice rather than an arrogance based position. Yes, of course I see giving money to charities as a charitable donation. . . . I think that there is no question whatsoever that private schools are charities, and I think that the prejudice which I know exists on parts of the left is based almost entirely in ignorance of what private schools actually do, and about the number of people who go to them who would not otherwise be able to do so if those who paid full fees were not doing so. Nearly a third of the pupils have been attending either on full or partial bursaries which allowed them to have opportunities which otherwise they could not conceivably have had. I think that that's tremendously valuable, and

I think that the maintenance of the buildings, the libraries and the cultural heritage which they maintain is a social value to the community which the state would not pay for. So you know, to the extent that the British private schools are in many cases located in historic buildings and the homes to historic collections, the burden on the state to maintain those is reduced to nothing by the charitable donations.

Charles articulates with confidence his belief that paying his children's school fees to elite private schools is a charitable donation, explaining that private schools are classified as charities and that his donation enables less affluent students to receive financial assistance and protects the cultural heritage and historic buildings of the nation. When it is suggested that his charitable donation is really paying for his children's education, Charles argues that there is always an element of reciprocity and self-interestedness in giving. Contradictory evidence is attacked as ideologically biased, lacking reason and knowledge. It is ironic that Charles, who genuinely believes in progressive politics, justifies elite schools in terms of liberal values, such as social mobility and diversity. Charles may want to believe in such ideals and values, but in fact he is subconsciously legitimatising his own privileges and status and transmitting his cultural capital onto his children (Bourdieu 1986). It is also questionable whether his financial contribution to elite schools is morally desirable, given the detrimental effects of private schools on the social class system.

Middle class individuals can also subconsciously frame giving as virtuous that validates and reproduces their social position (Curtis 1997; Shapely 2001; Kidd 1996). Charities confirm the value of individuals' cultural competence and skills, ensuring that their symbolic status and power are widely recognised in society. Zoë, an upper middle class university lecturer, enjoys giving occasional lectures for free to the Workers' Educational Association, a non-profit adult educational institute:

I tend to do some teaching for the Workers' Educational Association. . . . I'll teach for nothing. . . . It's just a really good thing to be doing, everyone's getting a lot out of it, people like it. I get a lot out of it too. . . . It's great to be able to see people engaging and taking off.

Zoë teaches English literature at the Workers' Educational Association without receiving any payment, bringing satisfaction to adult learners and obtaining praise and recognition. While teaching literature may appear to be a disinterested charitable act, her action serves to valorise her profession and to demonstrate to others the importance of her cultural capital, as she struggles to compete for symbolic power in the academic field (Bourdieu 1990). Middle class individuals can deliberately misrecognise giving as virtuous with the aim to bolster their career.

In a capitalist society, individuals can be self-deceived by the power of money, which becomes a crucial symbolic product, imbued with magic, recognition, status and civility (Marx 1986; Smith 1976; Simmel 1978). The economic system cultivates a fetishisation of money, as individuals try to accumulate money and to be thrifty. Individuals may subconsciously believe that a bit of symbolic power and moral worth is lost when donating money, so may prefer to give time or just a bit of money. Kate, a working class house-keeper, explains that she lacks sufficient money to make large financial donations, tending to volunteer more:

I mainly give time more than money, but I do buy raffle, I do sponsor people like if they do a walk or a run or something like that or a marathon. And I have a direct debit out of my bank every month for cancer research. But apart from that it's not a huge amount because I don't have a huge amount of money. So I

think what I do is I give what I have got which is time rather than financial. I leave that to all the people that have got the millions. No, I haven't got lots and lots of money to be able to do that. But I do a little bit.

While it is easier for upper and middle classes to donate money and so give up a bit of recognition, power and status, it is much harder for working class individuals to give money and to lose symbolic power. The latter tend not to donate money, preferring to give time and clothes. Ranjit and Kate are cautious and wary about giving money, subconsciously feeling that some magic, recognition and status will be lost. Although they know they should donate to worthy causes, they are also careful about how money is spent in a highly commodified society, misrecognising and assigning money worth and power.

The fetishisation of money also dominates charities that appeal for money, believing that money has magical power to solve problems, such as poverty, homelessness and animal abuse. But working class individuals are more comfortable in donating or buying clothes in charity shops. Ron, a former working class dockyard worker now retired, criticises charities for asking for money:

Well I'm aghast about a charity . . . [saying] please send a donation, and it tells you how much the donation should be. I think that's absolutely frightful to say to someone please donate £15. . . . To quote money is very awkward. To quote money is not the right thing to do. People haven't got in some cases money to donate. . . . I've given clothes to different charities, RSPCA, which is a cruelty thing, worldwide animal one's, children one's in particular when they come up, Scope is another one I've given to, all cancer one's, quite a lot of them.

