

**A CONVERGENCE OF RISK ATTITUDES? ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIAL
INEQUALITY AND WORK IN POST-COMMUNIST AND 'TRADITIONAL'
EUROPEAN MARKET ECONOMIES**

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Abstract

Economic and governmental reforms typically coincide with political and perceptual changes among the population, either preceding or following them. Radical *systemic* change in a country's governance may reflect or trigger similarly rapid and fundamental changes in attitudes and behaviours among citizens. Using the International Social Survey, this paper analyses reported attitudes to social inequality and work orientations in European post-communist countries, monitoring those reported immediately after the introduction of market economies (in and around 1990) to more recent years (up to 2005). The emerging patterns are compared with those reported in Western European market economies around the same time in order to observe the extent to which, if at all, popular attitudes in old and new market economies have aligned following regime changes.

1 INTRODUCTION

This paper explores changes in the perception of social risks during a period of rapid social change following the collapse of the 'Iron Curtain' that divided Western and Eastern Europe until the 1990s. Although our main interest is to observe how perceptions and changes in perceptions coincided with social and economic change in the formerly communist or socialist countries of Eastern Europe, in studying these, we will also look at Western European countries in order to identify similarities or differences in these changes. Most notably, we want to explore if attitudes have converged between Eastern and Western European countries and, if so, whether attitudes have changed in Eastern or in Western Europe, or in both.

As we will see, in the course of their regime change, some of the Eastern European countries underwent dramatic social and economic changes. These often resulted in rising levels of unemployment and social dislocation following the countries' exposure to global competitive forces that their economies could not match. Could this have resulted in changes to perceptions of social risk and their acceptability?

The 'new capitalist states' of Central and Eastern Europe have been slowly integrated into the comparative study of welfare states and welfare regimes (cp. Deacon 1993; Fenger 2007; Kogan et al., 2008). Risk research has been somewhat slower at incorporating these countries in its research portfolio, especially in comparative research, where systematic cross-cultural studies are still largely concerned with technological risks (cp. Renn and Rohrman 2000). One recent exception is Erlinghagen's (2007) analysis of subjective job insecurity which compared – and found substantive differences in – Eastern and Western European countries.

Risk perceptions are not cast in stone, but can change and be changed. Like public opinions surveyed in mass polls, risk perceptions are affected and informed by temporary impressions, recall and anchoring, reflecting current popular concerns as well as personal anticipation of real and imminent loss - or invulnerability to such losses. Risk perceptions are also subject to learning – individuals' personal learning from experience, which results in adaptation of values, norms and judgements to new circumstances. However, these adjustments can also be rather short-term, as we revert to our original learned and most deeply engrained risk concepts (cp. Cebulla 2004).

The far-reaching socio-economic and, personal changes associated with regime transition provide a unique opportunity for studying the durability and malleability of risk perceptions and attitudes under radically changing exogenous conditions.¹

¹ Most of the survey questions that we will analyse are concerned with 'attitudes' towards social and economic phenomena that might constitute risks, rather than perceptions of what might constitute a risk and 'how much' of a risk it might represent. However, in this paper, we will use 'perception' and 'attitude' interchangeably.

2 THE DATA AND THE COUNTRIES

For this study, six waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) were analysed. The ISSP is an annual programme of social science surveys conducted in unison in currently 44 countries. Each year, representative samples of these countries' populations are asked about a range of social issues. Specific survey topics are covered in modules that change from year to year, but are also repeated after some years. Over time, this has created a valuable source of historical and contemporary information about social attitudes. Three ISSP modules are relevant to this study.

In 1987, 1992 and again in 1999, the ISSP included a module on perceptions of attitudes to social inequality (Table 1). In 1989, 1997 and 2005, the ISSP asked participants about their work orientations; while in 1985, 1990, 1996, and also in 2006,² the focus turned to people's view of the role of government in society and the economy.

<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>

We have chosen these three modules as the focus of our analysis because they most closely relate to the principal social (inequality), economic (work) and political (government) changes that have occurred in Eastern European countries. In capturing the public's perceptions and assessments of these changes and the new conditions that they have entailed, we can gauge perceptual and behavioural preferences and their persistence.

Although the ISSP aims for complete coverage and identical use of questions, not every country has taken part in all surveys every year. Participation of Eastern European countries, among which we include Russia by way of shorthand, has been more recent. This adversely affected the availability of data about Eastern European people's attitudes to governance. As a result, our analysis primarily focussed on work orientations and attitudes to social inequality.

Table 1 also shows the countries that were selected for this study. In part, their selection was driven by the availability of data. The selection also reflected the need to limit this exploratory investigation to a manageable number of case studies. This said, the selection was also informed by welfare regime theory, as, from the Western European states, one representative of the conservative (Germany), the social-democratic/Nordic (Norway) and the liberal (GB) welfare system was selected (Esping-Andersen 1990). With respect of the Eastern European countries, political and economic reasoning, rather than welfare regime models, informed their selection, although some support can be found for this selection within recent welfare regime models that incorporate former communist states (cp. Fenger 2007). Russia was a 'natural choice' in that the country had, for decades, represented the archetypical communist welfare state. It was – and remains - the largest economic power among the former communist block countries. Unlike other post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, Russia seeks to maintain its political influence and independence, including towards to the European Union, which other post-communist countries have already joined or want to join.

Poland and Hungary were selected to represent states at different stages of economic and political development, with Hungary also being a country with a

² Data for 2006 were not yet available at the time of the study.

historically greater openness and affiliation to Western European economic and social principles as well as greater economic strength. As will be seen below, the two countries' welfare regime transformations after communism also proceeded along somewhat different paths.

The three countries took the final steps from communist/socialist to post-communist transition states in 1990 (Poland, Hungary) or 1991 (Russia). In 1990, Poland saw the former 'Solidarity' trade union movement win their first parliamentary elections, while in Hungary, multi-party elections were held for the first time. Both Poland and Hungary joined NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004.

In contrast, Russia emerged out of the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, which, after years of strain and piecemeal modernisation under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, finally splintered into Russia (or the Russian Federation) and 14 other independent states, ushering in the end of Soviet unity.

Although we selected three Western and three Eastern European countries, the intention was not to match them for direct comparisons. Instead, the focus of this study was on general comparisons across broad political categories (post-communist versus 'traditional' capitalist countries) and observation of changes within countries.

Whereas the ISSP records participants' opinions and preferences, the survey modules say perhaps less about attitudes and, particularly, behaviours towards *risk*. Approval or disapproval of social inequality, a particular work ethic or ascribing government the role of job creator, however, give us some indication as to the extent to which, in Sztompka's (1996, p. 199) words, post-communist societies have moved away from "*the focus on security rather than risk..., reliance on governmental support rather than on oneself..., system-blame rather than self-responsibility...*".

Although perceptions do not always and immediately find reflection in actual behaviour, they are good guides to "behavioural aggregates" (Ajzen and Fishbein 2005, p. 208). That is, despite the many factors that affect individual decisions to behave in a certain way, in their totality, perceptions inform behaviours and behaviours reflect perceptions. In individual instances, our behaviour might deviate from our perceptions, beliefs or values because of the strength of contemporaneous and competing influences, such as the threat of physical force or recall of past experiences. Taking all everyday decisions and actions together, however, they tend to correlate highly with our underlying beliefs. It is with this in mind that we interrogate the ISSP opinion data.

