It has been pointed out in several places before that there is something missing in the formal logic that has come down to us from Russell: his ‘logically proper names’. Russell analysed descriptive terms like ‘the king of France’ by means of quantified formulas. Thus ‘The king of France is bald’ he analysed as ‘\(\exists x (Kx \& (\forall y (Ky \rightarrow y=x) \& By))\)’. But that left him with nothing of the form ‘\(Bx\)’. He knew that only ‘logically proper names’ could take the place of ‘\(x\)’ in such forms, and that certain pronouns and demonstratives were in this class. These also gained their referents ‘by acquaintance’ and not ‘by description’, which contrast he dwelt on in further ways. But Russell could give no formal expression for such referential terms to clearly distinguish them from ordinary proper names, which he called ‘disguised descriptions’. The omission has had many consequences some of which I have discussed before. This paper expands on the matter in a number of other ways, first in the area Russell was primarily concerned with, namely Predicate Logic, but then, perhaps surprisingly, moving on to discuss the theory of intensional constructions in the same light, supporting George Bealer's application of 'first order logic' in this area. It turns out that filling the gap that Russell left leads not only to a better predicate logic, but also to a better comprehension of intensional operators, and even the propositions and other items they operate on.
At least in some cases, the values confronted in legal decision-making appear to be incommensurable. Some legal theorists resist incommensurability because they fear that this presents an overwhelming obstacle to rational decision-making. By offering a close analysis of proportionality and, more particularly, measures of proportional value satisfaction, I show that this fear is unfounded. Comparative measures of proportional value satisfaction do not require the values to be commensurable. However, assuming incommensurability presents us with the problem of public significance in the proportional satisfaction of values. When two values are commensurable, this public significance is provided by the mediating effects of the overarching third value that provides the common measure of the values. However, when this common measure is removed, then the public significance of value satisfaction must be otherwise achieved. This is why I propose an equal proportional value satisfaction as the most appropriate proportionality maximand. Under equal proportional value satisfaction, the proportional satisfaction of any one value has significance for each and every other value. This kind of public significance is interpersonal rather than impersonal (or second-personal rather than third-personal). The paper then shows that the legal process that is most appropriate to equal proportionality is a process that implements defeasible legal rules.
High-Dimensional Inference with Applications

The workshop will explore theory and practice for high-dimensional statistical inference by bringing together applied mathematicians, statisticians and bioinformaticians from the UK and internationally, with a focus on the future direction of the topics. A number of invited national and international guest speakers will contribute talks on subjects including
• Bayesian nonparametric statistics
• wavelet based functional data analysis
• regression and calibration with many covariates
• Bayesian experimental design
• classification and discrimination in high dimensions
• Innovative non-Bayesian and classical approaches.

The titles and abstracts of the invited talks will appear on the web soon. The website with registration links has been opened several weeks ago:
http://www.kent.ac.uk/smsas/events/HDIA2013.html

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