Ron believes that charities make inappropriate requests, and that working class individuals are too poor to donate financially. Instead they donate clothes, which lack the magical powers that money possesses, and buy items in charity shops. While working class individuals may regard shopping at charity shops as a charitable act, they are deceiving themselves, since they are making a virtue out of a necessity (Bourdieu 1984: 175). Whereas middle class individuals tend to mis-recognise the economic in paying private school fees and teaching at adult learning centres, working class individuals tend to disguise their disinterestedness in buying clothes in charity shops.

In addition to class emotions, racial beliefs and feelings can distort moral sentiments and judgements, developing into a mis-guided conscience that results in individuals not giving to needy causes overseas, preferring instead to donate to local charities. White ex-pats, who worked overseas and lived in comfortable surroundings away from the native community for many years, tend to have a contemptuous and disdainful attitude towards black people, subconsciously regarding them as inferior beings (see Goldberg 1993 on racist culture). They can be misguided in reaching judgements, drawing upon selective and bias information and experience to justify their behaviour (Mele 1999). Derek, a former lower middle class college lecturer now retired, does not give to charities overseas, thinking that his donation will be mis-managed:

If I see somebody shaking a tin, yes I'll contribute, but if somebody is shaking a tin in aid of twinkle toe children in Burundi, I say, 'No, sorry, don't do that. I don't know where your money's gonna go. I know it never reached the people it's intended to reach.' And they say 'Well, I think that's very unfair.' I say, 'Yes, so is living in Africa, because I've done it, so shut up!' I have seen it

from the far end. I've seen the bags of rice, UNESCO, not for re-sale, on private premises being sold, and I say 'Why should I contribute to that?'

Derek is very critical of humanitarian relief programmes in Africa, believing governments and international agencies to be corrupt. Having lived in Africa for many years, he is confident in his own opinion, citing evidence of misappropriation of resources. Derek has little sympathy for black people living in miserable and poor conditions. As a white man, he enjoyed many privileges when he worked on a large farm in apartheid South Africa and then for a major tobacco company in what was then Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. In recounting his exploits, Derek is not reflexive of the unjust living conditions that black people endured, making a disparaging remark that Zimbabwe has become a wasteland, now that it has rid itself of white rule.

Individuals, who have had military and police training and experience, also tend to develop a mis-guided conscience about overseas charities. Military and police personnel, who are trained to regard foreign powers and outsiders with hostility and suspicion, can develop a scornful and disparaging attitude towards governments and non-governmental organisations in developing countries, viewing them as corrupt and unreliable (see Said 1978 on orientalism). They subconsciously associate foreign countries with negative and undesirable practices. Richard, a former lower middle class publicity officer now retired, saw active service during the Korean War. He considers charities as a profession and a business, and doubts whether progress has been made in poor countries:

The general rule is I don't give to charity, I've seen far too many professionals working for charities on very good salaries, driving company cars and employing professional fundraisers, so how much actually gets to the starving Chinese I've no idea, but I'm not going to risk my money. So Oxfam is definitely a no-no and all the others like it. . . . As for these charities that are installing pumps in African villages, Africa must be knee deep in pumps by now, for 50 years people have been contributing their ten bob or whatever it was to put a pump in an African village, there can't be that many villages, so somebody somewhere is doing very nicely out of this and it's probably the pump manufacturer.

Richard sneers at the idea that charities do good work, feeling that the charity industry and African state officials are corrupt. He has a disrespectful view of many African countries, which he feels were not ready for independence and would have been better served if they had stayed in the British Empire.

While white individuals can describe how little of the donation reaches intended recipients in developing countries, they have fewer doubts about local charities and their own benevolent funds. They subconsciously perceive local charities as honest and efficient, moving away from their general condemnations of charities as corrupt and wasteful. Richard's military experience has subconsciously made him more sympathetic to charities related to armed forces:

The big charities are suspect to me, the small appeal, local appeals, yes I'm usually good for something for that, I mean I always buy a poppy, but then again, you know, that's the service you see and, one of these days, you know, I might need their help. . . . I would almost certainly give it to the Royal Navy Benevolent Trust, because of my background. The Navy was the only organisation of which I've been a member, which actually has a facility for looking after their own.