3 SOME (MORE) CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS

The study of risk perceptions under conditions of regime change is far from straight forward. There are a number of challenges that any such analysis needs to address - or, at least, acknowledge.

First, conceptually and practically, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine causal effects, that is, did risk perceptions change as a result of regime change, or did regime change result from a change in risk perceptions? This is partially a data problem: we do not have sufficient information about the prevalence and nature of risk perceptions in Eastern Europe prior to the late 1980s and early 1990s. In fact, we have no data about risk perceptions for Western European countries either, because risk perceptions, in their narrow and specific meaning, were never queried in this or similar surveys at the time. However, we can extract from those surveys attitude and preference questions, which, albeit to varying degrees, are suitable

approximations for risk perception questions. The core issue, however, is that in the absence of data pertaining to the period prior to regime change, - preferably *long* before this occasion - any analysis lacks a definite baseline, from which to monitor change. Not least for this reason did we include a comparison with Western European countries in our analysis. This approach was also taken by Shalom Schwartz in one of his (and colleagues') study of value change in Eastern Europe, to which we will refer below.

A further problem is the lack of panel data. Although we will be able to use several years of survey data that included repeated question modules, these modules were put to different population samples. Although we can, therefore, study risk perceptions at an aggregate, country level, we cannot study in any great detail how individuals might have adapted their risk perceptions in the years during and after the regime change.³ For this paper, we have conducted a series of logistic regression analysis in order to identify the characteristics of those who expressed given risk perceptions and whether these characteristics (and, hence, groups of people) had changed between the years. Thus, we can identify changes in the populations expressing certain views, but also gain some, if limited, insight into the 'drivers' of perceptions. In turn, this allows reflection on the likely context that triggers shifts in the 'categories' of people who share given risk perceptions.

4 RISK AND REGIME CHANGE

Regime change has brought economic benefits to Eastern European countries, but also entailed heavy social costs including, but not only, in the three countries included in this comparative study. Hungary, Poland and Russia experienced notable growth in their *per capita* Gross Domestic Product (GDP), one of the main indicators of economic growth, in particular since the 1990s (Figure 1). GDP per head grew approximately fivefold in the Eastern European countries, which was more than in two of the three Western European countries. However, GDP per head remained far below the levels enjoyed by the Western European countries.

<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>

Whereas change in *per capita* GDP in the Eastern countries was proportionately similar to that in Western Europe, if slow and failing to significantly close the gap, price inflation was considerably higher in the Eastern than in the Western European countries (Figure 2). Indexed at year 2000, inflation increased in subsequent years most dramatically in Russia and Hungary. But even before the year 2000, the data show a rapid rise in inflation in all three Eastern European countries. Between 1989 and 2003, real wages grew by 19 percent in Poland and 17 percent in Hungary, but declined to 68 percent of their 1989 level in Russia (Heinegg et al., 2007). Whereas unemployment rates in the fifteen years to 2005 either rose (Poland) or declined (Hungary, Russia). Employment rates fell in all three countries, indicating an expanding inactive labour force (ibid.).

<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE>

³ Arguably, understanding individual responses to regime change is more insightful and critical to risk research. For instance, cross-sectional data can give the impression of aggregate stability because individual perception changes 'cancel each other out'. It can, thus, lead to misleading conclusions. In the absence of genuine panel data, pseudo panels may be designed to test the validity of cross-sectional research findings.

The statistics illustrate the severe economic adjustment problems that the Eastern European countries faced during their conversion to capitalism. The economic changes coincided with fundamental political and, importantly, social policy changes.

4.1 Policy Change in Eastern Europe

Constructing the new capitalist welfare system in Eastern Europe is still a work in progress, as individual states experiment with different types of welfare provisions, stop-starting initiatives as they respond to political and social pressures (Cerami forthcoming b). Despite this state of flux, the emerging welfare states of Eastern Europe share a common policy agenda that seeks to shift the responsibility for personal welfare and security from the state to the individual. Throughout Eastern Europe, governments have introduced "Bismarck-style welfare institutions" (Cerami 2008b) based on the protection from the adverse consequences of (health, unemployment) risk through contributions to insurance funds. Inevitably, this has left a coverage gap for those who cannot contribute to these funds due to unemployment or lack of finances, - including the growing pool of the economically inactive.

Despite shared agendas, policy change in Eastern Europe has not been uniform. Notable differences have emerged in the detail of policy reforms and initiatives, and in their timing. Studying the emergence of unemployment compensation schemes in Central and Eastern Europe, Polakowski and Szelewa (2008) found diverse and changing provisions for the unemployed. Categorising services according to their accessibility, generosity, duration (of benefit payments) and the obligations placed on claimants, they concluded that, while at the start of the transition from socialist to capitalist modes of production

"reformers created quite open and generous systems of income support....after the first signs of unemployment, reformers in most of these countries started to introduce restrictions" (ibid, p. 17).

Restrictions included curtailment of the duration of unemployment benefit payments (Czech Republic, Slovakia), the introduction of means-testing and flat-rate benefits (Poland). But not every country experienced dramatic changes; some, like Slovenia and Hungary retained their financially comparatively generous unemployment compensation schemes already in place before their transition to capitalism, albeit, in Slovenia's case, not without reducing the period of eligibility for support. In contrast to the stability of provision observed for Hungary, Polakowski and Szelewa (2008, p. 19, emphasis in original) concluded that, overall, Eastern European countries had taken a "*divergent path of development*, reforming their policies with different tools and in different directions".

The authors came to a similar conclusion when investigating the development of childcare provisions in Central and Eastern Europe before and after regime change (Szelewa and Polakowski 2008). Not only did they find that policy toward childcare followed different models in different states, providing varying levels of support, but these policies also changed over time, not infrequently reversing initial policies. Only Poland maintained more or less the same policy throughout, providing least support for, and intervening least in supporting, families and childcare. In contrast, over the same period from 1989 to 2004, Hungary moved from a pro-active policy of supporting the traditional family model that channelled women into the role of carers in the home, to a model that enabled women to be carers, but also, through the generous provision of childcare facilities, encouraged labour market participation.

