School of Economics


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Dr Edward Cartwright

Reader in Economics

School of Economics, Keynes College, B1.06

Edward Cartwright is Director of Graduate Studies (PhD programmes)


Edward Cartwright is Reader in Economics. He gained a BA in mathematics and economics at the University of Durham and an MSc and PhD in economics at the University of Warwick. He subsequently spent a year as a post-doctoral student at Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne before joining the University of Kent in 2004.

Edward’s main research interests are game theory, behavioural economics and public economics. His current work focuses on threshold public good games, large games, the consequences and origins of conformity and prejudice, and leadership in coordination games. Edward is associate editor at the Journal of Public Economic Theory.

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Working papers

  • Alberti, F., E. Cartwright and A. Stepanova (2013) 'Explaining Success Rates at Providing Threshold Public Goods: An Approach Based on Impulse Balance Theory' SSRN 2309361 (paper).
  • Alberti, F. and E. Cartwright (2011), ‘Full Agreement and the Provision of Threshold Public Goods’, Jena Economic Research Papers, 2011-063 (paper).
  • Patel, A., E. Cartwright and M. Van Vugt (2010) ‘Punishment Cannot Sustain Cooperation in a Public Good Game with Free-Rider Anonymity’, Göteborg University Department of Economics Working Papers in Economics 451 (paper).
  • Cartwright, E., J. Gillet and M. Van Vugt (2009) ‘Endogenous Leadership in a Coordination Game with Conflict of Interest and Asymmetric Information’, University of Kent School of Economics Discussion Paper 0913 (paper).


  • Cartwright, E. (2014) 'Strategic delay and information cascades' Journal of Economics forthcoming (paper).
  • Cartwright E. (2014) 'Imitation and coordination in small world networks' Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management 21: 71-90 (paper).
  • Cartwright, E., and M. Wooders (2014) 'Correlated equilibrium, conformity and stereotyping in social groups', Journal of Public Economic Theory 16: 743-766 (paper).
  • Cartwright E. and M. L.C.Menezes (2014) 'Cheating to win: Dishonesty and the intensity of competition', Economics Letters 122: 55-58 (paper).
  • Cartwright, E. and A. Patel (2013) 'How category reporting can improve fundraising', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 87: 73-90 (paper).
  • Cartwright, E., J. Gillet and M. van Vugt (2013) 'Leadership by example in a weak-link game' Economic Inquiry 51: 2028-2043 (paper).
  • Cartwright, E. and A. Stepanova (2012) 'What do Students Learn from a Classroom Experiment: Not much, Unless they Write a Report on it', Journal of Economic Education 43: 48-57 (paper).
  • Patel, A. and E. Cartwright (2011) ‘Naive beliefs and the multiplicity of social norms’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 168: 280-289 (paper, working paper).
  • Gillet, J., E. Cartwright and M. van Vugt (2011) ‘Selfish or servant leadership: Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games’, Personality and Individual Differences, 51: 231-236 (paper, press release).
  • Alberti, F. and E. Cartwright (2010), ‘Does the Endowment of Contributors Make a Difference in Threshold Public Good Games?’, FinanzArchiv forthcoming.
  • Cartwright, E. and A. Patel (2010) ‘Public goods, social norms, and naive beliefs’, Journal of Public Economic Theory 12: 199-223 (paper, working paper).
  • Cartwright, E. and A. Patel (2010) ‘Imitation and the incentive to contribute early in a sequential public good game’, Journal of Public Economic Theory 12: 691-708. (paper).
  • Cartwright, E. (2009) ‘Social norms: Does it matter whether agents are rational or boundedly rational? Journal of Socio-Economics 38: 403-410 (paper).
  • Cartwright, E. and M. Wooders (2009) ‘On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players’ International Journal of Game Theory 38: 137-153 (paper).
  • Cartwright, E. and M. Wooders (2009) ‘On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium’ International Journal of Game Theory 38: 127-136 (paper).
  • Cartwright, E. (2009) ‘Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs’ Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 70: 164-185 (paper).
  • Cartwright, E. (2007) ‘Imitation, Coordination and the Emergence of Nash Equilibrium Play’, International Journal of Game Theory, 36: 119-136 (paper, working paper).
  • Cartwright, E. (2007) ‘Contagion and the Emergence of Convention in Small Worlds’, International Game Theory Review 9: 689-704 (paper, working paper).
  • Wooders, M, E. Cartwright and R. Selten (2006) ‘Behavioural Conformity in Games with Many Players’, Games and Economic Behavior 57: 347-360 (paper, working paper).
  • Cartwright, E. (2004) ‘The Stability of Conventions: Random and Lattice Matching Networks Compared’ , Economics Letters 85: 47-51 (paper).
  • Cartwright, E. and M. Wooders (2001) ‘On the Theory of Equalising Differences; Increasing Abundances of Workers May Increase Their Earnings', Economics Bulletin 4: 1-10 (paper).


  • Frank, B. and E. Cartwright (2013), Micoreconomics and Behaviour, McGraw Hill.
  • Cartwright, E. (2011), Behavioral Economics Routledge Advanced Texts in Economics and Finance.

Contributions to books

  • Cartwright, E. and T. Singh (2013) 'Social capital, the culture of trust, and economic development', in Christiansen, B. and M. Basilgan (Eds.), Economic Behavior, Game Theory, and Technology in Emerging Markets, IGI Global.
  • Cartwright, E., J. Conley and M. Wooders (2006) ‘The Law of Demand in Tiebout Economies’, in The Tiebout Model at 50: Essays in Public Economics in honor of Wallace Oates, W. A. Fischel (Ed) (working paper, book info).


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Research interests

Much of Edward's current research focuses on aspects of leadership, social learning and social influence. Specifically, it looks to model situations where economic agents are making decisions sequentially or repeatedly and can observe what other agents have done in the past. How are/should agents be influenced by what they observe others doing? and how should an agent behave if he expects others to be influenced by what he is doing?

Particular applications of interest include public good games, coordination games, and large games. Edward's preferred approach is one involving both theory and experiment. Some specific issues that are the subject of ongoing research include:

  • Who chooses to lead, and follow, and why?
  • Does leadership help to resolve coordination problems? If not, what does?
  • The optimal theory of search when agents can learn from the search of others.
  • Does signalling increase giving to public goods/charity?
  • The origins of prejudice and economic discrimination.
  • Ex-post stability and categorization in games with many players.

Current and past research grants that have helped fund this research include:

  • 'An experimental investigation of prejudice and economic discrimination', Nuffield Foundation Small Grant (2009-2011).
  • 'Why some people choose to be leaders: the emergence of leadership in groups and organizations', joint with Mark van Vugt, ESRC Small Grant (2007-2010).
  • 'Anonymous free-riding in collective action problems', joint with Mark van Vugt, British Academy Small Grant (2008-2010).
  • 'Social Learning and the Theory of Search', ESRC First Grant (2006-2007).

Edward is also a member of the University of Kent's Centre for Reasoning and The Centre for the Study of Group Processes.

Edward's RePEc page is


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Consultation hours

  • Tue 10.00-11.00
  • Wed 14.00-15.00


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PhD supervision

Current students

Former students

  • Dr Amrish Patel (now at University of Gothenburg) (personal page)


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Administrative roles

  • Director of Graduate Studies (PhD programmes)


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School of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP

Undergraduate enquiries: +44 (0) 1227 827497, Postgraduate enquiries: +44 (0) 1227 827440 or email us

Last Updated: 21/10/2014