Richard is willing to give to military charities because of his background and self-interest, believing that he may require their service in his old age. Racial feelings, military education and self-interest have driven Richard to make self-deceptive judgements about the relative merits of charities operating overseas and in the UK. While Ranjit is more sympathetic to charitable causes in India because of his cultural background and is less likely to give to charities in the UK, Richard has opposite sympathies and prejudices. In both cases of non-giving, they fail to respond to the moral reasons of the situation, ignoring the needs of vulnerable and poor groups.

Donors and Moral Concern

Donors vary in their moral concern and commitment to social justice, compassion and morality (Archer 2007). While donations may attract praise and social approbation, praiseworthiness depends upon how donors respond to moral reasons in making donations (see Smith 1976). There are at least three types of donors depending upon the strength of moral concern and the responsiveness to moral reasons (Arpaly 2003: 87-89).

First, 'die-hard' philanthropists are so deeply committed to charitable duty and social justice that they give both in good and bad times, motivated by intrinsic values, irrespective of whether donations produce pleasant feelings. Eve, a working class part-time hospital porter, has unpaid council and utility bills, but still feels obligated to donate to Shelter, a homeless charity, and to tithe to the church:

I haven't paid the council tax for a whole of last year, which is terrible, I haven't paid my water rates either and we're getting bailiffs round about both of those, so we are kind of quite poor at the minute, but despite all of that I still think that I should be doing something, there's people who are worse off than me and if I see whenever there's like a thing saying, such and such of this payment will go to charity, please choose your charity, that's what I send it to the Shelter. . . . It says in the Bible that you should, sort of help out with your church and things like this and tithing like 10% of your income. I do that to my church, but that's not really voluntary, that's just, I have to do that if you know what I mean. . . . I have to justify it with my other half because he doesn't agree with it, but as far as I'm concerned, it's my religion, it's my income, it will go towards that.

Eve and her partner disagree over her charitable contributions, especially when there is insufficient money for food, medicine and bills, causing both distress and unhappiness. Her partner argues that the money should be spent on basic necessities, but she possesses a strong sense of duty to do the right thing, giving to worthy causes. Like Kant's sad philanthropist (1949:§1), Eve believes that her donations have a categorical value, motivated by doing the right thing, rather than to obtain any personal advantage. She has intense reflections on donations and tithes, being self-critical when she fails to contribute to the church, and imagining running up a tally with God when she gets behind on her tithes (see Archer 2007 on internal conversations). A combination of strong religious faith and personal experience of being homeless help to counter moral weakness, preventing akratic and self-deceptive actions.

Second, 'happy' philanthropists make donations because they experience pleasant social feelings through family attachments, friendship and solidarity. But when personal problems and difficulties arise, they lack a sense of moral obligation and concern to continue to give. Jane, a working class postgraduate mature student,

explains she felt pleased to donate to a children's charity because it was associated with her mother's voluntary work and she believed in the charity's aims:

I was earning a lot of money at the time and had no children and because it was the Save the Children Fund, I signed up for [a standing order]. And for about 4 years I gave £6 a month or what, with gift aid, to the Save the Children fund. And it made me pleased because I knew it was always happening and because it was a charity that my Mum was involved with and because it's an important charity because it's not only children abroad, but it helps children in this country as well. And it just made me feel it was convenient and it kind of ticked all my boxes, because it was a charity that I believed in, I didn't have to remember to give.

Jane was also happy that her donations via a standing order did not require much attention. On two specific occasions, she and her young daughters donated together in response to human suffering: when they were shocked by the disaster of the Indian Ocean tsunami during Christmas 2004; and when they saw images of sick and frail children during the BBC Children in Need charity telemarathon. But Jane's charitable giving also has an instrumental value to bond and nurture the family, which is her dominant moral concern (Archer 2007). Although instrumental donations may be morally desirable, they often lack moral worth because charity recipients are not accorded with dignity and respect, but are used to further personal interests, desires and wants. In addition, Jane stopped her standing order to Save the Children when her personal and economic situation changed, raising two children on social welfare benefits. Unlike Eve who continues to give despite her financial hardship, Jane curtailed her donations to use her resources to take care of her family. While happy philanthropists deserve some praise, they lack the staying power to warrant praiseworthiness.