The extent to which Central and Eastern European states were able to introduce social policy reforms was not only a reflection of political will, interest or power, but also of public opinion and preference, some of which was 'inherited' from the previous regime. In their study of family policies in the Czech Republic, Saxonberg and Szelewa (2007) note that popular demand for kindergarten places over nursery places, which had a poor reputation under the previous communist regime, hampered government attempts to curtail access to state-sponsored kindergarten places, despite a political desire for residualising state provision in this sector. In contrast, the Polish government was able to adopt market-led approaches to childcare provision, facilitated by the absence of any significant legacy of kindergarten provisions under the previous, communist regime. These examples also showed that reforms had strong gender effects, sometimes directly, as in the example above, or on other occasions indirectly as a result of uneven economic development and inequitable welfare entitlements provided by the new insurance-based benefits system.⁴

Like Hungary and Poland, Russia - the third post-communist country in this comparative study - remodelled its welfare system in the course of its regime change. In addition to privatising and differentiating pension benefits and introducing a mixed public/private health care system, Russia reduced its system of protection against unemployment and created a basic income safety net (Cerami forthcoming a). The economic transitions that followed the cessation of the communist mode of production resulted in high levels of unemployment, especially among those previously better-off, that is, specialist and skilled workers. A social crisis ensued, characterised by social dislocation (unemployment, homelessness, family dissolution) and a national deterioration of health standards (captured by a rising mortality rate). Current policy in Russia is to use oil revenues to improve the welfare system (Cerami forthcoming a), yet, given the crisis in the world economy, income from oil, once relied on as secure and rising, may be declining, putting the government's plans at risk.

That the introduction of new welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe has not been entirely successful is reflected in the high levels of social distress that are apparent in most of these countries, despite some recent improvement (as illustrated earlier in Figure 1). Social policy reforms have met with disappointment and disillusionment among the public whose satisfaction with health and social services in Central and Eastern European states has been declining and, in Central and some Eastern European countries, is now below the EU 15 average (Cerami 2008b).

Cerami (2008a) summarises the experiences, risks and contentions faced by the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe today, noting that:

“Whereas, during communism, the main risks that Eastern citizens faced are primarily related to the possibility of not finding the necessary consumables in the shops...or dealing with poor and the bad quality social services, in the post-communist environment the spectrum the ‘new’ social risk is substantially broader. NSRs include, for example, balancing paid work with family responsibilities, care for elderly parents and lacking skills...in the labour market, as identified for the West. Additionally in Eastern European countries there are the added NSRs of no longer having access to a secure job, pension, health care, or a minimum income.” (p. 2)

⁴ According to Cerami (2008a, p. 9) reforms in Eastern Europe “ask women to play the social and economic function of *wives, mothers, workers and care-givers* in a new and substantially less protecting economy” (emph in org.).

4.2 Cultural dimensions of change

Regime change not only requires institutional change, but also behavioural and attitudinal adjustments. While Sztompka acknowledged that the Eastern European revolutions changed institutions, he feared that

“to follow the new ways of life, to operate successfully within the new institutions, the people require new cultural resources: codes, frames, rules, new ‘habits of the heart’” (Sztompka 1996, p. 125).

Thus, people need to adapt mind and behaviour in order to be able to interact effectively with the new institutions and the new socio-economic environment.

The question of attitudinal or value adaptation to changing regime conditions has gained added attention ever since the fall of the Iron Curtain, but systematic empirical evidence is still patchy. Possibly the most comprehensive and best known empirical work on value change in Eastern Europe is that by Shalom Schwartz and his colleagues who have applied their value model, rooted in cultural psychology, to study differences in the key orientations of people who have grown up in Western (capitalist) and in Eastern (communist/socialist) European cultures (Schwartz et al. 2000).

Schwartz' Value Orientation Scale seeks to identify the principal underlying drivers of people's personal values through a set of attitudinal and reflexive questions. In risk research, Sjoberg (1997) found that Schwartz's value scale had considerably greater explanatory power of the nature of risk perceptions than other psychological or cultural models.

In their study of Eastern and Western European value systems, Schwartz and Bardi (1997) were able to draw on a range of studies involving teachers and students from several Eastern and Western European countries surveyed between 1988 and 1993. In some, but not all countries, teachers and/or students had participated more than once in separate value studies. Schwartz's scale measures various value attributes, including conservatism, (preference for) hierarchy, egalitarianism and mastery (that is, an emphasis on getting ahead, ambition). They found that conservative and hierarchical orientations were more prominent in Eastern than Western European countries, whereas the reverse was true for egalitarianism and mastery.

Although Schwartz's and Bardi's study was not longitudinal and, therefore, could not observe change over time among the same group of individuals, the authors did not believe that “recent revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe” (ibid, p. 407) had fundamentally changed people's values. They argued that “*more than modifications of the political atmosphere and of prevailing ideological messages*” (ibid., p. 407) would be necessary and that living conditions, opportunities and reward structures would also need to change to bring about alterations to people's value systems. But Schwartz and Bardi also believed that young people would adapt their values more quickly than older generations because they had been exposed less to the dominant values of the past communist regime.

Using various ISSP modules (on religion, the environment, and family and gender roles) pertaining variably from 1991 to 2004, Drnakova (2006) argues that there was already evidence of changing value systems in Eastern Europe as its people, more

so than in the past, valued “*self-direction, hedonism, universalism*⁵ and/or *achievement*” (ibid, p. 27, emphasis in original). Drnakova was able to conclude this after assigning modular ISSP survey questions to Schwartz’ value types. As she acknowledges herself, relying on her own judgement in doing so was a weakness of the paper, but a weakness that, one would hope, further exploratory analysis should be able to address and overcome in the future.

The Eastern European nations, of course, faced and still face tremendous challenges in adapting to new social and economic conditions. This socialisation process, Sztompka (1996) argued, would take much longer to take hold than the institutional reform process. Just as Schwartz and Bardi (1997), Sztompka sensed that young people, with fewer roots in and experiences of past times and routines, would be best positioned to make this cultural transition.

5 CHANGING ATTITUDES

The early post-communist period coincided with – and, possibly, was encouraged by - a high level of preparedness for radical economic change and, indeed, a high level of consensus in favour of a change that would alter current social and economic as well as political expectations and practices in society at large, but also for the individual. However, whereas some anticipations and expectations remained unchanged or showed little change over the following years, others experienced a reversal to levels close to those that might have prevailed in the communist era. Although we cannot be sure that the latter assertion is correct because we lack the data to test it, conceptually, as we will see, the reversal too is certainly compatible with reaching a new *status quo ante*. In the following, we illustrate this with respect to a battery of questions concerned with social inequality, work orientations and the role of government. Figure 3 below summarises the ISSP survey questions that were used in the analysis.

<FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE>

5.1 Attitudes to Social Inequality

The emerging picture of popular perceptions of (and attitudes towards) social inequality is one of relative stability in the Western traditional capitalist countries and of adjustment in the Eastern European countries. Most notable have been changes in Eastern European perceptions of the benefits of income differentials, the role of privilege in society, and the role of education and training in employment progression.

The perception that *income differentials were necessary for promoting economic prosperity* was held by about a third of the population in Western and Eastern Europe and, indeed by almost half the Polish population in the early years of the post-communist transition (Figure 4). In the following years, approval of income differentials declined in all three post-communist countries, falling below 20 percent in Hungary and Russia and below 30 percent in Poland, while fluctuating in the Western European countries.

<FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE>

⁵ Universalism describes an appreciation and tolerance of difference, and a positive attitude towards welfare and environmental protection.

Just as belief in the economic benefits of income differentials declined, the perception that *coming from a wealthy family* was an important prerequisite for getting ahead in life became more prevalent (Figure 5). Once again, Western Europeans were less likely to hold this view.

<FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE>

This growing belief, in Eastern Europe, that background mattered (again) to personal progression coincided with a sustained belief in the virtue of personal effort. As Figure 6 shows, there was a steady increase in the proportion of people in Eastern European countries expressing the opinion that *education and training* should determine – alongside other factors – earnings in employment. In fact, by the end of the 1990s, the approval of education co-determining pay had reached levels indistinguishable from those in the three Western European countries.

<FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE>

Finally, attitudes *to taxation* of high incomes varied very little between the East and the West, with the exception of Russia – although a high proportion of ‘don’t know’ responses distort these results (Figure 7). Up to 80 percent of the populations believed that people with high incomes should pay a larger or much larger share of their income in taxes than those on low incomes. The percentage rose slightly year-on-year in the Eastern European countries, in particular in Russia, but remained more stable in the Western European countries.

<FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE>

Overall, perceptions of social and economic risks in the Eastern and Western European countries, having started from sometimes rather different positions and appeared to assimilate with time, largely as a result of changing perceptions among the populations of Hungary, Poland and Russia rather than changes in the perceptions prevailing in the Western European countries.

5.2 Role of Government

Survey participants in the Eastern European countries were more inclined than Western Europeans to ascribe the government the responsibility for providing jobs for all (Figure 8) or to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor in the country (Figure 9). In both instances, about 80 percent or more of the populations of Hungary, Poland and Russia believed that government should “definitely” or “probably” be responsible for ensuring full employment or social equality. This compared to between 60 percent and 80 percent of the populations of Germany (West), Britain and Norway. Support for this government role was highest in Norway, where the percentage of the population arguing that government should “definitely” be responsible for these tasks was also the highest and closest to that in the Eastern European countries.

<FIGURES 8 AND 9 ABOUT HERE>

Attitudes changed very little over time in any of the six countries.

5.3 Work Orientations

The data on work orientations showed yet fewer differences between East and West throughout the observation period and also fewer changes over time in the Eastern European (and for that matter also the Western European) countries. *Job security* (Figure 10) and, albeit less so, career *advancement* opportunities (Figure 11) and on-

the-job *independence* (Figure 12) were rated highly and similarly in all six countries. They also remained fairly steady throughout the observation period.

<FIGURES 10, 11, 12 ABOUT HERE>

Attitudes towards *working in the private sector* rather than the government/public sector also remained fairly steady over the years in all six countries, with the majority of the population in the Eastern European countries, given the choice, preferring to work in the public sector to working in the private sector (Figure 13). This was in stark contrast to public preferences in the three Western European countries, where the majority of the populations preferred working in the private to working in the public sector.

<FIGURE 13 ABOUT HERE>

To summarise, with the exception of Eastern Europeans' preference for public rather than private sector employers, their principal work orientations aligned with those in the Western European countries, while tolerance of social inequality declined to levels similar to those in the West. However, Eastern Europeans continued to assign a greater interventionist role to government than the people of Germany, Britain or Norway.

6 DRIVERS OF ATTITUDES TO INEQUALITY AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

While the descriptive data are helpful for depicting attitudes and perceptions *on aggregate*, they tell us little about who holds these attitudes and whether, over time, it is the same groups of individuals that do. To gain a better understanding of the dynamics of social risk perceptions, we conducted logistic regression analysis comparing (a) agreement and disagreement with the statement that income disparities were necessary for economic development and (b) preferences for public versus private sector employment.

These two survey questions were selected because they were deemed to represent key social and economic (or employment) changes that occurred and – for many – were expected to occur during the post-communist regime transition. Moreover, the question about employment preferences alluded to one of the key changes of this transition and the changing structure of employment opportunities that people would encounter under the new regime. A readiness – perhaps even desire – to seek employment in the private sector rather than the state sector, as had been typical under the previous regime, would, for many, become conditional for a successful *personal* transition to the new economic regime. Approval or disapproval of income disparities, on the other hand, indicates *generalised* attitudes to the social cost of regime change.

In the absence of panel data, to observe changes in the composition of those who express favourable or unfavourable attitudes towards income disparities or private sector employment, the findings from the regression analysis pertaining to different survey years are compared.⁶ The analyses were conducted for each country separately, using all available variables in order to identify those most likely to explain variations in responses in the individual country. The analyses used the latest available data (pertaining to 1999 and 2005 respectively for the income disparity and the employer preference question) and the data collected on the previous occasion

⁶ The two survey questions are taken from different ISSP modules and can, therefore, not be analysed together in a single regression.

(1992 and 1997 respectively). We did not conduct the analyses with the earliest available data (1987 and 1989 respectively) because not all six countries participated in the ISSP in that year⁷ and/or there were gaps and differences in individual questions and responses reported.

6.1 Income differentials

Attitudes towards income disparities in the early 1990s – the first of the two years in our analysis – were differentiated by the socio-demographic characteristics of the population in the West, but more strongly driven by social values and preferences as well as the observation of social conflict. The latter typically enforced the preference for income differentials (Table 2a and 2b). Across all three Western European countries and in Poland, support for income differentials as a means of promoting economic development was particularly prevalent among individuals with low or few educational qualifications, whereas people with higher educational attainment were less likely to support this view. In Britain and Norway, those who considered themselves belonging to the middle classes were also more likely than others to support income differentials. In Poland, people who considered their social positions to be higher and those who considered their social position to be lower than their father's before them, tended to support income differentials.

<TABLES 2a AND 2b ABOUT HERE>

In Hungary, support for income differentials was particularly strong among those who perceived high or indeed very high levels of conflict between the working and the middle classes of their country, whereas those who saw conflict between the rich and the poor, and those who worked for government, were least likely to support income differentials. In contrast, in both Poland and Russia, all else equal, income differentials were particularly supported by those who displayed a strongly meritocratic work ethic, holding the view that hard work (Poland) or hard work and ambition (Russia) were essential for getting ahead in a job.

Seven years later, when the ISSP used the same question module the next time (1999), the drivers of perceptions in favour of income differentials had changed, just as support for it had declined (Table 2b). Unlike 1992, in 1999, socio-demographic variables 'explained' support for income differentials in Eastern European countries (where it had declined to levels similar to those in the West) as well as in the Western European countries. Most notably, age was now a co-determinant of support for income differentials. However, whereas in the Western European countries, it was older generations who were more likely to hold this view, in the Eastern European countries it was the *younger* generations, especially those aged under 25, that is, the generations least likely to have experienced the prior communist state.

Beliefs in the meritocratic principles of social and economic development continued to inform opinions, as those who believed that effort would be rewarded were most likely to support income differentials in the economy. Unlike 1992, this was now also a principle supported by populations in the Western European countries.

A social position higher than the father's in the past continued to be statistically significantly associated with support for income differentials in Poland, although

⁷ Neither Norway nor Russia participated in the 1989 social inequality module, which asked about perceptions of income differentials. However, 1992 was sufficiently close to allow its selection without disproportionately affecting results. As regards the employer preference questions, no data pertaining to 1989 were available for Poland and Russia. Moreover, no data were available for Poland in 2005.

those who judged their position to have declined relative to their father's no longer held this view more strongly than others. In Russia, those who deemed their position to have remained similar to their father's also supported income differentials as a means for economic development.