Third, 'capricious' philanthropists are ambivalent about charitable practices, in that they can respond to moral reasons, but have a whimsical and casual attitude. Patrick, a working class student and a part-time special constable, does not reflect too much about donations:

I can give obviously with regards to money to charity, you get the odd like cash box, obviously, within supermarkets and shops like that, but I tend to give to the charity boxes a lot, but not high donations. I think it's a lot of small donations throughout the year, I mean if I get a lot of, like, loose change in my wallet and obviously the wallet's looking very heavy, obviously with a lot of change in, I try and put, obviously, my loose change in charity boxes, instead of like banking it in banks. . . . I didn't care, obviously, what charity it was, you know, I'm just getting rid of the money at the end of the day. Most of the time now, it's as they're giving me the change, if I see it's '1ps', '5ps', '2ps' I just quickly shove it in the charity box, or I say to them just shove it in a charity box and they do it for me. They've got one behind the counter, they do it there.

Patrick does not care which charity he gives to, motivated more by the inconvenience of carrying loose change in his wallet. While he will look out for his preferred charity, Kent Air Ambulance, he will also put the money in the nearest collection box. Patrick's deliberations on charitable acts are short and spontaneous, because he is more focused on his future career in the police force, as he combines criminal studies and law with police voluntary service to improve his curriculum vitae. His donations are accidental and his volunteering strategic. Whereas Eve's donations are motivated

by moral obligations and justice and Jane's by sympathy and sociality, Patrick's charitable acts are amoral, motivated by convenience and ease, lacking moral reason and worth.

Conclusion

I have examined how moral judgements on charitable donations can be critical, akratic and self-deceptive, resulting in giving and non-giving actions that vary in moral worth. Individuals engage in practical reasoning that involves both reflexive and subconscious evaluations about what is worth giving to. While many focus on family and career as their dominant moral concerns, only a few prioritise charitable causes and social justice, giving both in times of happiness and distress. Emotions, habits and unarticulated beliefs also shape charitable acts, subconsciously moving and motivating individuals to do the right thing, being sympathetic towards others, feeling morally obligated and having a moral sense. But social structures (such as class and racial inequalities) can distort conscious and emotional evaluations, causing individuals to lack the moral will to give to good causes and to be mis-guided about charity receipts and organisations. Class and racial judgements often mis-recognise and mistakenly interpret the moral economy of charitable giving, trumping sympathy and impartiality with class and racial interests.

Charitable donations can be morally desirable but lack moral worth, because individuals fail to respond to the moral reasons of the situation or lack deep moral concerns, motivated largely by social approval, sociality, lifecycle celebrations, reciprocity, convenience and tax efficiency. In some cases, giving can be amoral, devoid of moral reasons, undertaken without much thought to get rid of loose change. To some extent, requests for money donations by charities represent a fetishisation of money, imbuing money with magical power to solve structural problems, such as global poverty and animal abuse. Money donations can be an inappropriate and immoral way to address moral responsibilities, allowing individuals to have an arm's length relationship with societal problems, and to resist or evade making real decisions to change everyday practices and social structures to tackle human and non-human deprivation and suffering.

This paper criticised rationalistic moral reasoning, which tends to view humans as rational and autonomous agents, who rely upon universal reason to define what is good. This form of moral rationality is quite abstract and discursive, neglecting how moral emotions, habits, imagination, moral commitments, attachments and concrete particulars constitute everyday ethical practices and relationships, in which humans are vulnerable, needy and dependent beings. Rather, moral reasoning is practical and sometimes non-discursive, shaping our everyday moral responsibilities and global obligations. But practical moral reasoning is prone to distortions and fallibility, because we are embedded in social structures that threaten our sympathy, impartiality and critical inquiry.

There are four important implications for social theory. First, performative contradictions between moral ideals and actual practices deserve more attention in social theory. There is a tendency in social sciences to impute individual behaviour and motivation to instrumental rationality or shared collective values, overlooking how moral concerns, emotions, habits and unarticulated beliefs can generate critical, akratic and self-deceptive moral judgements. Individuals are evaluative and reflexive beings, who have to interpret the social world in relation to things that matter to them.

They also inhabit social structures that can distort moral sentiments, judgements and responsibilities, producing moral weaknesses, mis-recognitions and self-deceptions.

Second, a social analysis of everyday morality needs to explicate a critical normative standpoint, from which to evaluate social practices and structures. Values are often unreasoned or are viewed with scepticism in social sciences, making it difficult for us to recognise why particular practices are wrong and what makes specific actions reasonable. The disciplinary divide between sociology and moral philosophy must be avoided, if we are to provide a better understanding of social practices, and to offer a critical assessment of social structures.

Third, more attention is required on how different modes of moral reflexivity shape social practices and relationships, and in particular on how they relate to volunteering and charitable giving. Often social theory reduces civic participation to social coordinates (in particular social class), ignoring the significance of personal reflexivity and moral concerns.