6.2 Employer Preferences

The drivers of employer preference, first analysed for 1997, bore some resemblance to the drivers of attitudes towards income differentials. And again there were some stark East-West differences. Across all six countries, the main driver of a preference for working in the public sector was – already working in that sector (Tables 3a and 3b). Other key drivers were a desire for job security (Germany, Norway, and Hungary) or less concern for career advancement (Germany, Britain, Norway, Hungary, and Russia). The desire for a job “useful” to society also increased the propensity for preferring the public sector to the private sector in Germany, Norway and Russia. In Poland, the belief that work was one's most important activity also added to the likelihood of someone preferring a public sector to a private sector job.

<TABLES 3a AND 3b ABOUT HERE>

Similar to the case described with respect to support for income differentials, younger people (those aged 25-34 in Hungary; anyone under 55 in Russia) were less likely to prefer the public sector and, conversely, more likely to prefer working in the private sector. Age was no independently significant factor in Poland. Having a secondary education and being or having been married also increased the propensity for preferring public sector work, with some variation between the three Eastern European countries. In short (and only slightly simplified), *young people without current family obligations* were most likely to want to work in the private sector.

There was no such clear socio-demographic pattern observable for the Western European countries, where work ethic and the type of the current employer most strongly affected employment sector preferences. This had changed little by 2005, the next time the question module was used. Again, the current employer and work orientations were the main drivers of employer preferences, again with those more concerned with the social ‘usefulness’ and security of a job and less concerned with career advancement most likely to prefer a public sector employer to a private sector employer. In fact, apart from changes in variables co-determining perceptions in Germany, the variables driving employer preferences in these countries remained very much the same. In Germany, work orientation, a statistically significant factor in 1997, no longer determined employment sector preferences in 2005.

In contrast, by 2005, employer preferences in Eastern Europe were no longer significantly affected by socio-demographic and economic factors as their drivers shifted to concerns about job security, advancement and value.

7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The evidence presented in this paper suggests some marked similarities, but also differences in the social and economic preference and retention of these preferences between the Eastern and the Western European states and their populations included in this survey. Both the populations of post-communist Eastern and of the traditional capitalist Western states shared a concern for job security and the reward of effort and performance; the latter saw a particular rise in support in the post-communist countries during their transition to capitalism. The countries also shared a

basic sense of social justice, which tolerated some inequality, but within limits. Thus, in the Eastern European countries, income differentials were initially seen as necessary for economic development, but support for this principle fell with growing socio-economic inequality and slacking economic development.

Although the view that government should be responsible for reducing income differences or ensuring employment for all was not equally shared by Eastern and Western European populations, the differentials were perhaps less than one might have expected. In fact, the key difference may lie in the precise form that people believed state intervention should take, rather than the principle of state intervention itself - a detail that the ISSP did not investigate.

Public perceptions of social inequality and work effort aligned in the East and West over time, in particular as the support for income differentials to promote economic development declined in Hungary, Poland and Russia. Likewise, perceptions that education and training should determine pay rewards became more prevalent over time in the Eastern European countries, reaching levels of support matching, if not exceeding those in the Western countries. The view that jobs should offer advancement opportunities held fairly stable over time, although the absence of data for Poland restricts comparisons between post-communist and traditional capitalist states. Throughout the observation period, the strongest East-West difference was the greater preference of the people of Hungary, Poland and Russia for the public sector as their employer.

However, yet again, there was similarity among the difference. In all three countries, with comparatively little variation, perceptions of the benefits of income inequality and of preferences for private (rather than public sector) work were rooted in underlying preferences for reward of effort, ambition and advancement, sometimes coinciding with an awareness of significant social conflict in one's country. This principal link between attitudes towards social inequality or working for the private sector and basic work orientation was only briefly further – and independently - accentuated by age in the late 1990s.

7.1 Living in Risk Society

As suggested by Schwartz and his colleagues (1997, 2001) and Sztompka (1996), young people who might have been least exposed to the values of the old communist regime, were more and most likely to adopt the values of the new capitalist system. This was the finding from the regression analysis of the 1997 question module on private sector employers, but it can be observed for every year and in each country: preference for working in the private sector declines with age and is markedly more prevalent among those under the age of 45 and even higher among those aged under 35.

Yet, in all three countries (although the data are less complete for Poland), young people had been most 'exposed' to the post-communist economic risks, experiencing above average rates of unemployment (Heinegg et al., 2007), while also more frequently finding employment in the newly emerging private sector (Table 4a and 4b). Across the population, between 1997 and 2005 the relative proportion⁸ of people working in the private sector had almost doubled in Hungary (rising by a factor of 1.76) and more than doubled in Russia (up by a factor of 2.26), whereas relative employment in government or publicly owned companies in 2005 had fallen

⁸ That is the proportion of respondents in employment in the ISSP working in a given sector in a given year as a percentage of all respondents in employment.

to three-quarters of its 1997 share. Varying across countries, between one-sixth and over half of young people worked in private business in 2005.⁹

<TABLES 4a AND 4b ABOUT HERE>

However, in the long run, neither the new welfare regime nor the emerging private sector appeared to have made private enterprise or the 'transition costs' of greater income differentiation attractive to the people of Eastern Europe. ISSP data showed that job satisfaction in the three Eastern European countries was markedly lower among those working in the private sector than among those working in other sectors.¹⁰ Specifically, fewer private than public sector workers reported having supervisory functions, which, especially in Russia, appeared to be linked to lower levels of job satisfaction among individuals who considered job advancement opportunities important to their job.

Concurrent with the failure of the private economy to provide improved working conditions, people in Hungary, Poland and Russia experienced, subjectively and in many instances also objectively, a deterioration in their social and economic position that the new welfare provisions might not be able to correct or cushion. As seen earlier, by 2005, support for income differentials as a means for promoting economic development was associated with a social position that was perceived to be higher (Poland) or the same (Russia) when compared to the father's position in the past. In all three countries but particularly Poland and Russia, the proportion of people who perceived their social position as at least the same as, if not higher than, their father's steadily declined from 1989 to 1999 (Figure 14). Whereas to some extent this would have reflected changing reference points (fathers whose own position had already improved during the post-communist transition), this change in risk perception mirrored slow or uneven social and economic improvements.

<FIGURE 14 ABOUT HERE>

Under these conditions it is perhaps not surprising that the people of Hungary, Poland and Russia continued to "*focus on security rather than risk...reliance on governmental support rather than on oneself*" (Sztompka 1996, p.199), but work orientations suggest that they also accept self-responsibility (rather than reverting to system-blame).

If Eastern Europeans, as according to Schwartz and Bardi (2001), appear more inclined towards conservatism and hierarchy, rather than egalitarianism and mastery, then this evidence suggests this may well have been a reflection of their anticipation of post-communist social and economic changes and subsequent realisation that the benefits of the transition were less than had been expected. While work orientations turned strongly meritocratic,¹¹ the reality of economic development appeared, certainly in the eyes of the population, not to keep pace with expectations. If this

⁹ Remarkable is the high proportion of employment in government and/or publicly owned, cooperative, or not-for-profit businesses in Hungary in 2005. Comparison with data from 1997 suggests some change in the definition of these categories or coding errors, as such major shifts seem unlikely. The data for these types of public employers are best summed up and read as combined statistics.

¹⁰ This was also the case in Russia, where the private sector tended to pay higher wages than the public sector. - Data not shown here but available from author upon request.

¹¹ As well as individualistic, since family circumstances were decreasingly considered relevant to progression in employment.

interpretation is correct, value orientations were not given the opportunity to develop and move further from the communist principles of conservatism and hierarchy to the principles egalitarianism and mastery more reminiscent to risk society. This conclusion concurs, then, with the warning, cited above, by Schwartz and Bardi (1997) that changing the “political atmosphere” and “ideological messages” would not suffice to bring about value change, but needed to be supported by real changes in living conditions, opportunities and reward structures.

The citizens of Hungary, Poland and Russia experience a world of uncertainty and a clash of expectation and reality. They live in a risk(y) society, some features of which they have become more reluctant to accept.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1 ISSP Modules, by year and country

Module	Year	Germany	GB	Norway	Hungary	Poland	Russia
Social inequality	1987	X*	X		X	X	
	1992	X	X	X	X	X	X
	1999	X	X	X	X	X	X
Work Orientations	1989	X	X	X	X		
	1997	X	X	X	X	X	X
	2005	X	X	X	X		X
Role of Government	1985	X	X				
	1990	X	X	X	X		
	1996	X	X	X	X	X	X

Note: * West Germany only.

Table 2a Best Fitting Logistic Regression Model for Predicting Agreement with Statement that Income Disparity is Necessary for Economic Development, by country, 1992

1992	FRG			GB			NOR			HUN			POL			RUS		
	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
GENDER																		
Male				0.51	0.01	1.66	0.51	0.00	1.66									
AGE																		
65+			0.00															
16-24	-0.46	0.09	0.63															
25-34	-0.83	0.00	0.44															
35-44	-0.23	0.27	0.79															
45-54	-0.34	0.13	0.71															
55-64	0.05	0.82	1.05															
MARITAL STATUS																		
Not married										0.03								
Married, living as							0.58	0.01	1.78									
Widowed							1.18	0.02	3.26									
Divorced, separated							0.43	0.41	1.53									
EDUCATION																		
Degree/University	n/a	n/a	n/a			0.00			0.03									
University, incl incomplete	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a						0.01			
Abitur, other			0.08	n/a	n/a	n/a	-0.10	0.72	0.91				n/a	n/a	n/a			
None	0.99	0.02	2.69	1.33	0.00	3.80	n/a	n/a	n/a				n/a	n/a	n/a			
Lower secondary	0.36	0.07	1.44	0.74	0.05	2.10	-0.67	0.11	0.51				0.47	0.03	1.59			
Secondary	0.31	0.13	1.36	0.65	0.07	1.91	-0.73	0.03	0.48				0.05	0.78	1.05			
EMPLOYMENT STATUS																		
Other						0.00												
Employed				-0.69	0.01	0.50												
unemployed				0.46	0.21	1.59												
retired				0.16	0.58	1.17												
WORKING FOR GOVERNMENT																		

For government											-0.41	0.03	0.66						
RESP. INCOME																			
	0.06	0.00	1.06	0.07	0.01	1.07	0.11	0.01	1.12					0.00	0.01	1.00	0.00	0.01	1.00
SELF-ASSIGNED SOCIAL POSITION																			
Bottom 3					0.08				0.00										
Middle 4				0.88	0.03	2.40	1.21	0.01	3.37										
Top 3				0.41	0.16	1.51	0.29	0.47	1.34										
TRADE UNION MEMBER																			
Member																			
GETTING AHEAD: WEALTHY FAMILY																			
essential/very important	0.67	0.00	1.96																
GETTING AHEAD: HARD WORK																			
essential or very important														0.68	0.00	1.98	0.44	0.00	1.55
GETTING AHEAD: AMBITION																			
essential/very important																			
CONFLICT: WORKING V MIDDLE CLASS																			
very strong/strong	0.53	0.00	1.71											0.61	0.00	1.84	0.42	0.00	1.53
CONFLICT: RICH V POOR																			
very strong/strong																			
SELF-ASSIGNED SOCIAL POSITION RELATIVE TO FATHER																			
Father no job or unknown																			
Higher																			
Same																			
Lower secondary																			
Constant	-2.29	0.00	0.10	-3.42	0.00	0.03	-3.05	0.00	0.05	-0.93	0.00	0.39	-2.00	0.00	0.14	-0.98	0.00	0.38	

Table 2b Best Fitting Logistic Regression Model for Predicting Agreement with Statement that Income Disparity is Necessary for Economic Development, by country, 1999

1999	FRG		GB		NOR		HUN		POL		RUS							
	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)						
GENDER																		
Male										-0.61	0.00	0.54	-0.39	0.04	0.68			
AGE																		
65+			0.15			0.00				0.02		0.06			0.01			
16-24	0.06	0.86	1.06	-0.740455	0.10	0.48		0.95	0.01	2.59	0.92	0.03	2.52	0.99	0.03	2.70		
25-34	-0.70	0.02	0.50	-0.427819	0.22	0.65		0.21	0.54	1.23	0.63	0.15	1.87	-0.41	0.32	0.67		
35-44	-0.26	0.32	0.77	-1.706023	0.00	0.18		0.78	0.02	2.18	0.74	0.07	2.09	-0.30	0.44	0.74		
45-54	-0.12	0.66	0.89	-0.452378	0.14	0.64		0.14	0.68	1.15	1.13	0.00	3.09	-0.13	0.73	0.88		
55-64	-0.38	0.14	0.68	0.2388	0.43	1.27		0.44	0.19	1.55	0.49	0.25	1.63	-0.23	0.53	0.79		
MARITAL STATUS																		
Not married																0.01		
Married, living as																0.52	0.14	1.69
Widowed																0.12	0.80	1.13
Divorced, separated																-0.97	0.10	0.38
EDUCATION																		
University, incl. incomp										0.00		0.01				0.02		
None										-0.70	0.34	0.50	-18.69	1.00	0.00	-0.86	0.04	0.42
Primary, incl. incomp										0.76	0.00	2.14	0.70	0.01	2.01	-0.66	0.01	0.52
Secondary, incl. incomp										0.74	0.00	2.10	0.70	0.00	2.02	-0.50	0.23	0.61
RELIGION																		
None, not given																0.08		0.03
Cath										-0.28	0.81	0.75				-0.64	0.03	0.53
Prot										-0.58	0.04	0.56				n/a	n/a	n/a
Other										0.08	0.86	1.09				-1.79	0.05	0.17
EMPLOYER TYPE																		
Never worked, other																0.01		
Government																-2.32	0.00	0.10