Fourth, the concept of 'social embeddedness' needs to explore how belonging, solidarity, networks and communities can nurture and distort virtues, care responsibilities and normative expectations. Often social scientists pair the concept with instrumental reasoning or rule-following (e.g. social capital and norms), overlooking how ethical, emotional and habitual dispositions affect everyday morality.

Acknowledgements

This paper is an output of a project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, UK (Award No: RES-593-25-0003). It is part of a wider collaborative study being conducted at the Universities of Kent and Southampton, entitled 'Charity and Social Redistribution: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives', within the ESRC Centre for Charitable Giving and Philanthropy (www.cgap.org.uk). The author is grateful for the funding, which comes from the ESRC, The Office for Civil Society, the Scottish Government and Carnegie (UK) Trust.

Bibliography

- Archer, Margaret (2003), *Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Archer, Margaret (2007), *Making our Way through the World: Human Reflexivity and Social Mobility*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Archer, Margaret (2010), 'Routine, Reflexivity and Realism', *Sociological Theory*, 28.3: 272-303
- Arpaly, Nomy (2003), *Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Baker, Wayne (1984), 'The Social Structure of a National Securities Market', *American Journal of Sociology*, 89.4: 775-811
- Becker, Gary (1981), *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
- Benhabib, Seyla (1992), *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, New York: Routledge
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1977), *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1984), *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, London: Routledge
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1986), 'The forms of capital', in John Richardson (ed), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, New York: Greenwood, pp.241-258
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1990), *The Logic of Practice*, Cambridge: Polity
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1997), 'Marginalia – Some Additional Notes on the Gift', in Alan Schrift (ed), *The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity*, New York: Routledge, pp.231-241
- Bourdieu, Pierre (2000), *Pascalian Mediations*, Cambridge: Polity
- Curtis, Bruce (1997), 'Reworking Moral Regulation: Metaphorical Capital and the Field of Disinterest', *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 22.3: 303-318
- Cohen, Gerald (2000), 'If You're An Egalitarian, How come You're So Rich?', *Journal of Ethics*, 4.1-2: 1-26
- Filonowicz, Joseph (2008), *Fellow-Feeling and the Moral Life*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Goldberg, David (1993), *Racist culture: philosophy and the politics of meaning*, Oxford: Blackwell
- Granovetter, Mark (1985), 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness', *American Journal of Sociology*, 91.3: 481-510
- Korsgaard, Christine (1996), *The Sources of Normativity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Kant, Immanuel (1949), *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, New York: Bobbs-Merrill
- Kidd, Alan (1996), 'Philanthropy and the "Social History Paradigm"', *Social History*, 21.2: 180-192
- Marx, Karl (1986), *Karl Marx: A Reader* (edited by Jon Elster), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Mele, Alfred (1999), 'Twisted Self-Deception', *Philosophical Psychology* 12: 117-137
- Mele, Alfred (2001), *Self-Deception Unmasked*, Princeton: Princeton University Press

- Nichols, Shaun (2004), *Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Nussbaum, Martha (2001a), *Upheaval of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Nussbaum, Martha (2001b), *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, Updated Edition, New York: Cambridge University Press
- Portes, Alejandro and Julia Sensenbrenner (1993), 'Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action', *American Journal of Sociology*, 98.6: 1320-1350
- Rawls, John (1971), *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Rorty, Amélie (1985), 'Self-deception, Akrasia and Irrationality', in Jon Elster (ed), *The Multiple Self*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.115-132
- Rorty, Amélie (1997), 'The Social and Political Sources of Akrasia', *Ethics*, 107.4: 644-657
- Rorty, Amélie (1998), 'Political Sources of Emotions: Greed and Anger', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 22: 21-33
- Said, Edward (1978), *Orientalism*, New York: Random House
- Sayer, Andrew (2005), *The Moral Significance of Class*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Sayer, Andrew (2011), *Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Shapely, Peter (2001), 'Urban Charity, Class Relations and Social Cohesion: Charitable Responses to the Cotton Famine', *Urban History*, 28.1: 46-64
- Sherman, Nancy (1997), *Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Simmel, Georg (1978), *The Philosophy of Money*, London: Routledge
- Skeggs, Beverley (2009), 'Haunted by the Spectre of Judgement: Respectability, Value and Affect in Class Relations', in Kjartan Sveinsson (ed), *Who Cares about the White Working Class?*, London: Runnymede
- Smith, Adam (1976), *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund
- Tronto, Joan (1994), *Moral Boundaries: A political argument for an ethics of care*, New York: Routledge.