1999	FRG	GB	NOR	HUN	POL	RUS
Public owned, non-profit		-1.86 0.02 0.16				
Private firm		-1.74 0.01 0.18				
Self-employed		-2.02 0.01 0.13				
PARTY AFFILIATION						
No party, no pref, other, no specific		0.00	0.00			
Far left		n/a n/a n/a	0.38 0.77 1.46			
Left, center left		0.07 0.84 1.07	1.05 0.16 2.87			
Center, liberal		0.44 0.31 1.55	1.54 0.04 4.66			
Right, conservative		1.02 0.00 2.77	2.45 0.00 11.61			
GETTING AHEAD: WEALTHY FAMILY						
essential/very important	0.42 0.04 1.53				0.56 0.01 1.75	
GETTING AHEAD: RIGHT PEOPLE						
essential/very important	0.49 0.01 1.63		0.61 0.00 1.84		-0.72 0.00 0.49	
PEOPLE GET REWARDED FOR EFFORT						
strongly agree/agree	0.74 0.00 2.09	1.21 0.00 3.34	0.48 0.01 1.61	1.16 3.88E-06 3.20	0.54 0.01 1.71	0.94 0.00 2.57
CONFLICT: WORKING V MIDDLE CLASS						
very strong/strong					0.69 0.00 1.99	0.83 0.00 2.30
SELF-ASSIGNED SOCIAL POSITION RELATIVE TO FATHER						
Father no job or unknown					0.00	0.02
Higher					0.94 0.01 2.57	0.18 0.50 1.20
Same					0.13 0.73 1.14	-0.67 0.03 0.51
Lower secondary					0.43 0.26 1.54	-0.20 0.48 0.82
Constant	-1.47 0.00 0.23	-0.25 0.72 0.78	-3.19 0.00 0.04	-2.95 1.41E-19 0.05	-2.14 0.00 0.12	-1.79 0.00 0.17

Table 3a Best Fitting Logistic Regression Model for Predicting Preference for Working in Public Sector, by country, 1997

1997	GERMANY			GB			N			H			PL			RUS				
	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)		
GENDER																				
Male	-0.41	0.03	0.66				-0.43	0.00	0.65	-0.37	0.01	0.69								
AGE																				
55-64											0.00							4.31E-07		
16-24										-0.52	0.11	0.59						-1.99	0.00	0.14
25-34										-0.72	0.00	0.49						-1.73	0.00	0.18
35-44										-0.33	0.15	0.72						-1.56	0.00	0.21
45-54										0.10	0.65	1.11						-1.22	0.00	0.30
MARITAL STATUS																				
Not married											0.01							0.00		0.05
Married, living as										0.80	0.00	2.22	0.55	0.00	1.73	0.20	0.45	1.22		
Widowed										0.76	0.08	2.13	1.43	0.00	4.19	1.67	0.01	5.30		
Divorced, separated										0.62	0.05	1.87	0.89	0.11	2.43	0.51	0.14	1.67		
EDUCATION																				
University, incl incomplete									0.01		0.00			0.00						
None							n/a	n/a	n/a	2.12	0.12	8.30	21.11	1.00	1.47E+09					
Secondary, incl incomplete							0.69	0.00	2.00	0.85	0.00	2.34	0.98	0.00	2.67					
Semi-higher, incl incomplete							0.39	0.01	1.48	0.28	0.20	1.32	0.52	0.01	1.68					
RELIGION																				
None/not given			0.01																	
Cath	0.81	0.00	2.25																	
Protest	0.48	0.08	1.61																	
Other	1.30	0.01	3.67																	
EMPLOYEE TYPE																				
Self-employed			0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00					0.00
NAP/never had job	1.39	0.00	4.01	1.58	0.02	4.86	1.72	0.00	5.56	1.71	0.00	5.54	0.75	0.00	2.12	1.53	0.00	4.60		
Government	2.65	0.00	14.19	2.47	0.00	11.86	2.85	0.00	17.22	2.11	0.00	8.22	1.34	0.00	3.82	1.40	0.07	4.06		

1997	GERMANY		GB		N			H			PL			RUS				
Public owned, non-profit	N/A	N/A	1.81	0.00	6.11	1.04	0.02	2.83	2.12	0.00	8.37	1.43	0.01	4.18	1.32	0.09	3.76	
Private Firm	0.64	0.16	1.89	0.79	0.08	2.20	0.42	0.23	1.52	1.47	0.00	4.37	0.18	0.48	1.20	-0.20	0.78	0.82
INCOME																		
500 DM	0.47	0.47	1.61															
1500 DM	0.57	0.20	1.77															
2500 DM	0.99	0.00	2.68															
3500 DM	0.67	0.04	1.96															
4500 DM	0.49	0.11	1.64															
5500 DM	0.15	0.67	1.16															
8000 DM	-0.17	0.58	0.84															
FAMILY INCOME																		
(amount, continuous variable)												-6E-06	0.05	1.00				
TRADE UNION MEMBER																		
NA		0.04						0.00										0.01
Member	-0.67	0.32	0.51				-1.16	0.00	0.31						-0.73	0.27	0.48	
Not member	-1.14	0.08	0.32				-1.36	0.00	0.26						0.59	0.01	1.80	
WORK MOST IMPORTANT ACTIVITY																		
Agree												0.45	0.01	1.57	0.35	0.03	1.42	
JOB SECURITY																		
Very important	0.65	0.00	1.91				0.41	0.00	1.51	0.38	0.01	1.46						
JOB ADVANCEMENT																		
Very important	-0.70	0.01	0.50	-0.60	0.02	0.55	-0.53	0.03	0.59	-0.41	0.01	0.66			-0.41	0.02	0.66	
JOB USEFUL																		
Very important	0.50	0.07	1.65				0.74	0.00	2.09						0.50	0.01	1.65	
NEW TECHNOLOGY WILL MAKE WORK MORE INTERESTING																		
Can't choose								0.00										
Agree							-0.84	0.00	0.43									
Disagree							-0.66	0.01	0.52									
Constant	-1.61	0.04	0.20	-2.39	0.00	0.09	-0.85	0.12	0.43	-2.57	0.00	0.08	-1.28	0.00	0.28	1.14	0.18	3.11

2005	FRG			GB			N			H			PL			RUS			
SUPERVISES EMPLOYEES																			
Yes							-0.60	0.00	0.55										
TRADE UNION MEMBER																			
Never member												0.00					0.00		
Currently member												0.61	0.06	1.85			1.021068	0.00	2.78
Once member, not now												n/a	n/a	n/a			0.7591	0.00	2.14
JOB SECURITY																			
very important				0.53	0.03	1.70	0.76	0.00	2.14	0.45	0.04	1.57							
JOB ADVANCEMENT																			
very important												-0.51	0.03	0.60			-0.30578	0.10	0.74
JOB USEFUL																			
very important				0.66	0.01	1.94	0.83	0.00	2.28	0.43	0.06	1.53					0.428176	0.02	1.53
TIME WITH FRIENDS																			
more time				-0.59	0.01	0.55													
Constant	-0.86	0.06	0.42	-0.67	0.43	0.51	-2.99	0.00	0.05	0.39	0.78	1.48					-0.46074	0.20	0.63

Table 4a Employment Status and Employer Type, by age and Eastern European country, 1997, 2005 (column %)

		2005							1997							Proportional change 2005/1997						
Country	Employment Status	Age							Age							Age						
		16-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	All	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	All	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	All
HUN	employed	35.8	68.6	80.9	67.5	26.1	1.0	47.6	51.4	75.5	81.2	57.5	10.7	0.0	47.0	0.70	0.91	1.00	1.17	2.44		1.01
	unemployed	12.8	12.0	6.9	7.9	1.9	0.0	6.6	12.7	10.8	7.7	11.0	1.4	0.0	7.3	1.01	1.12	0.90	0.71	1.37		0.91
	retired	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.2	52.9	94.8	27.1	0.5	0.7	1.5	4.8	57.2	82.0	24.1	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.10	0.92	1.16	1.12
	Other	51.4	19.4	12.1	19.4	19.1	4.2	18.7	35.4	13.0	9.6	26.7	30.7	18.0	21.5	1.45	1.49	1.26	0.72	0.62	0.23	0.87
	N	109	191	173	191	157	192	1013	212	269	260	273	215	266	1495							
RUS	employed	45.3	80.4	78.4	73.1	47.0	6.3	57.4	35.5	66.8	76.0	75.0	24.6	0.4	49.2	1.27	1.20	1.03	0.97	1.91	14.43	1.17
	unemployed	5.2	2.9	5.7	3.5	0.5	0.0	3.1	8.1	16.3	10.1	8.3	2.5	0.0	8.0	0.64	0.18	0.56	0.42	0.20		0.38
	retired	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.7	43.0	90.9	21.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	4.0	64.4	96.5	24.4			0.00	1.44	0.67	0.94	0.86
	Other	49.6	16.7	16.0	17.7	9.5	2.8	18.4	56.4	16.9	13.6	12.7	8.5	3.1	18.3	0.88	0.98	1.17	1.40	1.12	0.90	1.01
	N	232	306	282	316	200	254	1590	259	307	367	252	284	229	1698							
Employer Preference																						
HUN	Work for government	0.0	3.4	6.5	5.6	6.1	5.1	5.0	40.0	45.8	46.2	55.8	79.5	83.0	58.8	0.00	0.07	0.14	0.10	0.08	0.06	0.08
	Public owned firm, cooperative, not-for-profit	9.6	24.3	26.6	34.1	50.7	80.7	41.2	1.5	1.5	4.0	4.5	8.5	8.3	4.8	6.25	15.79	6.63	7.53	5.96	9.77	8.58
	<i>Work for govt or public owned firm etc.</i>	9.6	27.7	33.1	39.7	56.8	85.8	46.2	41.5	47.3	50.2	60.4	88.0	91.3	63.6	0.23	0.59	0.66	0.66	0.64	0.94	0.73
	Private firm, others	84.6	68.4	55.6	50.8	37.2	10.8	47.1	53.8	38.8	36.5	27.5	6.5	3.5	26.7	1.57	1.76	1.52	1.85	5.72	3.10	1.76
	Self employed	5.8	4.0	11.2	9.5	6.1	3.4	6.8	4.6	13.8	13.3	12.1	5.5	5.2	9.7	1.25	0.29	0.85	0.79	1.11	0.65	0.69
N	52	177	169	179	148	176	901	130	260	249	265	200	230	1334								
RUS	Work for government	20.5	19.7	24.3	30.4	42.0	54.3	31.6	45.9	47.7	59.2	60.5	64.4	100.0	55.6	0.45	0.41	0.41	0.50	0.65	0.54	0.57
	Public owned firm, cooperative, not-for-profit	17.4	16.3	23.5	26.0	34.7	35.5	25.5	14.3	19.7	19.0	24.7	27.4	0.0	20.6	1.22	0.83	1.24	1.05	1.27		1.24
	Private firm, others	58.3	59.9	46.0	38.5	20.7	10.3	39.1	29.6	23.4	15.0	12.1	5.5	0.0	17.3	1.97	2.56	3.07	3.18	3.78		2.26
	Self employed	3.8	4.1	6.3	5.1	2.6	0.0	3.8	10.2	9.2	6.8	2.6	2.7	0.0	6.5	0.37	0.44	0.92	1.95	0.95		0.59
	N	132	294	272	312	193	234	1437	98	218	294	190	73	1	874							

Table 4b Employment Status and Employer Type, by age, Poland 1997 (column %)

		1997							
Poland		Age							
		16-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	All	
Employment Status									
employed		39.6	76.5	76.1	75.7	22.6	3.5	53.3	
unemployed		20.3	12.3	10.8	6.1	2.6	0.0	9.0	
retired		0.5	2.0	7.3	16.1	71.0	94.7	27.7	
Other		39.6	9.3	5.8	2.2	3.9	1.8	10.0	
N		182	204	259	230	155	171	1201	
Employer Preference									
Work for government		28.2	37.7	40.0	41.0	52.9	0.0	38.7	
Public owned firm, cooperative, not-for-profit		1.4	6.5	5.1	4.6	0.0	16.7	4.7	
Private firm, others		40.8	26.0	23.6	26.6	17.6	0.0	26.4	
Self employed		29.6	29.9	31.3	27.7	29.4	83.3	30.2	
N		72	156	197	173	35	6	639	

Figure 1 Gross Domestic Product per head, by country, 1980-2005, US\$




Figure 2 Average Consumer Price Inflation, by country, 1980-2005, US\$, Year 2000=100.




Figure 3 **ISSP Module Question in Analysis**

<p>Social Inequality</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• “Do you agree or disagree with each of these statements?...Large differences in income are necessary for (country’s) prosperity”• “To begin, we have some questions about opportunities for getting ahead....First, how important is coming from a wealthy family?”• “In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each of these things be, in your opinion? The number of years spent in education and training?”• “Do you think that people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share?”• <p>Role of Government</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• “On the whole - do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to...provide a job for everyone who wants one”• “On the whole - do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to...reduce income differences between the rich and the poor”. <p>Work Orientation</p> <p>“From the following list, please tick one box for each item to show how important you personally think it is in a job. How important is...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• ...job security• ...good opportunities for job advancement• ...a job that allows someone to work independently. <p>“Suppose you were working and could choose between different kinds of jobs. Which of the following would you personally choose? I would choose</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• ...working in a private business• ...working for the government or civil service• ...can’t choose.

Figure 4 Agreement with statement “Large differences in income are necessary for (country’s) prosperity” (%)




Figure 5 Importance of coming from a wealthy family for getting ahead (%)




Figure 6 Importance that Education and Training Should have to Earnings (%)




Figure 7 Taxes that people with high Incomes should pay compared people with low incomes




Figure 8 Agreement with Statement that Government should be responsible for Jobs for All (%)




Figure 9 Agreement with Statement that Government should reduce income difference between rich and poor (%)




Figure 10 Importance of Job security (%)




Figure 11 Importance of Opportunities for Advancement in Job (%)




Figure 12 Importance of Independence in Job (%)




Figure 13 Preference for Working in Private Business or Government/Civil Service (%)




Figure 14

Subjective Social Position Relative to Father's (%)

